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/ ■< Foreword . , : . '
. , This thesis is divided into two sections: Part I',
sets out the traditional views on the fundamental nature of
liberty as it is understood in Catholic doctrine, and examines 
a representative selection of Spanish commentators relevant 
to the Golden Age, including jurists, theologians and poll- 
tical scientists, to confirm their acceptance of traditional 
views; Part IX examines the manner in which these views are 
reflected in five selected literary works, and explores the 
problems presented by the doctrine as they are apparent within 
these fictions. The selected literary works are Lope de, 
Vega’s Fuenteovejuna and El Me jor Alcalde, el Key, Calderon 
de la Barca•a El Alcalde de Zalamea and La Vida ea Sueno, and 
Cervantes’ La Ilustre Fregona (with corroborative evidence ; 
from Rinconete y Cortadillo). / ,
. The aim of the thesis is not to try to delineate
or evaluate the views of Lope, Calderon and Cervantes vie a 
vis the fundamentals of the contemporary concept of liberty, 
nor have I found it necessary to thus indulge in what would 
be an almost pointless exercise. The aim is to discover what 
these artists can tell us of the difficulties created by the 
problems of liberty, and thereby to suggest the way in which
it
we ought to approach these problems if we are to understand 
liberty in, the way it was conceited by Spaniards of that 
period# By the same token, I am not purporting to show that 
the literary works mentioned are primarily concerned with 
liberty, even though three of them are explicitly involved 
with the problem; I am only maintaining that, as part of the 
imitation of life which the works present, and while 
acknowledging that invented characters do not have effective 
liberty, we can see the problems that liberty poses for real
. men. '. ■ - '■, / _ ... ' ' ’ ' ' ' ->• .
If asked to justify the choice of this topic for 
a doctoral thesis^ i.e. , as a contribution to the sum of 
human knowledge, I would submit that the meaning which the 
concept of liberty had in the mind of Golden Age Spaniards 
is not as well-known as it ought to be, considering the 
frequency with which it is mentioned in critical comments 
on the literature; some of my footnotes will attest to this.
In view of the above implication that the topic 
has relevance to a wide range of Golden Age writings, it may 
be asked why X have examined only five works in the light of 
my findings concerning the theory. One reason is that I am, 
as already Indicated, more interested in suggesting the 
proper approach to the problem than in attempting a compre­
hensive survey of all the works or authors touching on the
problem. However, the main reasons are twofold, namely, the 
complexity of the subject, and the complexity of the works ; 
studied# While Part I illustrates the difficulties of simpli* 
tying the doctrine, part II shows that its implications cannot 
easily be reduced to formulae and categories; the product of
these two factors is the considerable amount of detailed .
investigation necessary in any attempt to understand the 
concept as it appears in such difficult works as those studied 
here* To try to produce a °synthesis0 of the patterns (if 
any) to be seen in a large number of works would, obviously, 
only result in a mass of misleading information, of the like 
of which we have already seen too much, while a detailed 
study of a large number of works - clearly desirable * would 
take many years and thousands of pages# .
, The reasons for choosing these particular works
for detailed analysis are that two of them (El Mejor Alcalde, 
el Key and El Alcalde de Zalamea) treat» among their main 
themes» problems of justice and law, i.e#, problems basic to 
the notion of Christian liberty (see Part I), while the other* 
three, (ruenteovejuna, La Vida es Sueno and La Ilu a t r e Fregona) 
have been previously recognised as being explicitly involved
; e.g., Everett W. Hesse•» monumental travesty of Caldero*
nian criticism, Calderon de la Barca,°Twayne»a World Authors 
Series,0 Ho.. 30, New York, 1967.
with the concept -of liberty. This division is not meant - 
to be categorical: the two themes mentioned, justice and 
liberty, overlap considerably (as they must) in all the \ 
works studied./, ' \ .* - . . :. z
. . The reasons for choosing well-known works, about .
which much has already been said i are, in the'; first place, 
that their familiarity should enable the reader to appreciate 
the problems.1 am identifying more easily than would.be pos­
sibleif .,I were to adduce lesser-known works, whose interpre­
tation might well be a thesis in itself even before the /
question of liberty could be discussed? and, in the second 
place, that these works are not yet, I submit, bowing beneath 
the weight of too much criticism - rather is there still much
work that remains to be done on them. •, , .
. While it has not been my aim, at any time, to write
a thesis whose foundation is the, re-interpretation of familiar 
works, I have nonetheless found it necessary to add my own, 
interpretation to some aspects of the literature studied.
Such added interpretations - a major effort in the case of 
El Mejor Alcalde, el Rey - have not arisen from any. desire 
to. force the literary texts into .a mould formed by the theo* 
retical background, nor from a desire for gratuitous innova­
tion, but are the natural and inescapable results of lengthy 
and detailed examination of the works. It may be questioned
■ • ' • • ' / ’ vii • ' ■ ...: • • ■ :
whether a thesis be the place to add new material to the 
interpretation of familar works; I can only submit that such 
additional interpretation is> perhaps, the sole witness to 
the usefulness of the original analysis undertaken. If the 
fresh study, of a concept does not present, either directly 
or indirectly, a case, for modifying to some degree our view 
of relevant works, then the study can scarcely have been 
worthwhile; my own case must stand or fall on the validity 
or invalidity of my findings concerning Fuenteovejuna» La 
Vida es Sueho and La Ilustre Fregona, but, in any event, a 
literary thesis ought, I would have thought, to add to the 
sum of literary knowledge. ,
It will be noticed that the Spanish writings I have 
studied,for an insight into the theoretical background are 
taken from a period ranging from the first half of the 
sixteenth century (Francisco de Vitoria) to the middle of the 
seventeenth (Saavedra Fajardo and Andres Mendo), while the 
literature analysed ranges only from Cervantes’ Novelas 
Ejemplares to Calderon’s £1 Alcalde de Zalamea - fifty years 
at most. The reason for including a wider temporal range of
theorists is that I was concerned to demonstrate the consis­
tency of the basic beliefs under discussion, as a background 
against which to set the examination of the artists’ work.
THE CONCEPT OF CHRISTIAN LIBERT! AND ITS INTERPRETATION
/ : IN SIXTEENTH- AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURT SPAIN
. ’ • • - 2 - . •• . .'
Introduction
Part I of this thesis outlines my frame of reference 
and presents the definitions on which my main lines of 
literary enquiry will, in Part II, he based. The limitations 
of the two chapters which follow need to be stated.
To begin with, I am not going to embark on a 
comprehensive philosophical survey of the concept of liberty 
from ancient to modern times, although I have explored some 
of the terrain in my reading. The subject is vast, and, 
anyway, it has already been done, notably by the Institute 
of Philosophical Research under the direction of Mortimer 
J. Adler. Secondly, I am not going to attempt a historical 
survey of the concept in practice, a task for which I have 
no qualifications.
Chapter I presents a summary of the basic theory of 
liberty according to the Catholic doctrine relevant to 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain. "Theory", almost 
by definition, implies controversy, and of course there was
The Idea of Freedom, a Dialectical Examination of the 
Conceptions of Freedom, Mortimer J. Adler, Institute of 
Philosophical Hesearch, (New Tork, 1958), (2 vols.). This 
book offers an excellent account of the problem, in my 
judgement. Its detachment is impressive, its definitions 
are entirely satisfactory and its explanations are thorough 
and profound. I am indebted to this work for several 
references to source materials which I might otherwise 
have missed. . .
controversy about liberty in contemporary Spain p as well as 
in other;countries and at other times; however, it seems to 
me to be valid to talk about basic assumptions, since the 
controversies about free will and so on concern, not so much 
the existence and nature of liberty, but, rather, its 
mechanics and its relationships with other concepts, such ,
as Grace, pre-destination, God’s foreknowledge, astrology ; 
etcetera. Thus, for example, the arguments in Spain at the
end of the sixteenth century, when Molina and Suarez, among . 
others, were disputing Banez* development of the hypotheses 
of St* Thomas Aquinas, were concerned with how God moves the 
will, and not with the nature of the will’s liberty or with 
the meaning of perfect (i.e.?spiritual) liberty. Similarly, 
the issues concerning human liberty in the mediaeval '< 
controversies, as examined in great detail by Odon Lottin, 
do not challenge the underlying tenets of the theory. It is
p . • ‘‘ ■ . ' ' , ■'
For a brief survey of these controversies in mediaeval 
and Renaissance Spain, v. Otis H. Green, Spain and the 
Western Tradition, (Madison and: Milwaukee,’ 19^4), Vol. II, 
pp? 212-278$ for a detailed study of the sixteenth- and ; 
seventeenth-century arguments, V. Alberto Bonet, La Filosofia : 
de la Libertad en lag Controversies Teologicas del Siglo XVI
y primers mi tad del XVII, (Barcelona, 1932). :
^Psychologie et Morale auxXIIeet XlIIe Siecles, .
D. Odon Lot tin,. (Gembloux, 194-2 jl, Tome 1, ’ ’’Pro hinnies de , .
Psychologic,” pp. II-389. \
- 4 -
these basic beliefs* which do not change, that I shall attempt
to describe in brief.
Chapter II adduces some examples from Spanish 
theorists - political writers, jurists, etc. - to demonstrate 
these beliefs at work in their examinations of the body 
politic, including a few historical examples to illustrate 
the difference between official theory and official and 
unofficial practice - the purpose of that being only to show 
that the difficulties involved in the practical application
of the doctrine are not the inventions either of the artists
studied in Part II, below, or of myself.
~ 5 * ' «; \
j ’. ' . Chapter X -
basic concept of liberty according to Catholic Doctrine ..
’ ^he first'point to make quite ,clear when discussing
thevbasic assumptions is that it is quite useless to think of 
liberty in 17th century Spain, in terms of liberty as we
' conceive it in what might loosely be,, called modern western 
democracies, where the concept is primarily concerned with
■ political and social possibilities. For nueH, liberty is 
•..except- in theological terms1 * really an adjective, in that 
it is applied to various fields of human activity.which we 
select as being essential to human happiness, and which in ' 
.sum we call liberty; hence Benedetto Croce’s statement that 
’’liberty in the singular exists only in liberties in the 
plural.” 'The concept is, we might say, a basically secular 
'•concept, concerned with allowing, men the opportunity for some
^The Roman Catholic conception of liberty, for instance, 
is still based on Thomistdoctrine, V. Papal Encyclical, ”De 
Libertate Humana,” Leo XIII, dated June,20, 1888, in Acta , 
Sanctae Sedls, Studio et cura Iosephi Pennachi et Victorii 
Pinsesai, Yol. XX, Letters di Sua Santita Papa Leone XXIX, 
(Rome.1887),/PP* 593-613» for an English translation by the 
Paulist Press, V. The Church Speaks to the Modern World, ed.
?. E„. Gilson, (Garden City, N.Y., 19^), pp. 55-85. 7 .
■ History of Europe in the Mneteenth Century, (New. York,
•' 1933). pp. 12-13. ’
kind of self-realization in this life, and our institutions 
are, theoretically anyway, concerned with this kind of < ;
liberty rather than any other.The First Amendment to the «
American constitution is a good example of this, with its 
affirmation of four basic freedoms of speech, press, religion, 
and assembly,-and of course there are countless other- con­
texts in which the idea of liberty may become involved- not 
always to a very sensible effect (e.g.? the freedom of the . • ' .
motorist, of the ad-man,-of the door-to-door salesman, and 
so on). It may seem obvious that the idea of liberty.in 17th 
-century Spain has very little in common with the modern. 
approach, but I think it is worth stating, as confusion .
between the two occurs more often than one would expect, even
; . •. . . '' ' 4 ■• ■ . • " ': ‘ - ’•
- amongst serious scholars. . \ . ■
/ This is probably a highly tendentious statement, since ...
Sartre and Bergson, for example, see liberty as basically 
self-determination, while Freud and Tillich are examples of 
a concern with the Platonic?idea of liberty as self-perfection . 
in a moral sense. Nevertheless, Bentham, Hobbes, and Mill, 
among many others, are primarily concerned with liberty as , 
self-realization, and it seems fair to say that our institutions 
have up to now owed more to the latter than.to Sartre, Bergson, 
Freud and Tillich# (These analyses - but not the conclusion -
' are Adler*s, op. cit. ) • / -• '' * s ’
4 '••• . ‘V ' r "
? V. extraordinary remarks such as Erich Fromm’s; nWhat 
characterises mediaeval against modern society" is the lack of 
individual freedom. n "...mediaeval society did not deprive 
the individual of freedom, because the ’individual* did not 
yet exist." The Fear of Freedom, (London. 19^2), pp. 3^-5*
Then of course there are - or were - the Hispanic scholars who 
tend to suggest that Lope &'Co. were democrats, liberals, et. al.
• - ? - .. • •• ■- • . -
. . The Catholic view of human liberty shared by . ,
Spanish theorist© of the 16th and 1?th centuries depends on
<ah entirely different basis: it is essentially a religious , 
concept. This Catholic view is based on the Aristotelian 
conception of liberty as individual self-perfection, the 
mastery of the passions of. the soul and of the body by the 
reason. However, while Aristotle thought that true liberty 
of this nature was possible in this life, later Catholic 
theologians thought otherwise, and their analysis of liberty 
depends on certain precepts which may briefly be described 
as follOWS . . . /•' , . • .
. - The crucial distinction between man and animal is
that man possesses reason. Beasts behave the way they .do 
because their instincts demand it: they have no alternative.
; But man behaves the way he does because he chooses to, and 
his choice is a product of his reason and his will. Man’s 
ultimate end is God, and man, by nature, desires the good,
• that-is, he desires happiness; the supreme good and the 
•: supreme happiness are to be found.in God, and only in God.
The ability to choose the direction he will take towards 
happiness is what constitutes man’s natural libex'ty: that is. 
the freedom of/the will. Even though man’s reason ought to ■ 
make the right choice possible, it is not always easy to 
recognise and pursue the true good, and man ih offered the
. help of Grace so that he aay find his way; he also has the - 
guidance of law - eternal, divine, natural, and human. * to ;
' ; clarify the; right mode of behaviour in particular circumstances:
. law is reason, and obedience-to law,constitutes the essence
• of liberty/ This natural liberty * reason acting on the will 
and its choice ~ is the basic liberty, and from it derives ,
the possibility of a higher liberty, the liberty of the spirit, 
which consists in the will’s being so well-ordered that a man
. . voluntarily chooses the .greatest good *. i.e. always follows 
the moral law - because he desires only virtue and is above 
the distractions of lesser goods. In this life, it is not 
possible to attain this higher liberty completely, but man 
can aspire and move toward it. Natural liberty and spiritual 
ormoral liberty are, then, the only true aspects of freedom;
/ political liberty, the participation in the government of the ■<. 
common weal by the citizen, is of lesser importance, should , 
be subordinated to the higher liberty, and is not indispens­
able to the possession of true liberty. These premises 
require some,, amplification. ... . . . ..••••
/ Aquinas defined choice as "judgement .about what is 
to be done°,\ and as na sort of decision about what has .
' ,5"Homo non dicitur ease liber euarum actionum, sed liber 
electionis, quae est judicium de agendis." De Veritate,
Q. 24, Art. 1, Ans. 1, in Sancti Thomas Aquinatis Doctori© 
Angelici, ordinis praedicatorum, Opera Omnia,; (New York, 1949 ),
previously been deliberated.” He also makes the point, 
basing his argument on Aristotle’s definition, that ”to 
choose is to desire something for the sake of obtaining . -
\ something else ; wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the
means to the end.” Free choice is a power, which man has
■ '• - ' 3 • • ' * ’ • '
by virtue of his possession of reason and will. Men desire
Tomus IX, ’’Quaestione© Disputatae.” English translation of , . 
/this and all other quotation© from De Veritate by RobertW.
Schmidt, De Veritate, (Chicago,’1924).. • •I lean quite ,
heavilyi/oh Aquinas for my definitions and explanations, so /
.1 would like to make clear in advance, repeating the point— 
made on page J, that I am aware of the continuing conti'oversies 
about certain aspects of the problem, particularly in Spain," , •'
and that many: of Aquinas’ conclusions were disputed by Spanish ,
. theologians (among others).* However, said arguments were not 
concerned with the fundamental nature of liberty, and it io ;
the latter concept that I am describing here; Aquinas*. ,
definitions seem adequate for this purpose, not because he 
was the generally-accepted authority on all such matters, . . 
but because his basic assumptions concerning the nature (as 
opposed to the mechanics) of liberty were shared by later 
theologians, jurists, political writers,, etc. / ..
,”Ipsa electio est quasi qpiaedam scientia de praeconsiliatis, ” :
-: He Veritate, Q. 24, Art. T, Ans. f. 17. ‘ ' - "•••. - '• , • ,*
’’Eliger eau tern est appetere aliquid propter alterum .
consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem,”
Summa Theologies, ; I, Q. 8?, Art. 4, - in S. Thomae de Aquino, <
- ordihia praedicatorum, Summa Theologiae, Cura et Studio .
Institdti Studiorum FIedievalium Ottaviensls, (Ottawa, 1941). /• ; -
English translation (of this and all other quotations from, /
the Sumaia.-Theologica) taken from the translation of the work ' , ;
by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London, ?
;1938h: / V* / . . ’ -<■/.-• . • . ’• ' • .
’’Liberum arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis.
Sed in homine invenitur ratio et voluntas. Ergo et liberum . 
arbitrium.” De Veritate, Q. 24, Art. 1, To the contrary 3, ,! . .
(and elsewhere).
that which is good, and the choices a wan makes are made. 
because he believes, at the time of making the' choice, that
.. the object’of his desire, the object of his choice, will be 
good for him; cf. Aquinas: "Mari wills happiness;;of necessity, 
nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy."' In a 
man whose reason and will are properly ordered, the reason . 
governs the will and is able to direct the will according to 
the dictates of reason, so that his choice is of a higher 
good, and not deceived by the lesser goods which passion or
. ignorance might-suggest to him, < .. .< • ; '
. • / It is that power which constitutes man’s free will,
that is, his natural liberty. Although wan may choose >
between the good and the bad, ..that does not mean that man 
is properly exercising his natural liberty when he chooses 
evil, for choice is concerned with the means fitted for the, • 
• end.. Han’s end is God, men desire the good, and concerning 
that there is no choice, for choice is not concerned with 
ends, but with means. Therefore, the means chosen for
’ , .£x necessitate . beatitudinem homo vult, nec potest .
velle non .esse beatus, aut miser. " Summa Theologica, I-II,
Q« 1 3 , A • £> » ; . "l - ! - - "
10 '■ ' " - .. ;..Philosophus dicit, ...quod ’voluntas est finis,
electio autem eorum quae sunt ad.finem.’. ...finis, in 
quantum est huiusmodi, non cadit sub electiohe." ibid.,
1*11/ Q. 13, A. 3»
this end must, by definition, be good, and man properly . 
exercises his natural liberty when he chooses the good. The 
choice of evil is hot a function of liberty at all, but the 
denial, or at very least the misuse, of liberty, for the 
meaning of this liberty lies in man *s privilege of doing as 
he ought * acting according to his nature -.voluntarily, 
unlike npn*rational creatures which are not competent to 
choose and do as they ought because their instinct forces f 
them to do so.^T Hence Aquinas: "And forasmuch as man is ■ 
rational is it necessary that man have a free will." '< .
Similarly, man’s liberty also stems from the aforementioned 
end (God)? he has an immortal soul, and thus is not chained 
to any particular good on earth, so that his will is free to 
choose that which partakes of the eternal perfect good.j
\x-XThus» man’s natural liberty does not Involve man’s 
doing or choosing completely as:he likes. Aristotle’s
condemnation of ’’doing as one wants" as a false definition 5
13 • ?• ■■■'' X
of liberty and Plato’s contempt for the democratic , '
». proprie voluntatis est eligere? non autem appetitua 
sensitivi, qui solus est in brutis animelibus. Et propter 
hoc brutis ahimalibus eiectio non=convenit." Ibid., • 1*11,
Q.- 13, A. 2. ■ ':•'</ /'? J/? /-- ' X ^>yX_
: "Et pro tanto.necesse est quod homo sit liberi arbitrii,
ex hoc ipso quod rational!© est."- Ibid., I, Q. 83, A. 1. \X
,e.g., Politics, Book V, Ch. 9, translated by T. A. . 
Sinclair, (Penguin, .1962), p. 216.
- 12 -
character who "believes in liberty and equality0 and "won’t 
14listen or open his doors to the truth", .. are developed by 
Aquinas and other Christian writers for whom sin is a kind 
of coercion and a form of slavery. Choosing evil cannot be 
a function of liberty because man’s liberty depends on, his 
nature (the rational creature) and his end (God), and sin 
is contrary to the one and a turning away from the other. • 
Sin, therefore, being something outside man’s naturej and 
contrary to hi© end, is an external force on. man as he ought
to be. The man who chooses that which is evil is not
following his true nature but is being driven by that within 
him * his malice - which would pervert that nature. "Hence," 
according to Aquinas, "it belongs to the perfection of its 
liberty for the free will to be able to choose between 
opposite things, keeping the order of the end, in view; but 
it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything
by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to
15 ■sin."- Liberty, then, is liberty to choose good - almost
14Republic, Book VIII,•Section 7» translated by II. I>. P. 
Lee, (Penguin, 1963), p* 334.
15 ‘ .
"Unde quod liberum arbitrium diversa eligere possit .
eervato ordine finis, hoc pertinet ad. perfeetionem-liber-
tatis eius; sed quod eligat aliquid divertendo ab ordine
finis, quod est peccare, hoc pertinet ad defectum libertatis.
Summa Theologica, I, Q. 62, Art. 8, Reply Obj. 3«
the adjectival sense of liberty mentioned in connection with 
modern liberty, except that liberty must hete; this -predicate 
of hthe good" to mean. anything-'.&t ■all# To .demonstrate, that 
it makea- no sense to talk of "freedom to sin," -St* • Augustine
dx*aws the analogy, of a slave in.bondage -"who .does with '
pleasure the will of his motors’!. • he way want to do?an he-
•is cowmanded, but that does not iaa&e him any..the less a slave,
" "" '?g ' ’
and 'the'.slavery of sin • holds men similarly .in bondage«... As - 
a;conclusive,argument against liberty *a including the .. •' 
freedom to sin, man’s liberty cannot be greater than God’s, 
and God cannot sin, so the choice of evil cannot be a function 
of liberty; cf# Aquinas: "Among rational creatures only God .. 
has a free choice naturally impeccable and confirmed in
/ ; "Libcraliter enim oervit, qui sui do®ini voluhtatem .
libenter fecit#\ Ac per hoc..pcccandum liber cst, nui peccati 
eervus ost. Unde ad juste faciendum liber non erit, nisi 
a peccato liberatus esh.e juatitiae pooeperit eervua. Ipsa - . 
eat vara libertas propter recti fact! laetitlam/.#•# quomodo. 
quisquam do libero arbitrio in bono gloriatur opera, qui 
nondum .est liber, ad opo.randum .bene ,Enchiridion, ~ '
Gup. XXX, in Petrologies Curaus ComVlotus, ' Serie s' L>Atinat . 
©d. 4-.T, ,MiB;n©,, <Farie, 18^,. Vol4? XI, .p.; 24?..,. English . 
translation by J# F. Shaw, in'' Basis Writings of It. Augustine, 
;ed # Whitney J. antes, .-.(New York, 1^48) ♦' I am 'aware" of the ' 
possible dangers of using Augustine a© an authority, inherent 
,in..hl's particular historical -context 'and .his. later Jre.trnotionB,* 
but the Enchiridion, written only nine years’before his. \ 
death, is described by Whitney J. Oates as "the most complete 
short statement of ‘Auguhtiniaii Christianity" (op* , cit., ?
Introduction, pi-vxxviiil.' '
' •• 'V:. " '• ■ ... “ ’M * . •? - ' . -l ' - . ' '' , .
■' - : 17 ’ ■ ■ - ' ’ ’■ ’’ '/
Goo$,” and ’’There is a greater liberty of will in the
angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can
, ; „18 , ■' ' :
. ? /aia/’ ’ . .. _ . ‘ : • •' •; ' ■■
That brings us to the ultimate goal and consequence 
of the' proper use of natural liberty, which is spiritual 
liberty, sometimes termed moral liberty, Spiritual\liberty 
is the condition of the will which invariably chooses that 
which is, or which pertains to, the.greatest good; it is the 
condition of voluntarily applying the precepts of the moral- 
law to one’s own '.choice:- and action, not because of the ..
'restraint of law, nor for fear of the sanctions of law, but 
because of a complete desire for virtue. Absolute spiritual 
liberty, is the absolute inability to choose evil, the condir 
tion of making the moral law one’s own law, of virtue as a 
habit in all.'.things. Aquinas puts it like this: ’’Since man, 
by his natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is 
.contrary to natural reason, it follows that .freedom from sin 
is true freedom which is united to the servitude of justice ,
? ’’Inter naturae, rationales-solus Bens habet liberum . 
arbitrium naturaliter iapeccabile et confirmatum in bono”.
Be Veritate, -Qi 2*f, A. 7, Kopiy. ' , • , ■
' '• • 18'* • ' > • ‘ ■' • •
maior libertas arbitrii est in angelis, qui 
peccare non possunt, quam in nobis, qui peccare possumus.” 
Surama Theologica, I, Q. 62, A. 8, Keply Obj. ; ;
' since..they both incline man tor that which .is becoming to.
:him«n The=crux of this whole concept is that virtue, must , ./
be a“ willing .morality: ; mere* obedience to law is not enough ■; 
for;moral liberty which'consists in a. will* so well-ordered
, that’to sin is inconceivable,. . ; ’’ " . •' ■ - ■ ■ ..
Such.true freedom cannot be completely attained in-.
this life, for one reason, .'because man is flesh as well as
■ .spiritand the flesh always bears the.possibility, of sinj •
• V for another reason,;, because; ^Complete. freedom transcends .
conflict, power, and temporal process, for, in the'peace of 
. the soul at rest in union with God, freedom is identical- .
' with perfection achieved and is no longer the power to achieve
.. ’’Veruntamen, quia homo .secundum naturalern rationem ad 
; . iustitiam inclinatur, peccatum autem est contra naturalem
. . .rationem, consequens est quod libertas a peccato sit vera -
, libertas, quae coniungitur servituti iustitiae,.quia per 
; utrumque. tendit homo in id quod est conveniens sibi.H
J Sumea; Theo logics, I ir* IIQ > 183, A. A» .
sUffifi3a C o n t r a G e n t i 1 e s,'. 1V 22, in Opera Omnia, Tombs. V, ,
; English translation (of•this and ail other quotations from . '
Gumma Contra Gentilesj taken from the,translation of the work 
by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London, ,•
' ■ 1938). The cited chapter, which explains the concept at .. .
length, makes the analogy with friendship (HGimilit.er autem 
et amicitiae proprium est consentire amico in his quae vult”),
. . maintaining that-.^Spiritus autem.functus sic nos ad agendum
inclinat. ut nos yoluntarie agere faciat, inquantum nos arsa- 
tores Dei constituit,1/ . and .concluding that nCu& igitur Gpiritus 
Sanctue per amorem yoluntatem inclinet in verum bonum, in quod
. naturaliter ordinatur, tollit etservitutem qua (homo) servus 
passionis et peccati effectus, contra ordinem voluntatem agit, 
et servitutem qua contra motum suae voluntatis secundum legem
'• j \ agit, quasi legis servus, non amicus.n ’
• ■ «• • 21 ■ / ’ * ; • ' ‘ • ■ •' •/ it,” as Adler describes it, and the infinite liberty of *• ’
/ union with God is obviously not a condition we can experience
on earth for very long. We can, however, move towards it, ; 
and the more, virtuous our habits are, the closer, we come to
. true moral liberty; but its distance from us is stated clearly
. by Aquinas; . -v. . ... • . - ; .•
' To have the judgement of reason unobstructable
; surpasses;the state of.this life for two reasons; .
/ primarily and principally because,it is impossible 
J for reason in this life here below to be always in
the act of correct contemplation so that the reason . .. . 
for everything we do is God; secondly, because the
: lower powers do not happen to be so subject to . <
^reason in this life that the act of reason is in no
; wise obstructed by them, except in the case of our
. Lord, Jesus Christ, who was at the same time on the .
>ay to God and in possession of Him. * -
By the Grace proper to this life, however, 
a man can be so attached to good that he cannot sin
t : except with great difficulty because his lower :
; powers are held in check by the infused virtues, ,
. his will is more firmly inclined to God, and his 
? reason is made perfect,in the contemplation of the 5 —
. divine truth with a continuousnees that comes from ^2
. the fervour oflove and withdraw© the man from sin.11
< • . 21 The Idea of freedom, VoX. 1, p. 280. . ? ,
"Tamen non posse intercipi judicium rationis, excedit 
statum viae, propter duo. Primo et principaliter, quia / 
rationem esse semper in actu rectae contemplationis in statu 
viae, ita quod omniumoperum ratio sit Deus, est impossibile.
; Secundo, quia in statu viae non contingit inferiores vires 
ita ration! essesubditas, ut actus rationis nullatenus 
propter eas impediatur, nisi in Domino Jesu Christo, qui 
simul viator et comprehensor fuit. Sed tnmen per gratiam 
viae ita potest homo bono astringi quod non nisi valde de
,, Human liberty thus consists in man’s reason and end,
in his power to choose the highest good. Unfortunately,
, man’s greatest problem is to know what is the right judgement, 
what is the right choice, how to distinguish the real from 
the apparent good in particular circumstances. .Man is able
, to choose the good which.is proportioned to human nature -•
; i.el-, mundane things such as where to build a house, when to ; 
5 take an.umbrella, and so on - but, to distinguish and choose
. the good which is above human nature, man needs, and receives ,
the assistance of Grace; without Grace, ’’free choice is
incapable of the kind of good which is above human nature.”
The complete reconciliation of Grace with free will is a
mystery, and a discussion of the arguments is unnecessary
here. For the purposes of this examination, suffice it to .
say that the gift of Grace does not remove all obstacles to
man’s grasp of the true good: it merely helps him to try to
overcome them. However^ there is a less mysterious (in the
difficili peccare possit, per hoc quod ex virtutibus infua&s , 
pinferiores vires refrenantur, et voluntasin Deum fortius
inclinatur, et ratio perficitur in contemplations veritatis 
divinae, cujus continuatio; ex fervore amoris proveniens 
hominem retrahit a peccato.” De Veritate, Q. 24, A. 9, Reply.
. - ’’Ad hoc ergo bonum quod est super naturam humanam, con- • ? .
stat liberum arbitrium non;posse sine gratia;” .Aquinas, Pe 
Veritate, ^.24, Art. 14, Haply, This is one of the problems 
mentioned, earlier (p. 3) about which arguments have raged, : 
and. in which Aquinas* conclusions have been attacked as much 
as those of other thinkers.
theological sense), more easily identifiable aid to man’s 
liberty, and that aid is the guidance of law.
■ ; One of the important conclusions of Adler’s intensive
Sstudy of liberty is the following? \ \
, f . In the chapters dealing with the different .
: .forms taken by certain of the freedoms we have
• . identified, we have found that law - positive
.. , . law, moral law, physical law * is a pivotal term
in the discussion. ... The fact that law is 
.< intimately connected with liberty becomes Intel­
ligible in the light of our generic understanding . ;
of freedom. If some tension between self and other . ,
.. is involved in any conception of freedom,* then law
“ . . plays one role when it represents a power alien to
the self, and another when the self is able to 
: make,.,the law somehow its own or an expression of
its power. In the first role, law is an obstacle 
to freedom; in the second, it is a source of 2k 
freedom, or even part'of its substance.
As Adler duly goes onto note, these statements beg some 
questions, so that^ for example, ’’-the relation of law to /
liberty is differently conceived according as the type of 
law in question is thought to be purely an>expression of 
reason, purely an arbitrary or wilful imposition, or a mix* 
turn of the rational and the arbitrary,” and so on. But 
the quotation as it stands serves the purpose of this essay 
by emphasising the fundamental importance of law in relation... . ; 
to most conceptions of.human liberty? without law, human
The Idea of Freedom, Vol. 1,< p. 6l7„ . .
^The Idea of Freedom, Vol. 1, p. 618.
liberty- whether.individual or collective — becomes merely 
license or anarchy; and the "eec.ond role" Adler refers.to 
is the one which is directly relevant to the Catholic , .
liberty.I am describing here, in which the relationship 
between law and liberty requires close examination., .
.< ? As is well known, the foundations of the mediaeval
world-picture are set in the force of law, law which among. 
Spanish jurists is divided into the four Thomist divisions 
of eternal law, divine law, natural law, and human-law. *
The theoretical aim of the jurists and theologians is to 
deduce and understand the correspondences between these . .*
various levels of law, and thus to make sense of the function 
of human law, which is supposed to reflect and represent 
natural and divine law - and therefore eternal law - by 
guiding the political and individual order in the directions 
which natural and divine law would appear to dictate. Law,
> above all, is.supposed to embody the precepts of reason,
. reason which separates man from the beasts and endows him
■ • - ' • ■ • ' ■ - • • ,* ,
* with his natural liberty; justice, as Aquinas says, is a
\ ”♦... * virtus humana est quae bonum reddit actum humanum,
et ipsum hominea bonum facit. Quod quidem convenit iustitiae. 
. ..cum iustitia operation©® humanas rectificet/. manifeetum 
est quod opus hominis bonum reddit." Summa Theologica, II-II, 
Q. 58,. A.?. ' ' V, ■ ;■ / ■ ' ••••.; - '••• 5
virtue, which makes a man' and.his acts good; Kor most men, 
then, law is necessary to order the reason to guide the will 
in the direction of choosing the good. Law is a guide to . ? 
man’s actions in that it rewards good and punishes evil; 
man’s reason, by observing divine and natural law, is able 
to discover right and wrong, and to create his own human law 
to direct human society towards.the good. Natural law is 
the eternal law planted in rational creatures, inclining .
them to their right action and end as individuals, i.e., to
. their ultimate happiness, their perfection as human persons, 
and their fellowship with man and God, while human law, • ,
drawing on the principles of natural law, is supposed to do < 
the same for societies, governing the well-being ofthe /
people and the community. Human law, therefore, to the: 
extent to which it is concerned with right and wrong, thus 
depends on the higher powers, for men do not decide what is 
right and wrong, they, deduce it, via reason, from natural 
law and divine law,ewhich are the segments of eternal law , 
revealed to man# Human law.should thus be a reflection of, 
or rather, derived from, the.principles of eternal law as ; 
far as they are known; ideally, then, human law should .
encourage good and deter evil. It is from that.premise that 
the logical conclusion that human law - just human law - ia
•/ -• 21 - . ■ - • ..... •
' ■ ■ ■ .. ■ ■ - . ' ' ■ • ? 27 • ’ ' •-■ "
binding in conscience is diawn by Aquinas, for one, and by 
Spanish jurists such ad Suarez^snd Vitoria. Human law
cannot, however, ban evil and command good overnight,, and ,
■ . 30 'the attempt to do so would,-as Aquinas observed, cause ■ ..
• more evil than it could hope to eradicate, for virtue is a
habit, and is learned gradually,-, rather than enforced ;sud* 
denly; human law only directs' men in the path of virtue, , 
without actually forcing saintliness upon them. .
Given that true human liberty is the voluntary 
obedience to moral lawand supposing that human law does
leges huiusmodi onera proportionabiliter inferentes 
7 iustae sunt, et obligent in foro conscientiae, et sunt?leges
legales." Ibid., I-II, Q. 96, A. 4. -
P. D. Francisco Suarez Granatenei, e Societate lean, ,
^ractatus De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in decern libros die-*
tributus, (Antwerp1613), v. Liber III, Caput XXI, " Ptrum
lex civilis possit subditos obligate in conscientiae foro,*’ 
and Caput XXII, HUtrum omnis lex humana, seu civilis obliget 
in conscientia, aut possit esse vera lex sine tali obligations.
' . "Principum leges et conetitutiones ita obligant, ut 
transgreeores in foro conscientiae culpae rei sint.M\ \
^alecciones Teologioas del Maestro. Fray Francisco de Vitoria,
Edicion critics, con facsimil de codices y edicione s pr in-
cipes, variantes, version castellans, notas e introduccion 
por el P. Maestro Fray Luis G. Alonso-Getinoi 3 vols. , 
(Madrid, 1934), Tomo II, De Potestate Civill, para.!15,
•Tertia Conclueio, p.,195. ;
30 ' ’ •- " ■ ' ■ ", "DIcendum quod lex humana intendit homines inducere ad
virtutem, non subito, sed gradatim. Et ideo-non statim <
multitudini imperfectorum imponit ea quae sunt iam virtuoe- ' 
orurn, ut scilicet ab omnibus malis abstineant. Alioquin , 
imperfect! huiusmodi praecepta\ferre non,valentes in , , 
deteriora mala prorumpe runt ... h Gumma Theologies, I-’II, .
Q. 96, A. 2, Reply Obj. 2. , . ’ . , \ \
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reflect the eternal law, it follows that man’s natural 
liberty coincides with, and his moral liberty consists in, 
his obedience to human law. Law, we must bear in mind, is 
reason, and reason is the. source of man's freedom because it
allows him to choose the good; so human law makes the con­
clusions, of human reason known/to ordinary men, thereby •-
• guiding' them toward the free choice of the good. Thus, as 
Leo XXII’s encyclical puts it,/’’In man’s free will ... lies 
the very> root of the necessity of lawVh . man is free when 
he acts according to the dictates of reason, and reason 
enshrined in law helps him to do so. The nature of human 
..liberty thus involves obedience to the eternal law, the law 
of God, which commands good and forbids evil; this authority 
of God protects and perfects human liberty, the supreme end 
of which.is God himself: man’s subjection toGod is no denial 
of liberty, because man is by nature subject to; God, and the 
free choice.of thegood is necessarily a function of that < , 
relationship. Kan’s highest duty,-then, is: to respect 
authority and submit to just law, for the just law is, by
. ’’Iamyero haec ordin&tio rationis lex nominatur. Quam- 
obrem cur homini lex necessaria sit, indpso eius libero 
arbitrio, scilicet in hoc, nostrae-ut voluntates a recta 
rationis nediscrepent, primaeet causes, tamquam in radice,
',/ quaerenda. n ”Le Libertate Humana, ” para. 6. Acta Sanctae 
Sedis, Vol. XX, p. 597, English translation from The Church 
Speaks to the Modern World, p. 61.
. '--a - >• '
definition, in accord with the Christian moral law of the 
Gospel, which brings man nearer God and therefore makes him v
. more free; obedience to just law by the membersof the com* - 
. munity should also;effect their protection from evil men. .
‘ / '.The essential point,; then, isr that freedom must
follow.reason and the moral law. . It is an individual respon-
„ sibility, not a responsibility of the state. Except when the 
distinction between natural and moral liberty needs to be 
made, it is hot liberty in the adjectival sense which always 
demands a predicate, for its predicate is implicit in its 
nature: liberty is the power to choose good, or the habit of-_ 
choosing good. Liberty, after all, is, the opposite of 
slavery, and the worst kind of slavery is sin, for it is 
slavery according to eternal and divine law, whereas other
>kinds of slavery are the ordinations of lesser forms of law. , \ 
/“ ; /Since, ideally, the delineation of political or
social liberties is unimportant if the laws of the state are
just, and since, -ideally, man’s possession of natural liberty 
and the possibility of his moral liberty are assured irres-
' pective of the condition of human law (because the use. of
the one and the aspiration toward 
dual’s own responsibilities), the 
liberty for its own sake (i.e. as
the other are the indivi-
idea of political or social 
part of the well-being of
the members of the community) does not, among Spanish
.^theorists at least, assume great importance. .. Obviously,
- human law-- if just - assists'what we call liberty, in the 
t2Qth century,, just as our laws do when they protect liberties 
which we define in constitutions ^written or unwritten), but 
.although one could:examine Spanish codes and deduce their
equivalent of constitutional liberties, it would be anachro­
nistic,’ misleading, and unhelpful, because Spanish theorists , 
just did not .think of liberties in that fashion*. They did 
discuss liberty with regard to certain fields of political
■ behaviour,; as- 1 hope to show in due course,' but at this 
juncture it is more useful merely to clarify the theoretical 
context within which political liberty was discussed.- • ' •
: .. Aquinas1 idea of political liberty followed
. Aristotle; political liberty entails the participation . ; 
by citizens in their own government, that is, their having 
a share in the^ making of their own laws/ . Aristotle had
■ said that this liberty was confined to only certain members 
of the, state, as a privilege of status, but while Aquinas 
does not state clearly where he stands with regard to
‘ ; nSi enim sit libera multitude, quae possit sibi legem
facere ,-. plus;est consensus totius multitudinis ad aliquid 
'obseryandum quod consuetude manifestat, quam auctoritas
/ principle, qui non habet poteetatem condendi legem, nisi 
inquantum gerit personam multitudinis.11 Summa Theologica, 
I-II, Q. 97, A. 3, Keply J- . •, <. • ■ ..
the first
liberty, .The 7 
because men;can
how absolute their ruler.
true liberty does not,’
structure for its existence
eligibility, many Spanish theorists ~ Suarez, for instance;- ; 
do not even discuss that kind of liberty in 
place - .not, that is, in terms of political 
importance of political liberty is limited,
be free without it if they obey the law willingly/ Laws 
should represent the will of the people (although it is not '"-YsY 
clear which people are thus represented), and the people •*. ; . ■ <■
may change laws, but even if these condition© do not apply, • f; 
men may still be free, no matter
' Nevertheless, although
depend on the political or legal
since these circumstances neither affirm nor prevent human .
liberty, the circumstances can assist men in the use of ; ','.7;
liberty by allowing action. Moral liberty is possible \ ?
within a tyranny, but external circumstances can certainly .
help men to exercise their natural liberty and a spire toward . 
moral liberty# Human law is mainly concerned with the com­
mon good, and the more areas there are of private decision,-; Y " 
the greater opportunity man has to exercise his;natural 
liberty.< However, this freedom of action must still. be
»cf. ibid., Supplement, Q. 4?, A. 6, which affirms?a ; ; \
man’s freedom, to choose his own wife, for' example.'. rv
• subordinate to the moral law: men’s private acts must still
be for the good* The point is, though,<that man*s real ' - 
freedom lies in hi© choice rather than in hi© action;-he \
1 may will a.thing but be prevented, and lie may not will a , 4 ..
• •thing.wh i ch'he i © forced to .pro©e cutes e ither way, \ i f h i s, .. . k
choice i© directed towards;the good, hi© natural and moral ;
; liberty are not threatened.- ' • . , , ” . . -
' • In sum,, freedom must .mean compliance with moral , >
law, lie. reason,, and it is not the right to choose evil.
Human law should embody the moral law, and the man who, with • 
the help of Grace, voluntarily behaves according to human 
just law, is the man who is free. Where the spirit of the ' ; 
Lord is, there is liberty,’* (2 Cor. 2:1?), and only bad men , 
feel that good laws are coercion, ■ Natural liberty is in .
' ' 34 '• • ‘ ; • • - . • . ; '‘ „■ ,
hAdprirnum ergo dieendum, quod in opera hominis duo est .' 
'invenire: scilicet electioriem operum, et haec semper in
: ; ho minis potestate‘ .consist! t; et operum gostionem sive execu-' :- 
? tionem, et haec non semper in potestate hominis potestate
est; sed divina providentia ,gub'ex;nant.e", propositum ho minis , .
ad finem quandoque perducitur, quandoque vero non.? Ktk ideo 1 :. 
homo non , dicitur e© ce iiher e.ua rum act! onum, s aa 1 iber \ '
electioni©,. quae ;.est judicium de agehdis. Et hoc ipsum .
. - -nomen liberi-arbitrii - demonstrat.’/ De Veritate t Q, 24, ,
. A.kl, Ans. 1.: . /’ ' 4 ;■ .
• *'' 35 •• ;• - v.: >. k
H... homines virtuosi et iueti non subduntur legi, sed ?. 
soli mali.” Summa' Theolo gica, I-IX, Q. 06, A.5; nServiliter 
an tern (homo^. agit si, tali voluntate manente, propter * \ k 
timorem legi© in contrarium positae ahstinet ab eo quod vult.”. 
Summa Contra Gentiles, IV-22. ■ \ k ; !
the choice, the possibility of which derives from the 
intellect and the gift of reason - that isfree will; 
spiritual or moral liberty is*the habit of using that free 
will to direct the self toward the good in all things, but , 
is incomplete in this life because man is a creature of the 
flesh as well as the spirit * the ultimate liberty is union 
with God, sharing, becoming identical with, God’s law, love,
. and'liberty• Political liberty * Consisting in the partici­
pation by certain citizens in the process of making just 
laws, is of lesser,moment, and a man may be free even while 
possessing no political liberty at all# ; \
\ : All this is relatively straightforward in theory,
but there are many complications in practice, as the 
theorists know, perhaps the most serious difficulty of all 
lies in the imperfections of man’s faculties and powers.
Free choice is a combination of reason and wills but human
reason may easily be deceived, and the will may make a wrong 
choice * the whole problem of human knowledge and under- ■
? standing, and the necessity of prudence, is involved. Law, 
as has been said, is supposedly the application of reason 
to human circumstances, and liberty is therefore meant to be 
consistent with obedience to human law; but, as Aquinas pointe 
out, much depends on the state of the law, and a human law 
is a just law only when it is directed towards the Common
-s • ’ : 28 * •' . ... ■ ■- '/ .
good, and -meets.certain other requirements* What to do about 
an; unjust law? Aquinas says an unjust law is contrary to 
God’s-law and should be disobeyed, but who decides whether 
or not a law is unjust? When should it be disobeyed? How? 
The complex and voluminous writings of Spanish jurists bear 
witness to the endless.difficulties involved in the interpre­
tation of eternal, divine, and natural law, and in the 
devising of human laws to reflect these interpretations; but 
in addition, there are endless difficulties involved in the 
contingent application of all kinds-of law - from eternal to 
human - in real-life situations*. Language itself is a bar 
to the desired harmony, as the efforts of Spanish jurists to 
arrive at some kind of linguistic precision demonstrate;
and so on* It is these difficulties which are seen to arise
in literature, when artists force us to see the limitations 
of our intellectual constructs, as I want to show later*
But before that, some examples of Spanish versions of the
doctrine are in order ♦ ~ ' .<•- ' \ • •
< ”♦..leges,possunt esse iniustae per contrarietatem ad
bonum divinum, .... et tales leges nullo mod© licet observare. 
Summa Theologies, x l-'II, Q* 96, A. 4. •' , ? ;-
<.??e*g*, Suarez, De • Legibus, Liber XXI, Cap. XV; Liber III, 
Cap. XXVI; Liber V, Cap*. VI: Liber VI, Cap. I; et al.
-;v/ ■ ‘ ; • *’ 29 - *. ■ •"; '
’ ■ _ -, - / ' Chapter XI . , ■ . ' • ' ' '' ' •
The Doctrine as it appears in Spanish theory of the
XVIth and XVIIth-eenturieg ■ '• •/.
, ; An oft-repeated definition of liberty amongst Spanish
jurists and political writers is that supplied by the Corpus 
Juris Civilis Romanis: ’’Libertas est naturalis facultas eius,
quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quod vi, aut jure probibe-
1 ' • '? ? . ' ‘ . ••
tur.” Alfonso el Sabio’s Siete Partidas translates this as:
’’Libertad es poderio que ha todo ome naturalmente de fa:ser 
lo< que quisiere, solo que fuerca,o'*derecho de ley* o de \ 
fuero,non gelo embargue.” The liberty referred to here is 
the liberty of non-slavery in terms of civil law - in the 
introductory paragraph of the titulo, under the heading 
”De la libertad,” it is explained that ”Onde pues que el 
titulo ante deste, fablamos de la servidumbre,, queremos aqui 
desir, de la libertad. E mostrar que cosa es, e quien la 
puede, dar , e a quien, <•» (etc. j*1 But by the sixteenth 
century there are extensions to that definition. For example,
Digestorum, Bk« 1, Tit. para* 4.
. Las Siete Partidas del sabio Rey don Alonso, (Salamanca, 
1576), Partida IV, titulo 22, ley 1». J 1-V , \
;Vazquez de Menchaca bases his discussion on liberty on the 
definition from the Pigestorum, which he quotes; but, just 
as there are other kinds of law apart from civil law, so. 
there are other kinds of slavery apart from civil slavery, 
and, as Menchaca states elsewhere, man was created free by 
nature, but can be enslaved in four .different ways, viz., 
a) by ius divinum, nquasi supernaturaliter homines sorvi 
poenae efficiuntur per peccatum; ” bh by ius naturals,
< Sic ip so rum hominum quidam hebetlores quasi natura serviunt
prudentioribus a quibus reguntur*1 the Aristotelian basis •
; / • . • - < • ' '• ■ '■ . ' ■of natural slavery; e) by ius gentium, as a prisoner of 
war, and d) by ius civile - a free man may sell himself 
into slavery. Obviously, the most important of these
.D. Fernando Vazquez de Menchaca, Controversies Funda­
mental* a, (first published 1®>6M, la tin text with Castilian 
translation by Fidel Hodrxguez Alcalde, 4 vole., (Valladolid, 
1951),liber 1, Cape XVII, para 4.
4 •' " • '£ ’ . .7 •ibid., Cap. IX,.. para. 2.
.ibid,, Cap. IX, para. 3. In ibid., Cap. X, para. 12, 
Menchaca says of this theory of natural slavery: nSed veritas 
(mihi credite) mera est istorum doctrinam meram esse tyran- 
nidem bohl consilii’• fc amicitiae tegmine intrusam in certam 
human! generis internetioriem ac miseriam, ... (etc.),n and 
observes that Aquinas inclined towards this Aristotelian
. doctrine.
ibid•, Cap..IX, paras♦ 4*9•
7ibid., Cap. IX, paras. 10-1?.
classifications are the first two, which concern the lack of
* the natural and moral liberty .previously described, and ' ■*
other Spanish writers, logically, discuss the-problem in 
.the same term's. " • \ \ „• . ■' ' t
, • The important aspect of-the Homan-based definition
is the-exceptions stated: ^nisi; si quid-tvi, aut jure, 
prohibetur.” How can force be reconciled with liberty? 
Menchaca explains: nsi dum donare aut venders rem meam> 
vellem princeps tyrannus prohibuxt non ideo minus ©ius . 
dominium dicor habere;11 on the higher levels of liberty, 
that is the same principle as the Thcmist assertion that, ;
.. even if a man wills to do right but is prevented, or wills 
not to do wrong but is forced.tor his liberty is still 
intact, in his choice. The significance of the other condi­
tion, °aut jure,’1 is obvious: true liberty consists in 
obedience to law- whether moral, natural, or human just law; ; 
it; is Cicero’s dictum 11 legem servi sumus ut liberi esse.-’ . 
poesimus11 made applicable to all "levels of existence. It -
. is this servitude to justice which affirms the "good” pre* 
dicated to jinn’s free choice and aspirations to virtue, and 
it is implicit in the innumerable statements on liberty by 
Spanish theorists. Juan de Madariaga exemplifies the
&ibid.Cap. XVII,'para. 6,
~ $2 *
approach and the detail: •
Liber est, dize Aristotelee,;•qui est sui !
ipsuis causa*,.. ♦, vivir conforme nos lo dicta • >’.
nuestrabuena razon clara ydespasionada, eso ; :
es vivir con libertad# Puescomo las justas .
v leyess'ean conformes a la razon natural, o '
sobrenatural: y el hombre no pueda hazer cosa
? mas,conforme a su naturaleza racional, que\ , 
regirse por raxon; por esto, no solo, no es
- 1 servidumbre,.sino libertad muy libre, vivir
segun las leyes que la buena razon humana o •<. 
divina tiene estabiecidas.... be donde;infiero, .
- que eon aucho mas litres los que viven con las
. ■'•;ieyes de la Perficion Evangelica,’• que los que 
viven como quieren.; ?/. . ■
To do as one likes, Madariaga concludes, is ’’vivir como 
bestia, y claro esta que la bestia no es libre, aunque ella; 
se lo pxense.” - . - ; _ * . y
‘ The basic conditions of human liberty are outlined 
in Madariaga’s statement: our liberty consists in our reason, 
which tells us how to live as we ought according to our 
nature; we therefore are free when we live according to the 
laws which stem from divine and human reason, and not when 
we live according to our animal (i.e. irrational) desires.
This principle of obedience to moral law, and to law which 
is moral, as the touchstone of liberty, is a principle that 
is reiterated'by other theorists whenever they touch on the
Fray Juan de Madariaga, Del Senado y de su Principe, 
(Valencia, 1617), Cap. M,; pp. 477-$.. ’ . ..
10ibid., p. 4?8.
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concept of liberty, as the following examples illustrate* 
Caetillo’ de Bovadiila, a legal expert, expresses
the theme in several ways: "Segun San Geronimo, para con,;
Dios aquella sola es la libertad, no servir a los pecados;0 >• 
nse r subditos del unico y supremo Senor ... e'e’: supreme Y ; -
libertad;n nSegun Boecio, sums libertad es obedecera la ?
’/'■ 13- ■
justici&i U Padre Rivadeneyra quo tea:the same pa esage from
■■ ’ 7 ‘' ’ ' . . ''' ■'.. • .. ■; 7': ? ; ' ' ■ ■ ■
St. Jerome as Bovadiila quotes, to make the same point , ,•
while Padre Juan de Torres entitles one chapter of his ; /
Philosophia Moral, /’Quan preciosa sea la libertad, la qual 
pierden los hombreefsujetandose a los yicios.; Furio / 
Ceriol,; discussing the freedom of the ruler to reward whom \ 
he pleasedefines t he liberty o f the ruler: 40tro dira que 
el Principe es libre, i ha de dar los ofields a quien bien 
le paresciere; Respondo: que :la libertad del Principe noY
^Castillo de Bovadiila, Politics Para Corregidores»
(first published 1597)v (Amberes,. 1750), Libro I, Cap. 4, ,
para.-' 33'.,? ;■ , YY, ? >'??' ‘ <. ; ' / ? >Y'Y-7 'YY-y"-
Ibid.4 Libro II, Cap. 16, para. 12. ?'5vY ’’
Y; J^ibid., Libro III, Cap. 1, para. 2.,/Y-
<14 X'.-' ':Y. Y-;-.- ’•••-•/ ?Y'Y Y-<-YY Y'7
; : Pedro de Rivadeneyra, Tratado de la Religion y yirtudes 
que deve tener el Principe Christiano, (Madrid, 1595)» Yy;/"?"- 
.Libro’ II, >Cap., 7, p... 311 • ■ <’v Y ;YY YYY ' ■ .’ / YY.
- El Padr e Juan de Tox-res,? Philosophia Moral de ■ Principes, 
para su buena criancaYy govierno, (Burgos, 1596) j Libro XVI,
.Cap* <1 /..A ' ■' I....... . :
lo es, quando va fuera razon, 'porque entonces abuse i servi- 
dumbre se liama: entonces es; libre, quando usa de buana razon, 
porquede otra man era es tirano. - Martir Hizo is as clear
as Madariaga: HCrio Dios al hombre con tan libre potestad 
sobre sus acciones, qua obra de tai suerte, que puestos todos 
loa requisitospara la.ejecucion, pue.de obrar- y dejar de 
obrar >... esta potested en el hombre se extiende solo a una 
o a otra obra buena moral,; que no exceda los limites del fin 
natural del hombre, y esto se prueba porque el entendimiento 
humanoconoce lo que es honesto y decente y lo que se conforms 
con las leyes de la razon •..” v reason is always greater < 
than sin, and Hla virtud se prefiere a todas las cosas; \ . 
con ella se guards y. se conserva la libertad, salud, Vida, 
hacienda y patria, ny •• - . •. '-/?•. \
;* ./ • A Saavedra Fa jardo, while expr eesing -1 he -‘same: . /
principle, is one writer who also mentions one of the ... \
problems involved, Discussing the necessity for the,Prince ’ 
to inspire fear as well as love in his subjects, he points
A;- i6•• ' • ? ' ; ‘ A .
; :1 'Fadrique Furio Ceriol, El Concejo y Consejeros del
Principe, (first published 1559), ed. D. Sevilla Andres, /.A- .
( Valencia, 1952), p. 171* \ ; ; ?
'<j ^Martir Hizo, Norte de Prlncipes, (first published. 1626), 
edA Jose Antonio Maravall, (Madrid, 19^5), Cap. VIII, p, 44.
; \ ' s";' 'A ' fA.
Ibid., ’Cap. VIII, para, 4, p. 46. ’ a A . , ■ ;
^^Ibid., Cap; XII, para. 3, p. 6?.
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out that ’’naturalmente se a ma la libertad, y la parte de 
animal que esta en el hombre es inobediente a la razon, y 
solaments se corrige con el temor,” It is, however, 
necessary that the Prince ’’mantenga dentro de los limites 
de la razon la potestad de su dignidad, el grado de la 
nobleza y la libertad del pueblo’’^ - men may fall for 
false liberties, and the Prince must dissuade them therefrom 
while at the same time protecting their true liberty*
Ideally, men should not be coerced by fear, but Fajardo is ; 
a political writer trying to make theory and practice 
compatible, The important aspect is the emphasis on 
reason, the basic premise of natural liberty, which Vazquez 
de Menchaca sums up as well as anyone: ’’Quod si dixeris, 
ergo tunc [i.e,, on account of God•s ability to change the 
order of things arbitrarily! non foret nobis liberum 
arbitrium, respondeo, quod non desineret fore liberum, nam
Saavedra Fajardo, Idea de un Principe Politico Christiano, 
(first published 1640), (Valencia, 165^), Kmpresa^MXVIIIj ..
. para, 5* \ '• •• ' ‘ *\ ' ■ ' .
^^ibid., Kmpresa XLI, para, 7*
Fajardo was"one of many writers more concerned with . 
political expediency than with absolute morality, and often 
has to defend a position which he knows is not strictly 
ethical, An excellent account of this is given by Monroe ■
2, Hafter, in Grecian and-Perfeetion, (Cambridge, Mass*, 1966), 
v. Chapters I-1II in particular* : ;
-• - ; • • ' 36---7 \ , •'
ideo homo rations praeditus est, ut natives inclinationes 
& appetitus valeat superare, & rationis vi frenare, subigere 
& calcitrare.”, This was, in fact, one of the roots of 
the great sixteenth-century controversy concerning the • -7 .
: Amex'ican’ Indians: whether’ or not they should be legally <-• 
enslaved dependedj in part, on whether or not It. could be 
proved that they were possessed of reason; of course,;It 
also depended on whether one accepted the premise of. natural 
slavery in the first place-(cf. footnote $, supra). ,
.. In the above statements, the ideas of both natural
liberty (possession of reason) and moral liberty (withdrawal 
from sin) are stated* It should be noted that;the perfection 
of God’s freedom is also referred to in the course of certain 
disputes , byi : for instance, Vazquez de Menchaca: ’’ipse [Oodj. 
nihil mali facere potest, quia &?«i sit omnipotens, tamen 
maium facere posse, potencia non,est: sed potius infirmitas 
non valentis abstinere a, malo.” The problem Menchaca is 
analysing is ’’Dispensare an possit Deus cum praeceptis • 
decalogi?” and similar arguments explored by, e.g.j Suarez • f
' 23 ‘'' : . , ' .
• Controversies Fundamental©s, Liber 2, Cap. XXV11, para.13«
• ;?./—ibid., Cap.. XXVII, para'i 2< „ - - ;'' ■■ ’ . .
" 25 ' • ; ' ' " ' ’ ’ ■ • •' ' ,’ • De Legibus, v.e.g., Liber XI, Cap. VI; "An lex naturalis . 
sit ;vere lex divina preeceptxvaVh in particular paras. 10-15.
and Vitoria, contain, implicitly or explicitly, the .
• affirmation of God’s inability to do evil, i.e., of his
- perfect liberty♦ , y •
That men experience great difficulty in discovering 
. the proper use of their liberty, and eyen in understanding •
the differences between true and false liberty, has alrea dy 
been suggested:,.the problem involves the whole context of 
man’s search forprudence within a. complex universe where 
he may easily deceive himself*. Everybody wants liberty.
We know it is desirable: it is the opposite of slavery, it
’ '- suggests the absence of restraint, and, to the undiacrimi- 
nating, it suggests,tas Aristotle had observed, doing 
exactly as one likes. That much is self-evident., and were 
the situation otherwise we would not need civil laws, . ' , 
Fajardo recognises the difficulties when he Writes: f’Ks la 
malicia como la luz,.que por. cualquier resquicio penetra,
■ y es tai huestra inclinacion a la libertad, y tan ciega
huestra ambicion, que no ay pretexts que mire a uriadalias,
* * z. * < • r* - > ' -' - * * ,' ” + 27a quien/no demos credito, dexandonos enganar del.” He
26 ' - ■ * *>• ’ . . - -
* - - De Homicldio, para* 4: nDeus an naturas rerum immutare
potuerit, vel ab initioialias facere, quam nunc sunt,” and 
pax^a. 5: nDeus quod naturae, rerum mutare non possit -ab ,?* 
authors probari videtur," Helecciones, Tomo III, p. 25* •
-Idea de un Principe Politico Christiano, Empress 
LXXV1X1, para. 1. : «. " ' • ' y - .
■ — ; /•'■' •. -.?8 . ■ ' < •
; ..proceeds to describe the way in which some people use thia 
human weakness as a means to their own ends: hAfectan la 
libertad por ganar el aplauso del pueblo,contra el M'agis- 
trade, y perturbar la Pepublica, reduciondola despues a ;•
la servidumbre. Buela el pueblo ciegamente al recl&rao 
de libertad, y no la oonoce, hast a que la ha perdido, y se
' ha Ila en las redes de -.la-servidumbre/1 and he cites the 
prince of Orange and the Low. Countries as an example.-, .
The Aragonese disturbances ai'ising/out. of the flight and
z/imprisonment of Antonio’Perez.,‘ Secretary to Philip' II, 
serve, as an example of the same kind of thing closer to ; 
home/(,v. Appendix. I). ' ♦ . }‘
■ ' ; , /-‘As is obvious, then, men are inclined to pursue
what Tacitus called ’’licentia quaia*stulti libertatem 
vocant,M and to say that- that is obvious is to say that it
. is a real and, within the Spanish*Catholic context, universal 
problem; it is, as has been said, the root of the necessity 
of law. That, and other human weaknesses, are recognised -
: by most political and moralist writers, although they hold 
differing views about which safeguards were most useful; 
some/ 1ike Quevedo.in Politics, de Dios y gobier.no .fle Cristo,
/ibid., para. £>»
/ demand adherence to virtue, while others are more concerned 
with the political than with the moral value of an action.
For those who took this latter attitude to relative extremes, 
particularly . the s commentators on Tacitus,. "questions of good \ 
or bad were not relevant; the effectiveness or ineffective*
nesg of its [political science*sj principles was of chief
• ' 30 • ' ’ ’ ‘ - ;■concern.” . - . ' • \ ' . ./•
, The guidance of law is supposed to help counter the
particular human deficiencies concerned with libertyr.but, as 
indicated in the preceding*chapter, it also introduces: further 
problems. The sine qua nihil relevance of law is made clear < v. 
by most writers ~ Kiao expresses it in exemplary fashion: ”La 
monarquia real y legitima es aquella donde los subditos obede-, 
cen las leyes del monarca, y el moharca las leyes naturales, 
dejando a los subditos la libertad’natural y la propiedad de 
sus bienes.” In this ideal situationj wherein human law accu* 
rately interprets and applies natural law, man’s liberty is in­
deed assured via obedience to human law, and it is thus logical 
to accept Aquinas* conclusion that just law is binding-,in- , •
conscience. Hence Suarez: "Dicendum^ vero est, legem humanam :
Hafter, Graeian and Perfection , p. ?. . ; ;
30Hafter, ibid., p. 12. ' H ./• ;
. ^Norte de Prlncipee, Ob. II, para. 2, p. ,22. ;. ‘ ■
civiiew habere vim, & efficaciam dbligandi in conscientia," 
hi© ground© being, principally, that ’’legislator civilie 
ferfc leges ut minister Dei per potestatem ab ipgo acceptam,” 
’’jus dirinum, et naturals die tat, servanda© esse juntas 
leges a legitimie principibus positas,” and that ”haeo 
potestaa eat necessaria ad oonvenientem gubernationem 
reipublicae humanae*”^ Vitoria takes the same position, 
and on sxmxlar grounds*
there are several difficulties inherent,in the . 
application of these conditions, and perhaps the most dif­
ficult problems concern the unjust law. ’’Lex iniusta non .... 
eat lex” is an oft-invokedAugustinian axiom: Suarez 
adduces it as an exception to the argument that ihe people 
must accept the laws they are given, r and Vitoria concludes 
that ”Ego pro certo habeo, quod omnes leges injustae, etiam 
Papae, non obligant in Toro conscientiae;that is all
LeKlbUB, Liber III, Cap. XXI, para. 5. ,
•^ibid., para. 6. ■ .
Ibid*, para* 7* ..." . .
^ibid., para. 8, . . ' ; . .
36 ■ - • -' ' • ■V. Chapter I, footnote 29,supra. ;
37P. Legibue, Liber III, Cap. XIX, para. 11.
Potestate Papae *t Concilii, Prop, XVII, para. 18, 
kelecclonest Tomo II, v
very well, but what is an unjust law? , Vitoria reiterates the 
Thomist definition: a law is unjust when it fails to her; ; 
’’primum potestas in ferente; deinde finis,5 scilicet, propter 
bonum commune; postremo forma, ut scilicet, secundum sequali- 
tatem proportionis imponat subditis leges onerosas. "59 But
that only begs the question; who decides the character of . 
these aspects? Furthermore, bothSuarez and Vitoria < con­
clude that tyrants should be obeyed, because a tyrannical 
order is better than no order at all; it is true, of course, 
that the necessity to obey a tyrant’s law does not mean that 
that law is binding in co nsc i enc e, but/ the distinction would 
seem fine enough to be irrelevant in practice, while, anyway, 
it has been sa id that unjust laws should not even be obeyed: 
we should obey God rather than man, etc. The most telling 
indication of the difficulty surrounding the whole concept ?. 
is provided by Suarez, in one of his reasons for accepting
39 Ibid., p. 266
’’Minus enim malum est, sic gubernari J^i.e.by a tyrant,J 
quam oamino non gubernari.” De legibus, Liber III, Cap, X, 
para. 8, . . '■ • /'•' <•.;; A ?'A.,'_ / / - _ ‘.
"Certe videtur, quod leges quae sunt convenientes A *-•; 
Reipublicae, obligent, etiam si ferantur a tyranno, non 5 / 
quidem quia a tyranno latae, sed ex consensu Reipublicae, 
cum sanctius sit ut serventur leges a tyranno latae,quam 
quod nullae servantur;” Releccionea, Tomo,II, De Potestate 
Civlli, para. 25♦ p. 208. Aaa a Av..
tyranny, namely, that if the refusal to, comply with the 
demands of a tyrannical regime were considered licit, 
^’quilibet subditue vellet superiorem suum judicare, & conae- 
quenter illi, obedientiam negare, quod absurdissimum est”. 
Herein lies what seems to be a universal problem of human 
society, for it bears within it the possibility of the . 
society’s collapse (which^involves further arguments about 
the degree to which such an event can sometimes be desirable, 
if at all); the importance of law testifies to the serious­
ness of the problem, end I shall be referring to it when 
discussing some of the literary aspects in later chapters.
At this point, it seems .useful to recall that, 
while the theorists agree that obedience to just law is the 
guarantee of liberty, they do not suggest that there should 
be no areas of private decision; Suarez agrees with Aquinas 
that it is impractical to command good and prohibit vice in 
civil law; There are many realms of human activity where 
the subject is entitled to choose a thing without the 
guidance or coercion of the law, and, as has been said, 
external circumstances have a bearing, in practice, on man’s
Pe Leglbus, Liber III,;Cap. X, para. 10. f ■
'•»*43:' . ? • , •" s
’’leges civiles non posse ferri de omnibus actibus 
omnium & singularum virtutum,” ibid., Liber III, Cap. XII, 
para. 11; .’’non potest lex civilis prohibere omnia vitia 
contraomnes virtutes,” ibid., para. 12, *
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liberty.. Official acknowledgement of that is evident in the 
endless succession of Royal letters Patent which the Spanish 
Crown sent to the colonists throughout the four centuries 
of Spanish rule in the New World? the interest:of- these 
documents is that they were intended to stop the enslavement 
of the Indians and to afford them the same basic rights 
that Castilian subjects enjoyed, Their gist,therefore* 
tells us what it meant not to be slave, i,e., what some of : , 
those areas were in which a man could freely choose his 
pourse of actions he must be allowed to own property, to 
marry and have a family, to find sufficient food and rest, 
to be able to live without danger to life and limb, and’to 
find his chance of spiritual salvation? such were the main 
activities in which the state said that the subject should 
exercise his own judgement and responsibility (v. Appendix 
II). As is well-known, the practice,, in Indian affairs, 
did not even begin to match the theory. Perhaps more , 
important in a discussion of the concept of liberty is another 
reference to the arguments concerning the nature of the 
Indians, for the disputes concerned, not the principles of 
a free man’s private responsibilities, but whether or not 
the Indians should even be considered free men? these dis­
putes have been analysed by a number of authors - suffice 
it to recall here that the case against;the Indians was that
they should not She treated as<free men because'they did not 
possess sufficient natural reason (in that they reportedly 
indulged in sodomy, cannibalism, human, sacrifice, and other 
activities denoting an irrational nature), while the case > 
for the Indians was based necessarily - on the grounds that 
their sins were sins' of ignorance which could be eradicated • 
by demonstrations of reason. ' ■ . ' \ '
■■■ As regards that aspect of .liberty.;which* in Chapter 
I, I referred to as "political" liberty * some-Spanish ; V . 
theorists were less.happy to accept the doctrinal conclu-; • 
sions in toto, and were more concerned with citizens’ . . •<
participation in government than-was deemed necessary by 
doctrine. This political participation - if it may. be thus 
described * is expressed in terms of'the subject’s liberty 
to advise and criticise the monarch, and the monarch’s duty 
to, seek this counsel. Hence, for instance, Kivadeneyra,. '. 
saying that one difference between a King and a tyrant ie
that the King "se huelga de ser/avisatdo con liber tad y aun
■ ■ ■. ■ . ■ . , ■ ’ - ■' *■ • ’ •' ■ 44. ' ■■ • •'
reprendido con modestia cuando ha errado," whilst the 
three necessary qualities of any "buen consejero" must be ; 
"grande experiencia, mucha caridad, y libertad en el-decir,"
Tratado de. la Religion, Libro II, Cap. 9» P» 321.
: *?Ibid., Cap25, p. M9.
for, as he says in the following* chapter, clever thoughts 
are useless if they are never expressed; furthermore, ,Hes 
muy importante e.et’e libertad en el buen consejero, por^ue 
es rara y se h&lla yen ,pocoen -said reticence, whether < 
inspired by fear, or love, being not at all useful. Host, 
writers from expediency or otherwise - are careful to 
point out that.the freedom to advise in no way implies lack 
of restraint, or exemption from law. Madariaga, for example; 
”Ee la libertad el nervio de la vida del consejo y la que - 
haze a los hombres generosos ...H but the law may recommend 
restraint at certain times, nY ningun hombre politico ha de 
tener por servidumbre, este no poder hablar, siendole prohi- 
bido por la ley; . antes goza entonces de mayor libertadn 
because such a prohibition, explains Madariaga, is doubtless 
designed to protect us from our ambition, avarice, etc; , 
in other words, a political liberty must always be sub­
servient to the requirements of natural and moral liberty. 
Mendo writes;«”«'.. deje (the Prince) decir a sus Ministros 
su parecer con libertad, y sin miedo ... Pero de tai suerte
se ha de decir la verdad a los Reyes, que no les exaspere , 
el modo;-..hablar con mucha libertad, no es aconsejar,
Ibid., Cap. 26, p. ^23. ‘ \
rPel Senado y de su Principe, Cap. 30, p. 362.
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>8sino ofender,n and Fajardo implies the same discipline
nDecir verdades mas para descubrir el mal gobierno, que 
para que se enmien.de, es una libertad que parece advert!-
miento, y es murouracion; parcce celo, yes ma lie la.. Por 
.. . fan male la jusgo -como a la lisonja, porque si en esta ae
halla el feo delito de la servidumbre, en aquella una falsa 
especie de la libertad.** ' . :
’ . . But, withal, liberty in the body politic - as J
distinct from within the individual - is primarily a matter
of subjection to just rule which is also stable. For 
Vitoria, nQudd non est minor libertas in regall principatu, 
quam in Aristocratico et Democratico. Quia cum eadem sit J
; potestas, ut supra probaturn est, sive in uno, sive in pluri- 
. bus, sit, et tahtum uni melius sit subjici quam pluribus
(tot enim sunt domini quot sunt superiores); ergo non est 
minor libertas ubi omnes uni sunt subditi, quam pluribus,
, ...*’< and, for Fajardo, ”no consiste la libertad en buscar
esta, o aquella forma de govierno, sino en la conservacion
P. Andres Mendo, Principe Perfeeto, y Ministros Ajus- 
tados. Documentos Politicos y Morales, (SalamShca, 16^6), 
doc. _69, paras. 9" 11 • : . ' • - ■
. . ^Idea de un Principe Politico Christiano, Kmp. XIVIII,
<para.. "l4." 7 - 1 • ... .
- 50 • ' • -■•’ 7 ; •' •"" ■'1 ’ '* Helecciones, Tomo XI, De Potestate Civill,?para 11, 
1st Concl., 1st Corollary, p. 190i / ■ -
de ©quel que const!fcuyo el largo uso, y aprovo la experiencia 
en • quien se-guard© justicia y se conserve la quietud publics, 
supuesto que .se ha de obedecer a un mode de dominie, porque.. . 
nuncu padece mas la libertad, que on tales mudahpae.An
' aphorism.-of Alamos <y Barrientos, one. of. the Tacitus commen­
tators, posit© three conditions for assessing the liberty 
in a republic:. ' ’ ( - •' •. -
\ . La primera, quando no ay enella poderio que •
- ' ©obrepuje, o iguale las leyes, sine que por alias . -
solo se deter&inan igualmen.te -to das las diferencias 
de los ciudadanos sin aceptacion de personas. I.a 
segunda, quando los Kagistrados del; govierno; y
\ . justicia, no sirven ni agradanalpoderio .de uh
particular con afrenta suya, teniundo por merced .­
baser su gusto, oomo a medio de su acrecentamiento,
, sino que proceden .conform© a la verdad, y guard&ndo
' ■ , ^la. dignidad, y entereasa devlda ja su oficio. La’
tercera, quando la mis ma Hepublica no esta opriaida 
del senorio de un particular; sino quo todos los 
ciudadanos poaseen por igual la libertad, y tienen
. igual esperanssa de mercedes,\y oficios por virtudes, .. 
y merecimientoo. X procediendose al contrarid en 
estos tr.s capltulos, oa certiasima senal'de lo que 
ee va assentando en ell© la tirania;8'^ *
the target of the writer’s strictures seems obvious enough.
. An indispensable corollary of all that is that the
King must himself behove and legislate according, to the pre­
cepts of divine and natural law, ns is made clear by every ; .
• 51 - ' ■ " ...• op. cit,, K»p* •LXXVXXX, para. 5. •
■ . ./^Alamos <y Barrientos, Tooito Es panel, llustrado...con' .
Aforismoo, (Madrid, 161A), Xforisao A 112, p. 206. .....
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writer on the subject that I have read* As Suarez puts it, 
it is God who gives laws, man’s role being only to transmit 
them, so the Prince must be subject to them; -if laws are 
just laws, they bind in conscience, so the Prince commits 
a sin if he breaks them, just as do his subjects. -
’’Political” liberty is not of great1 importance as
a part of the fundamental concept of liberty described in 
. the foregoing, and the failings of the Spanish monarchy in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and of its adminis­
trators, need no comment from me. However, it is worth
adducing a few historical examples to suggest the difference 
between the theory and the practice of that aspect of 
liberty. First, one or two contemporary comments on the 
problem of liberty of counsel are appropriate. - • ■' .
■ . ’ ■ Jn 16O'?, the Venetian Ambassador to Spain, Simon -
Contareni, reports as follows: • .
. < In quanto al Consiglio, che la seconds parte '
dell’ultimo punto, diro che vie un Consiglio
5?Be Legibus, Liber Ill. Cap. ioqtV, ''ntr«m legislator suia 
legibus obligetur,” v.e.g. para. 26: ’’posse legisiatorem 
sua lege obligari, quia fert legem ut minister Dei, cuius 
auctoritas in ilia obligations intervenit.” . > * t
■ The ci’iterion of obedience to just law as a basis of ; '
political as well as of.natural liberty perhaps goes some, 
way to explain the problem posed by libertad de concienciaj 
and the consequent Spanish opposition to it (v. Appendix III).:
;> nella. Spagna il: quale come supremo dovrebbe 
• •'/- /. commandars su,tutto, ma non ^libero che di -
solo/nome, e dirb all* EE. VV. che non havvi 
'; nella Spagna alcun uomo che ardisca dire
liberamente la sua opinione e.aoito^meno se .in 
qualche cosa& contraria alia volunt& del duca
- di Lerma; e por averlo fatto solamenteuna volta
1’arcivescovo di Toledo, ch*era il maestro di 
scuola del re, cadde en' disgrazia e Kodrigo , .
Vasques che era il presidents di Caetiglia fu .
■ - messo in questo pesto, e suo padre uomo eminen- 
tiseimo; fu toIto dall1 impiego e scacciato 
dalla-corte sicch& poco dopo mori; ed un altro
• che era'- Inquisitore generale per il medesimo 
. motive cadde nella steesa disgrazia.?5 ,
Ab a foreigner, Contareni might have any number of reasons 
for criticising unfairly, but the Spanish commentator 
Cabrera mentions some,of these cases in his Relaciones,’ and 
sees them in a similar light. For example, he has this to 
say with .regard to the case of Kodrigo Vasques: HTodos han 
tenido por riguroso termino el que se ha usado con el, 
porque era muy bien quisto y gobernaba con satisfaccion;
... no pa"race bastante culpa [viz., certain advice he had
' offered Philip Xlj para lo que se ha hecho con el., pues 
debia de aconsejar lo que le parecla que convenxa."2
Relazioni degli stati europei lette al Senate dagli 
-ambasciatori veneti nel secolo decimosettimo, r a c c o 11 e e d 
annotate da Nicol6 Baroszi e Qugllelmo-Berchet, Serie . 1,
Spagna, (Venice, 1856),Vol. 1, p. 325..
-■ ~R^Xncion dated 19th June, 1$00, in Relaciones de las
Sucedidas, principalmente en la Corte, 1599~l6l4, ■
D. Luis Cabrera de Cordoba, criado y cronista del Key B. 
Felipe 2°, (Madrid, 1857).
... “.;...' In such casesi. political intrigue was more
influential than political theory, and a proper analysis' 
of the events is best left to historians. Adverse criti­
cism of official policies certainly did not.always lead to 
reprisal: Furio Ceriol’s Remedios of 1575 was viiry criti­
cal of Philip Il’s policies in the low Countries, .saying 
that punishment should;be administered with justice and 
mercy, and that it was therefore wrong to punish the inno­
cent nine-tenths of Flanders for the crimes of one tenth: /
the obvious solution was to pardon them and withdraw. - v. 
But that was in the reign of Philip II, and Furio Ceriol 
seems to have enjoyed long-standing royal favour. The 
atmosphere apparently changed almost as soon as the Marquis, 
of Denia (Duke of Lerma) took the reins: as early as 1599, .
Inigo.ifcanez was imprisoned, tortured and condemned to 
death (thesentence being later commuted to imprisonment),
Remedios, included in £i Concejo y Consejeros del 
Principe, ed. cit. To my knowledge, the Remedios never 
incurreddisfavour, although two other works by Ceriol? .
were prohibited by the Council of Trent, namely, Rhetoricorum 
Libri III a nd Bononia^ slve de libris sacris convertendis 
in vernaculam linguam libri II, the condemnation being 
concerned with their approval of said translation. \ ,
^Charles V afforded Ceriol special protection, while / 
Philip II employed him until his death in 1592,■ / For an ; 
explanation of the faction struggles with which the Remedios 
was associated, v. J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1A69-17lb, 
(Pelican, ’ 1970), pp.258: f f7 ■, ...... ............. ........... ....
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for distributing a pamphlet; ostensibly approving t he current
administration, but attacking the previous King. .
, In the field of political liberty (in the sense of
liberty of counsel), the difference between theory and ,;t \ =
practice is plain.to see: in spite of,the fairly straight* , ; 
forward theories propounded by those writing on the subject,i 
the practice was quite another story. Such inconsistency< 
is, of course, only one aspect of the vast problems atten­
dant upon the attempt to make practice match theory through* 
out the gamut of human affairs> Recent research continues.
to show that Golden Age Spain was no different from most :
civilised societj.es in having to struggle with the difficul*
ties inherent in the maintenance of law and order and the
government of a,nation. As Julio Caro Baroja concludes, ; 
nothing is simple and formularised about historical
Inigo Ibanez, who was secretary to Philip III and ,, 
Lerma, was heavily punished for his pamphlet “El confueo e - 
ignoran te gobiernod el Hey passado,” which may hav e be en 
intended as, or taken as, a disguised attack on Lerma; his 
accomplices, however, were freed after one month’s arrest.:
V, Cabrera, Relaciones dated 4th February, 1600; 23rd 
September, 16OO; 4th October, l6O3| 2nd February, 1605?
14th May, 1605; and 31st August, 1610, on Ibanez’ death. ,
Such as, e.g., Albert A. Sicroff, Les Controverses des 
Statute de “purete de aang” en Espagne du XV au XVII<
slide, (Paris, 1960), and Julio Caro Baroja, La Sociedad
Criptojudia en la Corte de Felipe IV, (Madrid, 19^3) •
.. situations.; we find pressures working'/ag&inst pressures,
• and the idea of a monolithic, disciplined Spanish society
•of the sixteenth and 'seventeenth centuries is utterly 
. misleading; the nature of that society was "mucho. mas /• ?
.= fluida y contradictoria do lo quo croon sus apologistas 
.0 sus censores.” ■ . ' . / * . • • ' ; , •
' , ' To close this chapter on the,Spanish theorists’ ’
conception of liberty, X would point out that most of the
‘ quotations I'have used.for demonstration are, 'in their; con-' 
texts, in the nature .of passing remarks, and do not form 
part of any great controversy or dispute concerning the
. nature of liberty. That is a. reflection of the fact .that 
• the ideas I have outlined were indeed basic assumptions,'
commonly accepted. There were problems associated with 
these assumptions, certainly, and they were faced and
: argued, but the fundamental nature of liberty seems to ; • 
have remained undisputed in the period under examination.
. ; . As a final example, to illustrate that, 1 would like to 
quote part of the defence of Fray Sanchez de las Brasses 
(ElBrocense) to charges brought against him by the Inqui­
sition, in 1600. Fray Sanchez had asked for an audience, 
and the official record reads as follows (my underlinings);
-op. cit», pp. 125*8. ,.• /• ■
Dijo: que el ha pedido audiencia como tiene dicho 
para decir que ie han dicho que en SalaiEftnce dicen 
que este ha dicho que niega el libre albedrio,' y ‘ .
qu© lo que pasa es que an el libro que esteha 
eompuepto.de la retorxca niega haber for tuna/, y
,-v ; en el/capitulo que en el dicho libro hace de las - 
causes naturales e luego de lasrhumanas dice entre
/ otras cosas que lo que hade acontescer a un bombre 
es neceearip, y que’de?aqux toman ocasxon de esta 
necesidad que pone en ello, a decir que niega el
• •/ : libre albedrio; y declarandose mas dice' que no hay
1 fortuna/sine .'\hado, • y que en este ’hado’ es en . 
quien pone necesidad, y esta palabra * hado; llama *. .
, este providencia de-Dios, y que una cooa es el 
libro albedrio para no,ir los hombrea tras del .
. pecado y otra cosa.-es estar sujetos a lo que les 
/ha de acontescer que es el ’hado,f y aei son dife- 
... rentes libre albedrio y hado, y que negar; el libre //.//
/ albedrio es cosa de herejes y este no se mete en 
/ - 'eSO«bS- . / > \ /"//-•'/ , ;/•
Fray S&nches is affirming his belief in natural liberty, and’ 
the orthodoxy of that belief is clearly stated... ' .
/ It can be seen, then,/that, for Spaniards of the 
Golden Age, liberty is primarily a fuhctiod of reason and / 
will, that it is a libex'ty to choose the good, that it. thereby 
entails voluntary obedience to just law, and that, in a state
/ of perfection,, it is the spiritual liberty which few men, 
xf any, ever achieve.
’’proceso original que la Inquisiciqn de Valladolid hiaso 
al maestro Fray Sanches.de lasBroaas, llamado vulgarmente , 
el Brocense,” in Coleccion de Documentos Inedxtoe para la
Historia de Kspaha, Vol. II, (Madrid, 19^3), p.’125*
•///*A common usage of: the term itself, libertad, refers to 
exemptions from law enjoyed by those who had a political or
.. . legal right to them,. a< historical matter which 1 need not ,
.... . Afterword to Part I ■ ' ■ •
Of the foregoing, most is already known; it needed
, to be stated in order to focus attention on the main issues 
of this thesis, I have taken the risk of quoting from a ; 
mixed collection of writers * political commentators, jurists, 
theologians, moralists - while remaining aware, as far as 
I have been able, that they are trying to examine different 
things for different reasons, and that even within these 
groups they take different stands on issues ~e,g.,’amongst 
the jurists, Dominicans differ with Jesuits; amongst theolo­
gians, the pro-Aristotelians argue with the anti-Aristotelians 
over the status of the Indians; amongst political writers, 
some (like Fajardo) are prepared to compromise moral standards 
if political realities so require, whilst others (like 
Quevedo) are not; and soon, In all these various approaches 
to theory, however, the nature of liberty is one of the 
assumptions which - as far as I can see - is in no wise 
disputed. ' . /
and should not examine. Heally, that kind of liberty is ; ;
associated with human liberty in name only - It means, after 
all, exemption from law -as is perhaps shown by its having 
several synonyms (e»g«, franqueza,■fuero, exencion, privi- 
legio), while libertad in the fundamental philosophical sense 
has none, Libertad as exemption seems to derive from the 
Homan legal usage of libertas, concerning property rights 
(v. Justinian's Digests, VIII-6-18)..
X have given a disproportionate amount of attention 
to the matter,of political liberty * because the disparity 
between the theory and the practice can be shown historically 
and it seems worth showing how a fairly straightforward;? . 
theory can become distorted and irrelevant in life* The 
real, import ant forms of liber ty are rat her,more complex and 
are characterised by more difficult problems, which are’ 
virtually impossible to identify in action historically. ? 
Those problems can, however, be shown artistically, and the 
main purpose of this thesis is to.demonstrate how they may 
use fully be discussed in literary contexts• ; ? ’ r- ‘
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' Chapter I
Lope de Vega»sFUENTEOVEJUNA
Fuenteovejuna is concerned with, among other things, 
the problem of tyranny, The association of liberty with
; tyranny has already been shown in Fart. 1 of this thesis, and 
can be further demonstrated by a brief examination of the 
concept of tyranny, which, in many sixteenth- and seventeenth- 
century Spanish writings, involves the denial of liberty.
The concept of tyranny involves us in two problemsr 
one is to define precisely what constitutes tyranny, the other
• is to decide (and agree) as to what action, if any, tyrannised 
citizens may take to ameliorate their situation..
Naturally, Spanish political philosophers, trying 
to decide when a ruler was not a king, but a tyrant, sought 
to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the latter - often 
by way of a comparison with the former. Juan de Mariana, \ 
for example, asserts that a king is good to everyone, protects 
property and life and does not enslave his subjects, whereas 
a tyrant always relies on force and deceit, persecutes and 
cripples his subjects, stops all activities "libero homine
dignas exercere,5’ and so on. Hivadeneyra employs a similar?
argument; ME1 verdadero rey esta aujeto a las leyes de Dios
y de la naturaleza; el tirano no tiene otra ley que su.
voluntad . el uno tiene gran reepeto ala honrade las
mujeree honestas, el otro triunfa de la honestidad dellas;
el uno se huelga de ser avisado con libertad y aun reprendido
con modestia cuando ha errado, el otro ningunacosa m&s
aborrece que hombre grave, libre y virtuoso .*."etc. ;
Martir Kizo, observing that "La Monarquiatiranica es aquella
donde el Sehor, deepreciando las leyes naturalss, usa dela
libertad de los subditoscomo de bus esclavos,"^ describes
the same classic.distinction between king and tyrant: "el \
rey se conforms con las leyes de 1© naturaleza, y el- tirano
las huella y desprecia." Dictionary definitions offer a
suitably concise reflection of contemporary thought on the
subject - the 1611 edition of Covarrubias* dictionary, for
example, informs us, under the heading Tirano, that
Bate noinbre, cerca de los antiguos se tomaba
en buena parte, y significaba tanto como
aenor, Key, y monarca, el qual tenia potestad < .
plena sobre los subditos: ... Despues se vino
1D. Rage, at R.gis Inetitutlone, Libri III, (Moguntlae, 
1605), Uber I,. Cap. V, p. 50.
^Tratado de la Religion, Libro II, Cap. 9, PP- 520*1. 
^Xorte de Principes, ed. cit., Cap. IV, p. 27.
*Ibid., p. 28.
. a reduzir a que tan solament.e signlficasse al que ’.
. . , por fuerza, o mana, sin razon, y sin derecho se
'■.. apoderasse;del dominio, e imperio de lbs Heynos
/ y tfepublicaa: y de aqui llamamos tirano eomunmente
. a qualquiera que con violehcia,. sin razon ni 
justicia se sale con hazer su voluntad. Llamamos 
a los mercaderes tiranoe, quando nos venden la , 
cosa por precio subido. Tirania, y tyranizar, y
/.estar uno tyranizado, os avasallado, y sugeto a 
: , la rigurosa voluntad deotro;..”
Piccionario de Autoridadee gives, under the heading 
Tyrano: ”1. Senor que gobierna sin justiciar y a medida de
su voluntad” and under Tjrania: ”1. Gobierno a la voluntad ; 
del senor sin justicia ni regia ... 3, Translaticamente se
llama qualquier afecto, que de tai modo se apodera de la -t 
voluntad, que parece que la yiolenta eu libertad.’*
- The significant common denominator in all these- 
definitions is the tyrant’s contempt for law and justice, his 
power being.exercised ’’sin razon,” ”sin derecho” or ”sin 
justicia.” If moral and natural liberty consist in and depend 
on obedience to just law, the threat to liberty that tyranny 
represents is plain.
. • Definitions of the terms became increasingly ,
; important in the political arguments of the late Middle Ages
and sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as men vzrestled with 
- the problem that C. H. Mcllwain describes as being comprised
of the opposition of two beliefs: on the one hand, ’’let every ., 
soul be subject to the higher powers,” and, on the other,
. ■ \ •. ■ .5 .... ■■ ■ , - . . ,
MWr must obey God rather than man.n That problem involves 
us in the second difficulty mentioned above, namely, deciding
.. what to do about tyranny when satisfied that one was faced .
‘ with it. . . '_•••'■• - ’ • ;
\ vAmongst European thinkers, conclusions on the 
matter covered every shade of opinion, from uncritical 
obedience, critical obedience and attempts to reform, to
/ disobedience and tyrannicide. Spanish theorists reached 
similarly diverse conclusions - Suarez, for instance, recom­
mended the acceptance of tyranny, simply to avoid worse 
circumstances, such a© anarchy, while, at the other extreme, 
Vazquez de Menchaca condoned the killing of tyrants. Others 
were more circumspect and correspondingly more equivocal; 
Mariana, for instance, postulated certain conditions for the 
legitimate killing of a tyrant: he had to be a usurper, or
^The Growth of Political Thought in the West, (London, 
1932), P, J69. .■
^For surveys, examinations and analyses of these theories 
see Mcllwain, op. cit.;; G. fi., Sabine, A History of Political 
Theory, (London* 1.951)» Michael B. Foster (Vol. IF-and W. T. 
Jones (Vol. II), Masters of Political Thought, (London, 1961).
.' ?"minus aialum eefc, p.r ilium {tyrannum] gub.rnari, quasi 
omnino carere juste coactione, et directions ...n De Legibus, 
Book III, Chapter Xi para. 9. ?
• ' ‘i R ' f' • . . • - . - \ • * -
• nTyrennorum occisio inculpate est,n Controversies 
Fundementaleg, Lib. I,sCap._ VIII, para 41 (title).
extremely lawless, or sacrilegious, he had to be given prior 
warning that his subjects were dissatisfied, the result
should not prove to be a worse situation, etc, Needless to
-•' ; „•! ■' ,. . ‘ A' /'• ’’ '• * ' : ' '• ' •; 10
sayy.no one theorist was able.to resolve the problem completely5 /■
why that should be so is something Lope is able to demonstrate,
. and by studying his treatment of the problem in Fuenteovejuna , 
we can see reflected/perehnial jjroblems of liberty. •
. , In Act III of Fuenteovejuna, the gathering of the ' ••. '
mob and the subsequent murder of the Comendado'r take place 
amid shouts of n 1 Mueran los tiranosP’ and at this stage of the *
play no-one in the audience is likely to argue the point of ■
/ De keg a, Cap*, VI, HAn tyrannum opprimere fae sit«,f. .. /
\ In hie Recherches sur le theme paysan dane la «comedia# au 
teaps de Lope de'VegaV (Bcrdeauxt 196$), Nog! Salomon has \ y 
this to says HEn principe, le droit de la revolts contre le 
tyran etait reconnu par I*ideologie feodale et monarcho- <
seigneuriale. Saint Thomas d’Aquin le reconnatt expreesement. .
Ft plus U*un juriete du eiecle d’or a developpe la theorie /•'•' 
de ce droits, notamment Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez . -;y-
etJuan de Mariana. /Meis ;en pratique, comme nous.le verrona,
, la revolte de fait dee sujetcy ou dea vaasaux,• ne recevait ; ;
pas la consecration que lui concedalt la theorie.H(py 856,:
, fa. 25)'Couched in such:, vague terms, that' summary/.could . . y. 
mean anything or nothing; but, if we are to infer that Vitoria, s
a Suarez and Mariana were among those who conceded ”la constcra- \ 
tion que lui concedsit la theorie,” the statement is, in my . 
estimation, an Inaccurate simplification? in Mariana1a analysis 
of the problem, the conditions and qualifications attaching ! 
to’the right of revolt are of decisive importance, while ’••/-•' . 
Vitoria and Suarez', far from granting the right of revolt, A. 
adduced some good reasons for submltting to the rule of a 
tyrant (of. Part 1, Chapter II, pp.,41-42, supra). • . .
the accusation of tyranny. It is when we compare the staged 
events with written theory that problems arise, and it seems / 
useful to ask where and why these problems occur, and what
- they/mean; in what sense is the’Comendador atyrant,or not « 
a tyrant, given the criteria of the theorists, based on self­
, centred.transgression Of law? In what other ways, if any, 
may tyranny be seen? • ••" - . ' \ '
: The first point which should be made in this context
is that an integral part of the play’s structure is the 
role of the Reyes Catolicoe, who are seen to fee constantly , 
in the political background, inexorably pushing forward their
, task of bringing.the rule of lav/ and Christian justice to a 
unified Spain? we already know that Ferdinand and Isabela 
were regarded as exemplary monarchs by Lope’s contemporaries, 
by virtue of their success in this venture. We are made 
aware, then, that Fuenteovejuna is one of the regions of the 
country which this new order of justice has not yet reached, 
that the society we are watching in the scenes setaround 
Fuenteovejuna is a society which is in its last phase, so / 
that the laws, and customs which formerly helped sustain the 
encomienda system have lost their force, with the result that
, ' •< Examined and explained fey, e.g., William C. McCrary, in,
** Fuen teove juna: its Platonic vision and execution,1* Studies 
in Philology, LVIII, 1961,,pp. 179-192. ? / '
an anarchical situation has developed - anarchical, that ia, 
for men like the Comendador, the second-in-command of the 
Order of Calatrava, with nobody to answer to, bar, in this 
case, the young and naif Master of the Order, whose will the
.Comendador subverts with little difficulty, In effect, this, 
manipulation of the Maestre (made explicit in the opening •
. scenes of the play, vv, 41-172), is itself a form of 
..tyranny * the Comendador is setting Himself up as the supreme 
authority in the Order, and perverting its function to suit .
his own designs, which, as the spectator knows, are opposed ••
.,to those of the Keyes Catollcos, and thus opposed to all
that the latter represent in the way of natural and civil law.
. One of the main criteria for;judging a tyrant being
■ the extent of his refusal to acknowledge natural law and its 
. ramifications, we must examine the Comendador’s behaviour in 
this light./ Obviously, we may say of the Comendador that he
breaks natural and moral law. In his pursuit of Laurencia,
for example, he brings about the distortion of the girl’s
own natural order, an effect we see in Act I: ... .
Pardiez, was precio poner, " ' ' • .
1 . < ; Pascuala, de madrugada , • .
’ . « • ' un pedazo de lunada \ \ :
- •<'••• '' . al '.'hue go para comer,. - ’ -/ ,
•/.’ : fuenteove juna, edited by W. .Si Mitchell, ’’Bell’s Spanish 
Classics,” (Iondon, 1966)$ all quotations are taken' from thia 
edition.-' '; V' .■
«’•. •• • con; tantp salacaton , ’•
, . de line; rosea que yo amaso,
y hurtar a-mi madre un vaso •
_ .. del pegado canjilon; ? .
que cuantaa raposerias, .
' /. . con su amor y sus .porfias,
r . . tiehen estos bellacones; ’ ,
‘ .. • ; ’ ' / /■ ; (X,217-2W .
Laurencia is here describing what would be the traditional
. vida aldeana, with all her activities in harmony with her
station in life, were it not for her rejection of the human 
' male, in whom she has, she says, no interest (v. 273,
fiarse deninguno,” in agreement with Pasouala’3 unflattering • 
, description of the male, ;with its conclusion, nPue© tales los
hombrea son,” (265])» thus denying a fundamental law and s
function ofher womanhood/ This distortion, aggravated by 
the Comendador,•eventually results in Laurencin*s complete - 
breakdown, culminating in herfrenzied behaviour at the
. beginning of Act III.
, The ways in which.the Coiaendador causes such effects 
by breaking natural and moral law© are obvious enough *' 
violence, sexual promiscuity, treason and so on; but one 
immense difficulty which undermines all the theoretical 
definitions of tyranny is that most of us break natural and 
moral laws every day, and possibly, on a minor scale, in ways 
similar to the Comendadorfs; we might even envy the license
; ■ i
he so obviously enjoys* Certainly, we cannot be surprised 
if kings and nobles and other meh in positions of authority
, share the same weaknesses which beset the rest of the human 
.; race.' . - ' ‘ • • 7 •.
Lope suggests, in several ways, that such per­
plexities are involved when men try to apportion guilt and 
responsibility. On the one hand, he points to the similarity 
between the Comendador*s behaviour and that of the city 
audience watching the play: , '
. . < (Ah I7 Bien hayah las ciudades,
.7 ’ . . que a hombree de calidades ' . .
'7:\--7- no hay quien sue gustos ataje; ' .
.. *7 ; '7 ’ alia precian casadoe • 7‘
que viaiten sus mujeres. 7
777\ •' (II, 141-5) / .
On the other, he wakes it quite clear that the villagers are 
far from blameless. Many of the women give in to the 
Comendador quite willingly, thus contributing to his desire
, for excess.. There are many reminders of this lack of 
7 feminine discretion, beginning with the first conversation
between Laurencia and Pascuala: 7.7 '•
PASCUALA To, Laurencia, he visto alguna
7 7 7. tan brava, y pienso que was;
• ‘ ’ 7 > ■ y tenia el corason , • '• .
;brando como una manteca •
LAURENCIA iCuantasmozas en la villa, 7
del Comendador fiadas,
. ; andan ya descalabr&das 1 7 7
■ ; " (1,179-195)
~ M * ... ’ •• ? x';
His listeners ere never surprised when the Comendador makes
his frequent references to his conquests, such as:
COMBNDADOH tNo se rindio Sebastians, ;
. - mujer de Pedro Bedondo, ’
con ser casadas entrambas, ' ,
. • y la de Martin del Poso, .
> habiendo apenas pasado .
dos dias del despoaorio?
LAUBBNCIA Esas, senor, ya tenian, .
de haber andado con otros,
<•' . el casino de agradaros; (I,; 798*806) . ;
In Act IX, yet more women are implicated: , : '
COMENDADOH . \ ^Que hay de Pascuals? . . .
< ‘ ■ £Que hay.de. Olalla? - . ' ‘ ;
^Que hay de Ines? / (II, 199-217)
The girls he names are all "'"willing, " and give rise to Flores* V
remark, . - - ' ’ ' . . ' •<; _ ? , • ’ •./<-. < . ;' •. .
. mas hay mujeres tambien, - . ' ; :
, porque el fil6sofo dice
. que apetecen a los howbres * . ? •. ' :
;como la forma desea . ‘ .
, . \la. materia; * . ; (II, 2^0*^4) .
Meanwhile, the menfolk only seem to become Really roused when 
the Mayor's daughter is abducted. ?
So,; in the milieu of Fuenteovejuna, none of these 
accusations of transgression of natural and moral law carry . 
much weight * few individuals are totally innocent. Eitherj 
therefore, we call the whole human race tyrants or potential • ; 
tyrants, or we pretend that kings and nobles are not susceptible •
to the same temptations as other men, or we set about the; 
impossible task of distinguishing between major and minor . 
transgressions of law - distinctions which Lope shows to be 
utterly irrelevant in practice, even if conceivable in theory. 
There, is, however, another way in which the spectator can 
assess the Comendador*s tyranny, and that is by noticing the
latter’s own concept of law and justice.
In two confrontations with the assembled villagers,
.'the Comendador is forced to try and defend and define the 
laws by which he justifies his behaviour, and by which he . 
acts. The first argument hinges on the conflicting views of 
honor expressed by the opposing parties, and the Comendador 
becomes very confused because of his reluctance or inability 
to distinguish moral law from social custom (Act II, Scene IV, 
especially vv. 117-^50). The villagers assert what they con­
sider to be their rights under the moral law, no es ;
justo/ que nos quiteis el honor.’1 126-7j), while the
Comendador asserts, what he sees as his prerogative by social 
custom ("vuestras mujeres se honran,” [iX, 137 j etc.) They 
both use the same word, honor, to say what they mean - hence
the confusion. According to the social customs invoked; by the, 
Comendador, women are privileged when seduced by a man of 
noble rank; according to the moral law affirmed by the vil*
.lagers, not only is such behaviour reprehensible, so also is
the attempt to induce innocent women to indulge in it, whether , 
by bribery, coercion or just satisfaction of their desires. • .
. ... In the ideal society, moral law and social custom ■
.would be in harmony; when we are shown circumstances in which 
they are contradictory, we must conclude that there is some<- .
thing very wrong with the social custom. let, social custom ”
is,the law the Comendador.chooses to uphold (when it suits y.
him), no matter how much it may conflict with natural law or '/>
moral law. l‘he perversion of law which the Comendador*s /-'i
behaviour represents is emphasised in this scene by Lope’s ?
presentation of Leonelo, whose appearance at the beginning of ; ’ 
Act II is his only one in the play. Leonelo is a iicenciate C ;
in law, who has been studying at Salamanca, and says he has 
tried to learn something ('’Saber he procurado lo importante,M 
| II, 4oj). Having pointed out his knowledge of lawi Lope uses . 
him to express shock and horror at the demeanour, of the *
Cpmendador: ’’^Viose desvergUensa igual?" (II, 121); ’’iCieloJ . ?
iQue per esto pasas?” (II, 162).
Immediately following this demonstration of the 
. Comendador’s attitude to law, we have an indication of his
notion of justice. After the villagers have left the square, < ? <
he- asks Flores, • . . ;
\ ; - X el villano, $ha de quedarse ./'•
. con ballesta y sin castigo? (II, 170*1)
to which;'Flores replies, '■ '
. ‘' ... •>'•‘7 Anoche pense que--estabs. ,•
, ; a la puerta de Laurencia,
. y a otroque su presencia ; .
, . <y su capilla imitate, . .
'<• , de ore ja a oreja le di ■
. un beneficio famoso. . (II, 172*7) . -s
Whether or not there is any truth in this claim of Flores, 
the fact that he adduces it to placate the Comendador is a 
revealing commentary on the latter*s ideas of judicial pro* . 
cedure. yIndeed, the Coiaendador is not in the least interested 
in the wounding of an innocent man, his only reply being,, . 
’’^Donde estara aquel Frondoeo?*’ (11^ 17&)»< Further, although 
he talks about castigo, it seems, for him, inseparable from
• 'vengeance:, ’• ‘ ,
que hast a due llegue ocasion 
\ \ al franc de la rason >
, thago la venganza estar, (II, 197-9)
a confusion which is apparent on other occasions, cf. I, 855*6 
(”Mas yo tomare venganza/ del agravio y del estorbo,°) and 
II, 572*5 (nLicencia les-quiero dar /♦,../ para vengarse.de ti.H)
The second confrontation referred to above occurs
= Aquinas regards vindicatio as, in certain circumstances, 
a legitimate judicial factor, but adds some suitable qualifi­
cations: "Est ergo in vindications considerandus vindicandus 
animus. Sic enim eius intentio feraturprincipaliter in 
malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et ibi qulescat, est 
omnino illicitum; tetc^” (Sumas Theologies, II*II, Q. CVIII, ; 
Art. 1). It seems clear that the Comendador* s animus would 
disqualify his venganza as a constituent of justice.
when the Comendador,suspends the.wedding ceremonies, and this
is where the Comendador has to defend his idea of law and his 
practise of justice (II, 709-781). Here, thd villagers are
; subjected to a sustained barrage of.equivocation, part of 
- which is of particular interest in this context as the basis
of the charge against Frondoso:
*' . /.• No: es; cosa,
, f Pascuala, en que yo soy parte.
Es esto contra; el maestre
Tellez Giron, que Dios guarde; .
es contra toda su orden,
es su honor, y es importante'
para el ejemplo, el castigo; (II, 73?~9)
-The audience has been able to see all the conditions which ; 
qualify the Comendador’s bland statement of hierarchical 
orthodoxy: the reasons for Frondoso’s defiance, the contempt 
the Comendador has for the Maestre, the fallacy of ”No es
. cosa/ ... en que yo soy parte,” the previous argument about 
honor, the absurdity of talking about ejemplo, and the pretence
.that,this is castigo (rather than venganza)»■ All of these . 
factors make <nonsense of the Comendador’s claim to be acting 
to uphold the law as we understand, it.
Of this speech, Salomon says, ’’Pour le Commandeur, il ne 
fait pas de doute que la resistance des manants a une signifi­
cation antifeodale,.et que la rivolte se fera un jour contre 
I1Ordre militaire tout entier, s’il n’y met bon ordre a temps 
en faisant un example” (op. cit., p. 855» fn. 24). However, 
the Comendador’s words surely represent nothing more than a 
legitimate and orthodox defence of the social order; their 
importance consists in the irony with which they are imbued by 
the dramatic context, an irony which has profound implications.
, ; />. 71 * - . ' ■ r
‘ The trouble is, that although the Comendador’s < .
procedures are no more than a parody of justice, there is a
certain legalistic truth, in the postures he assumes. Frondoso
did commit a crime, which, strictly speaking, is a crime
against the Maestro and his Order and, under normalcircum-
stances, deserving of exemplary punishment. The same may be
said of the Qomendador’s silly reply to Esteban*s reprimands
Nunca yo quise quitarle 
/ su mujer, pues no lo era. (II, 756-7)
The legalistic truth implicit in that remark is that, while 
a husband (or father, brother or any other blood-relative of 
the girl) has:certain rights of retribution and reparation for 
advances forced upon his wife, a friend or fiance has none 
adultery is more serious than simple fornication. While this 
does not mitigate the Comendador*s tyranny, it does demonstrate 
how easily human law may be reduced to ah instrument of tyranny, 
and even though
...reyes hay en Castilla,
que nuevas ordenes hacen,
con que desordenes quitan, (II, 758-61)
we can see that even laws which are not obviously unjust can, 
become mere instruments of tyranny when exploited by the, . 
.unscrupulous.- . : \ ,,
?v.e*g., Fuero Jungo, libro III, Titulo J, "Titol de las 
mujeres libres que lie van por 1 fuer za;n La s Siete Partidas, ;■ 
Libro VII, Txtulo 20, etc.
.. . •• ; - ?2 * ;
. The Comendador*s ideas of law and.justice are thus 
a’perversion of all that a seventeenth-century audience might 
consider law and justice to be. Obviously, therefore, the ; 
spectator is able to condemn the Comendador as a tyrant, given 
the theoretical criteria. However, these criteria do not . 
present the characters in the play with an unanswerable case 
for calling the Contends dor a tyrant. Law and life combined 
are shown to be too complex. Because of the blurring of issues 
and the legalistic half-truths and the absence of impartial 
witnesses, no character in the play, can point to one isolated, 
specific instance and objectively affirm the Comendador’s 
tyranny. The only people, associated with .the play who are in 
aposition to make an objective judgement about the Comendador, 
and have the necessary information to do so, are the audience, 
who have seen through all the conditions and qualifications 
and the,half-truths of the Comondador’s justice, and who 
therefore have more knowledge of the problem than any stage- 
character, from the King down to Menge* Lope is, 1 think, ; 
making us see that the.only way a judgement of this sort can 
really be made according to the academic criteria is by being 
a witness to all the circumstances surrounding the case, and 
that that is impossible in real life, Iz , .
. Even more distracting than the intellectual dif­
ficulties surrounding the assessment of tyranny in a practical
situation is the problem represented by the massacre itself, 
for Lope completes the logic of his presentation of the subject ; 
by showing how the villagers themselves become tyrannical* For 
the first two acts of the play,we watch the Comendador tramp* 
ling on all the laws pertinent to the villagers * moral law, 
natural law and civil law* This culminates in the closing 
scenes of Act II, where he disrupts the wedding * an occasion 
on which all laws relating to man are seen to be In harmony * 
and, robbing Esteban, the Mayor, of his staff, boats him with ,
it. By abducting Laurencia the Comendador offends moral law, 
by stealing her from her father he offends natural law, and, 
as the last straw, by assaulting Esteban with his own staff of 
office, he destroys the last vestige of law remaining in the 
village, viz., their local civil law. As a result of all that 
the villagers finally become utterly lawless, that is, tyran­
nical; the uprising is, indeed, representative of the kind of 
mob rule or papular rule that was as^repugnant to Spanish 
theorists as any other kind of lawlessness- The wayIn which < 
Lope presents this breakdown of order has implications for 
political theory which need close examination. /
' ^^fr. duaa de Santamaria’s viewpoint is representatives
’f assi dixo Aristotelee, que ninguna tyrania avia mayor, mas . ,
: perniciosa, que la de un pueblo entero, que de suyo es 
inclinado a; erueldad; ’ Republicsi y Polioia Christiana,
(Barcelona, 1617)Chapter 1, folio 3* ' ;
... ,'v The -Comendador ’ s .tyranny having reduced the villagers,; 
to a similar state, of lawlessness, the villagers begin (at, 
the end of Act II and beginning of Act III) to call the ...
Comendador a tyrant. In the first sixty lines of Act III we 
are shown an argument amongst the villagers* concerning what 
they ought, could or should do: what Lope is offering here is 
a peasant version of the academic controversies; various 
theories are suggested, and-they all sound feasible* But the 
peasants are having to grapple with the pressures of circua*- 
stances which complicate theories♦ Juan Rojo’s hope lies at
.' first in the jfteyes Catolioos : . ./ " \ ‘ .
, Mas pues ya se publics y manifiesta - .
que en paz tienen los reyes a Castilla, ,
; y su venida a Cordoba se apresta,; ‘r :
. : . vayan dos regidores de la villa :> ; . = :
y echandose.a sus pies pidan remedlo.
/ ; “ (III, 24-28)
but Barrildo knows that the monarchs have too many,other con­
cerns ; to worry about: ' ’•> : ‘ ; ■ ...
’.».». no podra, ocupado, ; ? '• /'.< «?''
. hacernos bien, con tanta guerra en medio
. > (Ill,: 31-2)
while Lope shows that the monarchs are nowhere near C6rdoba 
anyway: they spend the play moving from Medina del Campo to 
Toro,to Tordesilias. . // . .
! A regjdor then suggests, ’Mesamparar la villa*1 i.
(Ill, 34), but, as Juan replies, ’^Gorao es posible en tiempo
- ■' . ‘ /. ■ ■ -• ■ •' “ 75 * • ■?' .. .• • ' •;
limitado?’1 (Ill, 55)» and besides, what about Frondoso and
Laurehcia? In desperation, the regidor then voices the idea .;
of assassination:“Morir, o dar la muerte a los tiranos,?
(III, 46). .But that is an awesome, unheard-of recourse, and,
even though Esteban seeks to justify it,
El rey solo es senor despues del cielo, .
. • y no barbaroshombres inhumanos.
Si Dios ayuda nueatro justo celo, ,
■ ' ique nos ha de coetar?■ . (Ill, 49-52)
such talk is never convincing, while, more to the.-point., doing
the deed is another matter,\ hence Mango’s warnings ,
. ‘ ’ .. . . Mirad, senores, '
, ’ ' que vais en estascoaas con recelo.
Puesto que por los simples labradores 
. ‘ estoy aqul que mas injuriae paean,
mas cuerdo represent© sus temores.< .
. ■’ ; ■ •' ■■ . ‘ - /(ill, 52*6)
Men go knows from experience that having a just cause guarantees
nothing, that making wordy decisions is very different from
actually hurling oneself against vicious, armed thugs. Juan
Rojo joins the ranks of the insurrectionists, but his language
is far from that of the academic theorists: , .
. Si nuestras desventuras aeconpasan,
... para perder las vidas, £que aguardamos?
Las cases y las vinas nos abrasan: .
tiranos son5 a la venganza vamos.
■ •' • >(111/57*60.) 
Remembering that the play has shown several times
how the villagers tried to counter the tyranny of the Comendador 
in what might be termed an idealistic manner, i.e., by
>attempting to reform him. we find/ {when, we . combine that with -•
. the suggestions-made in this first scene of Act XXI, that \
various solutions.to*the problem have been mooted* They are' 
all, however, inconclusive; they do not lead to a decision.
What;does trip the balance and precipitate the decisive action?
• • Hot' wordsi but the entry.; of a dishevelled and demented girl; 
not the strength of any theory written in a scholar’s study 
but the shattering arrival of Laurencia, hurling imprecations ,
at the men, twisted out of shape by the Comendador’s impor­
tunities t panic-stricken by Frondoso*s perilous situation.
, That-is.the catalyst< Logic and theory are suddenly swept 
aside by the dramatist, for this is not imitatio libri, this
.is what happens. Lope is showing us that such problems as we 
; have witnessed in the play are not, in practice, resolved /- \
rationally, in spite of the theorists* efforts to find x*atioiial • . 
solutions: the villagers? order having been disrupted on all 
levels, it is not to be expected that they should sit down 
and-decide what to do on the basis ofacademic reasoning . 
(although they try). The massacre, then, is not the result . 
of an orderly reasoning process, but’.of the opposite: the 
complete breakdown of reason and order.
i The whole atmosphere of the succeeding scenes
relating to the uprising emphasises its essential irrationality: 
the/blood-Iust of all concerned, whether male or female; the
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distortion of nature represented ;by the women*© becoming
warriorsi assuming a temporary masculinity; the attacks on ' ’
the members of the Comendadox\’s household -not gratuitous,
of course, but as sadistic as anything we have seen from ,the
gentry;.the sacking of the Comendador’s house; the mutilation
of his body after the murder, end so on. Lope specifically
draws our attention to these final acts of mindless savagery
in the comparative calm of the Court, when Flores reports the
event .to' the King; / , ' • • ' ‘ ■. .
: rompen el crusado pecho .
con mil heridas crueles, \
y por las altas ventanas 
le haceh que al sueIo vuele,
•• - . adonde en picas y espadas .
, . le recogen las mujeres.
. . Llevanle a una casa muerto
, y a porfla,; quien mas puede
. mesa eu barba y cabello
, y aprieea.eu roatro hieren. \ ,
. . Ln efecto fue la furia
„ tan grande que en ellos crece,
que las mayores tajadas 
. las orejas a ser vienen.
. Saquearonle la casa,
cual si de enemigos fuese,
y goaosos entre todos ;
han repartido sus bienesw (III, 327-3^8)
We might feel inclined to discount, that as merely a part of 
Flores’ slanted reporting, but hope has made a point of inclu 
ding many of the details given in Hades’ account of the , 
massacre (and omitting some even gorier details, presumably 
on‘the grounds of taste), which reads as follows;
./ ' Antes •que' die see el anima a Dios, -tomaron ©u cuerpo
X con grande y regozijado alarido, diciendo,Viran .
' ■ ; 'ids 'Reyes'' y muer&n-los , traidore©: y le ocharon por - .
• ; una ventana a la callt: y otroe que alii estaban
■ con lanqas y .espad&s, pusieronlaa puntas arriba,y 
< para recoger en ellas el cuerpo, que aun tenia ,
anima» Lesjjues ;de caydo en tierra, le arrancaron ■- • , 
las barbss y cabellos con grande crueldad: y otros
- ‘ . con Ids pomo sde las. espades le.quebraron los ? >
diente©.*.. petando juntos hombres, mugere© y ‘ ;
- ; ninos, llevaron el cuerpo con grande regozijo a la ;
■ . place: y‘alii todos loshombres y mugeres le
4 hizieron pedacos, arrastrandole, y haziendo en el
.grandee crueldades y eecarnio©: y no quisieron ,,, .
. darle a susycriadq©, para ’enterrarle'i - pe\ mas: de«to \ •
' dieron eacomano a su caoa, y le robaron toda su.
.. hazienda; W \ ' • ••• •< ’ /; •
Lope seems determined to draw our attention to the bestiality»
, •ho. found in his, historical source^ not only in the passionate ■
scenes ofthe-,rebellion, when the audience would; not be ready 
to make a?detached judgement, but also, via Flores’ report, in 
a later, less emotional context; and Florasreport is surely 
lent validity by the fact that the last picture implanted in ‘ 
our minds, before the scene switches'to the Court, is of a • -
, normally bright and cheerful young girl - P&scuala ■* brandish­
ing a weapon and hysterically shrieking nMorire matando” ..
‘ . (HI, 267),/ . . " .. / ; . \ / /
. ; . . Prof, Spitzer, examining the language of the ;
‘ uprising, sees it as an ordering, rational process, but J- .
-17 ’ - ?. •. : •
. Fr* Francisco de Hades y Andrade, Chronica de las tyes ... 
Ordenes :y Cavallerias da Santiago, Calatrava y Alcantara, 
(Toledo, . 1572), folio 797 Col? 5 - folio Jd; Col'; A, ,
, ;?nA central theme and its structural equivalent in Lope 1a 
Fuenteovejuna,H Hispanic Review, XXIII, 1955, pp., 27^-292*
think he is a little too academic when ‘he asserts that order 
ia present evert in the rebellion (in the cries of ’’tVivan los 
Reyes I”) although other critics would support him* ■ 1 suggest
i that the pattern we, are meant to see is one of disorder and 
tyranny among the villagers bringing the Comendador’s evil ", 
home to roost, their mass behaviour being a reflection of, as 
well as the result of, the Comendador’s behaviour. Prof.
Parker makes some pertinent observations on the treasonable 
aspect of the Comendador’s behaviours the Comendador is now 
destroyed by the treason of the villagers against him. The 
Comendador had trampled on the villagers, now they trample on 
him; he had denied them mercy, now they refuse it to him; he 
had denied them justice, now they deny it to him; he had
Dr..Perry J.Powers, commenting on the words of the 
regidor at the meeting, ”Ta, todo el arbol de paciencia roto,/
’ corre la nave de temor perdida” (III, 38-39)» says that ”We 
must understand the metaphor of the ship as foreshadowing 
the violence to come, but it does not characterise the 
cltimens of Fuente Ovejuna as driven by ubbridled passions,
\ like a ship before a gale;” it seems to me, though, that ; 
the latter is precisely the import of the metaphor.; (The 
concept of the city-state in the dramas of lope de Veta,
./ unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, f Johns Hopkins University,
PP. 53-4). Dr. Robert Fiore says, ’’All legal and
peaceful means have been exhausted to recall the Comendador 
to a sense of duty:” they have not, they are simply unavail­
able or irrelevant; (’’Netural law in the central Ideological 
them, of fuent.ovejuna," Hiepania, XLIX, j966, pp. 75-80,.
, V. p. 79. ) • \ ■/.
’’Reflections on a new definition of ’Baroque’ drama,” 
Bulletin Cf Hispanic Studies, XXX, 1953 ♦ pp. 142-151.
given girls to.hie henchmen for their pleasure, now his men
are set upon by the same girls# Flores tells the King that
•. En txtulo de tirano \ , /
< • ; le acumula todo el plebe,
' • y a la fuerza desta voz ' ’.•/ : /. ...
/;• ' el hecho fiero acometen; (III, 317-320)
there is a certain truth in that remark (although it is not
; the whole truth) and it offers an additional irony in suggest­
ing that there is, in that respect, similarity between the 
villagers and the Comendador, who is himself so confused and 
convinced by his own rhetoric, as I shall demonstrate shortly#
? The process of cause and effect has come full circle, destroy­
ing the cause - but hot the effects - of the'disorder, and 
the motif of "Fuenteoyejuna lo. hizo** in the torture scene
.. emphasises the fact that the villagers* act was a crime, that 
all; of them did take part; and that the whole village is
.. indeed guilty# ' • ' ■ ' ‘
' , • ; /. The implications of all that for political theory
seem to be, that it is all very well to try and' decide what 
. : to do about a tyrant, but, if we become victims of tyranny, 
the disruptive effect on our nature renders us incapable of
looking to reason and discipline for a way out of our predica-
• S aent.; When we consider how the author has presented that 
factor, combined with the insight we are given into the dif­
ficulty of matching theory (encased as it is in mere words) 
to the elusive complexities of-real life, and with the
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. demonstrations we are given of the ease with which the ....
language of human law can be twisted so as to justify or , .
disguise the evil intentions of the unscrupulous* we begin < 
to see that, oh the problem of tyranny, Lope has forcefully •:
.. shown the inevitable discrepancy between theory and practice, . 
and some of the reasons for it. I use the word.’practice’ .
advisedly, remembering that,this play, at least as far; as 
Lope and his audience were concerned, deals with a historical ■ ,
v situation and event, even though we do now have,evidence to 
, show the fallibility of Lope ’s probable source. , .
f ; It should be clear from the foregoing that such
; ; situations as the play describes present great problems for
; human liberty, with its dependence on reason and obedience to 
just law; these problems are particularly involved with the
, malleability of language and the way human malice can twist 
just law into unjust law. Of courseit is easy, and possible, 
to say that, since natural and moral liberty depend only, on 
man’s nature and the, individual’s moral condition,.it is ' 
meaningless to ask if liberty is at stake in situations such ,
Hafael Hamxrez de Arellano, "’fiebelion de Fuente Obejuna 
contra el Comendador Mayor de Calatrava Fernand Gomes de Guzman,M i 
Boletin de la, Heal Academia de la Hiatoria, Vol. XXXIX, 1901,
r pp. ^46-512, and Claude E. A nibai, f’The historical elements 
of Lope de Vega’s Fuenteovejuna," PMLA, XLIX, 193^, PP«657-718. 
These two articles provide near-conclusive evidence that Lope 
used the account of the incident given by Hades y Andrade, and 
that this account is very different from the historical truth ;' 
revealed in documentary sources. :
as Fuenteovejuna’s, However, it is commonly admitted that 
natural liberty must have some degree of protection for 
ordinary mortals, who need help, in the shape of-just law* 
for both guidance and protection, if that libertyis not to 
be placed in jeopardy: that is what the theorists mean when 
they refer to the tyrant’s contempt for the liberty.of his 
subjects* ■ ’■ . • •"
As an illustration of that, consider Laurencia, 
whose acceptance of the laws which bind her to her station 
in life, manifest in her statement of the Vida aideans (I, 
217-24M, suggests that she employs her natural liberty 
properly, but whose denial of human love and rejection of all 
men is a denial of part of these laws, and, as such, a 
deviation from her natural liberty, an obstacle caused by 
an outside influence, the Comendador* The Comendador thus 
circumscribes her freedom of choice, in that he causes a ; 
lessening of her ability to use her reason, to the effect . 
that her rejection of the Comendador temporarily bring© about 
her rejection of Frondoao, although both men are entirely 
different. Even in this matter, Lope reminds us of the part 
language plays in confusing issues: the King refers to the 
Comendador’a behaviour a© demaslas ^emediad sus demaelas,H 
jfl, 70fe{) only a few moments before Laurencla calls Frondoao*s 
advances demaglaa ("tus demasias/ que murmurs el pueblo todo,”
7 •• . 7' ' " ' 7 “ . ' - 83 * i ' -• - r ' . -
I, 726-7 ); although the two, contexts are entirely different, 
the same word is applied to both.. There is, in all of this, 
the usual deceptive element of truth in the Comendador’s . 
words to Laurencias HVienes a ser un monstruo,n (I, 789)» 
the truth being, that the Oomendadorfs behaviour has partly ; 
obscured her ability to recognise the vast differences 
between the superficial similarities of Frondoso and the 
Comendador. . ’• * '
. This confusion of Laurenciafs is rectified by 
Frondoso's courage, so that later, in the scene showing their 
betrothal, she joins Frondoso in a free and lawful act of 
mutual acceptance, in which liberty is seen in the harmonious 
relationship of the various levels of the laws they accept. 
Freely choosing each other, Laurencia and Frondoso demonstrate 
their respect for, and obligation to, society, and their 
deference to natural and divine laws; such willing obedience 
to just and harmonious laws constitutes natural liberty. It 
is supervised by the father of Laurencia, who is also the 
village alcalde, representing the kind of authority which 
protects these laws, and forming a vital link in the chain 
connecting daughter with father, alcaldei King, and God.
For a moment, order reigns, natural liberty seems to mean 
something, and implicit in the arrangement is the possibility 
of moral liberty, the permanent inclination of the will towards
. • — 8^* . - • \ • t •
Gbd. • ? \ ’ \ ' • J’ • • ,•
The audience knows, of course, that this harmonious
state of affairs will not easily survive, for although the 
regidor1 s remark -
Ta a -losGatolicoe Reyes,
que este nombre les dan ya,
presto Espana les dari\:'' ’
la obediencia de sus leyes, (XI, 465-8)
affirmed the; existence of the ideal chain and corresponding
- ; liberty, we watched, only minutes before, the awful scene of 
the abuse of Mango and Jacinta; the faulty link in the chain, 
the Comendador, is. a menace to the fragile structure of
. liberty we see established here. Soon, that liberty is
shattered, by the imprisonment of Frondoso and the twisting 
out of. shape, once more, of; Laurencia*a natural order. Both ; 
Frondoso and Laurencia eventually break the laws of all levels 
of justice,. resorting to uncontrolled .savagery, and, tempor­
arily at least, perverting and denying their natural liberty; 
by that time, all the other villagers are. reduced to similar
■ 'behaviour. ' >
This brings us to a crucial point, namely, that, 
/because of the. interdependence of liberty on various levels
of-human society, the villagers* liberty is obscured as a 
result of the loss of liberty in the Comendador. himself* Much, 
has been said about the freedom of:the peasants being lost and 
regained, but it is the Comendador who is. the farthest removed
of all from, human liberty- The confusion of his reason and . 
hie surrender to passion may usefully be examined in this ,
v light- ' ; , ’ ' '■ •
• The regidor from Ciudad Seal tells the King, early
in the play, that5 •/ • ' ' ' /** ' •' ••
Alii,? con mas libertad .. , - .
; de la que decir podemos, .
’ . . tiene a los subditos suyos .
.. a todo contento ajenos- (X, 690-3) .
There is no need to enumerate all,the actions by which the 
Comendador demonstrates his libertad in social and political 
activities, but, if language betrays the quality of a man1® 
reasoning process, it is appropriate to consider the way in 
which the Comendador’e loss of natural liberty is made apparent 
via the language he uses- . y •
Our immediate impression of the Comendador, to be
gained from the first scene of the play, is that of a man who
attaches great importance to words, while misunderstanding
or misusing their importi he talks of cortesla and is incensed
by the Maestre’s apparent lack of it, but reveals that, for
him, cortesla is only a political devices \ . • ;
: ; Es Have la cortesla
: , para abrir la voluntadj ;
- ' • 22 "■ • ' ‘ '• - ' ' > ’ ‘;The word libertad means license here, as it often does; . 
of- the King’s order to Manrique, ’’remedied sus demaslas,’* 
and Manrique’s reply, ’’Pondre llmite a su exceso" (I, 708 \ 
and ?18)- ,• ' - ' .; '5'\ • .
. . y para la enemistad ... ' - '•
? , la necia descortesia. Cl, 12-16)
Be himself, meanwhile, offer® only gross discourtesy, made . 
unpleasantly obvious in the following conversation with the
. - Maestre, in which we see how dangerous the Comendador can be 
when he deliberately perverts language to sway others and 
subvert their will* Far more dangerous, however is the way 
in which the Comendador’s language confuses himself, a 
phenomenon we see constantly throughout the play.
; The discourses of Frondoso and laurencia on courtly 
language (I, 290-34?) suggest to us how words may be used to 
corrupt their referents, preparing us for indications of how 
behaviour can be conditioned by such distortion. When the
. Comendador enters, brusquely accepts the peasants’ homage, 
and repays them by chasing their daughters, we begin to see 
the self-deception:of his languages the (to him) self-evident 
truth of no sois?” (I, 602) leads to his question,
”^Que reparan/ en no hacer 16 que les digo?” (I, 609-610). 
Because the peasants are ”his” in an administrative, or economic 
sense, he cannot see why they are not ’’his1’ in a moral or 
physical sense: his words assume a whole truth where there is 
only a half-truth, and he fails to understand the distinction 
which Pascuala makes in reply: ”Si, senor;/ mas no para casos : 
tales,” (I, 602-3). The words the Comendador uses here - and 
in many other in (stances - are symptomatic of. and Instrumental
in, the confusion of his reason which perverts his natural 
liberty. .' ?. ■ • - . •• .. . \ "/• ‘ '
The Comendador is conscious of no ambiguities, and
his behaviour reflects the confusion of his language. It
could be suggested that he is aware of the equivocations and
consciously uses them to try to bamboozle the peasants, but
this possibility seems to be belied by his fury when worsted
by the, peasants in an argument over these very equivocations
(II, 30*163), fury which does not disappear when the villagers
do. The argument begins with the Comendador confused by his
own metaphors / \ , -
. • Quisiera en esta ocasion .
> que le hicierades pariente , ' :
. : . a una liebre que por pies, ;'< . .
- . ' por momentos se me va. (II, 98-101) .
The hare he refers to is laurencia. By equating hare-coursing 
with girl-chasing he implies that the latter is, like the 
former, a noble pursuit5 in so doing, he ignores the fundamental 
difference between men and beasts, vis*, the power of rational, 
choice in the farmerf in effect, that denies the natural 
liberty of all men. .
I have already mentioned-the exchange concerning 
honor (IX, 117-15°) which occurs in the same scene, with the 
Comendador again refusing to see more•than a,single meaning 
for a single word. The Comendador*s honor refers only to
■ •, " • ■ • . *," ' '■, •*i * 88 — . • ' ' ' - •. ' -. *
social atatue, which the villagers clearly do not have;
•;< - " • ^Vosotros honor t eriels?; "’ '•'/ - ■ </ •’
iQue freiles de Calatravai (11/128-9)
other concepts of honour, such as moral integrity (the highest 
form of honour),. mean nothing to;him/ In his eyes, therefore, 
the peasant girls can only gain honour fro® his attentions- 
"vuestras mujeree se honran" (II, 1J7), The one word 
conveniently confuses the iisue, and the Comendadorrs 
behaviour follows suit* The same mental simplicity fastens ■
; on the concept of purity of blood: his is socially or 
genealogically pure, theirs is not, therefore they lose
. nothing by mixing theirs.with his - nt ^ensuciola yo juntando/ 
la mla a la vueetra?0 (II, 133-134); the introduction of a
/ contradictory moral factor - rtCuando/ que el mal mas tine que 
alimpia" (II, 134-133) - which suggests that his socially ’ - ' 
pure blood may be a moral impurity which etaine, reveals his 
own equivocation and reduces hi® to blundering confusion,
The implications of the perversions of language, 
described earlier, are shown in action in these and other 
scenes, with the Comendador going to both extremes, praising 
promiscuity and insulting chastity*/ . He is trapped and misled . 
by hie own language, encouraging himself to submit to the 
clutches of sensual self-indulgence; the symptom aggravates 
the disease, the disease being the breakdown of.reason* That
itis not deliberate is.confirmed in the scene following the 
one referred to above«\the Coaendador asks his men, nFstos,
^ee igualan conmigo?” (II, 168), an affirmation of social 
criteria, at the, expense of moral criteria, which even Florae 
feels bound to correct, nQue no es aqueso igualarsetr. (II, 164)* 
.. What is apparent in all this chaos, surrounding and
stemming from the Comendador, is the interdependence of the 
concepts Of liberty, law and language, lope presents the 
Comendador as a man in whom disorder, brought about by the 
dominance of the passions over the reason, is compounded by 
the failings of his reason itself, befuddled as,it is by his 
careless distortion of language; On two counts, therefore, 
the Comendador»s natural liberty is nullified. The ramifies* 
tions for the villagers have already been indicated in the . 
discussion of tyranny, above: the Comendador is, effectively, 
the man whose legal authority they must accept; obedience to 
his law, far from assuring their natural liberty, would (and, 
in some cases, does) represent a perversion of liberty. When 
the villagers challenge the Comendador on rational grounds 
(in the arrest-scene and in the scene just mentioned), the 
Comendador can only reply by insulting and humiliating them, 
so that even overt attempts to re-introduce some semblance of
reason into the Comendador’s influence over their affairs are 
doomed to failure. The Comendador twists language and law in
his attempts to defend himself, and the villagers, who, like 
most people, need the guidance of law for the proper use of 
their liberty, are denied it. . Although they could, theoreti­
cally, maintain their liberty by adhering, against all the 
odds, to the moral. law, the p'rac 11 cal ef fect of the situation 
is thateven as they try to resist the Comendador’s perver­
sions, they are - because they are normal,tweak and confused 
men and women - being. driven by. him to the point;where passions 
can no longer be contained by reason.
, It is generally assumed that, by the end of the'play, 
the villagers have regained their liberty. It is worth 
examining the ending of the play closely to see to what extent 
that is true» t .
The first thing to be said is, that the villagers do 
not regain liberty via the massacre of the Comendador, for 
reasons already given: neither natural nor moral liberty is 
to be found in the tyranny of mob savagery. The only possible 
sense in which the death of the Comendador assists them in 
their natural liberty, or brings them closer to moral; liberty, 
is that:the way is thereby cleared for the Reyes Catolicos to 
impose just; civil law for their guidance in these matters.
To discover whether Xope wants to leave such an impression, 
we need to explore his presentation of the King’s attitude to, 
and relationship with, the villagers.; ,
. In the past, some critics have been at a loss to
understand just why lope shows Ferdinand and Isabela as being 
anxious to punish the villagers who:seoiu so justified in their 
rebellion (apart from the‘fact that it is mentioned in the 
Hades source}. But Lope knows that-the revolt, because of 
its very nature, could not be presented, as being unequivocally 
approved, especially by the King; for the uprising represents 
and reflects the same kind of anarchical. disorder of which
the Coxaendador was guilty. Indeed, Lope has pointedly altered 
his Hades material in.order to emphasise the monarchs1 desire 
to punish the villagers* According to Hades, when the 
pesquisidor returned from Fuenteovejuna with insufficient 
evidence to apportion blame and punishment, nsus Altezas siendo 
informados de las tyranias del Coaendador mayor, por las quales
avia merescido la muerte, mandaron se quedasse el negocio sin
. " • -'* ' ’■ ’ " zk ' ’’ \ ‘ ■ • ■, ‘ • ■
mas averiguacion;” but, in the play, the situation in
Fuenteovejunais made clear to the King long before the 
massacre, in the first act; - -'V;- ‘. .. '
_ HBY ' ^Londe queda Fernan Gomez?
HEGIPOH 1° Bn Fuenteovejuna creo,
, . ' •''' ■ por-.ser su villa,- ■ - • :
y tener en eila casa y asiento.
• ■ ■ • ;?; Alii, con mas libertad -■< ■
*_ -e.g., Anibal, op. cit.
,’ - ' ' ■ ''
op. cit., folio 80, col. A.
-■ - ‘ - •' *•; de la que decir podemos* • • / . •
7 / tiene a los subditossuyos
• ■ ’ " , a todo contento ajenos. (I, 690-693)
Before sending the judge, therefore,/the monarchs knew that 
there were many reasons for the villagers* madness. -That 
makes no difference to the sending of the judge, for civil 
;iaw must be seen to apply to everyone, but it does make a 
difference to; the events surrounding the return of the judge, . 
because, in the play, the King does not pardon the villagers 
out of sympathy for their plight (as*kades suggests), about . 
which he already knows,'but says that he is forced to pardon .. 
them for lack of formal evidence, even though he still strongly -­
disapproves of the crime; ;' ■ ’ ;
” -;■* . 1 ' Pues no puede averiguarse ' -f ‘ ■’ ' ; '
el suceso por escrito, . ' - , .
. ; aunque fue graVe el delito,
• / ; \ , por fuerza ha de perdonarse. . (Ill, 791-^)
\ ; The point that Lope must have been aware of is that 
the King must show that such rebellions just cannot be tolerated, 
for, however justifiable they might be, they represent disres* 
pact to authority; the King is the highest authority in the ; 
land; he, of all people, cannot permit, by condoning insurrec­
tion, the establishing of a totally unacceptable precedent.
The King’s words, on hearing of the massacre, leave no doubt 
on; t.hat?scores • ■' \
. • . ; ;£star puedes confiado
\ , que sin castigo no queden. .
*93 --
t // ; JE1 triste sue e so ha oido , .
tai, que admirado me tiene, . ■ ,
y quevaya luego un juefc ' . •• •;
que lo averigtte conviene, ' ■.. .
. * ' y castigue a losculpados *• •
' ; para ejemplo de las Rentes* \ .
• ' ■ , , \ '. Vaya un capitan con el, • ' ‘ / / ■ \\
; porque seguridad lleye; ...
■ ■" ''W • que'tan grande atreviaiento />; > '
: castigo ejemplar requiere, (III, 3&3~37M
. . By the end of the play* therefore, the King has done
two things for the villagers: he has tortured them, and he 
has pardoned them* We can only regard these as two markedly , :
diverse procedures - yet both are justified by the requirements. . 
of human lawt To uphold the law, the King must seek to ascer­
tain where the guilt, lies, and, to uphold the law, he must 1 
drop>the charges when baulked by lack of evidence* That such J 
contradictory measures are both mandatory under the aegis of 
human law must invite us to question the quality of justice < 
dispensed by the latter, and it is not Lope’s only reminder
i of the ambivalence inherent in human law even when it is dis- 
'peneed by monarchs whom Lope’s contemporaries regarded with ‘
; nostalgic admiration* Fox' example, it io noticeable (Lope . '
has him say it twice) that the King’s reasons for punishing ,
: the villagers ~ ’’parafhjemplo de las gentes,” ”... * que. tan
grande atrevimiento/ castigo ejemplar requiere” (III, 370 and 
3^3-4) - are exactly the same as the Comendador’s reasons for 
arresting and punishing Krondoso: **-?es importante/ para el
«to ^^4* **
ejemplo, el castigo” (II, 733*9)*
The point is not, that the King is as much a tyrant
ae the Comendador * clearly, he is not * but that human law 
and its wording can be made to seem either just or unjust, 
so that the King is as susceptible of misinterpretation, and 
therefore as capable of ambiguity, as the Comendador. 
Furthermore, if human law is hampered by its language, so 
also by its methods. While acknowledging that torture was 
an accepted judicial method in Lope’s day, there is nothing 
to stop a seventeenth-century, audience wondering how much 
difference there is between, on the one hand; the torturing 
of every man, woman and child in the village * to which Lope 
devotes quite a bit of stage-time * and, on the other hand, 
the savagery of the villagers againstthe Comendador, or of 
the latter against the former, or of the Maestro against * 
Ciudad Heal, , , , , , . , ‘ ‘ \ '•.
,/ ’ Added to the linguistic and procedural limitations,
which render the royal justice less than perfect, are the 
compromises made necessary by the force of circumstance.:, . 
That circumstances do not permit even an efficient King such 
as Ferdinand to be constantly aware of what is going on is 
pointed out at the beginning of Act III, where Barrildo 
doubts the King’s ability to help the villagers (”.• • no
' - • ' ' ’ ' ' . ' ' ' • pK - ...
podra, ocupado,/hacernos bien v. •” l’51-2j). That political:
. ; circumstances necessitate compromise in the pursuit of justice
is suggested by the way Lope presents the King’s pardon for 
the villagers, and especially in the setting of the King’s
. ' attitude to the villagers side-by-side with his attitude to 
the Maestro: it is all very well to say that, since the vil­
lagers are pardoned, order has.been restored, the rebellion, 
vindicated, happiness assured, monarchy glorified, peasant , 
dignity acknowledged,.and so on, but, while the King agrees 
to overlook the crimes of the villagers,-he is also prepared
< to overlook the crimes of the Maestro, even though the latter 
are more obviously treasonable. The Maestro is, to be sure, 
utterly humiliated by the King, who ignores his excuses, dle-
: dains his interruptions, and assumes his functions; the Maestro’s
treason, though, is still a capital crime, and the King, had 
he deemed it necessary, might well have found ways of circum-
- venting the papal protection of the Order and had the Maestro 
executed, tope, via Manrique»s indulgent remark - ”... aunque 
es on edad pequeno,/ es valeroso soldado” (III,.657*8) * seems
- . It is interesting to note that another version of the
historical event, palencia’s, notes that the King’s failure 
to punish the villagers was due to ”los innumerable® apuros 
de aquellos dxas,” and to the complex political circumstances. 
v* Crofttca de Enrique IV escrita on Latin por Alonso de 
Pniencia, translated, by L. A. Pax y Melia, in Coleccion de
? ' . Escritores Castellanos, Historiadores, CXXXIV, Tomo IVf 
Libro XXVI, Cap. IV, p. 205.
to indicate that a degree of royal leniency is being exercised.
This comparatively generous treatment (compared,
that is, with death for high treason) of the Maestre is usually ,. • 
regarded as lope’s affirmation of the need for intermediate ./
authority. That seems, dramatically anyway, a weak argument* /
In the drama, the King seems to be surrounded with ’’good men <
and true”, such as Manrique and the Conde de Cabra; if the ..
King does-need weak, vacillating and corruptible adolescents 
for his intermediate authority, the prospects for stability 
are scarcely better than they were before. More revealing is : 
the policy of the historical Ferdinand, who did indeed retain 
the Maestre’s services, but who also eventually took over the 
leadership of all three great military orders. It is thus
; difficult to reconcile the need for intermediate authority
with either Lope’s presentation of the events or with what he - 
knew of/the history; to see why lope shows this retention of 
the Maestre’s services, I think we must look for dramatic 
reasons./ / ■ • ’ . •
„ When we consider the dramatic parallels between the
villagers and the Maestre, we must begin to Wonder what is ? '
meant by the closing aspects of the play’s structure. Both , 
the Maestre and the villagers are corrupted by the Comendador; 
both are driven to violence by the Comendador - in the Maestre*s 
case, a man savages a town, while in the villagers* case, a :
town savages a man? both are, thereby, strictly speaking, . 
guilty of:disrupting the whole social and political structure 
of the state, and therefore both are arguably guilty of treason 
against a King renowned for his law-and~order campaigns; both , 
come to realise that they had better make it up to the King, 
both go to the King’s court to confess their guilt (blaming 
it on the Comendador), pledge their allegiance, and ask for 
pardon, and both are accorded a grudging pardon by the King* 
These‘last events take place in successive scenes at the end 
Of Act XII? • .. „ •;
If the structure of the work is as important as is. , 
generally agreed, lope seems to be drawing our attention to 
something other than the unity of King and people* Histori­
cally, we know-that the King’s pardoning of the villagers was 
an act dictated:by calculation and expediency; Lope, while 
not (it is presumed) aware of the historical data revealed by 
Hamires y Arellano, nevertheless Seems to sense that the King 
was partly motivated by expediency, and to suggest it in his 
play* The clearest indication of that is to be seen in the 
way lope alters his sources. One alteration * perhaps the 
most significant * I have already mentioned: the changing of 
the Hades intimation that the monarchs discovered the Comenda- 
dor’s tyranny after the massacre, to the play’s showing them 
as being informed of it before the massacre and subsequent
judicial enquiry. Other alterations are apparent in the’final 
scene of the play, the whole ofwhich is an addition by Lope 
to the material offered by Hades, according to whom, no such 
meeting between King and peasants took place. The final scene 
is composed almost entirely of the villagers’ avowal of their \ 
allegiance to the King, one effect of which is that the neces­
sity for the King to exact exemplary punishment is considerably 
reduced, because the villagers plainly do not harbour designs ’■? 
which could be construed as laesa majestas, and because their
submission is as exemplary as their prospective punishment.
That leads to another hint of the King*s expediency: ;
■? X, la' villa es bien se quede / •’ ■
i • "?'en ml, pues de mi se vale, ' •
?•; ha sta ver‘. si ,;aca so .sale .
comendador que la-.he rede.- (Ill, 795*8)
Be takes charge of the town,, suggesting that this is a tempo­
rary arrangement. But the historical Ferdinand made himself 
Grand Master of the Order, of Calatrava only eleven years after 
the uprising in Fuenteovejuna,'and those of Lope’s audience 
who were aware of that (with greater or lesser accuracy) could 
hardly fail to interpret the stage-King’s pronouncement as the 
seizing of an opportunity to reduce the power of the order.
They might even wonder what exactly is meant by Frondoso’s 
words, ?tSu ma jested habla en fin,/ como quien tanto ha acer- 
tado”( III, 799*800). :
Taking all these matters, dramatic and historical, 
into account,,it seems appropriate to infer that Lope is .
inviting, us to see the King as being conscious of the politi- , 
cal advantage to be gained from the judgements he makes con- . ••• 
cerning the incident. If we were only shown the King’s pardon 
for the villagers, we might more readily regard it as tacit * - ;
approval of, and sympathy for, their action; but since.we see 
it in conjunction with the King’s pardon for the Maestre, who 
is.much more difficult to exculpate, we are forced to realise 
that the King’s motives are less than sentimental. In short, ,
he lets "off lightly both Maestre and villagers, for a mixture ,
of motives: because it serves his purpose better, because of 
the other claims on his attention, and because, in the case 
of the villagers, justice is marginally better served - but „
on procedural grounds rather than as exoneration. , ..
In pointing out that the King may be seen to have 
his own reasons for treating the villagers with magnanimity, .
I am not imputing to him,expediency in a pejorative sense, 
nor ami suggesting that. Lope would have done so (one can only 
speculate about Lope’s reaction to Machiavelli ’ s admiration/; '« 
of Ferdinand, expressed in Chapter XXI of Il Principe)., The.
King is faced with a real problem, on which depends not just .
his own advantage, but the advantage of the whole nation, 
whose prospects for. stability are inextricably bound up with
• ' , ' ' ' , - 100 - , .. • V ;
the prudence or imprudence of the King’s policies. In fact, 
the nation’s fortunes are virtually Inseparable from the 
fortunes of the Keyes Catolicoe ~ or, pace Henry Ford, what’s 
good for Ferdinand isgood for Spain. Faced with such a 
problem, the King has to take account of, on the one handj 
the demands of law and justice, which he himself is sparing 
no effort.to impose upon Spain, and, on the other hand, the 
pressures and circumstances and hazards of political activity, 
which have to be weighed, measured and countered if law and 
justice are to be successfully established. It is a matter 
of balancing advantages and disadvantages> of compromising . 
between the demands of the one hand and the demands of the 
other, and it cannot be easy. •. ;/
, The important issue being illustrated in the play,
a propos of these political considerations^ is that no matter 
how good, whether in intention or effect, a ruler may be, he 
is still subject to the difficulties and limitations inherent 
in human law and human politics. These difficulties may range 
from the obvious Inability of a ruler to be watching over 
everything and everybody (each appearance of the monarchs is 
set in a different place, as if to emphasise the incessant 
distractions), through the deficiencies of human witness (such 
as Fibres’ account of the massacre * hardly an impartial 
report, but the only one the monarchs ever get), to the eternal
problem of finding the right balance between absolute standards 
of morality, the practical application!of humanlaw, and the 
maintenance of political .stability*' <?’• ? 7?7>k/y-.' , " ' ' ’• 
7 . ; The above eraroination of Lope’s presentation of the
King’©'behaviour arose from a desi re to ascertain the extent 
to which the villagers gain liberty after the death of the 
Comendador^ What may. we’conclude? '7?"> ... "" \ ■■ •7 • ' ’ . '
The Villagers may beysaidytoseek their natural 
liberty in the:only way open to them, that is, by voluntarily 
'submitting to just law, which they do in the closing scene 
of the play. 7 As X said earlier, that is\the only sense in 
which they may find a greater liberty/ let, while7it is 
certain that the new order imposed by.the Keyes Catolicos 
does offer just such an opportunity for the natural liberty 
Of their subjects, in -that it provides the coherent civil 
justice * hitherto/ lacking - necessary for the guidance and 
protection.of their natural liberty, an audience may see v 
that the law whichoffers this greater /liberty is by no means
close to being the rational and reliable touchstone which 
natural liberty requires. A spectator,.seeing the fragility 
of the order, and the qualifications and ambiguities of the 
King’s justice, must conclude that the liberty attained by
the Villagers is still, in the practical sense, in danger of 
being somewhat circumscribed. ; .
. <; . Frondoso, in his valediction, calls his audience
: . a ’’diecreto senado*1 (III, 801) -a sharp little-digi since, ; 
on his first appearance,Frondoso told us all about the a
vocabulary: of.flattery prevalent in the city -- but one which
• appeals ;,to our pretensions to being judges of what goes on 
around us. „A seventeenth-century man, if he were to reflect '
J on this problem of liberty in Fuenteovejuna, might consider
, a further point. The Keyes Ca tollco s were venerated for 
uniting the nation under the rule'of just law;: obedience to •• \ 
their law should, one would think, be the best way of assuring 
natural.liberty:that one could ask for. Although the play 
shows that,.even under the.Reyes Catolico s, law and liberty 
were less than perfect, that was^nevertheless,the "good 
old.days;? but those "good old days" were a very long time - 
ago - about 14O years -since when the unifying and construc­
tive movements visible in Lope’s dramatic re-creation have
; degenerated,into the destructive, fragmenting tendencies of 
the seventeenth century.; If natural liberty was fragile in 
the reign of the Keyes Catolicob, what meaning can it have . 
in the reign of Philip III.- or of anyone else? For Lope1 s . 
contemporaries, such comparisons can hardly have been :
’ It was, after all, only a few years before the play was 
written that Cabrera had noted in a relacion: "Habra i5 dlae
que amanecieron en la Puerta de Palacio, en la de Guadalajara 
en la da la parcel Real y \del ?SoX, ciertos papeles a-mode de 
libello o pasqulncon tales o semejantes paXabras, provocando 
a los pueblos que deepertasen, porque unprivado tirano que 
gobernaba, tenia ,.al pey y Reino en ultimo punto • ” Relacion 
da ted A ug. 2, 1608, in jftelacion.es de las Cosas Sucedidas ♦«.
10^ -
/'? ; Chapter XX, - • ■- .
•7 -Lope de Vega’s EL MSJQjR ALCALDE, Eh KEY
: As their titles might suggest, Lope’s SI Major Alcalde, 
el key, and Calderon’s SI Alcalde de Zalamea, the latter to be 
studied in the next chapter, have in common an examination of 
certain aspects of human justice. In telling us something 
about justice, El Mejor Alcalde, el Hey tells us, as does £1 
Alcalde de Zalamea, something about liberty, offering a picture 
of:human justicein itsentirety, from King to peasant, and 
of the problems of obedience and servitude within the unity ... 
of the theoretical system.. To begin with, remembering that 
liberty entails voluntary obedience to just law, I propose to 
examine the way in which Lope sets the idea of obedience in a 
realistic context, showing how far an impeccable theory does 
and does not work in an imperfect practice. Having done that,
I shall try to show this whole problem set within the problems 
(as the play presents them) of the entire state and its order.
The first lines of the play (vv. 1->Qp are a
f Edition used; Lope de Vega, ■ Comedians, I, ’’Cl&sicos ; < 
Castellanos,H : (Madrid,; 1960). •
descriptionofnatural justice and love couched in idyllic 
/terms. The swain (Sancho), addressing the natural beauty
of the, Galician flora and fauna, asks, rhetorically, if there 
?, could he a greater love than his5• there cannot, of course -
he maintains r because the intensity of his love corresponds 
with the quality of Elvira’s beauty, which could not possibly 
be surpassed,.even by Elvira. The traditional correspondences 
between nature, beauty, and love are thereby established, as a 
background against which the action which follows is'to take
'.•■place< ( ‘ ; ■■ \ ' ' ' '■ <:. •
However, when that description ends, Lope takes us
from the dream-world of pastoral happiness, which we might ,, 
have been anticipating, to the HrealH world of human behaviour 
and its consequences. This is not to suggest that, because 
Lope knows that such a/world does not exist, he is deflating 
the notion; ratherit<seems/to be a fleeting suggestion of 
the kind of happiness which-men,can Imagine but never attain, 
a happiness consisting in life lived according to;its criteria; 
once presented, these criteria of natural justice remain as 
a backdrop against which are played out the difficulties and 
deficiencies “of., /human beings. On this occasion, .the humane ' 
are those who comprise the peasant society, but,the,same 
pattern is repeated when we are introduced to other levels
• of society, notably that of the local gentry and that of the
monarch and Court; for what we see in this play is, not the 
difficulties of"goodies" struggling against the deficiencies 
of "baddies," hut the conscious and unconscious distortion of 
truth by all men* It thus transpires that we do not have to 
wait for Donibllo’s aberrations to see how men’s limitations 
pervert the order they themselves construct and approve; in 
fact, the very first scenes give us an indication of how and 
why that happens* '• - ' ■ ; '• ’ < ■ -•/ :
/ , When Sahcho and Elvira are teasing each other and
: going through the motions of courtship, it is all very light* 
hearted and harmless ;;: but what is noticeable is that , the 
previous evening, Sancho, in order to catch a glimpse of his 
beloved, was hiding behind a tree ("To, detras destos
..castanos,/’ te miraba, con temor,,r [45*6 ]), while Elvira, ' 
realising this, was irritated (".Queme enojei cuando yi/que 
entre las aguas ise vio* " 169*7-0 J) ; ?&fcd ; that Elvira fancies 
Sancho while pretending otherwise * she wants to see him ;; 
("Por aqul Sancho bajaba,/ o me ha burlado el deseo*": [61-2]), 
but,pretend© she is looking instead for some lost corales 
("^Hae halladounos corale©/ que en esta me.rgen perdl?" [75*6ji; 
and that Sancho realises that Elvira has accepted-., him .only 
when she finally tells him that women often say the opposite . 
of what they meant.... . /. *•’> 77?-
Sancho,.pue© tan cuerdo eres,--' ; ; .
advierte que las aujeres
.. '••■■s ?;<■< '.-r: .< ■ - ■??<:: 1,• •
’/ <- \\;hs.blsmcs>cuando,caiiaabs, >. ’ X ' '
?■ ::conc<?deaiO6 si negaaos: .. ...
;;-pcr<estp', y per lo quavea, / ‘ ;
nunca credito nos des, < = •• / ..
( < nicruelesniamo roses? /• ’’
- , ' ’ ' • , .porque todas nuestras cosas / •
se hah ;‘de .ehtender-al reves. (102-10).
That is all absolutely understandable, blameless, and comically 
familiar, but we still cannot avoid realising that this ■ 
essentially simple, basic, and benevolent human activity is 
dependent upon * or made, by humans, to seem dependent upon - 
concealment, secrecy, dissimulation,, and even lies. At the
end of the scene, Nuno approaches andSancho and Elvira 
decide that this is the moment to ask hie permission to marry. 
It quickly transpires that Nuno is delighted (he doe© not .. 
even bother to say ”yee”), but, while Sancho is putting the 
question, Elvira hides’behind a tree (”E1 suceso espero/ 
detras de aquel olmo017*8 J) and tells Sancho, J’... no 
digas que.yo quiero” (116). So we already see, in the 
relationships between two lovers and a kindly father, the < 
suitor hiding and his beloved concealing the truth, and the 
beloved hiding while the suitor conceals the truth from her 
father (nDe mi amor pagada,/ me dio licencia para hablarte 
ahora,”Ji8h-5p. ' •/ A/. ’ :•<' -/> '•
■ ■ Now, we might ;not pay much serious attention to all
of this? after all, two queasy moments in anyone’s life are 
1. asking the girl,- and 2. asking her father, while from a
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detached viewpoint both occasions are usually rather ...comical, 
and must seem so to the audience in this instance? Neverthe­
less, lope chooses to present it in considerable detail (the
' play could have begun at, say,, v. -15.4 > ( WNO<; uSancho, &tu 
. estabas aqu£?M J with ho loss to plot or exposition). '
Furthermore, he does not change the subject once,Nuno has 
given his permission, but rather, he'forces us to notice it: 
for in the following scene, when Sancho and Elvira are again 
alone together, they return to their lovers1 lies and lovers* 
cruelty (251 ff; Sancho lies even as he'admits the ft truth*.*’i 
cf. v. 2$2 **dijo mil veces que si.H Nuno did not say ”sih
..once, let alone a thousand times.' A trivial point, of, course, 
but on such trivial points do serious crimes,and serious 
punishments depend, later in the play). Why do they behave, 
in this way? Vanity, perhaps, or a hind of instant catharsis 
the creation Of tension and the pleasure of its,relief; at any 
rate, we all.do this, and in a similarly jocular' fashion.- 
But the joke may not always be funny, and it is Elvira who
. draws our attention to the notion which, in context, if we 
have not been noticing what is happening, is surprising: 
l*amor todo es venganzas** (270). This, she says,, is a lesson
- she has learned from the preceding events which we have just 
.witnessed; so we have-been warned, and are invited to realise. 
; what has happened as well as just to laugh at it. Only after
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,\all this, then, do the 16vers filially admit the truth to each 
other - “SANCHO* Luego, $ya soy tu marido?/ ELVIRA. ^No‘ dices 
que esta tratado?” (2?1-2) - yet Sancho ’ & parting comment as•
1 / the scene changes is, “me ha ensenado el amor/ a, toner 
. entendimiento“ (301-2). / . ... • '
v . / During these opening scenes, we not only find out 
. the. extent to which Sancho:and Blvira innocently distort :
matters, but also something more obvious, that is, how easy 
it is for other people to Come-between them;and their legiti-
•. mate and orderly goals. .This happens during the scene showing
■ Sancho trying to get Nuno’s consent, when Pelayo, although ,, .
without malice, constantly gets in Sancho’s way and renders, 
farcical and difficult a task which we might have expected to 
be serious and straightforward. Ideally, Sancho’s little 
speech (contained in 137*9, 166-9, 175 and 1?8) ought to be 
sufficient to. clear up the business in a few seconds, but in 
practice he is repeatedly baulked by Pelayo. At first sight,
’ it might seem as if,this were a visual representation of the .
. : </theme‘of the play - Pelayo, the gracloso who cannot Speak
; properly and sees sex in every remark (and is therefore, we 
complacently assume, perhaps, intellectually disordered), 
comes between Sancho and his heart’s desire by his Crude . 
affirmation of lusty However, we might notice that Pelayo, ... 
with his crude jokes and lustful assumptions, is nearer to ..
the truth of the matter in hand (marriage) than is Sancho:? 
Pelayo sees marriage for what it really is - the divine and 
human blessing on the act of procreation (cf. ’’fuera en tu 
casa yo mas importantei/ porque te diera cada mes^un nieto.”
229-jiO ),; and a struggle for material security: . , '?•?
; Con cuatro o eels cochinos que toviera,,
. Que estos parieran otros,•enseis anos ?
' . pudiera yo labrar una cochera. (190-2).;; :
Nuno’s blessing at the-.end of the scene, ’’Pues el cielo,/ ? 
Sancho, tu vida y sucesion aumente.” ?(222-3)♦ is only what 
Pelayo has been saying all along. In addition, Pelayo’s . 
remarks are pointing to the truth in another sense,' for he 
isr to begin with, only doing what Sancho alsO.has to do, 
viz., interpreting Elvira’s language?: that he interprets it 
wrongly is as much a, joke on Sancho and Elvira,as it is on . 
Pelayo. All through the scene, then, Pelayo<s absurdities = 
are juxtaposed with Sancho,’s formalities, but in the scene \ 
just described it is Pelayo who offers more truth. :
; Summarising the flavour of these scenes, it seems
that a:simple truth like love is thus hidden by other factors 
one of which is the .nature of words themselves, which, •? 
apparently, can either conceal or reveal the truth, according 
to the intent of either the speaker or the listener, but? 
which are ultimately dependent for the truth not on either of 
these,, but on the context of their referents./ (Thus, Sancho*
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words ”por Elvira me abraso y me consumo” 1169J are an 
acceptable cliche in- this context, as a;part of natural 
justice and ordered society, but .similar language uttered 
later by Don Tello cannot be so accepted.) ;: The, irony is, 
that the truth as suggested by Pelayo is rejected by Sancho 
and Nuno, who consistently tell him to keep quiet « from , 
embarrassment,J perhaps, or just irritation and. probably 
also by the spectators,; who very likely see Pelayo as a 
”dirty;old man,” in the comic sense, who is frustrating a 
”nice young man”,and his prospective father-in-law; so we, 
like Sancho and Nuno, do not like to. hear the .truth, but we 
are going to hear and see it whether we like it or not, and 
it may as.well be pointed out at this juncture, that Pelayo ; 
is frequently presented by Lope as a protagonist; who can 
direct us towards the truth, a point/to which I shall be 
referring again later* '
,? . The reason why all of that is/relevant to the theme
under examination may be found in the scene involving Nuno / 
and Pelayo; which is se t between•the.scenes involving1 the two 
lovers*. If, as suggested, the scenes between SanCho and 
Elvira show us the difficulties which human beings place in 
their own way in a--game, as simple; as love, we-might begin to 
reflect on the difficulties which beset them when they 
approach the far more.complex andpotentially dangerous
.. * 112.:- •>, •• '/ . •
problems of finding, keepings and protecting their place in ' 
society, where men’s courage, honesty, and altruism are rarely
- as apparent as they are between lovers,. This brings us to / 
the problem of service and obedience, in Which is involved - '
. the whole social structure of law on which liberty depends, - 
and which is immediately brought to our attention as soon as 
Nuno appears (-121 ff.), .Nuno is berating Pelayo for his .. 
incompetence as a shepherd, and his; first words? are ”Tu\ . / 
sirves .de tai.manera ” (121), Pelayo, then, is Nuno’s . 
servant (but not his slave), and as such may well be free . .
and happy by way ofobedience to Nunc, IF Nuno is a good 
master whose commands are just; as much is suggested by 
Nuno’s question,/’^Tienes algun descontento/ en mi casa?” 
(125*6); pelayo says ”yes”, whereupon (although Pelayo’s , .
complaint proves to be a joke) Nuno replies, HPues hoy tu 
servicio acabe,/ que el servir no es casamiento” (127*8 ).
This comment of. Nuno’s-indicates the liberty men. may find , 
in voluntary service to just law, and, indeed, Pelayo may, 
if he wishes, find a master whose law is more just than Nuno’s 
and thus find a greater liberty. However, although that is 
all very well in this mircocosm, these .theories are not so'., 
easily effected on a wider social level, and that ‘is to, prove 
one of the central problems of the play; for, although; Pelayo 
can easily change masters, Nunp cannot, neither can Sancho,
nor Elvira, nor hundreds and thousands of'other people of 
greater or lesser importance who all happen to live in this 
particular state sunder this particular government.: The . 
society, as the spectator knows, is comprised of many complex 
relationships between many complex people; we have been 
watching, and will continue to watch, the difficulties sur­
rounding one of the simpler relationships Clove) between two ' 
or three of the (superficially) simpler people. Nuno’s words 
may draw our attention to that:”el servir no es casamiento” ’ 
, (128 :just; after we have watched two lovers having great dif­
ficulty arranging a marriage); the statement is. true on the 
level, of Pelayo’s service to Nuno, but not on the level of, , 
say, Sancho’s to Don Tello, and that is where the problems ; 
begin| for, obviously, the difficulties surrounding much more 
complex relationships, such as obedience to just law, will be 
multiplied almost infinitely. } Pelayo may find liberty through 
service to Nuno, but will he find it through service to.Don 
Tello? Will Nuno? or Sancho? Will Don Tello - or any of 
them -■ find liberty through service to the King, on .whose s 
justice the Whole structure ultimately depends? .
The lovers are like everyone else:-they do not live 
in a vacuum,<and Xf we realise.that Nuno’s words to'Pelayo • 
are only relevant within certain limits, we ..should ponder the
• matter when Nuno addresses Sancho in exactly the same way,
n#u sirves a don Tello” (193)*: At this point we are being 
; drawn into the* wider problems of. putting theory into a wider
practice. What Nuno says is theoretically quite right, and 
.. if Don Tello is a just manobedience to him can therefore
protect the liberty of Sancho and Elvira; Nuno is less con­
cerned with formalities than with a dowry, thus eliciting a 
protest from Sancho.(HPesame que mi amor pongas' eh duda.11 
UJQ9J)» but that is not important - Nuno is not trying to 
offend Sancho (or Don Tello ), but merely.offering the .?
f- experience: derived from a knowledge of the dietary short- ..
<„ comings of the fruits of love. That Sancho .should obey Nuno\
because of the latter*s seniority is also quite just, as •
: Sancho admits: Hire, pues tu lo mandasJ’, (222), and also: -
. dice Nuno que.es razon, .
por ser mi duenO; en efeto, *
, < es viejo yhombre discrete . .
- . ’ ‘ y que merece opinion ’ . < ’ ■; -
- , ?, • , , por ser tu padre tambien, (283~7) . • '
; and it is therefore; an obedience which, since Nuno appears ;
to be a sensible and law-abiding man, should bring liberty; 
($ahcho’s UYo voy de/mala gana ,f?221 ], should not be . taken ‘ 
too seriously - a few minutes later he tells Elvira, nPlega 
al cielo que me den/ el y su hermana mil--cosas,'” 12$0-1 ] - > 
but, nevertheless, he. is again?trying to avoid an unromantic 
truth, and, nota bene, this is all among friends). Everybody
* it seems, is doing the right thing, and yet-this very action
of going to see Don Tello is one of the immediate eauces;of 
the disaster, Sancho, placing his vida and alma in the .hands 
of Elvira (who has just described love as venganzas), is now 
about to place himself in the hands of someone far less . 
anxious for Hiswelfare. - /' ’> ' • ; / •
. i- The difficulties of a system as delicate as the one
wo have been dealing with are thus presented in these opening 
scenesi and throughout the rest.of the play the whole problem 
of obedience and just law, with all its implications for what 
human, liberty means in practice, :is put before us* Thus it 
transpires that Sancho, for all the.right reasons, presents 
himself to his superior,, and, as a consequence, finds himself 
in a situation,not unlike that of Peribanez, who also went to 
present himself to his..master, but for all ,the wrong reasons. 
When we begin to wonder how this can happen in Sancho’s case, 
werought to continually bear?in mindthat the principle of 
obedience as the basisyof Justice and liberty lays a .great 
onus on both superiors and inferiors, but particularly on 
superiors, for obvious reasons.; Therefore we have to examine 
the concepts-:of justice and liberty within Don Tello, which I 
shall, now do, while a t ,;the same time examining associated 
problems within the context , y . ; . i' ' v 7^7’. . •
< .‘7 '• Oddly enough in view of later events, Don Tello at
first ajjpears to be what modern criticism calls a ’’sympathetic
- * •" ’ V:-;' ' /■-/i 116/- ''• . / - --
characterFrom his first appearance until he arrives at , 
the wedding he seems to be a model of decorum. He behaves*5 
as a noble, should, indulges in correctly noble pursuits, is- * 
courteous to his family, affable to his servants, and extremely 
civil and generous towards Sancho. However, just-as the-.. 
idyllic flavour of the first peasant scene.soon disappeared, 
so also within this harmonious picture of aristocracy do *
faint suggestions of difficulty make themselves apparent, . ... 
wheni for instance, the subject of pop Tello’s marital.status 
crops up (360-72); For we are. told that Don Tello, stuck out
, here in the backwoods, is himself something of a prisoner of 
the social structure s “El se'r aqui .poderoso/ no ine da tan
' cerca igual,” (363^^) .- he cannot, get married (or so he.saye)
■ becausej being the top; man in this peripheral area, there is
no-one of equal ^status with whom to make a match* Feliciana,
at this point, aiak.es the interesting comment that there would
be,nothing wrong with marrying a nice girl of lover .status *
a comment which becomes'relevant again later in the play - ;
which Don Tello laughs off with the suggestion that Feliciana
has an ulterior motive: *..•?.. ‘ ‘ .
'• . ’ . FELICIANA. No os estsbs/aqul tan nisi
. . ' de algun senor generoso
. ' \ ’ t ’ ■ ' ' la hija. ’ , ■ '
D. TELLO* ... . ■ • Pienso quo quieres * , ,
: reprehender no haber, pensado :
en. -ca-sarte, que e s cuidado , ?
que nace:con las ..raujeres. (363-70)
a " . This little exchange offers-three interesting •. *’ ,
points* One<isr.that Don Tello asserts his obedience to a 
certain social law, while Feliciana denies the importance of
. .said law; there are, then,?two sides to-this briefly-mentioned 
?topic, and later/.it becomes critical, Whether or not/this .
; law is just, aiid whether or not denial of it is consequently . . 
a deprivation of Don Tello’s liberty, is immaterial: he thinks 
he should conform, and that is what matters, and, given his 
attitude, we may feel that Don Tello’s station in life places 
restrictions on him with which most normal men would find it ■
. difficult to live for any great*length of time, These res­
trictions may be a .part of Don Tello’s liberty, but, in 
practice, what ensues is the destruction of liberty, The .
second point is, that in his reply to Feliciana, Don Tello 
ducks the question and (albeit in a casually jocular manner)
'suspe cts Feliciana of being equivocal; just as Sancho and 
Blvira’s world was shown to be less than idyllic, so Don 
Tello’s world of harmony is shown to offer its difficulties - '
. difficulties similar?to those of the; peasant world,. That
brings us to the- third pointwhich is that immediately * \\
following this;hint of truth about Dori Tello’s world, Sancho
■ . and..Pelayo enter, ; '• •,
. • •*. ' Thus, by . the time both sides , are brought face to
’ "face, we have been given several .indications-of, not just the -
difficulties themselves, but of the continual presence of 
the difficulties involved in these?social relationships, 
especially of those which depend on the ability'of fallible.;/ • 
men to hold fast to tiuith and: justice* These difficulties ’ 
were apparent evenbetween Sancho and Nuno, and between Sancho 
and Elvira, and now we have a situation where a vital relation 
ship between a superior and an inferior is ^relationship;>' ;
devoid ■ ofr such intimacy as the peasants?; enjoy‘^between them* 
selves. Don Tello and Sancho know each other by sight: that 
is all. In the play we are reminded that the, social distance, , 
between families suchDon Tello’s, and families such as" .. 
Sancho’s and; Nuno♦s, is greater than it' was. • Whereas,Nuno, .
as Sancho tells Don Tello, could once lay claim to some status
■ ... '•'>,** que aun tiene '-paveses < . t-’ • ?
■ \ ”• ’ > •"' ■ en las ya borradas arms. '- ; ;? - ' ' . ■ , ••
? .■•?« ?".- de su portal, y*"-con ellas, ?; . • '* ,z\ ?? , ‘ - ...
' v de aquel tieznpo, algunas lanssas, 19*22)
Sancho is just one of over a hundred people dependent on Don
Tello: ■ • . 4 .. / ; . ?; '■ ■
?■ ; pobre soy, y en este oficio
• ?' que os Mie dicho , cosa -'e's ' clara . ' . ■'■ ?? \ ■ •'
•' que no me conocereis, • ■ ?. ?'
■ •/*•; porque los ciiados pasan . , ? •??.■,'■ ,? .
? . ? de ciento y treinta personas
* , . que vuestra x’acion :ague,rdan , ?. ? ’
y vuestro salario esperan. \ (39^*97).
The main difference between a vanished past and a less comfort 
able present is that, nowadays, people such as Sancho and Nuno
serve a master:/ ■- / ■
.. fue-mi-padre . .. .
' " hombre de bien, que pasaba - c '
, sin servir. • (Mi-13)
. . Clearly,’ that .change in the relationship between
thesuperior, and the inferior is significant. Theoretically,
there is no reason why a man should be. considered less free
when serving a master than he would be otherwise, provided
the master *s law is just. But in the proviso lies?the problem
the peasants’ law and liberty now depend on Don Tello, arid
this dependence is an important aspect of the plot.j Human
liberty requires voluntary obedience and co-operation;.however
that obedience is, in one sense, less than voluntary, as
Pelayo’s joke suggests at the end of :the scenet . \ . *
.Todos guardamos, senora, 
lo que : \ \
. • \ ‘ ' .» <• nos raandan ’ ? • , '
■ C • nuestros padres que guardemos.f(497-99)
That is irrelevant if the superior’s law is just, for divine 
law ordains the station;, to which a man is born. 'But the joke 
is emphasising the fact that Pelayo and- Don Tello have much
. in common despite their difference in station, in that Don 
Tello has., inherited his high estate just -as Pelayo has " ’ • 
inherited his low estate; it may be questioned, therefore, 
whether one man’s law, as it pertains to social and civil \ 
matters, is likely to be worthy of any greater respect than
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another*®* The nub of the problem seems to be, though, how 
can these intricate relationships work, when even simple ?. 
•relationships present; such problems? ; - • *
." "It should be pointed out; that, while Don Tello has
so far fulfilled satisfactorily his .obligations'towards his
subordinates., and has ruled out romantic relationships with
girls of . inferior rank, Sancho - albeit only for.harmless
snobbery or simple pride, - has repeatedly told Don Tello
that he, Nuno and .Blvira, are almost as ngoodn (meaning' t!as
noble1’) as Don. Tello, =e*g*, * • ‘ • ■,
‘ . .,/ Pero-en. Galicia, sehores,
1 es la gente tan hidalga,
•, • que solo en ser.vir,. al. rico c ,
• el que es pobre no le iguala, (387~9Q)
; He.. tra tado de c asarme.; ' . ' j
■ . con, una;doncella; honradar . :
\ hija de Nuno de Aibar, . , , ;
• : hoffibro que*.sue campos labra, '
perp, que aun tiene paveses '.
/ , . . . en las ya horradas'armas ■ ■ ’ .
\ ' de su portal, y con ellas, .
- - de aquel' tiempof algunas. lahjaas. (4*1^«2£) - •
< If Don Tello wanted; to take this seriously,, he could see it 
as a reduction, of his obligation? it would only’.be so in word 
rather than deedp.and of course would not. justify abduction
< and .rape, but the words .at any rate are spokenp, and words can, 
v often if not always, serve’.to obscure the distinctions of
truth*, lope seems to be .drawing'ourpattention to this via 
the 'comments..of'..Pelayo, who, as suggested be fore, often points .
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to the truth in the situations presented. Thus, when Don 
.Tello describes the honours, material and otherwise, that, 
he proposes to bestow .on Sancho, Sancho understandably
, voices admiration of his benefactor, while Pelayo inverts 
everything Sancho says: /• • \ •/.;••• /' ' "
/?■;' X'-'X SANCHO.
• '' • ’ • PELAYO.
SANCHO.
PELAYO.
. SANCHO.
■ PELAYO.:'- :
‘ . SANCHO. ■
, " PELAYO.
- SANCHO.
< ’’ ’• - PELAYO.
' JTanta merced L7\\X •' * ’ • '
. ' iMerced tantai
I Tan grande biehi < .
. . < i Bien tan grande i
IHarh virtudi? •’ ■- •
IVirtud raral . .
■ iAlto valor J • < ‘ -- , .
: ; iValor alto 1
iSantapiedadi : ,
v X iPiedad Santa 1 (446-$0)
not change the meanings of the words, 
put into our minds the idea of dichotomy
' ; These inversions do
’ obviously,, but they
and ambivalence, and Pelayo even hints that that is his inten- 
. , tion ’’Soy el que dice al reves/ to das las cosas que habra,”
. (4$r5-A)» the fact that (in this case) reversal; does not, . >
change the meaning-of the words is in itself an indication of •
. ; the vagueness of language, and later we find that the kind of
munificence Sancho' applaude. at this point can, in another '■ 
i. • context, become totally sinister (cf. ’’Prometela plata y oro,/
• Joyas y cuanto quisieres... [etc.]” .1277-88).But what is 
the danger.in this instance? Knowing the play, we naturally 
. have to say that. Don Tello’s honouring of Sancho’s wedding
. ; turns out. to be a cursef but, beyond that, we seem to be . •
watching the problems inherent in the idea of;8 man’s liberty 
being dependent;on another man’s justice, in the same way 
that, as Nuno knows, their livelihood is dependent on another, 
man’s generosity- The reaction of the superior to the *
inferior can, .and does, vary, apparently, and the consequences 
can be enormous^■as'the play goes on to demonstrate, as a ; 
corollary;of..men’s inability to cope with a system of whose 
demands they are.more or less aware. . '•//.’ •.
What reduces men’s ability to cope with the system 
is'suggested by Don Tello and Celio after Sancho and Pelayo 
leave, when Celio denies Don Tello’s imputation that his 
judgement of Elvira is clouded by passion: nD. TELLO. . Bien 
se ve, Celio, que habias/ con pasion. CELIO- Alguha tuve . •. ” 
(512-3). All men are susceptible to such clouding of the 
reason, including those in authority; obedience tola man 
distorted by passion is not liberty -he who denies his reason 
is denying his,own natural liberty, and hence of necessity •; 
does not govern others rationally -f-but'the situation must ", 
often, arise. That much is obvious to a detached observer, 
but someone involved in such a situation does.-not appreciate 
the pleasing logic of the syllogism -quite the reverse: he 
tends to become similarly disordered (cf. Fuenteovejuna).
. ... The irony is,-that - given the qualifications of
human motivation, which are going to beset any system - the
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flavour of most of the first. act, until the. wedding scenes, ’ 
suggests that everyone involved in meeting t he.requirements 
of the system: they are-'all. doing the right thing, ,.Sancho
- courts Elvira- according to, custom; Elvira coyly accepts,■ . 
according to custom; they both realise they must ask Father, : 
according to custom;. Father benignly approves Sancho’s . <’ ' • • ' ’ ’ , * - ',r . ' '' - " ■
request, and then tells Sancho to report it all to the: local 
senor; Sancho dutifully obeys-Nuno and reports to Don Tello;
; Don Tello lives in a manner befitting a noble; Don Tello 
greets Sancho courteously and treat’s him magnanimously; and 
Sancho and Nunc are delighted: by Don Tellers generosity as 
well as by hie honouring of the wedding with his presence / 
(523 ff. ) * Sancho even bestows on Don Tello the highest
• accolade, “un aenor todo perfetod*' (546). let,, from all 
these impeccable actions and strict adherence to recognised 
conventions, disaster ensues, and Sancho and Elvira, who do 
most of all to conform with the requirements (obedience to 
Nuno, Don Tello, the King etc,), are the ones who suffer most 
from,the calamity. How so? , ‘
; The answer is partly to be found in the parting
words of Don Telloand Feliciana after their.interview with
Sancho: ; -• \ ‘’ , - ■ '
/- , D. TBIXO. ‘ Hay algunas ..lab rad eras, . . ' . ,
*' • que,, sin afeites hi galas,' '•• ■ ... .\-
’ < sueien, lievaree 'loe ojos,?
• ya vuelta dellos el alma? '
. • pero son tan desdenosas, <
•_ que' sue melindres me cansan* - *
FELICIANA. Antes, las que se defleaden
•' suelen ser mas:estimadaa. ($15*22)
Dori Tello, who professes to have little interest in peasant 
girls, says that the pretty ones are too disdainful to be 
attractive, whereupon Feliciana remarks that ’’unwilling” ... 
girls ought to be held in higher rather than lower esteem. .
This ,little aphorism of Feliciana .sounds logical enough, but 
is really rather emptysince, in practice, it is as likely 
as not■to result: in paradox, for if resistance to seduction- 
increases admiration it will thus increase desire. (Later,
'we see Don Tello' caught,.;in just such a paradox, as drawing- 
room chatter turns into a real situation.) .Don Tello’s 
attitude to peasant girls is thus compatible with the system - 
but only until one does arouse his interest,rwhich is to say, 
his: self-interest. The point is, that these are only?words - 
perhaps uttered in all sincerity, but nevertheless only words - 
which can be either forgotten, or given another mean; ing by 
self-interest, when other passions, other contexts, distort 
their original meaning. . ... . -
; ‘ - “• -< ’ In the following, scene; we find the complement of
this observation, as Sancho and Nuno preen themselves on the .
success of the former’s interview with Don Tello; their 
■satisfaction is not occasioned by the fact that the conventions
have b0n duly observed, but by the fact that; the conventions 
have worked to their advantage. Naturally enough, everyone 
Don Tello, Nuno,/Sancho etc. is satisfied<with the system • 
for. as long as it protects>their interests** Thus, although
. Sancho and Nuno shortly change the subject (561 ff»), Lope ;
’ * , ‘ \ » At' . » . v f * ' * -. •
does not: the speech and behaviour of Sancho, Elvira and " .
, Nufio are as susceptible as anyone else’s to* the distortions
of self-interest, vanity, passion of whatever, and the point 
of the foregoing is to suggest that when we look for reasons 
to:explain the sudden disorder of this apparently ordered- 
section,of society, it is not enough just to point at Don
' Jfello,. although the greatest responsibility roust be his. We 
are given ,an opportunity to examine these implications in 
the scenes of the wedding and the abduction which close the 
first; Act. . ~ • v. ' \ *; •. *’,/' * ' -
, Immediately obvious, in the; wedding scene is, once* - 
again, the presence of Pelayo, who, we might recall, has -
. shown that he knows exactly what marriage is all about - he . ' 
can see the truth behind the circumlocutions. We might also' . 
recall that Nuno and Sancho are intensely anxious to impress
< Don Tello with their .past glory and present honour, ef*:
NUNO. lOhl, si aquesta casa fuera, . .
‘ • pues los huespedes espera . .
. mas ricos y poderosos. ' •
. ' ;deste reino, un gran palacio * • * (536-9) ■
and quiero/ que ehtiendaeste caballero/ que soy algo
o que :io fux,n (576*8), Now the whole community, from senor 
to ’’clown”, is present at a^ceremonywhich involves the whole 
community, and ail t,he themes previously defined,come together*
' After greeting Nuno and Sancho,; the first thing Don Tello does 
is to cast an eye over the girls he sees; we may or may riot 
like to; take . this?.seriously5 it is perhaps only the kind of
•behaviour we see in a man who winks at all the waitresses. ,
- However, we have to connect it with Don Tello’s social situa*
tion and its attendant restrictions, and it is Pelayo who, .
constantly draws attention to Don Tello’s excessive interest
< vin. the womenfolk? ’MGomo pescuda por ellas,/ y por los zagales 
noi” (611*12); One aspect which may strike.us about the
; whole scene is, that’while Pelayo * in distracting Don Tello 
just as he distracted Sancho when the .latter was asking for 
Elvira * s hand *' is hit ting t he nail on the; head, he is con* 
stantly brushed aside, not only by Don Tello, but also: by; . >
Sancho and Nuno ! Don Tello’s irritation is to be expected,
: but the opprobrium heaped upon Pelayo by Sancho and Nuno seems 
designed to indicate something to us, for what Sancho and Nuno 
are doing is rejecting the truth Pelayo offers; perhaps that 
is because they would rather not face it, but it seems more " 
likely that,/it is"because Pelayo is ruining their attempts to 
impress Don Tello, which, in turn,’is perhaps! why Pelayo -
rejteats, in essence, the quip we recently.(498-9 quoted
above) heard him offer to Feliciana: nAqi' mi madre me hizo”
(618). At/any rate, Nuno eventually tells Pelayo explicitly
to go Pomev/here, else; ? ’ « . ’ ; ' •
PELAYO. Y yo, iadonde he de sentarme?
\ . NUNp.?- Alla. pn ?la caballeriza .
. : tu la. fiesta solemnize.. . -
D. TELLO.', 1Por Dios quo siento abrasarme J.»- .
?'■ £ Como 1 a no via se 1 la ma? *
Pelayo, /senor.: #
: f-~'v ? 4N0 quieres ■ .
cellar? ? Habla a las mujeres,
. . y cuentaete tu por dama, ; (643*50)
(an ironic twist in itself, since"habla a las mujeres” is 
what/Pelayo is saying about Don Tello). Those concerned,
PELAYO.
NUtfO.
then, rather thail hear'the truth spoken aloud, try to push 
it into the background; it is.Worth; noting that, later in 
the play, the Kingtreats Pelayo with much more.respect.; It 
is also worth noting that, later in the play, when. Don Tello 
reveals his feelings to Elvira, most of us in the audience 
probably feel a sense of shock: we too do not always want to 
hear pertain things, even if true. . - ' . ; . ..
; . When Elvira is brought-into the^wedding feast, Don
Tello is smitten, and from this point on his reason is sub* . 
ordihated to his. passions. There is little point in remarking 
that he should not let this happen, and particularly not with 
girls of inferior status; our starting point * and Lope’s * 
is that it does happen,';in which event, what do our theories
■ -V - -128 - : • , ; ’
mean when transported from hypothesis to reality? '
; / .< It would be useful to examine firstDon Tello’s
speech and behaviour, in order to summarise briefly the
’ nature of the intellectual disruption ;within.and the con­
, . sequent denial of.,reason Without• This self-imprisonment
of Don Tello’s begins as soon as he acts on his desire for 
Elvira -deeds first, words later# Thus, he forbids the 
entry of the priest, and from then on uses this non- / .
appearance of the priest' as ;a pretext for not returning 
Elvira to Sancho, and as a sort of justification for his 
behaviour which he foists upon everyone, from peasants to 
King< The sad paradox of the attitude he assumes makes 
itself apparent immediately and continually, e.g., in his
' spurning of Sancho’s courtesy with words that are equally , * 
as applicable to himself as they are to Sancho : ’’I Que con- 
dicion tan yillanal/ iQue puesto en su gusto estal” (681-2). 
His obsession with Elvira, and with his own gratification, ;
drives him to ignore'the warnings of his own servant, Celio 
(who, within Don Tello’s household, is often the spokesman
/ for common sense), cf. 727*50• When-’we next see Don Tello, 
j at the .beginning of Act 2, his reasoning verges on the absurd.
He is trying td tell Elvira that ;Daneho : ' •
.. / ’’ • . No>es tu esposoi —
; , ni un villano, aunque dichoso.
./ . - digno de tanta hermosura, i’’ (886-8)
Belying on an irrelevant legal; quibbld after he himself had 
twisted the law to make the quibble possibly he avoids the 
fac t that, by the same token , she is not worthy of ..him,' Don - 
Tello, His other arguments are as foolish as, Elvira shows 
them to .be, and,-presumably, Lope *s.only - point in putting 
them before us is to make us aware,of DonTello^sself-
. deception as caused by his twisting of reason: e
- ; TELLO,. Dices que no puede ser • . , . ••
■ " '' yer,i;._ desear y querer? ,
. ; • ELVIRA. ; Es verdad. ■ ‘ ; . - . , .
, D. TELLO. ; Puss dime, ingrata, • ; ‘
>;?■. < icomo el basiliscQ mata
• •, ", con solo llegar a ver? . ..
t ELVIRA. Ese es solo un animal.
D. TELLO. Piles ese fuetu hermosura. , (924-30)
? Elvira, of course, can only trot out all the usual explanations
of amor which Don Tello and the audience already know, but 
this has no effect on Don Tello because he is trying to
. justify that which he already knows is wrong - hehce silly ‘ 
.paradoxes such as neres necia en ser discretaP (946) - doubly
paradoxical since he had said before that disdainful girls 
bored,him($19-20 quoted above), ; : ‘
' What we watch'and hear is Don Tello’s destruction 
of his own liberty, which is’.what turning away from .reason, /■
■ choosing evil, entails; Don .Tello’s own words give him away: « 
.comparing Elvira’s beauty with a basilisk, he is implying
. that Elvira is similarly governed by instinct and hence not
endowed with the faculties of reason and choice,. Elvira’s
. •rebuttal, ? ‘ ‘ . <- ■ Y? '■
‘ . »• ELVIRA. El basilisco mortal ,: ,' ’ : • ?
• '■ mata teniendo; intencion . - / ' ■
. '• • ;; •. de matar; y es/la razon * ' v-
tan ciara, que mal.podia
- ; ’ * matarte cuando te .via; '.Y ... ••
para ponerte aficioh, (932~8) \
suggests that the behaviour of the'basilisk represents ’ 
obedience to natural law, i.e., the fulfilling of a true end 
in life, whereas the true end of Elvira’s beautyvis; not the 
gratification of Don Tello’s desires and neither is that :. 
the true end of Don Tello’s position, power, and strength.’ 
Elvira’s,words, ’’Ese es solo un animal” ( 929.)« focus our .... 
attention on all of this* (A few moments later Don Tello is 
again denying natural law, denying his own sister; ”^Es 
posible que tu seas/ mi hermana?” J~989*?C j )., Don Tello
proceeds to assert that he is 
treat Elvira like this; that, 
as he has been told,/not only 
but also implicitly by Sancho
obeying laws which force him to . 
however,; is not strictly true, 
eaqolicitly by Celio; and Feliciana, 
and Nuno. More to the point, he
refuses to try to see beyond this dubious human law to which 
he claims allegiance, refusing to face higher laws, natural.
and divine laws, which forbid this kind of behaviour and which 
certainly do not admit of transgression for the sake of a 
silly human convention; such is the kind of danger referred
•; -; ;> • . - 151 ■ - .. ■ . - ,t
. to earlier a propos -of Don Tello’s adherence;to an accepted • 
convention* , .t . . . .. ..
, A phrase which reveals what all this means in terms
of liberty is, estas leyes, a quien yo/ he de obedecer ,
. por fuerza,” (957r8); as liberty consists in voluntary 
obedience to just law, the words ”por fuetfza," if °estas
, leyesh are justj give away Don folio’s loss of natural liberty,
his submission,to his own unreason; while, if ’’estas leyes”
are unjust', a possibility which has already been suggested to
the audience - . . ... , , ' >■' - • ‘ •
' . ■' . - Despues que:. della me. cause, • -
?•• podrS ese -r.fi stico necio - ... .. • ,
. . • ’• casarse 5: que yo dare'..' •.. ■ ’
ganado, hacienda ,y dinero .< ■ v ,
. . . , ; con que viva; que esarbitrio .
i :’'de‘ muchos, como lo vemos , ’ .
•; . , en ,ei:mundo • • : /' ' • ;i ■ (741-7)
- then Don Tello,(who is in a better position * than anyone to ’
' disobey an unjust' law,.especially an unwritten social law) is 
just using the custom, and providing us with another example 
of words being used in an,attempt; to disguise behaviour... Of 
course, such pros and cons are again merely academic:, the 
only important and relevant point is that'Don Tello has
.forcibly abducted another man’s betrothed and is seeking to 
induce her to sin, .If his cause Were.just, he could command . 
her obedience,band she could obey in freedom; a© it- is, • 
obedience by Blvira to, Don Tello;would be a denial of her
■ '•< • *132' - , .
natural liberty; When reason breaks down withiri a man, it is \ 
not only his own natural liberty which is threatened, but also 
that of those around, him - to.what extent being .dependent only
■ on the extent off his power . \ •
. , • ' Obviouslyi we may reasonably allocate to Don Tello .
the major responsibility for what happens, and,we will no ' .
doubt sympathise with, or ’’side with,!’ Sancho in>his opposition 
to the crime., .But there are other things to be seen which in ; 
real life we might overlook, or regard'with indulgence, but .
* which Lope has deliberately put before us. I refer to the v
• extent ~ limited though it ;may be * to which Sancho and Elvira ■ 
expose themselves to the aberrations of Don Tello. This was
.. only hinted by the earlier scenes, when Sancho and Nuno were 
so excited by Don Tello’s munificence, but it gradually becomes 
more obvious> first in Sancho’s and Nuno’s rejection of
; < Pelayo’s observations on Don Tello’s behaviour at the wedding,
and then in Sancho’s and Elvira’s behaviour after Don Tello 
has left the wedding. For Sancho and Elvira, too, break a ' 
moral laws they are not married properly, the priest has not 
bestowed God ’s', blessing on their union, but they intend to -
• consummate the union anyway.; All. very understandable, but \ 
the interesting thing is, that.they feel constrained to revert
■ to the same kind of\secrecy and stealth that we noticed in 
their pre-marital relationship (this time with Sancho coming\ ;‘ .
. - -/•;/ . /-.•? 133 - .... . • - / : < ■■ . . y;
to the back door in the middle of the night), and/even to their
>. former ‘double-talk : ./ •’ ' :'--y \
• • /ELVIRA. Ya - eree'f; Sancho, mi, niarido : J//... '• .- -
. .. , ven esta npche a mi puerta./- . .<> .
: SANCHO.’. ^Tendrasla, mi bien, abierta? . - - . •• *'
'■■■ ' ' • /ELVIRA. ' Pues, tnoi 7 ‘ /. '/' y/\ . - .. - , •
<y ... SANCHO. ":Mif-remedio/haside. (715^8)/
Love etill depends on these subterfuges: although an outside ; 
agency has created a different situation, their behaviour is 
essentially similar to their behaviour at the beginning.
(When Sancho does, come to Elvira’s back door, he is accompanied 
by Pelayo, a reminder that Sancho, having ignored Pelayo up ' 
to now, is here demonstrating-the truth of Pelayo’s view of 
marriage.) . • * •/. ‘ . y '• ’ - ■ ■■ ■ .>.
. However, the main point-,which Lope’s structure seems
to emphasise is that Elvira is abducted with ease because of 
the;tryst she had with Sancho,,a tryst which is arranged a 
. few seconds after Juana’s- comment./on Don/Tello’© power / «■ ‘ - .,•/
.(“PELAYO. Pues don Tello, &puede hacello?/ JUANA. Cla.ro esta,
: pues. lo mando.” [70.1*2"]) - a tryst which Sancho, in the
style of Don Tello, seems to try to justify via word-play; .; /
. : ELVIRA. No quisb que el cura entrara. ...
. . ... SANCHO.. terq si te persuades . ♦ ‘
'•'/■ •■'/'... '•/' a abrirme, sera mejor; . • ' > -\ -
/ • / • ' y< . que no es mal-.cura el amor ., > .
. . . . ' . /para sanai voluntades.,. ‘ ...(722-6) . ■ •
'Elvira is anticipating that tryst when she- opens the door to 
Don Tello’s cohorts (“Entra, Sancho de mi vida” 17537).*' ’ ‘ -
because Pelayo wan right in betting that Elvira would be 
waiting by the door for Sancho’s knock: (nApostare/ quo esta 
por el agujero/ de-la ;1 lave Elvira atentar” f?8lrX3),• Blvira ?- 
falls into Don Tello’s-hands* 4 Sancho and Elvira are as ,t 
guilty of.. breaking a law as, is Don Tello? their guilt is- 
hardly of the earne category as Don Tello’s , naturally, and 
certainly does not justify or nullify the latter’,© crime, ' 
but the action does suggest that responsibility for the . 
disaster is not entirely on one side, in the sense that law , 
breaks down on all-sides, Natural liberty is obscured when 
a ruler behaves as Doh Tello does; hut it is also obscured 
when Sancho-and Elvira behave the way they d.o\ and for.
similar reasons. It is understandable * even valid- for . 
Sancho to blame Nuno for.the crime’s being- possible: 
uCriado«son de don Tello,/ a quien me mandaste.hoblar?/ ; 
imal haya, amen, el consejoi” (802-4) and f’Tu me accusejuste 
el dano,/ accusejame el remedio,” (827-8)? but Sancho himself 
is also implicated, and so. is Elvira, All men are capable of 
the imprudence which disrupts law and'liberty, as well as 
individuals alone, and Sancho implies as much a few moments ,
. later: ' • • . • > -
iQue trujese yo a mi casa 
el fiero leon sangrlento 
que mi Candida c orders >.
..me robarai ^Estaba ciego? .
Sx estaba; q ue no etit ran bien -
■ ‘ - poderosos Caballeros . , .\ ~
/ : ’ en las casss de los pobres , ’ <
. ... . que tienenricos empleos, (8M-8)
but he has had to learn the lesson the hard way. In view of
what he says ■from hindsight, ■- . - ' 7 . . ... -
. ' . . Claro esta que es el senor ,.7
qUe la ha llevado a su pueblo;
. ; . 7 •> •. . que el no me dejar casar ■ - ' ■ ■ ‘ /•. . -
; es el indicio mas c'ierto, ’ 7; (809-12);.
he might have had the foresight to tell Elvira to lock 7 " 
herself in rather than stand -by the door ready to open it; \
- but such things are. always obvious with hindsight, and less 
so at the time of decision, and we could hardly have expected
; . SanchO'- or anyone else, probably * to think rationally in T
the circumstances, of his spoiled wedding. The tragedy,
77 -7 perhaps, is not so much that such imprudence as we have
./ witnessed on both sides is likely, but that it is inevitable.
In practice, then, our talk about law and liberty is.only, 
relevant until the next human failing makes itself evident^ 
That is not to relieve Don Tello of any guilt * he Is. clearly 
the immediate cause of the calamity; I am only pointing: out 
that. XiOpe is not letting us escape the ^realisation of our 
limitations by booing and hissing at Don Tello. ’
.. Another indication of the;gulf between theory.and , 
practice is provided in the wedding scene by Sancho, who at 7- 
bne point refuses to obey Don Tello. This is Sancho’s first
act of disobedience; it is not meant to show that Sancho has 
/ begun to realise that he "should not obey an unjust ruler, or
some similarlyhtheoretical;argument; it is just that he draws 
a line at the amount of .attention Don Tello is to pay to his 
bride* Again, we notice how Sancho finds a pretext, which
. sounds valid but is irrelevant, for disobeying Don Tello,
J (HD< TELLO. Sentaos* SANCHO.: To tanto favor,/ y mi senora 
; presente,H;[637*8 J)| so that Feliciana is able to smooth 
. . .things out; but when Don Tello really; wants something, there
is no stopping him* So, when Don Tello can no longer resist 
■; the'temptation to try to possess Elvira himself, no-one can
make him corns’to his senses-.* not Elvira, not Feliciana, not 
Celio, certainly not Sancho and Nunoj not even the King. He 
wants the wedding stopped, and the wedding is stopped.
. Sancho*s willingness to obey or disobey now becomes unimpor* 
:tant. It is all very well to.cay that man’s liberty demands
liis .obedience to;reason, and then calmly to discuss the 
extent of his obligation to obey, reasonable law or to disobey
- unreasonable law, but Lope; here confronts his audience with
the uncomfortable realisation that none of,the academic 
arguments mean very much in practice; for, in the kind.of 
real-life situation which Lope is inventing for us here, the 
only thing that counts is, who has the power* Don Tello has 
only to say, ”no'entre el cura” (660), and’ the feast stops;
he has only to brush aside Sancho’$ attempts to reason with 
him,, ’’No me dilates, senor,/ tanto bien; mis ansias mira ... 
(etc.)” (669*80), with an inappropriate contempt ”SQue con* . 
dicion tan villanai/ »Que puesto ensu gusto estai” (681*2), 
calling Sancho’s desire -to conform, with natural law ”vplun- . 
tad poCo honesfca” (686); he has only to tell Nuno to take 
Elvira home and call it.a day - ’’Llevala, Nunof.y descansa/ 
esta noche.” (687*8); and there is nothing anyone can do .
about it. Hence Juana’s simple comment ”pues,5 lo mando” (702).
It is implied, then, that, for all the theories of > 
mutual dependence, the master-vassal relationship is ultimately 
a one-way relationship; the weaker is dependent upon the 
stronger. Speh a system can still assure men life, liberty, 
and salvation, if, but only if, the stronger element recog­
nises its own responsibilities to law and behaves accordingly. 
When justice - natural, divine, or other * is denied by the
\ stronger, liberty is destroyed and service becomes slavery; 
if we do not deduce this, Don Tello makes it clear to us in
’ ’ his ’’conclusive” argument to Cello, \
•' . ; Finalmente, y /«.. • \
■' ' yo;soy poderoso, y quiero, . .
; . . pues este hombre.no‘ es casado,.
.. ' ivalermede lo que puedo, . (747*50) ’
and in the actual deed ;of Don’Tello in abducting Elvira.., .. , ■
Nuno’s despairing cry, . ; ■ -- ;
x ’ . , . ' ■ Pero mis caducos. anos
y mi desmayado esfuerao,
_ ? . :■'?'■• £que podran cOntra la fuerza : • ■ .<
\ 'de un poderoso mancebo?1? ‘ / (761-4)
curses his own inability to? do anythingbut young wen’ are 
in the same, predicament, and '.-as we watch Sancho *s anguish 
in the last scene, the word poderoso is repeated again,
”.* un hombre poderoso,/ y el mas rico deste reino1” (814*5) 
and yet again, ”que no entran bien/ poderosos caballeros ...” 
(845-6). Where indeed can Sancho find justice, when power 
is law, and the most-powerful man in Sancho’s world is the < ' 
one who has flouted; the law? Whence, justice haying Veen 
destroyed, it is logical that Sancho’s reason be affected,, 
and Act I ends with Sancho’s cries of death and madness.
Thus, Act I. ends on a note of despair, the terrible 
despair of a man who senses that no principles of justice can 
be enforced against■someone who has transgressed laws pertain­
ing to -the most intimate depths ofhis life and being, because 
the guardian of justice is its transgressor. This is, in \ 
essence, the despair•of being governed by a tyrant. Act II, 
it may be noticed, begins on the same note as does Act I, but 
now the themes which began Act I - word-play, secrecy., dis­
honesty, all present among thy; closest and best-intentioned 
of. human relationships are shown in.a context which is much
more difficult and has much wider implications than the con­
text of everyday human affairs, that context being human
; “ -W~:. /'“/ . ; ■ ,
justice,, and, with it, human liberty\ •.
• 1 , , The awkward aspect of Don Tello’s self-defence - '
that Sancho and Elvira. were not yet married - is that",legal 
quibbles are not illegal. .Morality, and common-sense may .
, shout aloud that Don Tello’s point is so.absurd that it <" 
cannot.be taken seriously; but morality and common-sense 
are not always conspicuous inhuman affairs (if ever) - 
after allj Sancho and Elvira tended to justify their illicit ..." 
tryst in the same -way, the difference being that they said 
they were married, but were not - and that can be taken 
seriously, particularly when it means that a ridiculous /. 
legal quibble is used to pervert justice. So, as we watch 
all this, we may be asking ourselves, can justice depend on 
such absurdities? Since Don Tello obviously knows that his 
abduction of Elvira is criminal, we may say that it does not; 
-howeverj in the; sense, that, for all concerned, Don Tello is, 
nominally, the arbiter of justice, it obviously does.. Later, 
when the King becomes involved, we find that this kind of ? 
ambiguity in fact persists. . . .
'•'> Regarding the first scenes of Act II, then, we find
that the word-games and the dissimulation are more serious 
problems when they become part of man’s system of justice. ... 
The light-hearted games of Act I are suddenly very sinister, . 
as Elvira is ordered by Don T.fellp to hide (99® ff*)» Sancho
and Nufio pretend that they trust Don Tello (1007 ff.), and ’
Don Tello feigns'ignorance and innocence (1079 ff<). All
protagonists present are trying to avoid uttering the plain
truth, but‘nevertheless Sancho offers Don Tello an analogical “
truth and the opportunity to make a choice. The truth is
insinuated in Sancho *s description of his thoughts'about-_the"
moon; and the flora? ‘
Sail a los campos, y a la luz que excede
a las eetrellas, que miraba en.v’ano,
a la lunsi VeloK, que .retrocede -
las aguas y las crecq al Oceano ,' • <
"Dichosa, dije, tu, que no te puede.-.
quitar el sol:ningun poder humano '
con subir cada noche .donde subes, A.'
\ , aunque vengan con mascaras lasnubes.” ; .
' Luego, volviendo a los desiertos prados, ,
- durmiendo con los,alamos de Alcides s >
las yedras vi con, lassos apretados, \
... y con los verdes pampanos las vide si?
ViAy 1, dije, icomo est&is tan descuidados?.
Y tu, grosero, 'Icomo no divides, ; -'.-
,villano labrador,: estos amores, , : 
cortando ranias y rompiendo flores?n (1039-5^)
The scenes depicted.represent natural justice and harmony, but, 
with the justice and harmony of his own life overthrown, Sancho 
feels driven to disrupt the justice he sees in nature; he is, 
it.seems, describing the breakdown of law in himself, which 
has resulted from a-breakdown on a higher social level, and 
which leads .him to a t tack natural justice by hacking branches 
from the tallest tree: "Hague al &rbol nias alto, y a reveses/, 
y tajos iguale sus blancas mieS.es. H (1061-2) . He says he did. 
it.because "... fue tan alto y arrogante,/ que a Ids demas
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Como a pequenos 1064*5), but. there has to be a tallest
tree, there has to be a superior! and Sancho is denying the
natural hierarchy.if he quarrels with that! Meanwhile, -the' ;
choice he of fers Don Tello, is'/implicit'in his lie , about his-, ;
defence, of Don Tello__ , : '■
/f ’ ’MVillanos, • dije yo,' tened respeto;,. /
'' don Tello, mi senor, es gloria y honra
de la casa?de Neira,. y en efeto ' -
es mi padrino y quien mis bodas'honra,” (1071*4).
and in the request which follows it:
■;Con esto,tu piadoso, tu discreto,
* no sufrirasAla tuya y mi deshonra;, *
. antes.haras volver, la espada en puno,
. .a Sancho su;mujer, su hija a Nuno, . ., (1075-S)
That is the way the wo rid o ught to be, and Don Tello has the 
chance-.to restore obder; but it is not the way the world is, 
and Don Tello is not going to fulfil the suggested responsibility
All this manoeuvering is shortly made to look very 
silly, for suddenly the truth obtrudes of its own accord, as 
Blvira steps-out of her hiding place. .This basic truth, which 
gives, the lie to.Don Tello’s play*acting, presents us with a 
scene which resembles a painting or "a tableau/in that it sud- / 
denly offers a complete picture of the situation; ’’Sale Elvira, 
y ponese enmedio Don Tello,”.say the stage directions (1094*). 
Don Tello’s crime, is his disruption.of natural law by keeping - 
apar t' lovers and relatives; his anger stems;from haying, his 1
silly pretence exposed?' Sancho is being forcibly restrained .
by Nuno from attacking Don ,Tello - if he did so it would be a 
perversion of the social order, which is what.behaviour such 
as Don Tello’s brings about ? Nuno restrains Sancho because he 
believes injustice must be fought.with justice, not with ? 
anarchy; Feliciana. is horrified, but unable to influence, her 
brother because his own disorder destroys the natural courtesy 
he owes his own sister. '. That is the picture which is imprinted 
on•• our minds just before the play assumes a new dimension ; 
with Lope’s introduction of the King.?, , \ ’
• - v. ;‘To(recapitulate.fin’ the light of the theme being \ 
examined , part of the picture;, and of(succeeding scenes, is 
that the destruction of liberty within DojiTello, by his sub-,- 
mission toinstinct and denial ofreason, is now bringing 
about - as it must - thedestruction of liberty in those 
dependent on him. As we already know, this is inevitable 
because of liberty’s dependence on justice, and it is no use 
saying that liberty may be'protected via disobedience to < .• -
injustice, for we have just seen that what governs people’s 
decisions to obey or disobey is not morality so much as power; 
thus,:/Don Tello’s household have little choice; but to obey > 
Don Tello’s orders, -so they have to obey injustice and hence 
compromise their own liberty< as well as help Don .Tello '
destroy the liberty of himself and others. Elvira, who has 
had no" choice about,anything much, is now physically a
prisoner, while Sancho*slibertyis almost as damaged as is 
Don Tello’s not because he is obeying Don Tello, but 
because Don Tello•© bestial behaviour has aroused a. similarly 
irrational response; Sancho’s behaviour, like Don Tello’s 
is being shaped by instinct, the natural instinct of violence, 
a bestial force in. men :which is just as powerful as Don Tello’s 
sexual drive. Sancho is here: showing the same loss of reason 
that he showed at the end of Act Is ibis only wish is to die *• 
a denial of both reason and instinct^ cf* nYo “soy contento/ 
de mprir y no vivir,” (1111-2); ’’Escucha, Elvira, mi bien;/ . 
yo/me dejare matar” (1115*6); ”Hatadme, escuderoe” (1158);
£sera bueno yivir?” (1145 );.' ”que vida/ sin Elvira no la 
quiero” (1147-8); etc. Only Nuno retains a hold on reason and 
demands that Sancho, given the choice between justice and* 
savagery,: try to secure justices. ”Vive, y pediras justicia;/ 
que rey tiehen estos reinos,” (1149-50) - ; . ■
, This is an occasion on which we are made aware of 
the enormous importance of laws if-there is no higher justice 
worthy of the name, man’s earthly existence is reduced to the 
level of the beast®, for law is reason,' and reason is-a ref­
lection of the divine, that which raises man above the level 
of the beasts, that which makes.him free. Here, however, we - 
are watching a;qualification of human justice, namely, that 
the. ultimate/arbiter of human, justice' is he who wields the
•— 1 ^4, —
most power; it is one thing for,Sancho to offer poetic images 
of himself cutting down the tallest and most arrogant tree, 
but quite another for him to succeed in doing so to the person 
at whom the image is directed* In practicej what happens is 
that Sancho has to approach Don.Tello tactfully and try to 
shame him into returning Blvira, and the outcome is that it 
is Don Tello who orders that Sancho be cut down (that he is 
not is presumably because Don Tello’s squires feel it is more 
sensible to overlook both Don Tello’s insanity and Sancho’s
provocation, "Matadme, escuderos" D^38j), whereupon Sancho 
curses his inability to combat naked force of arms; "*Ho ’ 
tuviera yo una espadai",(1139)* ;
Sancho, then, has to feign liberty (obedience) in 
order to have liberty restored, but the attempt is doomed, 
since the man with the power to assure liberty is he who is
determined to destroy it* It is in the middle of all this 
chaos, this breakdown of law, this destruction of liberty, 
that Nuno first mentions the King, and from this moment the
problems of human justice, shown until now in a limited local 
context, are enlarged to include the wider national picture, 
Sancho had called Don Tello a "senor todo perfeto" ($**6) * 
now he calls" the King a "principe perfeto" (1180); Don Tello 
had said to Sancho, "To te hare justicia" (1086), and we..wit­
nessed the resulting travesty, its nature and its causes; the : 
King has more, power, more wealth, more status than Don Tello;
what will his justice be like? .
7 7 / ' , / With the introduction of the King, a digression is 
in order concerning the historical data (to use the term 
loosely) on which lope based this play, and to whioh, at the 
end of the last Act, he specifically draws our attention - .
.almost as a bibliographical reference:
7../ ’’ ••X /, ■ .. I aqui acaba la comedia • • ■ ’ ■
' • k- ?.;7-del mejor alcalde, historia ' . ' 7 , ■' '
7-7 que a firm a por verdadera ; . _
7', 7,, .7 7 7; ‘7 ' ' i* coronica de Espana: ' • ‘ :
\ 7/'7;77;/-' la cuarta parte la cuenta. (2406-10) ‘
7 It is/worth considering for a moment this source material,
which, as Lope tells us, is to be found in the Primera Cronica
2 '■ ’ ' ' ' ■ • ■General, (hereunder abbreviated as PCG), and to which he has 
made certain changes* There Is little modern historical data
> available concerning Alfonso VII, and, in view of my insuf­
ficient knowledge of mediaeval history, it would obviously be 
meaningless for me to pretend to make any firm assertions
7concerningthe truth behind the history as it is presented in 
the FCG« 'However, I think 1 can safely say that there is a 
strong possibility that the PCG♦ s account of the ’’iusticia
V Chapter 980 of the edition referred to here, namely,
Vol. $ of the °Nueva Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles,n Tomo I, 
^d\ ;Ri Menendez Pidal, (Madrid, 1906),pp. 659-60.,
;•?/<. The limited extent of this data is noted by C. Sanchez* 
Albornoz, in Estudios Sobre las Instituciones Medievales
: £>Pa^ol*B« (Mexico, 19^5)/ P» ^93. fn. 26. ■ j / ,
; /dell emperador” is. a: glorified account of what was essentially 
a calculated political ploy on;> the part of Alfonso VII, who 
seems to have been what the Americans, with unusual etymologic
. cal accuracy, would , call a ”shrewd operator-. The object:of '
-the ploy, of course, would be to consolidate, ,in one or more 
, of/several...ways’, the King’s power in a peripheral urea of his
kingdom. It seems appropriate, to outline’ the grounds,, pros,,
. 'and cons of this judgements • •• • ’ • "
'v:- .-The. -grounds for supposing that the King had ulterior
i-" . ■■ -> ,x 4 ■' ■ • • "• ■ ■’■ ?political motives ...\for going to Galicia, to settle the- come
, p iai nt, o a. labrad o r lie mainly in the case itself. ; T he t 
■,:;main thing would.,seem to be that, so far as I know, it is
unusual for a-King to intervene personally on behalf of a • 
peasant;, especially a peasant-,not residing within the King’s
; . own estate. "That:-the King grew up in Galicia.cannot he taken
.•A; seriously as. an explanation of the King*1 s.interest in the 
. labrador ‘ s right s h we know that- t he. historical Alfonso VII
was Constantly milking the Galician, hierarchy - especially
... y I emphasise the word ’’ulterior0 advisedly;, obviously, 
it the King had gone to Galicia purely for love of justice, 
tne;deed would still have redounded to;his credit, effected
,;a desirable strengthening of his position, and thus be bias- 
sified as anjact of self-interest; but,that, like Aristotle’s 
definition of love, would be only a verbal truth, and not.. ' 
very useful in practice, when distinctions become necessary:
, . (between .means and> ends, for. example). ; ' .
? - ■ ^14? - • ,/
the ecclesiastical * of its wealth; there is no sentiment 
in politics,as the less-than-intimate relationship between 
Alfonso VII and his mother, Doha Urraca, makes plain; and 
anyway, there is no indication that the infanzon of the 
PCQ was himself anything other than Galician - in fact,-it 
is presumably possible that' the King knew that infanzon as • 
a result of his Galician upbringing, and thus knew that he 
was too powerful« - ’ , • . ; • , ■ ‘ .
In the history, the initial crime of the infanzon 
is that he ’’tollio per fuerca a un laurador.su heredat.”
The seizure of land is a.very serious'.mediaeval crime ; (la ter, 
I shall examine the implications of lope’s changing the crime 
to abduction and rape), but,not one that would call for the .,/ 
personal intervention of the King unless it were on a'much 
larger scale ..than that of a peasant’s inheritance; ultimately 
hoxvever, in/both history and: play, the crime for which the"?/ 
noble is, ostensibly, executed is laesaK maj e stasis, ,■ or . .
treason* Although laesap raajestasi ;1 may be proved serious 
via reference to natural law, divine law, etc., it is, like
- V Sanchez-Albornoz,, op. cit., Chap. VIII,'in particular 
pp. 488 ff. ; ‘ ;
v. PCG, • p. 648a, for example.. • ‘
.. ?PGG, p. 659b, lines 44*5.
its modern counterpart "threatening the securityvof the state, 
clearly a crime eminently suitable for being tailored by a ;; 
ruler to suit his own self-interest, and in fact many crimes 
may be described as laesa majestag. The King would take
laesa majestas seriously, particularly blatant laesa ma jestag■
such as the infanson’ s disobedience; but the reason for that
would be because of the aforementioned nature of5 laesa ;
;majeatag, i»e», a challenge to the King’s power. \ .
, ; If we are to consider the possibility of the his-.
torical King’s acting purely out of self-interest, we have to 
consider what his motives might be. In fact, they could be J-' 
one, or a combination, of several: the most obvious ones 
would be, to consolidate his power in a distant corner of. the 
realm by making an example of a very powerful noble, and to 
demonstrate his determination to impose the royal will in 
every part of the land - the point of such an action being, /
obviously, to discourage other powerful men from opposing the
- ‘ 9 ■■ ■" /■ •" ■' ' ■»: . ■ .. : > • “ -King; ' the King might also want to demonstrate and extend his
. . cf« K., S. Lear, "The crime was not limited to such overt
acts of violence as would bring personal injury to the ruler 
but came to include maledictions as well as mere offensive 
expressions of opinion,” "Crimen laegae Ealestatis in the Lex 
ft°aana Wisigothorum,"<Speculum, IV, 1929 * pp . 73-fe?, v. p. 85* 
For an interesting examination of the concept in Tudor England 
v. J. ft. Tanner, Tudor Constitutional Documents, (Cambridge, 
1951), pp. >75-381.
. ^The same principle was involved -- although the5pass is not 
strictly analogous - when William the Conqueror, after taking 
London, returned to the southern area to exact exemplary retri 
button from such Anglo-Saxon nobles as continued to resist him
power ih; a more specific sense, namely, ,by extending his . 
jurisdiction over a wider area, .to encourage his subjects ' 
to think o f,,-him, as the supreme justice ,/and thus to bring 
their complaints,to.him rather than to lesser local justice®. 
As, Sidney painter points out, ’’Bights of jurisdiction were 
valued for, three reasons. For one thing they were profitable. 
In minor,cases one imposed;money penalties.- When a man was 
hanged,' the lord having jurisdiction seised all;his personal 
property. Then having these rights greatly increased the 
lord *:s control over his tenants.' The,.combination of delegate 
of the royal judicial authority and the power of the landlord
was almost impossible to resist/ Finally, these rights were
■ *' ' ' io -■ -• ■ / ■ *< * ' ‘“•"■f’ ;
a mark of prestige,” - In this extract, the author,is refer­
ring to lords, but? the same principles apply to-Kings, parti*, 
cularly, in Alfonso VII’s/case, the first principle,- that 
rights of, jurisdiction were lucrative. The King’s defence 
of the labrador would thus be, very appropriate to such an end.
; If the above motives are indeed behind the King’s 
moves in this, situation, then the closing.sentences5of the
historical account of the action would seem to confirm the
possibility; ’’JSstonces ell empera&or andido descubierta- et . 
manif iestamientre porGalliziatoda, et paziguo toda. la tierra
' 'TO . , ' ’ , . .
Mediaeval Society, Corn©Il University Press, 1968, p.
et tan grande fue ell: espanto que todos los onmes de la tierra 
ouierpn por este fecho, que non fue ninguno osado en.toda la./ 
tierra de fazer tuerto aotro. Kt esta justicia et'otras 
tales comoestas auie fechas ell“.emperador, por que era ell 
nmy temido de las yentes, et uiuien cada unos en lo suyo en 
pa^.n That the King then proceeded to ’’show the flag, ” as 
it were,' through the rest of the region,’immediately;after 
his confrontation with the infanzon, .seems to indicate :that
' the; King's motives were more than just love of justice, and; ' 
that- the gambit worked very well', enabling Alfonso • to*secure •• 
his. hold oh the region. Although the ,PCQ gives Ano date for 
the .event,, so that we cannot find any specific links between
; this instance and others, data published by Sanchez-Alba rno.z 
makes/it very clear that Alfonso VII did indeed :a<vail himself , 
of various political' ploys to assei^t his authority In Galicia., 
whether this particular occasion is or Is not one such ploy; .
. On the other hand,' there is the possibility - remote
■> though It seems to me - that the King's motives were wholly . 
above board,, that his interest was solely in upholding justice 
and punishing tyranny, ,so the aspects of the'history which v • 
offer that possibility ought to be considered* One is appa-. 
rent in .the tone of the- P.CG-, which suggests that, the King . '•
f P* 660a , lines ♦ ; ■
. ^op.cit., Chapter VIII. ; j .
went to Galicia simply because he.iwas ”muy justiciero.” / 
Whet hex' we accept this, and the value it would thus give to 
the steps taken by the King, depends on how much credence we 
afford the chronicler, how much idealism we expect from
- rulers, and how much weight we give to either, when balanced 
against the opposing possibilities, The other factor which
, might-suggest,that the King had no desire other than to see 
justice done is his sending of a letter before taking action 
in person: the Infanzon might have obeyed the letter ordering 
him to return the labra do r ’ s property, so that the King would 
not have been able to go and ^execute the noble and make a
: show of his presence in the area. nevertheless, had the 
noble obeyed the King’s letter, the very fact of a powerful 
noble’s backing down at the command of the King would have 
enhanced the King’s power in the area; furthermore, the King 
may have calculated (especially if he knew what the infanzon
< was like) that the noble would disobey his orders,and thus 
, give him just the opportunity he needed to punish the noble
on a charge of treason <(• laesa?? majestas;) ; he would not 
have been the only King to use such;a scheme - Philip IX of ■ 
France, in 1200, pursued a similar course of action against 
King John of England, in order to create a pretext for dec*
I . laririg forfeit John’s>fiefs in France (as against a pretext 
• for executing him). . ’<?/• ; \
• z.. Allthings. considered, then, it* seems to me''more.
. .likely that the King’s action in this case was'taken on; the
grounds of political advantage, including the disposal of an 
overly powerful lord, X repeat that I. do hot have the back­
; ground to make conclusive judgements about these historical .
- matters, and that the foregoing is therefore, to a certain /
extent, conjecture. There might -have been all kinds of ,
qualifying circumstances - such as various laws and contracts 
which we do not know about, and so on - but the FCG does not
'< mention them,, modern historians have not investigated them 
\ in great detail, and it seems doubtful that Lope could be
• aware-of them. What X have tried to do is to show that it is
.. possible to see that Lope could have inferred the motive of 
political.ambition from the King’s behaviour, because the 
important thing as far as the play is concerned is not to 
determine whether the historical King was guided by self­
interest or by altruism, but to see how far Lope’s Alfonso 
VXX is depicted as being guided by the one or the other, .. 
which means that the possibilities had to be explored first., ,
. ’ .. ... ■ >'• Be turning to , the?play, ;we find, that, as it develops,
the plot becomes increasingly concerned with the struggle 
between the King and Lon Tello, to such an extent that by the 
end of the play Sancho," Nuno and Elvira appear to be almost 
ancillary characters: they have, within the fiction, little . .
control over their own situation,/and, like us, can only; >
stand back and observe-the behaviour of the superiors, and 1 •'
await its outcome* Lope prepares,;us for this, when the King \ ?
is first mentioned, by Nuno in Act II (1i?0 ff. ). Sancho^ •?.’
listening to Nuno’s suggestion that he go to the King for
justice, expresses only scepticism at the idea: . . .
' lAy, Nunof, tehgo por cierto ; /
; . > que el rey de :Castilia, ■ Alfonso,\
es un principe perfeto•.
. . mas ipor-donde quieres que entre ..
; ■; ' un; labrador tan/grosero? . ' v. • < , ,
' ' , IQue corredor de palacio, . , • f ;
, /os&ra, mi atrevimiento T? '4 ' ' ’ • -a
• . ' pisar? iftue portero,Nuno, ... " ,
, ' permitira que entre dentro? . .. > '
• / . Aliia la tela, al brocado, ,
? al grave acompanamiento <
• v, ■ . - abren las puertas, si tienen , . ’
' . . ' razoh, que yo lo confiesoj" ; ;
.«• < - pero a la:pobreza, -Nuno, ‘ . •> > ;/■ ‘
solo dejan los porteros 5 / , . .
•>;. que/miren las puertas y armas, v.
,. A • y esto ha de;'ser/deeds lejos., .. ? ’/
. ' ' Ire-a Leon y? entrare
’ en Palacio, y yeras luego ’ . . ’ . -
como imprimen eh-'mis hombros ' '
- . de las cue hi Has los cuehtos*; ‘ ;
. • Pues. .iandar con memorial es ' «’•’? ?
?• que torna el rey r ieanto y bueno i ' ; • . '
.Haz cuenta que de sus manos ' ' . ' v
• , s en el;, olvido cayeron$ . . 5 (1178“12O2) ,
he even assumes that Alfonso is a ’’principe perfeto,” but;; 
says, in effect, ’’not that perfect,” It is true' that Nuno ... .
- 13 ? : > '' ■ •' ' -One wonders what reaction this'evoked from Lope’s audience, 
some of whom may have managed; to plough-through one or more of; 
the contemporary tomes delineating the qualities necessary for 
princely perfection, which almost invariably included strictures 
to the effect that the/King should always listen to petitions,? 
especially those from .the poor, <- ?'' " ‘ \ •?’ v’*?' '
- ■' " . : \ 1$^ * •• ; ' ;; ; '•> -Av
has confidence in the King, - perhaps; only to get Sancho out .A . 
of the way, cf* ’’que si.aqui te quedas, pienso/ qu© te han ‘ .
de quitar la vida1’ (12i4-i5)?. r hut he has been wrong so many • .. -
■ times that the audience cannot really be reassured by this*
?None,:of this , incidentally, occurs, in the history, according ..A 
; to which, the labrador makes straight for the Court, without
a, second thought - which is not to say that he had no misgivings, 
but which is to say that Lope pointedly tells "us something ‘ ,
which the history does not suggest. -.Later, we see that Sancho ...A,*
. was right, he is kicked out of the Court, and eventually he •. .
only gains access to the King because of don Enrique’s casual • A 
remark, ”Vn labx'ador gallego he visto echado/ a esta puerta, i
• y .bien triste,’’ (1316-17).//Yet it is at that point, when the ' A 
. King orders Sancho'to be brought before him,'that the Conde '•
Voices the conventional perhaps too conventional phrases .
of admiration: • • . • / - A. . ... ' -
•/<’•->/ ' J.Virtud heroics y raral \ .A - .
. A-A” ICompasiva piedad, surna clemenciat’ • t.- , • t
< • I Oh e j emplo de los reyes, A A. - '
A . i divina observacion de santas leyes1 (1321-4) \
It sounds good, but the trouble is that that is how the other
- levels of society we have seen were also introduced, that is,/ '*;■
with the natural and social^ order apparently being upheld;., on ;
those occasions we quickly-became aware of harmony wavering ■
. .into'sdisharmony, and'this seems to happen once again on the . A'-
highest, monarchical, level* At the .end;of the play, the same A;
■ Conde urgently begs the King todisplay clemency, and the 
King flatly re fuse a to do so* .
•/; If the preceding .paragraph-points, out some prelimi* 
nary hints that the King’s motives are not pure,and simple,
. there seems to;be another interesting note to that effect< 
given by,Lope in that, whereas the PCG gives no date at all - ' 
for the event, Lope specifically places it ,in the turbulent
.early years of Alfonso VII*s reign•Whether or hot the 
audience can recall the names, dates, and other1 data offered 
by the editor of’ tile ’’Clasicos Castellanos’1 text (v. notes 
to 1310 and 2410), two references, one at the ..beginning of 
each Court scene,.should remind the audience of two prominent 
historical personages who. assume considerable importance in 
the early years of Alfonso VII’s reign: Alfonso el Batallador . 
(”el de Aragon” L13Q9J ) and Dona Urraca (”E1 cielo sa.be, Conde, 
cuanto .estimo/ .las amistades de mi madre, £etc3 ” Ll6l9~243 ),
- his stepfather and his mother respectively. Their importance 
(historically) lies in t heir being the two main obstacles to 
Alfonso VII’s drive to assert his authority as King and, ulti-
■ mately, to pacify and unify a larger<area of Christian Spain 
than had been so unified by any preceding Christian monarch 
since the Moorish invasion. By reminding us of that, Lope 
seems to be suggesting that the action is taking place during, 
or immediately following, a., period of turmoil and internecine .
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strife, when pragmatism is of, far greater weight than idealism ?- 
•' in determining a politician ’5 course of action. Furthermore,
even if the audience does not remember all the historical, - 
matters, Lope tells us at the end of ythe play where to find 
the historical source of his drama a point which should be 
borne in mind a propos of all these historical references I ’
f am making, particularly since’the play itself is so different 
: /from the history, implying that, if - we do go to check the
history, we must surely begin to wonder why all these dif* 
ferdnces arose. • _ < • . .
> . . ? The reference‘to Doha Urraca also suggests;to me an^ .
idea far more directly concerned with the theme under discus* 
sion. Dona Urraca stands out in the history - even against 
the stiff competition * as; a somewhat bisarre- figure,, and her
conflict with Alfonso VIX offers one of the more lurid examples
•>’ \ ' -, 4; .• * •• i.. ,• •' ' - •'
of- this; she violently opposed his first coronation, and, as 
; a result, was besieged by,, him until some accommodation was
reached, and so on. The point I am making is that the struggle 
to gain and retain power is unscrupulous, unedifying and -
totally unsentimental - an obvious point, and one of-which we 
are doubtless already aware, but the significant thing is that 
Lope reminds us of.this point, with the’opening words of Act XXI,
*»4 ■ ; • ■ ■ ■ -■ - ; *PCG, p. 648a,. lines 18 ff$ - •*,. . , /.■ ,
the Act in which the King’g justice rla finally put. before ue* 
To see how Lope .presents .the royal justice, then, the King’s 
behaviour in, Act III,, and especially inthe .last few scenes
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of the play, ought to be carefully, examined, * - :
'• ' r-. • Don Tello’s power is constantly emphasised through­
out the play , 'e»g,-. by .Sancho (.’’poderosos••caballeros”‘,CS46J ), 
by Nuno (’’Mas tiene por ley su gusto/ y poder para matar
. Ql895~0 ), by Don Tello himself v(.”siendo, aqui el mas poderoso,/ 
el mas rico y dadivosoJ” ,L1264~$J), and the.King in particular, 
is made aware of it by Sanchos ’ . . - /.
‘ - > SANCHO; 1 ; Sancho, s.enory es mi nombre, ,
que a los pies de tu piedad '
, ' < ’// pido justicia de quien,
, .. . en su.poder confiado,
: ' ‘ a mi mujer me Ha/quitado, , •
? •••■' v * ' y me quitara tambien . '■ • . ''
la,i vida, si no/, me huyera'. '
_•.HEX, ^Que/ee hombre .tan poderoso
/• ' - .• . ' / ./• en -Galicia? .
■ : SANCHO. /•' . ’ ..... Es tan famoso, ’ .
; que desde aquella ribera .< :
; /' h^sta >la romana torre
\ « ; de/ Hercules es respetado;
. ■ si/esta con un hombre alrado,
. , ; •- solo .el cielo le socorre, \
' , ■' . El pone y el quits leyes: • ’
• ; ’ * ,v que est&s son las condiclones
.... de. sober bios Infanaones >
•--< ■ . 'quo ostan lejos de.los reyes, (1423-40)
and by Nuno: ’ \ •• ■ ;• • ‘ ‘ ‘ : /• . ‘ .
? . Nuno. Pero, senor, tenge miedq
\ . ' que/traigais dos hombres solos;
> . / ’ ; que no hay en todq .este reino ’
/ " mas, poderoso senor,.' - • . * ’ .
mas rico ni.mas soberbio., . (2038-42)
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One of sthe conclusions inferred from the discussions above,
concerning the relationships between Don Tello and his
subordinates, was that justice seemed to depend on the amount
of force on which its guardian could rely-. a conclusion
which leisurely reinforced by Nuno*s agonised words in Act III:
- IQue sufra el mundo que/esten. .
• • ,sus leyes en tai lugar, ■-
que el pobre alrico ha de .dar . 
su.honor,/y decir que es justol
- Mas tiene? por ley, su gusto ..
y poder para matar. • • • ' (1891-6)
When the King decides to. go to Galicia ;to bring Don Tello to 
justice, it is because there is no-one else who can do- so,- 
because no-one in Galicia can exert greater power than Don , 
Tello; that Don Tello is eventually brought to justice, then,.
. ■ is only because someone more powerful wants him to be punished, 
. so that when the King refers to himself as ”el mejor alcalde,
el rey,n (1776),. we may feel that the King’s superiority as a
judge,is not a factor of any=inherent powers or God-given .
talents, but of the strength he represents in political terms;
as Nuno says, men alone are insufficient: .
- •= . NUftQ. iViene grsn .gente con el?.,. . ' . - < -
SANCHO. Dos hombres. :
NUNO. <• , • *7 Pues yo te* ruego,<5
: 7' hijo, que no intentes nada, . ' ■*
' • v - que sera varib tu/iritento; ; ./
que un pqderoso en su tierra, J
■ \ . con arrnas, gente^y dinero, ■ ,, ,/ •
\ o ha de torcer la justicia, •- , 
o algu'na noche , durmiendo,• / ,< 
matarnos en nuestra casa (1955-63)
but Nuno does not -know that the man who is coming is-- like;-, 
Don Tello a -man whose power is magnified by his positionJ 
Thus, when the King arrives at Don Tello’s abode, he calmly 
relies on his position as'nYo”. to intimidate Don Tello 
When Don Tello and the King are finally - face-to-face jVDon' 
Tello surrendersronly when the King, tells him, nyo ;soy el . " 
Key” (2261): it is the King’s power, not his just-cause, * 
which overcomes Don Tello, lope seems to be implying as “•
•much in the brief exchange .between Don Tello and the King: /
i D. TELLO. T vos, ^adonde traeis
? . la vara? . • •••/' \ ;?y.< •
REX. ./ . ‘En-la vain© esta, -•••>'.-
: < •. .de donde presto: s&ldra,.' •
\/,;? y lo que-,‘paqa vereis.., (2255-56) .
The King is referring, course, to his sword. Don Tello 
does not get ;the point, but the audience should.
v . ; That human justice -must be.supported by force seems
inevitable, given the rarity with which reason prevails in 
human affairs, and the suggestion can hardly be classified
: as any*..kind of profound'insight. Those of Lope’s audience , ‘
, who thought about the matter at all were, no doubt, well..
aware that a lawful'society depended on a firm and just 
government, so that.it might be asked, what is so significant 
about Lope’s demonstration ofthe alliance between power and 
justice? The answer has to take the form of another question: 
what is the quality of the justice displayed by the King? At
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the end of the play we see a:criminal punished and his victims 
. recompensed (almost), and we may even feel, that the world
would be a good place if only the administration of justice 
could remain in the right hands, if only all kings displayed
" Alfonso VII’s devotion to duty, etc., - if only, that is, all 
the lessons of the ’’prince-improvers” could be adhered to.
But should we be entirely satisfied; with this, outcome, and
: = should, we be so uncritical of the procedures which, produce it? 
There are indications that we should not. \ /. •
., < • . .. One thing which may strike us about the King’s,
methods of imposing/his justice’is the extent to which they 
are dependent on secrecy and dissimulation, As in the history, 
the King orders that hie departure be kept secret and that
: callers be told that the King is too ill to see anyone:
aquesto no se puhlique J etc/j” (17.26*35); in the/history it 
is added that he and his aides travel in disguise. Lope also
makes him issue another order which should be noticed: he \ , .. 
tells Pelayo, to keep quiet -.in other words, he is telling . -
' one of the few sources of truth we have, that the. truth must 
not be spoken, that a lie must be told, ’’aunque todo el mundo 
os pida/ que digais quien soy” (1756.-7). Later* Nuno, with <
, ' less subtlety,- talks, of locking up all the. peasants: “Cerrados 
pienso tenerlos” (2036). Of course* we know why the King has 
to resort to such artifices: he wants to avoid warning the
. /' - 161-
noble of his approach - that is presumably the reason for
hie secrecy in the history/ and Lope suggests as much in the ■
King’s yarning to Nuno:. . . •
. . • Avisad los labrador es ,
-x ■ : • que no digsn a Don-Tello • ' ' •
• que viene pesquisidor; ~ •; (2032-5) .
however, we cannot feel- happy upon being .shown in this 
manner that human justice, in certain circumstances, 
apparently dependg on this kind of secrecy, lying, and even 
in a minor case of preventive detention.• For one thing,, ■[' ‘
such methods.clearly cannot be reconciled with the search 
for ;truth in which we would like to. see justice engage, nor 
can. we feel that such methods are very reliable, since, clearly 
such arrangements, can easily go wrong/ •’ -
: Nothing goes;wrong in this case, however, .and .the
King finally has Don Tello where he wants him.' Where does he 
want him? Apparently,<he is determined to see him dead. We : 
might derive a certain atavistic satisfaction from Don Tello’s 
execution,- but., if we do, ,1 think we run the risk of forget­
ting or. ignoring certain no tic eabie, aspects of Lope ■ a presen­
tation of Don Tello. Don Tello .does become terribly disordered 
and is knowingly guilty of some terrible crimes, but he,is no 
Fernan Gomez of Kuenteovejuna,■ He is respected and.admired 
by the peasants at the beginningj betrays.a surprisingly 
regretful or unhappy tone even in the course of his tyranny,
-‘V.p: -/162:-
:for example, - , \ /'/ •
■•. /" ‘ ,■ : \ ■ mas pienso/que bien deci*, . . ’
' ; ' /' . .. mirando la sujecion ; . ’; '• '
m 'del humano corazon, . .. /•' ' . /' .
. - . . que no hay mayor senorio . \ "
- ; ;>'• que pocqs anos. y brio, , , ; ' ’’ ..
;>/.'. hermosura y discrecion, , p . (188I-6)
and is unarguably behaving in? a manner of; which moat men
are capable * particularly in his position, with nothing in
sight to stop him * even -asserting, presumably with some , -
justification.,; that society’s mores permit him to do this
(741*7 quoted above) , and, further,'.that they force him to:
, / • • • i'ojala fueras/mi igual1/ ■
•'A : . Mas/bien .ves que tu bajeza ..
<</>-- : , ' ' af reritara mi hobleza, - ' ' . ’ ■
■■“//, • , y que./pareciera mal : ”♦./•//• - ’
‘ juntar brocado y sayal‘V'
;.,/•/ > /. ./’ • ’ Babe Dios si amor me esfuerza • . . ; ■
, que mi buen intento tuerza? •
pero ya el rnundo trazo'/ /,/ " .
’■ ‘/ - 'estas/leyes, a quien yo '■ • .'/ . ' •
< : : he/de'/obedecer por fuerza; ; (949-58)
and, later, si fuera mi igual,/ quo ya me hubiera , .
casado,” (1289-90)* But the most remarkable aspect of Bon 
Tello *s behaviour is his honesty, submission, and contrition p 
at,the end of the play, at which time we might feel a certain 
sympathy, and possibly admiration, for Don Tello; if we do, 
we are certainly not being overly sentimental or- forgetful,
for Lope makes Feliciana and both of the King’s aides, all of 
whom know the facts as well as the King and the audience do, 
try to persuade the. King, to be less: severe with Don Tellos
. > . ! D. ENKIQUE. Si p.uedp en presencia vuestra.•« •. '
. x CONDE. / Senor, muevaos a piedad ■ '
; '-que os crie en aquesta'tierra» *
\ FELICIANA. -.Senor, el; conde don Pedro • , ' .
' - ' ■ - de vosi'por merced merejsca.,. . .. *•
•> . la,vida de Tello. (257^-79)
?Nevertheless, the King refuses to reconsider his/
verdict, and’ coldly ./brushes aside the repeated requests for
clemency (none of which, incidentally, come from Don Tello),
giving as his reason,, • • • .
/••• ‘ Cuahdo pierde de su punto
- la justicia, no se acierta :_
v ■ en admitir ia piedad:
■/ . • ■' diyinae y .humanasletras ■ , . ; /. . / . -/
,. dan ejemplos. / (2287*91)
Whatever limited truth that aphorism- may contain - and let us
not forget that divine and human letters also provide examples
of .its opposite - it surely depends/on the crime and the punish
ment of which the King is speaking? the King goes on.to say:
‘ , Es traidor . ',/ ' " ‘ .
. - ■ todohombre que no respeta . * .
■ / a su rey,/y que.habla mal . ■„
de su persons en ausencia< /.. (2291^^)
Superficially acceptable as a truth, this latter definition 
cannot be indiscriminately applied in practice (unless we want 
to. make a traitor out of anyone who commits any crime at all), 
.and we have to ask ourselves, is Doh Tello really a traitor?
Can his disregard of the King’s written instructions seriously 
be construed as a wilful act of laesamaj;estaas• the ' ;
King is .so anxious to prove? . And. did .Don Tello actually not
'}
respect, or speak ill of, the King? We may, or we may riot ,1 
be inclined to feel that Don Tello’s treason is treason in
, name only; the point is,‘ that'the question.'is obviously open, 
arid that the crime becomes the capital crime of treason 
because the King wantsto call it thatWe may recall that 
the King’s first question to Sancho when he learned of Don 
.Tello *s, reaction to his letter was, ’’Carta de mi mano escrita../
/Mas que, ^debio de rqmpella?” (1699*,17OC)), to which Sancho 
‘.replied', ”Yes and no”; ' ,'•?
- . e.?;’. .• ’• leyola, yvno larpmpio; ; . ' . ‘ -
»’ , mas miehto, que, fue rompella V '
■/ ; leella y noVhacer por eIla.' ■ .
. .. .? ' ' lo que su Key le mando, - (170^-8)
whereupon.the King, calling this a;”buen modo/ de-hablar” 
(1721-2), decided that the provocation was sufficient. When 
he confronts Don Tello, the main charge he lays against him , '‘;
Vis this One of disregarding the King*s.instructions -
• - < •« '/Viiiano, iporVmi corona, . ... .
• “ ?vV ',. ’ que os he ' de \hacer> respetar ;
.■ ,y ? las cartas del Kriyi , (2268-70)
. . Cuando esta causa no hubiera,
. . x’ el-'desprecio de mi carta, '
'•:';V’V. : . mi?firms.,Vmi propia letra, ; 7 7/? ■
, V , £no era bast ante delito? , ; (236ri-7) ,
. ... • , . * ; •( 4c. *-* .. ' . . ‘.
and of course 2591^ quoted above.7? A
On the ;point of the King’s determination to charge Don 
Tello.withtreason, it is worth, recalling that Lope shows 
himself, in other plays, well aware of the implications of 
such situations; in ff 1 Dugue de Viseo, • for example, the King,'
, It might be objected that the charge of treason is 
irrelevant, that Don. Tello .deserves death for his offences 
against the peasants, and that the King would have, or should 
have, executed Don Tello whether, or not disregard of his 
letter was involved. It is difficult to be certain as to 
whether or.not the rape'of a peasant girl by a noble was a 
capital offence, < but what might concern us more than the 
legal details is the way in which Lope has presented the King’s 
attitude to Elvira’s situation, Given a minimal suspension
by twisting an innocuous remark,;,imputes the crime of treason 
to a man entirely innocent of any crime, . . j
1S ’ • ' ' ' ' ' '■ • ’ - «
Cf,, e,g,, Salomon; ’’Certes, c’est pour avoir desobei , 
aux ordres royaux que Don Tello est puni exemplairement; mais 
c’est aussi pour avoir accompli un forfait condemns comma 
exorbitant par, la conscience collective espagnole; le viol 
d’une vassale,” (op. cit,, ,p,. 888), Such statements cannot 
be left unqualified, as.I shall, try to show*  . . -
*ir? ■ - * s( 1 » * ♦ ., ’* r
'later Roman Law, and, probably, the Codigo de Eurico,
laid down that the punishment for abduction and/or rape 
should be death - v. El Codigo de Eurico, Bdicion, Palin- v 
genesis & Indices por Alvaro.d’Ors, ’’Estudios Visigoticos,”
Vol. II, (Madrid, CSIO, I960), pp. 140 ff. .In the Fuero. /. ■ 
Juzgo (1241 - the first Castilian translation of the Forum . 
Judicium of 699)> the punishment recommended for "algunomne 
libre” who ”lieva por fuerza muier virgen o bibda” is repara­
tion via the ceding of property, loss of liberty (i.e,^ 
becoming a servant of.the offended family), and (if rape was 
committed) 200 lashes given in public; v. the Real Academia . 
Espanola edition, (Madrid, 1-815')?, Librb III, Titulo 3, Ley 1.. .. 
Although there is no. mention of the death penalty for rape .. 
in the Fuero Juzgo, death is the recommended penalty in Las 
&iete PartIdas (v, Partida VII, Titulo 20, Ley 3)> at least, 
when ’’alguna mujer biuda, de buena fama, o virgen, o casada, 
o religiosa” is the offended party, .. \
of disbeliefi; or the simplest level of reaction to what is 
happening,on stage, most of the audience will be hoping that 
Elvira Will not be overpowered by Don Tello before the King
;7.-fi66- s';
rescues^ her? we can, therefore,: hardly fail to notice -
particularly as Lope’s scene-arrangement keeps us in touch 
with what is happening both in Tello’s mansion and around the 
King - that, when Elvira finally, is raped,zTello has time to 
rape her because the King delays his arrest, and that, indeed, 
the crime is committed while the King is enjoying a;slap-up 
lunch! The structure of this part of the play warrants close
examination* :
When the King has completed his (somewhat perfunc­
tory) interrogation of the peasants, he says, L '
Caballeros, descansemos, J
para que a la tarde vawos 
a visitar a don Tello, (2112-14)
which is rather odd, considering his conversation with Nuno
of a: few minutes before: ,; ' ; J '-v •> /
\REY. La informacion quiero hacer.,,
NUftO* Descansad, senor,” primero?;<
que tiempo os sobra de hacella.: . ,
KEY, Nunca a ml me sobra tiempo* (2051-54)
After the interrogation are shown the. peasants discussing, first 
the King’s judicial procedures and, then, the preparations for 
his jneal, (vv. 2122-48), whereupon .the scene changes to Don 
Tello ’-s-- house, where Tello, who clearly has not yet raped
Elvira,' i© furiously chasing her,' obviously: finally out of
. control (vv, 2153 ff..). This latter scene is pointedly ,
sandwiched between the scenes showing us the King’s activities,
so that, in the following scene (vv> 2195 ff<), it .is made
appar en t,t hat Tello f inally .caught Elvira, and raped her,
while, as already noted, the King: was ’lunching and resting. / ;
So, when Elvira finishes her story of the crime/what do we
think of the King’s remark, nPesame de llegar tarde*’ (2355)?
How can we believe,his contention that, J ! \ .
;• llegar a tiempo quisiera ’ s . . , \ ,
. .. , que- pudiera remediar ' •”>, *
, . : de Sancho y Nuno las quejas, • (2356*58)
. when his sense of urgency .was seen to fade* for as long as it 
took to eat a hearty meal? What kind of justice is he effect­
ing? His words suggest that he is punishing Tello for this 
last of fence against Elvira, . * , , .
; . . pero puedo hacer justicia /. ;
. cortandole la; habeas. ' ?
: . : . a Tello; venga el verdugo (2359*61)
- but he had called for a priest and an executioner long 
before he knew of the rape (”Haced traer de secrete/ un ,
. clerigo y un verdugo1* (2120-21 j). , . ; •
It is difficult not to; feel that, as far as the ' ,
peasants are concerned, the King might just as well have not 
intervened; Tello had always intended to return Elvira to her 
family after he, had conquered her resistance, so that all the
King’s machinations have not prevented,that which the peasants 
most/feared,. Waiving account o f jthe "structure: of the play , <
particularly/the details of those scenes examined /in the pre­
ceding paragraph, we thus arrive at. the startling, conclusion 
that, .by the end of the play, Sancho and Elvira and their 
unhappiness are almost .incidental to the high-level political 
intrigue, in which they have becomeinvolved. .If the reasoning 
I have/applied is valid,: it may?partly explain Lope’s reasons 
for changing the crime committed by thenoble,: from disseisin 
.in the history to abduction and rape in the play. . / For one 
,thing, the historical dispossession was a. single act, which 
did not place anyone in danger, whereas the abduction is a? ■ 
continuing c rime' w hich o f f er s great //dramatic potential, as a 
perilous situation against whichthepoliticalintrigue is 
set - not, that is, merely to titillate the audience, but to 
make us aware of the disparity between bhat which we would 
desire of human justice and that.which is being presented as 
human justice, a disparity which becomes increasingly overt 
in the closing scenes, as described above. For another thing, 
Elvira is finally raped, and that is a crime which, unlike
168 • '
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The -usual explanation for this, v.e.g. Americo Castro,; 
Lope de Vega,"Bibi« Literaria del Estudiante,” Vol. XIV, 
(Madrid, 1953)» P ♦ 20, is/that it offers more;human interest, 
appeals more to the audience,' etc.; that is difficult to • 
gainsay, but doeslead one/to wonder why Lope bothered to 
use a historical.source at all.
? ~ ;i69-.’r7( ” '.• ’’ ■• ■* ■
disseisin, cannot be undone* so that the point made of a ; 
similar occurrence in Calderon’s El Alcalde de Zalamea may 
also be made here, namely, that human justice can only be / 
dismally unsatisfactory in certain cases, .offering mere 
retribution and no hope of full reparation* Perhaps Lope • 
is emphasising that via the King’s arrangements at the end 
of it allt 4 ’ < - , ' .
Da, Tello, a Elvira la mano, ,
.. ; para que pagues la ofensa • ‘ .
. . ‘ ' con ser su esposo;y despues . ; ; ; ,
, . que te corten la cabeza,
. . podra casarse con Sancho, , <
- . con la mitad de tu hacienda J .
en dote, Yvos, Feliciana,
, . sereis dama de la Reina, ' ' •’ •
' en: tanto que os doy rnarido . ••
. s. , • ponforme a vuestra nobleza. (239.5*2404) *
Having heard Elvira’s vivid account of the rape,.we are 
invited to wonder, how much consolation is afforded Sancho 
and Elvira by Elvira’s marriage to, and inheritance from,
Don Tello, particularly as it is announced in the same ' • .
breath as the King’s plans for Feliciana, which seem strongly 
reminiscent of the mediaeval gambit of assuring influence in. 
a certain area by marrying a trusted courtier to a local 
leading lady. ... * • ' . .
.The impression all this leaves - again, if the
.foregoing reasoning is correct ~ is that justice (of a sort) 
is done, but that the offended parties are; in part recompensed,
and see their offender punished, not so much because they 
have a just cause, but because their needs, in this casSj • . 
happen to coincide with the King’s own requirements. That 
• is not- to say that Sancho and:Elvira did not have a just 
causer quite the reverse, for the whole point/ is,that the
. -King’s designs have to be tailored to fit ana. ostensibly 
just cause. The ramifications of thisi and its implications
/ for the quality of human justice,, are all too obvious, and .
• /. the., title of;the play invites us to ponder^the'-meaning .and .
. the ironyrof the KingM claim to be ”el mejor-alcalde.”
Nuno’s last words,i ”temblandoaestoyV (2405) are perhaps more 
than just an exclamation,/and we may also consider that even 
half of Don Tello’s wealth,-;which Sancho and Blvira now have, 
ie considerablej one day,,they or their descendants may find 
■ themselves on the wrong side,-in the' royal power -game. . .
. Is it so surprising-that the. justice’Sancho so
desperately seeks is ultimately dependent upon the require- 
ments/of a ’’power struggle”?; Certain passages in the play ; 
suggest that we should not be entirely unprepared for such an 
eventuaiity, and once again I refer to Pelayo as the character
. who may be pointing out the truth. \ ,
When Sancho and Nuno first consider going to ask
the King to intercede, Sancho ask® Pelayo if he will accompany 
him to--the Court. Pelayo, in his reply, ends with the word®:
" ' ? Die eh que es una talega ‘ ’ <•
. v :.;<donde junta lostrebejos > .
para jugar la.fortuna, ; . , • .'?••< '
, ' : tantos blancos co»o negros, . (^35“9)
The Court is a chessboard, "where destiny with men for pieces 
plays.” Within thecontext of.devious political manoeuvering’ 
which seems to shape this play :(and its historical.source),
, the metaphor seems'extraordinarily apt, and I presumably need
, not elaborate the.obvious* Suffice it to remember that in 
chess (the rules of which have not changed since the sixteenth 
century, according to my encyclopaedia), the whole game is 
ultimately dependent on the safety of the ?King:'the King must
’ be defended at all: costs (even the. Queen may be sacrificed!) 
and the game is won, lost, or stalemate,’ according to the fate
, of the King; no other piece is of any consequence in the final *
• analysis, and' all other pieces are ■ a means to an end * And we . 
all, know the connotations of the word peon in everyday language 
As regards Pelayo’s description, we also know that, in this 1 
.play, ‘ Lope is ”fortuna”,.and that he is manipulating the King,
y the Knights, the pawns, etc.5 this seems quite important, 
because, the chessboard is not an analogy of, real life,\since
.. the pieces on a chessboard, do hot move of their own free will <
. r^One meaning given in the Piccionario de Autoridades is,
”E1 queen las obras mercenarias trabaja por su jorhal, o en 
cosas materiales, que no pidenarte ni habilided” - not as 
powerful as the English’correlation of ”pawn” and ”victim”, 
but sufficient to suit the metaphor. ;?.< <
19i . -
ae men do; however, as an analogy of the play the concept is 
. valid, for the manipulator (Lope) is offering us a lesson in
the game, a lesson which goes beyond.trite analogies to 
, suggest how it is that .men with free wills and-immortal-souls
can sometimes seem to be only pieces on a chessboard*
• ‘ Later, in Act III,’ Pelayo is bragging to Nuno about
their chances of success in the forthcoming., judicial proceed­
ings, and compares what is happening with<a /card game, in 
which Don Tello has a good card, but not &0 good a card as
: t h e a.c e w hi ch Pelayo, an d Sane ho hold:
\ ^Matar? JOh, que bueno; es. escI 
.; £Nunca habeis jugado .al triunfo? 
Haced cuenta que don Tello .
ha metido la malilla;'■ ,
puds la depadi'lla- traetnos*.; (1964-8)
$ancho tells Pelayo to hold his tongue, because he can see.;-. '
what; Pelayo means, by referring to the unbeatable card; Nuno, 
does not understand, but we do, and what ought to stick in .
our minds is. that card gcarnes. are essentially games of chance* 
In this game, Sancho and Pelayo have been-dealt the ace and ., 
so take- the trick, but. it is clear that we cannot always 
expect a mission such as this * however just-the cause -to 
be successful* Once, again, we also have to bear in mind that
"Lope is "chance," and-the.same inferences may be drawn from, . 
<' .this image as from the chessboard image* There does seem to
be a warning in the play that we should note these images, :ln -
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that Don-,Tello has an image in his house which he conspicuously 
fails to ignore; I-.refer to the tapestry Pelayo describes, 
which depicts a King trying to kill one of his subjects,
(”Baul cuando al Badil ma tar gueria-’.’-Qv. 1401-15]). ; • ■■
■ • From all this, there seems to emerge a pattern in
which the King . is shown, not so much as the representative of 
scrupulous justice and impartial morality, cleansing the 
society of a man who, temporarily, opposes such concepts, but 
as a man behaving very much-like Don Tello himself; 'and the .
more one considers the modes of speech and behaviour of the ,
two men, the more apparent become the sipiilarities between ■
the©. ' ‘ ' •• • -
■ .. The fundamental similarity lies in the decisive -­
force of wealth and power in enforcing one’s law on society, 
and the way in.which it is used. Don Tello’s advantage,: which 
drove Sancho '■ to distraction, was that his own wealth and power, 
and hence his law, were unchallenged in Galicia. The King is 
eventually able to bring down Don.Tello because the King has 
behind him even greater wealth and power. < Perhaps lope is 
suggesting that when, at the end of the first Court scene, he 
shows us the King/giving to Sanpho his letter (which proves 
ineffective)^ while giving * to Pelayo a bag of; gold coins 
(vv. it is also noteworthy that, at the end of the ■
play, the King divides Don Tello’s wealth (between Feliciana
andBlvira). What determines the outcome of. the cbntest, , <
: then| is not a difference in kind but a difference in degree: 
the King -ip- ’’biggerb than Don Tello; the procedures adopted
by both men are basically the; same.
.. . Comparing their-procedures, we-, find that, for one
; thing, the King apparently/has" tore sort to various kinds of 
, .subterfuge— secrecy, lies, etc> . - in order to work hid will, 
just as Don Tello has to - Gf. the abduction*scene, and the
game he plays with Sancho and . NuHo> until Elvira steps but of 
hidingy for examplesy~:in order to work his will, until such 
tactics cease to be useful (which may also be said of the 
King). . Another point concerns, the reliance on words and 
customs to present' the; case in a desired light. Don Tello 
reduces<himself to the.-level of an- imbecile by constantly , 
relying on absurd word-plays, (cf. his argument,with Blvira 
at the,beginning of Act II,;his exchange with Nuno ~ nVoso- 
tros< sois los tiranosh pSV’M in Act III, etc.) to justify 
his position morally,-and on dubious customs to justify, his 
position socially. These are: the symptoms of a mind dis- . -
ordered or clouded by violent and uncontrolled (but not :.
. uncontrollable) passions: first lust, then pride and rage.
1 But* the King, to accomplish his aims, relies on;the custom
of executing,traitors, and relies on his own.interpretation 
(i.e. on his own word-usage) of both the law and the crime •
to show that Don Tello deserves his end* It seems to me
(and to the King’s aides), as suggested above, that this 
charge of treason is open to question; of course Don Tello 
is nominally guilty of treason, but only nominally - or, to: 
put. it another way, only legally* If we have listened to the 
language of the protagonists, especially of the King, and 
considered carefully their actions, we must surely begin to 
understand the impossibility or dishonesty of reducing 
human behaviour to legal formulaeLope has demonstrated this 
in an explicit and emphatic fashion with Don Tello; now he is 
letting us see a similar distortion perpetrated by the King, 
while at the same time: allowing us to view the King, if we so 
wish, as a guardian of truth and justice* Yet?such a.view, 
to my mind, can only be sustained if we accept the King’s 
words and actions at their face-value - the final irony being 
that face-values are not necessarily worthless, and indeed­
are not in this case.
' To reinforce this point I would again refer to the
second court-scene, in which Sancho tells the King what hap­
pened when he took, the royal letter to Don Tello,. The tone 
of the King’s ,fidebi6; de rompella?” ( 1700) displays - unless 
I am reading too-much into it - almost■an-eagerness for con­
firmation, the kind of question which speakers of classical 
Latin preface with a ’’Nonne ...n Sancho’s answer sums up
• ■; • '■ ;‘s: . / - 176 -<
; everything I am implying:. ”No, he didn’t tear up the letter, ■* 
but it wouldn’t be-difficult to say that he did” is the ,gist '< 
of it (T705-&. quoted above), ’ and the King• "s' approval of this
. judgement (1721-2 quoted above) ~ a judgement which could toe 
. made of anyone guilty .of the slightest misdemeanour *; is then •
put into effect. A few minutes later, as this scene closes,
->• this malleability of lanp;uage is commented on via * who else? 
Pelayo,; who, takes the King’s instructions (”no hatoeis de
quitar/ de los latoios los d,edbs'h]l76l*2j) absolutely literally, 
and has to toe told by. the;;King that the words did nbt mean e
' precisely, what, they said: .. •, ’ . . ’’ ' .
. ~ ’•PELAYO. Sexier, los fendre tan quedos,
que no osare; tooateasar, ... .>
• , ■' Pero eu merced,. mirando ■ ;
• . . >’ • . \ con pied&d mi suficiencia, \
; ’ me ,'ha vde-dar una licencia ■ t?:
, de comer de touando; en cuando. .
' . . KEY. No se entiehde que has de ester , •
•, . siempre la mano en la boca. > (1762-70) . ’
Later, Pelayo puts into practice the lessons he learns here:
when Nuno tries to prise from him the/secret of the pesquisi*; • 
dor’s identity (1992 f f♦), Pelayo conceaIs the truth\by con* . 
fusing the issue with words (”Es un homtore de buen peso,/ 
descolorido, encendido;. j etc .~| ” (2000*2008] ) * and this, we > 
remember, is in order to obey the King. Pelayo’s defence of
. ”esas malicias” (2024) is loaded with-irony: ’’^No vengo/ de 
la corte?... ^Que se espanta?” (2024t5) - spoken, let. it be ; , /
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noted, just before the entry of the-King.arid his'aides 2 . -
■- At the end, v?hen. Don Tello’s behaviour is brought
to a halt, the absurd justification to which he clings, ”No 
fue eu ffl.ujer, senor,” (2275),- is finally destroyed by the / 
King’s making the obvious point, UB'asta que lo quiso s.er” • 
(2£?6)< Don Tello’s words had obscured the truth, the King’i 
words now restore truth; .but, the reason why the King’s 
words carry greater weight is not because of the power-, of ' 
the words but because of the power of the King* Even the 
King’s next utterance is a silly lies Nuno did not ..complain 
to the King himself, but presumably to satisfy a legal- 
aspect of the case (cf. Don Tello, ’’Cuando‘se quejara Nuno,/
estuviera disculpado” j 1505-6and v. my chapter on Fuente­
- • . 54 . / . ’ - • ' ' :* z.
’ ovfejunaj above, footnote '15) * the King says that he did.
, Finally, the King duplicates what was perhaps Bon
Tello’s worst crime: the refusal to have mercy. Don Tello 
..denied pity .to Sancho, , to .Nuno, and of course - to- Elvira 
not surprisingly, since, iri his disordered state, his.con­
ception of pity, was expressed to Gelio thus: ’’Tuviera 
;{Elv iraj de six piedad,/ Celio, y no la for Kara” (190.5-4), ., 
The closing scene of the play represents the discussion on 
justice and mercy to which X have already referred, in which 
the three other members of the nobility present (Conde, don 
. Enrique,’arid Feliciana) try to persuade the King to modify
. - ' ■' ~ 178 - . ; ;-
his sentence on Don Tello; but the King decided long before 
that ©on Tello had committed a capital offence. Is it 
significant that the King .refers to "mi justicia” (2J82 - 
reminiscent of Don Tello’s "soy quien soy" |?i^8o ff.J ) 
rather than to "la justicia"? Perhaps not, since his next
words are- - ■ ■ . •
Cuando pierde de su punto/ 
la justicia, no se acierta
, ■ en admitir la , piedad j.
, - divinas y humanas letras
. . ; dan ejemplos. (2387*9^)
- but, as-already noted, this latter statement cannot go 
unchallenged. For one thing, justice without mercy is the 
Old Law, from which men are supposed to have been freed by 
the New law, of the Gospels, which rejects retribution ..for 
mercy and forgiveness. Fox' anothex* thing, while "divinas y 
huwanas letras" do give examples of merciless justice,.they 
also give examples of.the opposite, even in-the Old Testament
- the tapestry Pelayo saw in Don Tello’s house represents one
such example, for Saul’s pex'secution of David dragged on for 
a long time, and yet the episode ended in reconciliation and 
mutual forgiveness (v. I Samuel, 18-24), even if not 
permanently. . ' ' 1 ' ; ‘
The King, it seems, is determined to have his way, 
and whereas for Sancho the metaphor of cutting down the 
tallest- tree could, only remain a .-metaphor, . the King is able
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to convert it into reality- As we watch the final scene, we 
may well feel that Don Tello emerges from it with far greater 
.credit than does the King, We may also feel that Sancho’s 
closing words, although they 'are the standard valediction to 
the audience, carry overtones of irony in their reference to 
”el mejor alcalde,51 and particularly in the next,words, 
’’historia/ que afirma por verdadera/ la coronica de Espana” 
(24O‘7~9), since we find, upon reading the latter, that it is 
somewhat dissimilar from the story Lope has presented. To 
recapitulate briefly, it appears that the justice we have 
been watching is a justice in which the judge (who is des­
cribed as the best judge) indulges in procedures which not 
only cannot be regarded as satisfactory, but which also bear
an uncomfortable resemblance to the behaviour of the criminal
it also appears that the justice which is done, and vzhich we 
have to approve - redress and reinstatement for the.peasants 
comes about because it happens to coincide with the interests 
of the most powerful party• ‘
■ / All that is hot, however, leading to the conclusion
that Lope is writing in order to "expose" the improprieties 
of men.in authority: the truth we are being' shown is more 
difficult to face than that, Having just seen the similari­
ties between Don Tello and the King, we ought now to recall
the similarities we were able to observe between Don Tello
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and the peasants; this is where the detailed examination of 
the first peasant scenes again becomes relevant*,. In those 
scenes we saw, albeit in a comic and innocuous context, the, 
peasants doing the same sort of thing as we have seen Don 
Tello and the King doing* The peasants, too, found it neces­
sary to conceal the truth, even in the pursuit of natural 
justice; they too played games of secrecy and dissimulation; 
they were happy to rely on, and profit from, custom; and they 
too were not very careful about the meanings of the words they 
used, sometimes finding it convenient to justify themselves 
via a convenient catchphrase* All this was amongst lovers, 
relatives, and friends, while the.only one prepared to call 
a spade a spade, Pelayo> was continually rebuffed* These • 
aspects are part of the Hjustice11 of the peasant world, just 
as all. the political'tricks are part of the justice of the 
noble world, and all these aspects of the peasant world are 
shown us even before it is subject to the perversion brought 
about by Don Tello; even on the most simple level of society 
in the most simple relationships between people, truth and 
justice are seen to be at the mercy of the most inconspicuous 
forces (and the opportunity for showing this is another advan­
tage derived from changing the crime from dispossession to
, abduction). Small wonder that, when Don Tello does go haywire, 
the peasants too are driven farther from natural justice,.as,
"■ - 181 .. 7 " > • '
for instance, when Sancho becomes as unreasoning as Don Tello 
(801 ff., 1138 ff., etc.), when the father-daughter relation- 
ehip of Nuno and Elvira is distorted (1777 ff*), and so forth*?
This perversion of justice throughout all levels of 
society Is best exemplified by the way in which all,;these pro­
tagonists, volint nolint, try to punish or take vengeance on 
each other; It begins in the opening scenes, with Elvira and 
Sancho and their lovers’ games, in which latter there is the 
inevitable streak of lovers’ cruelty, with Elvira’s comment 
that ’’amor todo es venganzas” (270); the amazing thing about 
that situationis that it is reproduced in the relationship
to thebetween Don Tello and Elvira, as becomes evident
audience for the first time in Act II, .
. ' ? ’ ' x . ' Si alcanza
. mi fe lo que ha pretendido,
el amor-que le he tenido ‘
. se?ha de.trocar en venganza,
later to represent, in Act III, the final depths
disorder: : '
. . . Ta es tema, si amor ha side;
que aunque Elvira no es Tamar,
: : a ellale. ha de pesar,
: y a mi vengarme su olvido*
What is amazing is not, that love should turn to
(1303-6)
of Don Tello’s
(1923-6) 
vengeance in
the mind of the unbalanced Don Tello, but that the same thing 
should appear so normal and comical in the natural relationship 
between Sancho and Elvira. This possibility of punishment , in ’
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relationships between loved ones is again brought out in the . 
scene just mentioned above between Nuno and Elvira, where k 
Nuno is actually disowning Elvira because the unfortunate 
girl is, not the perpetrator, but the victim of a crime* 
Meanwhile, we are repeatedly shown the peasants’ vindictive­
ness towards Pelayo* . . .
Higher on the social scale, the will to exact 
punishment of one kind or another is more obvious, in the 
behaviour of Don,Tello towards Elvira, Sancho, Nuno and even 
his sister (e.g. ”»Mira que te he de perder/ el respeto, 
Felicianai” [2157*S*|), and ofscourse in the behaviour of the 
King. The effect all this has on the workings of justice may 
be seen in the experiences of Sancho: when the King decides 
to render him aid in the case, Sancho is, naturally, over- . 
whelmed with admiration for him - just as he was, equally 
naturally, overwhelmed with admiration for Don Tello when 
the latter offered him similar generosity. It seems that, 
for peasant as well as King, ‘’justice*1 means "that which con­
forms with my self-interest”; that may be a truism of any 
society^ But we cannot just ignore it; the audience is, after 
all, shown another offer of gifts in the play, by Don Tello 
to Elvira (12?7-’9O)» which we know is morally unacceptable 
because the end involved means making a whore of Elvira, and
for which Don Tello is able to claim society’s approval
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(7^3^5 quoted above) - point being, that calling something 
a truism does not absolve, us from the responsibility of making 
a judgement on'ourselves- \ .■ .
What we see in the play, as in Fuenteovejuna, is 
the whole spectrum of the social order -King, Court nobles, 
landed gentry, ex-landed gentry, peasant farmers, servants, 
and the village ’’clown”, - and almost all of them are behaving 
in more or less the same way. Each section ie introduced as 
fulfilling its role responsibly, but this never lasts long: 
the peasants have their natural justice - but love becomes 
”venganzas”; Don Tello personifies justice in the noble world - 
but munificence turns to bribery; the King’s first action 
causes the Conde to extol his ’’suroa clemencia” - but the same 
Conde later asks the King, unavailingly, ’’Pues la piedad,
£es bajeza?” (2386). What the King does is shown to be only 
any enlargement of what Don Tello does, which is an exaggera­
tion of what the peasants do, and they do what the King does, 
etc. etc., while, ultimately, justice comes to those who hold 
the strongest cards. ...
Within that context, the difficulties attaching to 
the concept of liberty as obedience to just law scarcely need 
to be enumerated, for the law is only as good as those who 
administer it, and is therefore associated with the basic con­
cept of liberty as the possession of reason and choice, which,
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as we know, ceases to be liberty as soon as choice repudiates 
reason.< The denial of liberty within Don. Tello has already 
been examined, as has the/lesser extent to which, it is appa­
rent in.Sancho and Elvira. It remains to point out the 
ironies of'the resulting destruction of the liberty which . 
depends on just relationships between all these protagonists, 
recalling, for the sake of clarity, that we are not discussing 
moral liberty (the permanent voluntary choice of the good 
which is not normally attainable in this life), but natural 
liberty,.which is our ability to choose good via reason (as 
opposed to being coerced by instinct), and which, in society, 
entails the voluntary obedience to just law.
‘ One of these ironies was noted earlier, that every­
one does nthe right thing1’but everything goes wrong. Don 
Tello obeys what he feels is a just law(that he should only 
marry his equal), yet becomes disordered and dangerous because 
of the onus it lays oh him; Sancho obeys Nuno - who, in making 
the suggestion, is also mindful of just law - in reporting 
his marriage to the senor; the natural liberty of all con­
cerned should be protected by all this, but it is destroyed, 
because, just once, instinct proved stronger than reason and 
Don Tello had to stop.the wedding* As a result of that, Don 
Tello claimed he was obeying the social Taw, in having to 
force himself upon Elvira rather than marrying her, but that
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-...is where the whole idea of obedience to law becomes unsatis­
factory, for it is where the limitation of law - namely, that 
it is expressed in human language - becomes apparent. Don 
Tello may be right in claiming that he is obeying the law 
(and who is to say that the law is unjust?), and yet, this 
obedience is being used to excuse what is essentially a loss 
of liberty in himself (via submission to instinct instead of 
to reason), as well as a denial of the liberty of Elvira, who ; 
is beingtold to obey that which is morally unjust but which 
Don Tello can call socially just. .
, Nuno, too, feels he.is obeying a social law when 
he insults, threatens, and rejects Elvira in Act III; it is
the same kind of social law as that to which Don Tello refers 
in his attempts to defend his actions (e.g. 7^1 “7 quoted 
above), and they cannot both be just; in fact, of course, 
neither is: both offend natural justice and there can be no
. liberty in obedience to them; yet these are the kind of silly 
beliefs which many in the audience would no doubt take seriously. 
Just how silly they are is emphasised by the fact that it is 
Elvira who shows Nuno that obedience to such laws is absurd 
(and hence nothing to do with liberty):/ she is the one who is 
suffering most (even being deprived of her physical liberty), 
precisely because of Tello’s adherence to the same kind of law. 
Shortly after that scene, Cello attempts to reason with Don
— .186 -
Tello: -
CELIO. Senor, lo que intentas mira.
D. TELLO* No mira quien esta ciego.
. CELIO. Que repares bien te ruego,
. que forzalla es crueldad. . :
D. TELLO. Tuviera de mi piedad,
Celio, y yo no la.forzara.
CELIO. Estimo por cosa rara
‘ SU'defensa y castidad 1 (1899*1906)
- an obviously futile endeavour in view of Tello’s loss of
liberty, but Nuno, too, because of his belief in the social
customs, had ignored a similar lesson from Celio:
CELIO. No teneis que temer, que ella resiste 
.. . con ga liar do valor y valentia
de mujer, que es mayor cuando porfia.
, s NUNO. Y j,podre yo creer que honor ma nt iene
mujer que erirsu poder un hombre tiene?
CELIO. Pues es tanta verdad, que si quisiera 
. . Elvira que su esposo Celio fuera,
• . tan seguro con ella me casara<$,
,como si en vuestra casa la tuviera.
\ ? . (1780-88)
Row can there1 be.such a thing as liberty when one of its 
requisites * obedience - is frequently a source of its denial?
The cruellest irony, perhaps, is that, as in El
Alcalde de Zalamea, the innocent person who suffers most, 
Elvira, is the one who is least guilty of transgression of law 
.or perversion of liberty. She is probably the closest to 
moral liberty: she obeys that which it is right to obey, and, 
far more difficult, refuses to obey that which it is clearly 
wrong to obey, in spite of enormous pressure on her to do so, 
in spite of her own father’s lack of trust in her, in spite
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of the pressure of an instinct that can easily overcome reason, 
namely, fear; her only fall from grace:(her tryst with Sancho), 
in contrast, is occasioned by a more worthy passion,. Yet.she
’ is the one who is imprisoned, assaulted, threatened with, death
. .and. raped, and her attempts to choose according to reason and 
nature, to reject the pressure of instinct within herself, 
are abortive, because another person’s,instincts are .combined 
with a greater strength than she can muster, because this is, 
as Feliciana says, a. battle,’’Eescansad, y volvereis/ a la 
bataila” (977~8), and one which she cannot win alone. She, 
too, must finally ask the King for'justice; her liberty is 
also dependent on the King, and that is not a reassuring 
thought. . ■ • • .»' * ;
' . For all concerned, then, liberty depends on the law
and justice of the King. When Sancho first went to see the
. king, it was only in obedience to Nuno, ’’For tu gusto te .
obedeaco” (1224), who was seeking justice in preference to 
anarchy. But Nuno, as we have seen, almost invariably sug­
gests that which is right in theory but wrong in practice. ' 
When we watch Sancho going to seek.justice from,the King, we 
know that.this can also mean that we are going to see if 
liberty is possible at all in human sooiety; at first, it . 
appears that it is not, but later, when justice - of a sort - 
is done for Sancho, liberty is presumably assured. However,
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' that is where all the qualifications of justice, described 
above, again become important, for we can only say that 
obedience means liberty in this case; even in this case, 
though, both the' justice and the -liberty are far from unequi­
vocal, and, as . for other cases, we cannot know what might 
happen* We certainly cannot ’avoid the problem that obedience 
must always be to an intermediary, not directly to the King 
himself, so that the possibilities of liberty through obedience 
are, for ordinary people, as varied as the seniors whom they , 
must obey, and, given all the problems of truth and deception 
that we have;seen in even the most intimate relationships, the 
obstacles are plainly formidable. <
The most important aspect of the King’s'behaviour 
in this regard, though* is his manipulation (as it appears to 
me)'of the language of,the law. , Human law purports to repre­
sent the application of rational principles to specific circum­
stances; Lope shows us, in yuenteovejuna, how distortions of 
language represent distortions of reason and law, and we can 
see.there the consequences for liberty. Unlike the Comendador,
, Alfonso VII; is not disordered and licentious - quite' the 
reverse; but, notwithstanding, law and reason are shown to be 
ambiguous* Therefore, although human liberty is1; theoretically 
assured by obedience to just law, we have to infer from Lope’s 
work, that such liberty is not completely assured thereby.
The comparison with Fuenteovejuna needs emphasising» in that 
Fernan Gomes is obviously guilty of twisting reason and law, . 
obviously destructive of liberty; with Alfonso VII, on the 
other hand (as, to.a lesser degree, with Fernando el Catolico) 
Lope shows that the fallibility of reason and law can be made
far lees obvious; and that it can be used.by men who are
‘ ■ - 20 • ' '' . •anything but unbalanced. The qualifications attendant 
upon our liberty are thus shown to be further-reaching than 
might appear if.,we were to consider only extraordinary 
situations such asthat faced by the inhabitants of Fuente- 
ovejuna; that facet of the condition of human liberty is 
shown more clearly in Calderon1s. El Alcalde de galameat and; • 
indeed, the interdependence of liberty, language and reason • 
will become increasingly apparent in subsequent chapters of 
this thesis. . . . ,
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Salomon, asserting that the peasants had confidence in 
the law and. the. King, says, ’’Pour eux,.face aux seigneurs 
et aux nobles, la royaute representait la liberte et la 
justice11 (op. cit., p. 90S), but I think that Lope shows the 
situation to be far less straightforward. .
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' ’ ' Chapter III '
. Calderon's EL ALCALDE PE 3ALAMEA , '
' 1 to ‘ ' # ' ' ’ , * •g . , ■ "for Calderon, as for Shakespeare, .Nature ... .Law ...
Reason ... are deeply Interwoven", and in BI Alcalde de - 
ftalamea there is,.as Dunn goes on to say,\ an "implicit concern 
with law ~ human, natural, divineIn particular, the play 
is concerned with tho nature of human justice, with its imper­
fections and limitations, and their causes, . The plot suggests 
a fundamental ambivalence involving the old problem of means 
and ends: human law may bring about a "just" end in a case, 
but the means to that, end may be.considered unsatisfactory 
from a moral or legal standpoint.- In this play,- therefore, 
the relationship between man’s imperfect lav; and his imperfect 
liberty may be usefully examined. •­
I propose to devote the first part of this chapter
P. N. Dunn, "Patriruonio del alma," Bulletin of Hispanic 
Studies, XLI, J964:, PP» 73-85, p.78. Dunn offers excellent 
explanations of. some of the play’s problems, v.‘ also "Honour 
and the Christian background in Calderon," Bulletin of Hispanic 
Studies, XXXVII, i960, pp., 75-105, and his Introduction and 
notes to the Pergamon Press edition of the play.(Edinburgh, 
1966), which is the edition to-which my references refer.
^"Patrimbnio del Alma," ,p. 8/+. . . •’ . --
to a survey of various aspects of human law as they appear 
in Calderon*s presentation of law and justice in action. The 
problems may be seen with reference to individuals, to the 
relationship between civil justice and military justice, and, 
from these, to the workings of human law and justice as shown 
via Pedro Crespo*s actions and achievements. The second part 
of the chapter will provide an analysis of the problems of 
liberty reflected in the above. It will be realised that, 
although discussion of liberty comprises the smaller part of 
the chapter, its problems are implicit in the difficulties of 
human justice, which must be examined first.
The most obvious example of injustice in an indivi- 
. dual is the Captain, Don Alvaro, described by Dunn as repre­
senting "law turned to self-assertion”; as that facet of the 
. * ,Captain*s character has been adequately studied already, there
is.no point, in reviewing it here. It is worth pointing out, 
though, how the corruption of the Captain is involved with, 
and reflected by, the disorder of his subordinates in the lower 
ranks of the army. It is exemplified by the insubordination 
of Rebolledo, and his talk of desertion, and by Chispa’s 
designs on the gambling concession. Calderon makes the drama­
tic connection between the two levels of rank by making the.
<E1 Alcalde de Zalamea, ed. cit., Introduction, p. 22.
Captain exchange favours with Rebolledo: he gives Rebolledo
charge of the boliche (which Rebolledo will delegate to
Chispa)* thereby obliging Rebolledo to assist him in breaking
into Isabel’s room (v. I, 602-648). Indeed, the Captain
avails himself of Rebolledo precisely because
. este.soldado, que es mas deepejado, j , -
. el fingira mejor lo que he trazado. (I, 604-5)
. The disorder and corruption amongst the lower ranks
continues after Chispa has become bolichera. She is accused
of cheating and slashes a man with a knife, as she tells ,
Rebolledo when he asks what the quarrel was about: .
CHISPA. Sobre hacerme alicantina 
: del barato de hora y media
; ' que.estuvo echando las bolas,
. teniendome muy atenta
a si eran pares o nones, (II, 161-5)
Shortly afterwards, Chispa and Rebolledo are aiding and abet­
ting the Captain in his attempts to attract Isabel’s attention 
(591 ff.), and Chispa, saying ’’Agora estoy en mi centro”
(II, 595)» reminds us of the violent confusion of the elements 
inherent in the. Captain’s disordered personality, and thereby
includes herself in the disorder. .
Significantly, the general indiscipline and disorder 
• of Rebolledo and company is used, in the opening scenes of the 
play, to draw our attention to some of the intrinsic difficul­
ties of human law and justice. The soldiers complain about
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the corruption of their superiors; apparently, when the
soldiers arrive at a town where they are to be billeted, the
officers accept the bribes of the alcaldes who offer enough:
que si es que se pueden ir,[the soldiers,J 
que daran lo necesario. (I, 23-4)
The footsore soldiers then have to keep inarching, while the
officers pocket their gains. But, while the soldiers complain
about corruption< they also display a lack of enthusiasm for
their commander, Don Lope de Figueroa, because his methods .
of enforcing the law are ruthlessly efficient:
, ■ ; '■ • ... sab’e hacer ' '■
. justicia del mas amigo
sin fulminar el proceso. (I, 56-8) -
. We are shown two aspects of the same concept, human
justice, but neither represents the ideal. Amongst the.
soldiers, justice; provokes only cynicism and mockery, as
expressed in Rebolledo’s and Chispa’s puns on-legal terms,
used to introduce a sardonic jacarandina:
CHISPA. Responds a esa peticion .
. citada la castaneta,,
- RBBOLLBDO.* • Y yo ayudare tambien. , .
. . . Sentencien los camaradas
. todas las partes citadas. (I,-95-99)
In legal language, responder means'1” to answer a summons,” 
peticion means ”.a demand1’, citado means ’’summoned”, sentenciar 
means ”to give the verdict”, and parte means ”a party in a 
lawsuit.” . . . . . . "/ . ■>.
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. When justice is mocked by these puns, we may become *
aware that while, on the one hand, such mockery from a rabble 
of conscripts does not tell us very much, on the other hand, 
justice may be mocked by puns in amore seriousway; for puns 
are plays on words, and words are the vehicles of human law*
So perhaps, we may feel at this point, human justice can 
become dependent on word-plays..
At the end of the play, singing and punning are
brought together again by these same characters, in the last
lines before the valediction: ;
HEBOLL.EDO: Yo no pienso ya cantar
’ , . ' • en mi vida. • ' . . • .
CHISPA: Pues yo si, :;
• . cuantas veces a mirar , ••
. : llegue el pasado instrument©. (Ill, 97^*7)
Rebolledo is referring to the singing in the street (beneath 
Isabel’s window) for which he and Chispa were recognised and 
arrested by Crespo (v..1X1, 396-63^) - Crespo being the first 
to employ the ambiguity of cantar (”... un instrumento/ tengo 
en que canteis mejor” pH, 601-2J). Chispa, though, is refer­
ring to her statements made to Crespo under threat of torture,, 
just as an English-speaking criminal might use the word “sing.” 
Crespo is then made to reply, ”Con que fin el autor da/ a esta 
historia verdadera” (XII, 978-9 - my underlining). What 
happens in between the quoted extracts shows that it is with 
good reason that Calderon introduces, at the very beginning
195 - • , • •• - - . .
and at the very end of the play, the Ideas mooted above.
The other problem of human justice presented in the
opening scenes concerns Don lope and Pedro Crespo* From the
soldiers, we hear opinions regarding both men. Don Lope,
Pebol’ledo tells us, . . ' • ... • .
- ... si tiene tanta loa 7 ;
de animoso y de valiente, .
la tiene tambien de ser 7
el hombre mas desalmado, : .
.. . \ jurador y renegado.
. : delinundo, ... (I, 51-6)
A moment later, the Sergeant comes back from the village to
tell us about Crespo; ■ ;
he,oido que es el mas vano 
' . ' * ■ • . hombre del mundo?, y que tiene
- . mas pornpa y mas presuncion , '
• . 7 que un infante de Leon. (I, 168-171)
How much truth is there in these opinions? Don Lope, des­
cribed as "desalmado,” later demonstrates genuine concern and 
affection for all three members of the Crespo family. Crespo 
is. described as vain and-pompous., but by whom? It is the sort 
of opinion we might expect from Don Mendo, who calls Crespo a 
”villano malicioso” (I, 409); it is not necessarily,therefore, 
an unbiased assessment of Crespo. . '
. : Through such situations we are being shown the falli­
bility of human witness, and human witness is another of the 
factors on which human justice depends. Later, Kebolledo. and 
Chispa testify against the Captain, but it is under the threat
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of torture and death: ; . \.
CRESPO.: Resolveos a decir ....
REBOLLEDO. iQue? • . . ■ . •
• CRESPO.. ■ * : ; cuanto anoche paso ... "
REBOLLEDO. Tu hija mejor que yo ; * .
■ ” • lo sabe. ' \ ./ ' ' '
CRESPO.. • o has de raorir . (Ill, 603-6)
and the validity of such witness is.; further shown to be ques­
tionable when Chispa is confronted with the same choice:
CRESPO. Resolveos a decir
. ;• vuestros dichos. • . •
CHISPA. • . Sx, diremos
. y^aun mas.de lo que sabemos;
. . que peor sera morir. ; (III, 623-6)
Unreliable enough in normal circumstances, human witness as 
adduced in such legal proceedings is even less likely to elicit 
truth. '. ' ■ ’ ;
As we watch the dramatic situations being.put before 
us, we are ourselves being made witnesses. We listen to all 
the opinions expressed, but ,we have to avoid being conditioned 
by any of them - soldiers,'officers, peasants or nobility - if 
our capacities for judgement' are to remain unimpaired. As 
regards Don Lope and Pedro Crespo, for example, we have to 
realise that they are both men of principle, but men who also 
have to pay heed to pressures and circumstances which may 
necessitate that principles be compromised. That much can be 
seen in the juridical conflict around which the plot revolves, 
with both men having to take account of.both criteria and events
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; and it Is also shown to be a problem in the wider context of 
human justice in general. ,
. ?.The juridical, conflict between Don Lope and Pedro
Crespo is,brought into the open when Don Lope arrives at the 
end of-Act I. The argument between the two, men serves to 
illustrate the conflict: Crespo asserts his right to attack 
the Captain, and Don Lope denies that right, while both invoke 
threats of death to reinforce their stance (I, 850-68). We 
have witnessed the events about which they are arguing (the 
Captain’s breaking into Isabel’s room), and we know that Crespo 
has a point; we also know that Don-Lope can legitimately claim 
that the Captain is his responsibility alone. Ideally, the 
two jurisdictions, the civil and the military, should work in 
harmony, having, on the moral level at least, the same aims 
and the same means. Here, they clearly do not harmonise, and 
we should ask ourselves why that is so.
. . The answer is suggested by what we have seen so far.
We already know that Crespo is proud of being Msi‘bien de 
limpio linaje,/ hombre llano” (I, 490-1).,-happy to fulfil his 
natural station in life as best he can, and conscious - and 
jealous - of his opinion. His attempt to conceal Isabel from
. - the soldiers is a facet of his customary prudence, but events 
beyond his control render his precautions abortive - worse,
- they aggravate his difficulties, cf... the Captain: ”y solo
' •; / *198 * ...... .
porque el viejo la ha guardado,/ deseo, vive Dios, de entrar 
me ha dado . (I, 591*2) -and, when that happens, he has to
tread warily, tempering with caution his desire to defend his 
family and his name. We also know-that Don Lope is a busy 
man with a job to do, many responsibilities, an invasion to . 
launch,'a King in the offing, and a painful leg; he is under­
standably anxious not to become involved in, or to have his 
men become involved in, needless altercations with civilians; 
when that happens, the interests of his army must take 
precedence.
Those are the kind of conditions which impair the
satisfactory workings of human law, and which qualify the
terms used by the protagonists in the dispute. Don Lope, for
instance, is within hie legal rights in taking to extremes
the separation of.the military and civil jurisdictions:
’ .. A quien tocara
.ni aun al soldado menor, 
solo un pelo de la ropa,
por vida del cielo, yo
le ahorcara, . v . , (I, 861-5)
but separate jurisdiction does not confer on the military the 
right to break civil and moral-law at the civilian’s expense. 
Crespo may have no right to take action against the Captain, 
but Don Lope has both the right and the responsibility, as he 
tacitly admits by, for example, ordering Don Alvaro’s company 
out of.Zalamea (v. 11, 481-494), and via his arguments, in,
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Act III, e.g. . ..
. ■ justicia la parte espere
. de rax; que tambien se yo ' ■ .
degollar, si es necesario. (Ill, 761-2) 
Yet, Don Lope does not discharge his responsibility adequately 
In the first instance, moving the Captain out of town is 
scarcely sufficient to keep him away from Isabel, especially
. as Don Lope is going to Guadalupe the same day, "... a pre- 
venir/ todo el tercio” (II, 55^-5), and will therefore be 
quite unable to support the theoretical force of his rank.
In the second instance, the phrase "si es necesario” is a 
limitless qualification, for Don Lope1s assessments of what 
is necessary and what can be done are very much conditioned 
by the circumstances of everyday life, the like of which I
. mentioned in the previous paragraph. The suggestion is even 
perceptible that one of the causes of his impatient dieposi­
tion is.the pain of his old leg-wound, which is constantly 
with him and which is referred to almost every time he -' 
appears - as in his very first scene, when he summarily 
clears up an unpleasant situation, his words implying that 
the short shrift he gives the protagonists is a product of 
his short temper: .
^No me basta haber subido . .
hasta aqui con el dolor • > ,
... • desta pierna, — que los diablos
. .. . llevaran, amen, — sino .
no decirme: "Aquesto ha sido"? (I, 789-795)
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The important point of all that is that the conditions and 
circumstances mentioned are perfectly normal: yet the workings 
of law and justice are plainly subject to them.
An analysis of,the staging helps to highlight some 
of the above problems, and the ”break-inn scene provides a 
good example. In his first appearance, Crespo lectures Juan 
about the importance of opinion and honor (I, 424-521)s a man 
should keep his word and not get into debt, "porque. ... tu 
opinion no falte” (I, 457-8), while ’’honor postizo” is worth­
less (I, 517)» to which Juan replies that the latter is not 
worthless if some advantage is to be gained therefrom. But 
in a practical situation - the "break-in” scene - their atti­
tudes are reversed: Juan wants to uphold the-family honour at 
sword-point, while Crespo feigns acceptance of the Captain’s 
story (I, 721-773.)* Why does Crespo compromise the natural 
law and social principle whose superiority he previously 
asserted? Presumably, in order to play down the incident and 
protect Juan; thus, when Juan and Don Alvaro draw their swords, 
Crespo steps between them .as peacemaker, emphasising his action 
with his words:' "Ved que yo estoy/ de, poi‘ medio” (I, 772-3)*
. ’ That is the scene which confronts Bon. Lope when he
- bursts in, and the onus of distributing justice passes from , 
Crespo to Bon Lope. Human witness then begins to confuse the . 
issue. Bon Lope wants to know what has happened - ”^Que ha
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habido? £Que, ha sucedido?” (I, 785)* Crespo ducks the question 
* ”Todo esto es nad'a,- senor11 (I, 79^)* Don Lope demands the 
truth - 11 Hub lad, decid la verdad” (I, 799) - and the Captain .■> 
tells lies (I,; 796-806). Rebolledo, his case unheard, is con- 
deraned on the strength of the Captain’s testimony - ’’Denle dos 
tratos de cuerda” (I, 815)* The truth then emerges, but only 
because of Rebolledo’© fear of the pain to which he has been
. sentenced; '• .
. . ' ; ‘ l, Como no . • .
lo he de decir, pues si cello
; \ -• los brazos me pondran hoy
atras como mal soldado?
. , . * El Capitan me mando . . . . ..
que fingiese la pendencia,
. para teher ocasion •; ' . • ■ •
de entrar aqui., * , ■ (1, 822-29)
Don lope’s only decision is to change the Captain’s billet.
Everyone leaves except Don Lope and Crespo, and the latter,
having wisely compromised his principles in practice, now
re-affirms them in theory: .
. . • A quien se atreviera
, a un atomo d.e mi honor, , ■ ' *> . •.
. \ por vida tambien del cielo,
. que tambien le ahorears yo,. . (I, 865-8)
an attitude which Crespo justifies by way of his famous - '
aphorism, ' ' . ... ' -•
. . A! Key la hacienda y la vida > - t
.. •, . se ha de dar; pero el honor
• , es patrimonio del alma< .
. y el alma solo es de Dios. (I, 873-6)
As Dunn has pointed out, Crespo’s ’’patrimonio del ..
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alma,” as a principle, conveys a vital and fundamental truth 
which does not require recapitulation here* Within the'imme- 
diate context of the play, though, it is a debating point, a 
general principle adduced to befog a particular issue. What­
ever Crespo means by “honor” - and there are indications that 
he is overly concerned with mere reputation - there is some- - 
thing wrong when duties to God and King do not coincide; . 
theoretically, the King is both God’s representative and the 
fount of honour in the state, and Crespo would need to do a 
lot more talking to prove that his ’‘honor11 has nothing to do 
with man-made laws. We have, after all, just watched Crespo 
showing how principles of honour must be adapted to take 
account of other pressures, and his fine-sounding declamation 
must seem less unequivocal when we hear his next remark, in 
reply to Don Lope’s “vais teniendo razon”: “Si, ijuro a Cristoi 
porque/ siempre la he tenido yo” (I, 878-80). Crespo’s appeal 
to ideals, in context, is a case of confusing a general truth 
with a particular truth, and, as such, is an instance of the 
serious aspect of the ambiguity of language, whose lighter 
aspects we saw in the soldiers’ puns. The implication for 
human law may be seen in Don Lope’s acceptance of the proposi­
tion; Don Lope is a man who does not have much time for the 
subtleties and ambiguities of language, as is shown by some 
of his comments to Crespo, e.g., .
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.. ^Sabeis que estai.s o.bligado . .-
. •' ar sufrir, por ser quien sois,
estas cargas? . (I, 869-71)
.in whioh there is some truth, but not enough to vindicate the 
outrageous behaviour of the Captain. Don Lope, it seems, is 
easily convinced by the form of words; yet he wields consider­
able, legal authority over both' soldiers and civilians.
Already, we may begin to see the effect; that words 
can have on the quality of justice* In the above situation, 
the arguments of both men contain both truth and falsehood; 
the tension between the moral and the social aspects of the 
play, and the disharmony between, the two jurisdictions, are 
consequences of that ambiguity. Calderon makes the point 
comically in the last moments of the act: the only field in 
which the soldier and the civilian fully understand each other 
is in cursing and swearing (I, 857-892)*
The same series of conditions and qualifications
that I have outlined continue to affect the behaviour of Don;
Lope and Crespo in Act II, still within their separate juris­
dictions* Thus they are forced-to act separately, instead of 
in concert, when their supper is disrupted by the soldiers’ " 
singing: Don Lope is trying to uphold the honour of the army
• (and of the Crespos), and Crespo is trying to keep Don Lope 
from seeing that he feels insulted (II, 519-590). They both 
want to do the same thing - stop the disorder - but their .
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motives are part dubious, part admirable, and, although their 
interests should coincide, they end up fighting each other 
(albeit unwittingly). When they reveal themselves, Crespo’s 
explanation for being in the fight (having bidden Don lope 
"Buenas.noches," ^11, 381J) is: "Sean disculpa y, respuesta/ 
hacer lo que vos hicisteis" (II, 465-6). At face value, that , 
would seem to be an admirable example of soldier and peasant 
acting in concert; but they have both come from the garden, 
where we saw exactly what Crespo’s following of Don Lope’s •
example involves, namely, grimly trying to keep up ..appearances, 
in the face of what he sees as humiliation, by pretending that 
his actions are a response to those of Don Lope. . Heaven takes 
the game as far as feigning empathy with Don lope’s physical .
pain; . - '
. que en* boda la noche pude *
dormir, en la pierna vuestra 
pensando, y amaneci . .
con dolor en ambas piernas. (II, 247-50)
Truth and falsehood again mingle deceptively, for in ‘
another sense Crespo?* g reactions; are dependent on Don Lope as 
well as on the other circumstances, for the other circumstances 
are partly Don Lope’s responsibility. And when Don Lope replies 
to Crespo, "Aquesta era ofensa mia,/ vuestra no" (II, 467-8), 
we know that that is not the whole truth either, for the situa- ■. 
tion definitely does concern Crespo. Although neither of the
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two men is? crooked, their playing with various kinds of truth 
undermines the ideals we know to exist; civil and military 
should not clash, but tension between them exists because 
• each is .circumscribed by different pressures. The tailoring 
of ideals to the pattern dictated by circumstance is a facet
of the. condition of human justice as a whole, to the play’s
presentation of which 1 would now like to devote some space.
. With the departure of Don Lope for Guadalupe and •
• A - ' . * . <***',•*'
the Captain’s subsequent abduction of Isabel, the demonstra­
tion of Crespo’s justice begins, when civil law is delivered 
into his hands. Here we are shown just how equivocal and 
unsatisfactory may be the means by which a just end is brought 
about. .. • ■ . • ' , .
At the beginning of Act III the spectator is probably 
in sympathy with Crespo, imagining the emotions aroused in the 
latter by the rape of Isabel and by his own (legal) impotence, 
lie brings Isabel back, to the village, having declined to kill 
her as custom law might have dictated, and when he swears to 
kill the Captain at all costs (”... el ansia mia/ no ha de 
parar hasta darle/ la muerte” [ill', -306-8^), we are unlikely 
to protest. By such conditioning of our intellect, Calderon 
makes us aware of the situation, for in the following scene 
Crespo is Aade alcalde of Zalamea (III, 509-3^8)• Given the 
circumstances .and the recent events, Crespo is the last person
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to whom judicial office should be given. He has just revealed
, his intention of taking the law into his own hands by killing 
the Captain: now the law has been officially presented to him. 
The audience, therefore, should be very circumspect in its 
attitude to Crespo’s actions, however much sympathy we may 
feel for him, and we need to examine very carefully the justice 
Crespo dispenses. ' •
If the normal legal channels were followed, the 
Captain would probably escape very lightly (he, at any rate, 
seems happy to think so and v. .also Dunn’s note to III, 979)«
; When Crespo is made alcaide, the approval of justice is not 
conferred on his vengeance; it only gives Crespo the chance 
to disguise it as an act of justice. Crespo fully realises 
his position, which is reflected in his first duties, of which 
the Escribano advises him; he has to welcome the King and 
arrest the Captain’s attacker (III, 312-27). For Crespo, that 
means he has to decide whether to be.the master or the servant 
of the law, and the decision eventually involves- his son and
, his daughter as well as himself and the Captain. , He quickly 
decides to try to play both roles, making his vengeance seem 
legitimate,.and once again language helps confuse the issues.
In certain parts of this scene, the words used might make us 
wary,, such as when the,Escribano tells■Crespo,
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. ’ • ' ' para estrena de justieia . . .
doe grandesacciones hoy (III, 312~5)
* estrena means ”o first act of initiation/’ but it also means
”a first gift/’ and the implications of that, in this context,
are obvious. Pedro Crespo accepts the two actions and the two
meanings of the estrena. His phrase,
- ICuando vengarme imagine., ... •
. . me hace dueno de mi honor ' ' ‘ "
la vara de la justicial (III, 328-20)
shows up the condition© to which human justice is exposed: here, 
it is put ini: the hands of a man whose state of mind is inappro­
priate for such a responsibility. The penultimate line of the 
scene, ”ya teneia el padre alcalde” (III, 3^7)» with its 
references to. God as father and judge, emphasises the contrast 
between what human.law is.sup,posed to reflect (natural and 
divine law) and what men make it in practice, while the combi­
nation of commonplace proverb and profound truth, in the same 
phrase, is another reminder of the linguistic ambiguity which 
can obstruct the precision of human law. ’ . .
■ ' In the light of all the above, the irony of the ,
Captain’s situation is plain. Having been the main cause of 
the tension between soldiers and civilians, and of, the rupture
4 ' • ..
v. Dunn, ”... Crespo’s use of the popular phrase ya teneis 
el padre alcalde (III, 2^7) becomes a sort of pun a lo divino: 
she ha© a Fatherwho is also a Judge - and the best Advocate 
is available (see 1 John ii, .1)f El Alcalde de Zalamea, ed. 
cit., Introduction, p. 23.
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of natural and divine law, he confidently affirms his immunity
from Vjusticia ordinaria:”
Que la justicia, es forzoso 
. " ; remitirme en esta tierra ./
a mi consejo de guerra;
, . . con que, aunque el lance es penoso,
tengo mi seguridad. (III,.377-81)
His confidence is based on a man-made legal distinction, and 
human legalities are not reliable# At the same time, it is 
a sobering comment on human law that the Captain should feel 
able to depend upon it to avoid being held accountable for 
breaking moral laws; likewise, that Don Lope should insist on 
the same point - ’’^Vos sabeis que a servir pasa/ al Key, y soy 
su juez yo?” (III, 787*8) -and that the King himself should 
uphold its ”la sentencia/ toca a otro tribunal*1 (III, 897-8).
When Crespo confronts the Captain, there is ambiguity
in the presentation of the former’s position. First, he uses
his position as mayor to arrange the confrontationj then he
admits that, in order to pretend that the ensuing interview is
on a man-to-man basis, and sets down his staff of office,
purportedly as an,indication of his good faith:
Ya que yo, como.justicia, 
me vail de su respeto
• .. . para obligaros a oirme, ,
la vara a esta parte dejo, . - . .
.. y como un hombre no mas,
deciros mis pehas quiero. Arrima la vara
(ill, 405-10)
But the vara remains there throughout the interview, falsifying
the picture, qualifying. Crespo{s.appeals to natural law and 
demonstrations of humility, and making the situation more 
than a matter of ’’decir penas.” Crespo, rather, is playing 
the part of prosecutor, jury and judge. . . •••;.
What happens in the interview has been analysed 
extensively by Dunn, and he shows convincingly how Don 
Alvaro is being offered the means to his own salvation, 
entailing the acknowledgement of his own humility via accept­
ance of Crespo’s offer. I think that Calderon is also setting 
before us the same phenomenon - man’s inability to accept the 
workings of divine justice, in spite of its necessity * via 
Pedro Crespo. If the.Captain’s moral duty is to accept
Crespo’s offer, for the sake of ’’reconciliation and unity in
5 ••• : '•
charity,” then Crespo’s moral duty.is to accept suffering, 
forgive them that trespass against him, and love his enemy. * 
Given the way in which Calderon arranges things, it seems 
possible that, we are watching the rejection of divine justice, 
not just by one party, but by both. The possibility of a 
divine remedy is offered to both men, and both reject it, 
leaving us only the unedifying processes of human justice, 
which is accordingly shown in all its gross inferiority and 
ultimate inadequacy. , ,
-■5 ' •’ -
Dunn,.<£1 Alcalde de Zalamea, ed. cit., Introduction, p. 21, 
(expounded at greater length in ’’Patrimonio del Alma”).
” . . . . - 210;-; . J .
The scene is not without indications from Calderon
that Crespo’s behaviour should call our attention to these 
matters. For one thing, we have already seen Crespo’s imita­
tions of Don Iopet< the representative of ail that he is trying 
to oppose (I, 850-890), and we even heard him say,; •
Yo, senor, siempre reepondo 
el el.tono y en la letra
. . que me hablan, ; (IX, 235-7)
- how far does that apply when he is dealing with the likes
of Don Alvaro? In addition, the account of himself that
Crespo gives to the. Captain bears a strong resemblance to the
account that Don Mendo gives us of himself. Don Hondo’s claim
is that ; •
no tengo que agradecerle [his., father/ ,
que de hidalgo me engendrase, 
porque yo no me dejara
, • engendrar, aunque el porfiase,
. si no fuera de un hidalgo,
. . • . en el vientre de mi madre (I, 269~74)
while Crespo’s first disclosure about himself to the Captain
betrays an attitude which differs from that of Mendo only in
its acknowledgement of the impossibility of the choice (and
even that acknowledgement is forced upon Crespo by the simple
fact that his father had neither inherited or acquired nobility):
Yo soy un hombre de bien, 
que a escoger mi nacimiento 
no dejara — es :Dios testigo—*
. . un escrupulo, un defeto . ,
en mi, que suplir pudiera
; la ambicion de mi deseo. (Ill, 419-24)
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Likewise, Crespo is at pains to assert all the assets he has,
which are the same kind of assets (wealth and status) that
Don Mendo pretends to have; Crespo, tells the Captain,
Siempre aca entre mis iguales <•
• • . . me he, tratado con respetoj .
•, de ml hacen estimacion
. . , . el cabildo y el Concejo, :
Tango muy hastante hacienda, 
porque no hay, gracias al cielo,
, . otro labrador mas rico ?.
en todos aquestos pueblos
\ de la comarca, . . (Ill, 425-33)
Outside the context, the remarks of both Mendo and Crespo con­
cerning statue conferred by birth may be seen as comments by 
Calderon on the notion of inherited nobility, the notion which 
governs the Captain4s thought and behaviour. Within the con­
text, Crespo’s.comments sound strange, coming from a man who 
has previously affirmed his regard for natural treasures and 
natural status, :
Another curious aspect of Crespo*s speech to Don
Alvaro, one which throws open to question his commitment to
justice and to principle, is his admission that he would not
be engaged in trying to come to some arrangement if the affair
could be kept quiet: .
•• - , : . fiste [defeto] , ya veis si es bien grande,
- . pues aunque encubrirle quiero,
. . . no puedoj que sabe Dios
■ . . que a poder estar secreto
y sepultado en ml mismo,
■ no viniera a lo que vengo; . , ‘ .
que todo esto remitiera,
por no hablar, al sufrimiento. (Ill, 463-70)
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His primary aim, in effects seems to be implicit in the words 
’’Kestaurad una opinion/ que habeis quitado” (III, 493-4).
The vocabulary of the scene.also points to the possi- 
’ bility of a better choice for Crespo * It is, noteworthy that
the word sufrimiento is uttered three times, twice by Crespo 
' and once by the Captain, Sufrir can mean both ’’tolerar” and
”padecer”, according to the Diccionario de Autoridades, and 
both meanings are involved in the scene. When the Captain 
talks of sufrimiento (”Ya me falta el sufrimiento,”^111, 518]), 
he means that he refuses to put up with any more nonsense; 
when Crespo uses the word ( ’’quedese algo al sufrimiento,”
”todo esto remitiera,/ porno hablar, al sufrimiento,”[ill,
4^8 and 469-70 respectively].), he is referring to his own pain 
and suffering. But what Calderon may mean is that the same 
choice is open to both meny namely, salvation through the 
acceptance of suffering: for the Captain, the suffering would 
be in the social and spiritual humiliation he would need to 
undergo to redeem his crime; for Crespo, the suffering is 
already a fact -nothing he can do can change it - but he 
would only accept it ”por no hablar,” from which we can only 
infer that his opinion precedes his duty to Christ.
Similarly, when Crespo, at theend of his exhortation, 
speaks of his humility,
Un honor
•• os pido que me quitasteie vos mesmo;
y con ser mxo, parece,
(segun os le estoy pidiendo
. con humildad) que no os pido . ■
• lo que .es mxo sino vuestro, (III, 509-1^)
a spectator may feel that Crespo is only conscious of humility 
inhuman terms; humility in divine terms would surely preclude 
both Crespo’s attitude and the scheme he is hatching.
As Dunn points out/ within the action ~ as distinct 
from the meaning ~ of the play, Crespo can be sure that the 
Captain will not accept his offer, and it would be absurd if 
the proposed bargain were struck. Indeed, Crespo has his men 
outside, ready for the Captain’s refusal. Divine justice
. having been rejected by both men, both men are now left only 
with human, law, which exists and operates in default of men’s 
submission to divine law. The Captain relies on human law, 
because, as we know, it will be lenient with him. Crespo’s 
problem is to bring about a just end (in human terms) by ,
/apparently, just means. He succeeds ih bringing about a just 
result (the destruction of the cause of the Captain’s downfall, 
his body), and is to be admired for that; however, the dubious 
quality of the means reveals some shortcomings of human law 
which the audience does well to ponder.
On the literal level, what we watch in the interview 
scene is one of the stages in Crespo’s plan to break the law 
whilst pretending to uphold it. The standard of truth and
scruple on which human justice is made to depend is suggested
by the type of person to whom Crespo turns for the evidence he
needs (Rebolledb and Chispa), and by the methods he uses on
them (torture, to avoid which they will say anything he wants
them to). The other components of Crespo’s justice follow
quickly. He imprisons his son, Juan, ostensibly for attacking '
the Captain, but really in order to protect him and to give an
impression of utter impartiality:
... a mi .padre.,tambien . - ,
con tai rigor le tratara. ,
(aparte) Aquesto es asegurar
/«• su vida y han de pensar
, . . • que es la justicia mas rara . . ,
• del mundo. . * (III, 678-85)
Crespo will ensure that Juan is acquitted:' ”(aparte) Yo le 
hallare la disculpa” (III,. 695)* He then makes Isabel file 
a formal complaint against Don Alvaro, much to her dismay, in 
order to lend a certain legitimacy to the proceedings. The 
purposes of these actions are valid, but the attendant means 
are questionable. . . A .
• ; An interesting consequence of all that is the
arrival of Don Lope and the ensuing argument he has with Crespo. 
Having shown us all the half-truths of Crespo’s justice,
Calderon puts them both face-to-face in defence of their own 
interests, and thereby draws our attention to an important 
problem. We are watching a situation in which there are two
alcaldes of Zalamea: both Crespo and Don Lope now hold authority 
and the power to exercise it with respect to the one crime. 
Crespo may still retain our sympathy as he spars with Don Lope, 
so that we are again forced to see how easily we accede to the
fallibility of human justice, unless we prefer. the formal, 
justice of Don Lope, who. is so jealous of the legalities of his 
jurisdiction that he is more furious at Crespo’s transgression 
of them than he is at Don Alvaro’s transgression of natural and 
moral law. However, it may be doubted whether there is any 
point in sympathising with the one or the other, for, when we 
see the two men together, we ought to remember that whereas Don 
Lope has been most courteous and considerate to Isabel, Crespo 
has forced her, to her distress, to sign the querelia against 
the Captain; and we may also notice that, whereas Don Lope has
treated Juan with the utmost generosity and gallantry (v. II,
612 ff.), Crespo has had Juan arrested, his crime being an
attempt to put into practice his father’s precepts!, Cf.J,
, que asi obedezco a mi padre 
eh dos cosas que me dijo:
’’Renir con buena ocasioh, 
y honrar la mujer,” pues miro 
que asi honro a la mujer,
, . " y con buena pcasion rino. , (II, 888-93)
It is as difficult to say which of the two men (Don Lope and 
Crespo) is better at upholding natural law, as it is to say 
which of them is better at upholding civil law.
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. In their argument in Act III (785-858),'Don Lope •
and Crespo each try to defend their justice by means! of . 
evasions and of propositions that are part true, part false; 
the.only result is an outbreak of violence, the antithesis . 
of justice and. order# The violence is halted by the arrival 
of the King, who has the power and the duty to restore order 
.and dispense./justice fittingly, and-we might expect him to
. demonstrate the highest standards of justice; he is, after 
, all, the mejor alcalde, the third alcalde to arrive in Zalamea.
However, we have already: been given indications that a mere 
. human cannot completely fulfil such responsibilities.' For
instance, it is the King’s advent, and the consequent absence 
Of Don Lope, that gives Don Alvafco the opportunity to abduct 
Isabel (cf. II, $48-559)> and♦ furthermore, the latter relies 
on the King for protection (HCon un hombre como yo,/ y en 
servicio del Key, no/ se puede hacer,” (III, $$6-8); ”A1 Key 
desta sinrazon/ me quejare” (ill, 566-7)). But Crespo, too, 
counts on the advantage to himself of the King’s proximity.
: Given all these factors, it is almost inevitable that the 
> events which follow the King’s arrival are as judicially fal- .
lible as the events preceding it. • • '•
• >. Crespo’s arrangements enable him to trick the King
into accepting his actions as legally valid. Again, we are 
shown half-truths being taken as whole truths, and Crespo’s
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language requires careful consideration. He tells the King
how the Captain was guilty of rape, . . .
y no quererse ca'sar ' .
* ■ . con ella, habiendo su padre * .
rogadole con la paz. , (III, 872*4)
The spectators know that Crespo did make such a request, but 
they also know that ”con la paz” avoids mention of the threat 
behind Crespo’s offer, both verbal (”Mirad que puedo toinarle/
■ por mis manos ...” £lll, 21f>~6j) and practical (his men were 
waiting behind-the door), Don Lope’s insinuation of favouri­
tism (”£ste es el alcalde, y es/ su padre,” fill, 872-6]) .
gives Crespo the chance to mention his prudent imprisonment 
of Juan (’’.•♦como he. pre so/ un hi jo m£o, es verdad/ que no 
escuchara a mi hija” [ill, 88.4-6]), which, we already know,\ . 
was calculated to have precisely the effect it now exerts, 
Crespo goes on to defy anyone to say ”que yo haya hecho/en 
ella.[la causa]alguna maldad” (III, 889-90) - but he is the 
only one who knows what has been happening; he invites,his
; listeners to ascertain ”si he inducido algun testigo” (III, ’ 
891) (but we saw him coerce Rebolledo and Chispa into giving 
evidence), or ”si esta algo escrito demas/ de lo que he dicho” 
(III, 892-» (but he dictated or wrote everything that has 
been testified). . \ - •
' The King accepts all that at its face, value (”Bien
esta/ sustanciado,11, (ill, 89^-§S), and the way is thus prepared
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for the King’s acceptance of the fait accompli of the Captain’s 
execution. AH' Crespo has to do is play on the meaning of the 
King’s own.words (”Vos habeis dicho que esta/ bien dada aquesta
',sentencia;” £lll, 912*~3j, and v. Dunn’s note), and adduce a 
convenient general truth to justify a particular course of
action: .. ' ■ '
Toda la justicia vuestra ‘
es solo un cuerpo, no mas:
... si este tiene muchas manos,
decid £que mas se me da 
uiatar can aquesta un hombre,
. queestotra habia de ma tar? (IXT, 917-22)
. That statement is merely a form of words, and the King, had he
cared to j^robe further into the particular situation, might 
have considered it-an unsatisfactory explanation; but instead, 
the King accedes to the general truth, and deems further 
enquiry unnecessary. Crespp£$ rhetoric wins the day.,- The 
appearance is that harmony is restored, but beneath the appa­
rent harmony, the fragility of our social constructs is
revealed.
, . $o Crespo wins his case, and justice, of . a sort, is
done. The spectator may feel that the ends of human justice 
have been served, but he must surely also feel that the means
of human justice have been shown in a perspective that is 
unsatisfying. Part of the unsatisfactory aspect of human 
justice is only caused by Calderon’s manipulation of the plot, 
of course (he could equally well have written a play showing
\ ■
human justice to be flawless), but we cannot deny all the
imperfections in such a way. We know that, if ,Crespo had ,
not carried out his schemes, the Captain would have received
lenient treatment from a military court (partly .through the
pressures of circumstance, which we have already seen in
action), and that, in real life, such an arrangement, such a
mockery of justice, would not be unlikely. We must therefore
wonder if the compromises Crespo makes with morality and
legality are not. essential components of human justice. We
must also be aware that, outside as well as inside a dramatic
fiction, the force of circumstance has much to do with the
operation of human justice; the King cannot be everywhere at
once - on how many occasions does his failure to intervene at
the appropriate time lead to a miscarriage of justice?
- . • The way in which justice is subject to■the pattern
of events become quite marked towards the ..end of the play.
When Don Lope arrives, soon after Orespo has completed his
preparations, he points out that, were it not for his gammy
leg, he would, have arrived earlier and freed the Captain:
’ • Que un alcaldillo de aqui ••
al capitan tiene preso.
Y ivoto a Diosino he sentido t
en toda aquesta jorriada - • . '
esta pierna excomulgada,
si no es. hoy, que-me ha impedido 
<, el no haber antes llegado
donde el castigo le de. (Ill, 7^2*7)
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- what would have happened then? Again, when the King arrives, 
just in time to prevent a fracas, his handling of the situation 
disappoints whatever expectations we may have had of seeing 
justice dispensed in a satisfactory manner; he is anxious to 
get it all out of the way, and expediency triumphs, because 
”me imports/ llegai' presto a Portugal” (III, 9^3-^)• That all 
this cannot be explained away by way of organisational demands 
(on Calderon) may be inferred from Don Lope’s remark to Crespo 
’’Agradeced al buen tiempo/ que liego su Majestad” (III, 9^9-30), 
which actually draws attention to the problem of what would 
have happened if the King had not arrived at that juncture.
It,seems that the circumstances which affect human justice may 
be as trivial as arrival and departure times. More importantly, 
the King’s urgency may invite us to consider the fact that the 
processes of human justice are, of necessity, subject to tem­
poral limitations: rarely, if ever, does a court have time to 
investigate all the circumstances of a case, or of an indivi­
dual involved in a case, , To say that legal processes can 
ascertain only part of the truth (unless unlimited time can be 
devoted to a case) is to say that justice is only partly done, 
which, in turn, is to say that ’’justice” must be partly injustice, 
if the machinery of ’’justice” is to continue to function!
; Equally important is Calderon’s suggestion of the ... 
extent to which principles of. justice can be befogged by words.
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At one extreme, there is Crespo, adept at the inappropriate 
application of a general truth to a particular situation 
("Toda la.justicia vuostra/ es un cuerpo, no mas"); at the • 
other extreme1 there is Don Lope, who is so me times careful' 
not to make unqualified statements ("si es necesario .;♦"), 
.hut whose attitude to the case. is conditioned by the impor­
tance he attaches to jurlsdicion.Which attitude contains 
the greater validity? . The King is convinced by Crespo, to 
the extent of making him alcalde for life. But the spectator 
is left only with the impression of the imprecision and ambi­
guity of words, which is the last thing Calderon leaves in 
our minds, ending the play with the punning, by Chispa, on 
cantar, to which Crespo, as I .remarked, earlier, even drav/s 
our attention ("Con que fin el autor da fill, 9?8 my
underlining)... Rebolledb ■and Chispa may not be the characters 
to whom we would look for a final impression of the play, but 
the.play began with their puns and word-plays, and,, now that 
it .has come full.circle, we can see what the implications 
were of that aspect of human language. ,
Now to the problem of liberty, I repeat, that it 
should be realised that all my remarks concerning justice in 
the play are not irrelevant or gratuitous, but an integral - 
part of the problem of liberty; * indeed, the two problems are 
in practice, enmeshed with each other.: If liberty derives
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' from obedience to law, and law-can be as fallible as is 
suggested, complications arise when we,try to put our theories 
of liberty into practice, It is all very well to: accept ?that
. liberty is a personal responsibility, but our attainment of 
. the proper use of our natural liberty-.is.made enormously dif­
ficult by our propensity for pursuing false liberties, believ­
ing them to be true liberty; we are, then, easily deceived, 
and we need the guidance and the protection of law and justice. 
How well that works in practice may- be seen in the dramatic 
context of BI Alcalde, de Zalamea, where we see various aspects 
of the problem: some men pursue-, false liberties, others attempt 
to employ their natural liberty as .is proper-but are confused 
by the shortcomings of human law, and there is even an example 
of natural liberty being used fully♦ • . ..
Don Alvaro represents the embodiment of the kind of 
excess which, is seen to be latent in every form of freedom 
.from restraint: his "liberty" is the false.liberty of rejection 
of moral law and the failure of reason to restrain the passions 
In the individual microcosm as well: as ;in the corporate macro­
cosm, the relationships between justice and'liberty apply, and 
the Captain offers a clear example of their distortion. The 
chaos caused by him .is caused by injustice in his own person­
ality, by disorder in'his will; justice within a man is the 
surest guide (because justice is.inseparable from reason) to .
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natural liberty, and inner injustice brings about a condition 
of moral slavery in the individual. Moral slavery involves 
the submission to instinct, the reduction to the level of 
beasts, that is, the denial of the faculty of choice. Examples 
of that process are not hard to find in the text.
The Captain’s injustice and lawlessness are made 
explicit in his declamations of desire at the beginning of
Act-II and, once again, Dunn provides a clear expla-
■ ■ ■ - 6nation of' the implications of his words. Briefly, the Captain 
calls on natural phenomena to justify his lust, but his 
examples are of rapid change and violent disorder inimical to
love. . ' ‘
. An important point Dunn .makes in his note is that 
"while the Captain flatters himself with talk about the power 
of his love, hi© words point in a different direction." \The 
Captain sees nothing wrong with his behaviour because he can 
find the right-form of words to coat it with a romantic veneer; 
he convinces himself by his own rhetoric. The similarities 
with the Comendador of Euenteovejuna are obvious, and similar 
observations concerning liberty may be made. Like,the Comen­
dador the Captain’s language confuses his reason, exacerba­
ting the disorder already existing in his will, and compounding
^El Alcalde de Zalamea, note on vv. 75-100 and 105-16, 
v. also Introduction, section 6.
the destruction of choice which his inner lawlessness has 
already caused« . ‘ .
There is a hint of the Captain’© confusion of words 
early in the play, when he offers a little theorem to his
. Sergeant-: ' ; .... . ' ' ■ ’
El que una belleza adora,
dijo, viendo a la que amoi .
• ’’aquella es mi dama,H y no:
. " , - ’’aquella es mi labradora.H .
■ ; . Luego v. si' dama se llama
■ ■ la que se ama, claro es ya
‘ . que en una villana esta
, ’ •• ' vendido el nombre de da ma. (I, -205-13)
The Captain,.apparently, attaches much importance to words, but
, the emptiness, and, worse, the pernicious effect, of his atti­
tude is.shown by his instant volte-face when he has seen Isabel
for tho first time: • ‘ . . . . .- ; .
• ’• •- . Quien nacio
- con obligaciones, debe . ;
•' acudir a ellas, zy, yo .
al respeto desta dama
suspend! todo el furor, (I, ?28-22)
There, the notion of dama is invoked because it conveniently 
. fits the situation, that is, it provides the Captain with an
excuse with which to answer Crespo’s query as to why he is 
’Complimenting Isabel instead of slaughtering Rebolledo. .Crespo,
of course, is not fooled for a moment (although Juan thinks he 
. isi), 'and his reply reveals the'transparency of Don Alvaro’s
rhetoric (”... es labra.dora, senor,/ que no’damaH p,
The situation is reminiscent of Fuenteovejuha, Act I. where 
Laurencin asks Frpndoso, "Damask.. noe llamas?" (v. 291), and 
there ensues a discussion showing the distorting effect of 
words. ; \
The connection between law, language, reason and 
liberty is visible in the Captain’s first remarks to teabe-1:
’ < • Pero mirad que no'.es bien ■
, en tan precise ocasion 
hacer vos;el bomicidio • • '
. . . que no quereis qua haga yo. (I, 703*6)
Xt is ah absurd hyperbole, by which the Captain seeks to make
an association of the pretended punishment, of Hebolledo with
the effect leabel has on hi®. To connect two such disparate
entities in one word is an outrageous distortion, even if it .
is standard courtly love talk; the Captain glibly employs the
metaphor on the assumption that Isabel will fee3. beholden to
him - homicldio is a legalistic term, and the Captain is trying
to impute to Isabel a'"crime". Isabel realises what is going
on and refuses the bait;
.? • . • • Que dejeis este -soldado ;
. • . os suplico; pero no . ■ • . .
nue cobreie de mi la. deuda
* ■ a que agradecida 'estoy.• ' - (I, 711-14)
The Captain then changes his tack, buk implicit in his play on 
homicidio is a contempt for 'law,5 as something to be manipulated 
at his own convenience, and a confusion of reason, boith of 
which conspire to negate liberty. The contempt;for law in
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this case is on a metaphorical plane, but it becomes a reality 
when, with his abduction of Isabel, the Captain demonstrates 
his scorn fox’ natural law and divine law; finally, he spurns 
human law, by mocking Crespo .’s. position as alcalde and main- . 
taining his immunity from any law except the slack law of. a 
military court, which to him is only a "lance ’penoso” (III, 
380).. Crespo mocks the presumption of the Captain.(Con 
r.espeto le llevad ....[etc J” £111, 575^863)» and the Captain’s 
complete denial of his natural liberty is reflected in the 
deprivation of his physical liberty, The metaphor of Isabel’s
‘. "crime” also, becomes a reality, and the Captain is surprised.
.■-/ An uncomfortable aspect of the Captain’s condition
is that, if, after the commission, of his crime, human laws 
were obeyed by everyone, as natural liberty requires, the
. Captain would get what he expects: trial by a military court.
On that issue at least, the inadequacy of human law as a 
guardian of natural liberty could hardly be shown more clearly: 
far from suggesting the right choice to the Captain, it merely 
encourages his license. . ...
. In. turn, the Captain’s denial of his own liberty . - 
helps to remove the possibility of liberty from his subordi­
nates. •. The Sergeant, Rebolledo and the others have to obey 
the Captain, who is, effectively, their law. Rot surprisingly,
. disorder and individual injustice is rife amongst, the lower
ranks* and obedience to the Captain does nothing to assist 
their liberty♦ Xn practice, it is not really very j^dnsible 
to say that the Captain is ’’their law”, because he imposes no 
law at all; if anything, he is dependent on them. The 
Sergeant lets him know about the girls, Rebolledo is the 
accomplice who facilitates his entry to Isabel’s room, 
Rebolledo also^suggests' the ”jira y fiesta” (II, 1^0) to . 
attract Isabel’s attention, which he and Chispa then organise, 
and all three * Rebolledo,, Chispa and the Sergeant * help the 
Captain to abduct Isabel. . There is no law at all amongst 
these types - not even ’’honour among thieves,” since Rebolledo 
(twice) and Chispa are quick to spill the beans when trouble 
arises - but only the anarchy which is destructive of liberty.
Needless to say, the perversion of Rebolledo*s 
liberty is not caused only by the Captain’s injustice, ,
Rebolledo is shown as a lawless character in the opening 
scenes: he wants to desert, and says it would not be the first
« time (”no sera el primer tornillazo/ que habre yo dado en 
mi vida” [l, 43-44J). Theoretically, Rebolledo*s service in 
the army ought to offer a form of liberty, in that it consists 
of obedience to an authority fighting (purportedly) for the 
glory of God and King; that is not what happens, because, as 
we see?, officers of the calibre of the Captain make nonsense 
of such liberty. However, the supreme commander, Don Lope, is
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not corrupt, and obedience to his orders might do more for 
Rebolledo*s liberty; but that does not impress Rebolledo, ; 
whose real problem is just lazy truculence and indiscipline. 
Rebolledo, like the Captain, therefore, is a disordered 
person whose natural liberty is nullified by that disorder ** 
his actions are as often motivated by the instinct of fear as 
the Captain*s are by the instinct of lust.
Rebolledo’s denial of natural liberty may be seen 
particularly clearly in Act II, when Crespo’s dinner with 
Don Lope is interrupted by the soldiers* carousing, and 
fighting breaks out (183-502). The supper scene begins with 
Crespo’s description of Isabel’s garden, in which the harmony 
of nature is explicitly stated (193-208 - I shall examine 
this speech in greater detail below). Isabel herself is the 
character who tries hardest to use her natural liberty, and 
Crespo, in her garden, affirms his own desire to live according 
to the natural precepts he sees represented there. Such a 
desire is a fundamental part of natural liberty, in that it 
characterises the voluntary submission to, or choice of, that 
which is in accord with one’s own nature. But the music of
nature which Crespo describes is soon disrupted, and it is 
disrupted by the intrusive, provocative and evilly-motivated 
music of Rebolledo and Chispa, with all the denial and perver­
sion of liberty that their music implies. When, at the end of
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the play, Hebolledo says he will never sing again, it is in 
no way a step toward liberty, but only a reflection of his 
fear of imprisonment and torture. .
The type of behaviour to be; seen in both Rebolledo 
and the Captain, and especially in.the Captain, is an extreme 
form of the kind of injustice and license of which most men 
are capable, if not guilty (though not necessarily to the 
degree visible in the Captain). Another example in the play 
is Don Mendo, who behaves exactly as the Captain does - but 
only in his imagination. Like Don Alvaro, Don Mendo plays 
silly games with language, his greater absurdity consisting 
in the fact that the only reason his language does not condi­
tion his behaviour (as Don Alvaro’s does) is that he is too , 
weak to have any behaviour. Nuno turns his every remark to 
a joke about food, which is to say that Nuno keeps puncturing 
his dream-world with reminders of reality; but Don Mendo 
refuses to acknowledge that which reason would dictate, and 
his natural liberty is doubly false, since, not only does he 
pervert it by indulging in his sensual imaginings, he also has 
no potential even of acting on, his irrational choices. His 
only liberties are his ’’exencion de mi linaje” (I, 264-), i.e., 
the dubious liberties of his bought nobility (dubious because 
they are exemptions from law e.g., he does not have to house 
soldiers), and the false liberties of his impertinent language
; .• . ■ ■ ■ , ; - 230 . - -. - • . '
to Isabel ~ "extremes"" (X, 378), as she rightly calle them*
Don Mendo*s inability to use his natural liberty is thus, 
effectively, implicit in Dunn’s description of him as "the 
mere plaything of his fantasies, divorced from all realities".
. Set against the perverted liberty of the above
characters may be seen the proper natural liberty of Isabel 
(not least, because she is persecuted by all of them), who 
is the one character in the play whom we may regard as ful* 
filling all the requirements of natural liberty, to.the 
extent that she comes remarkably close.to moral liberty.
Before examining her situation, though, it would be useful 
to examine that of the two main protagonists, Don Lope and 
Crespo* • ' ■‘ /" " '’ .’ 'X • - : - . . ;
• •’ . For Don Lope, natural liberty would. seem to be a
reality, . as, he is a.man who wants- to obey both natural law
. and human law. His predicament is summed up in the fact that 
•/.he eventually finds himself in the irrational position of 
. having to defend the Captain’s rights (and of being found
by the King at the beginning of the consequent brawl). The 
reason for his finding himself in such a paradoxical situa­
tion is not hard to discern.’ Human law is inferior in status 
to natural law, and is supposed to be made, by men, to .
^"Patrimonio del Alma," p. 82
harmonise with natural and divine law; hut, as we have seen, 
that harmony may break down, and a conflict between natural 
• law and human law may arise, Don Lope, when faced with such
a conflict, throws his weight behind human law, and the 
chaotic consequences of lending human law priority over 
natural law are clearly visible in the play. To a certain 
extent, such an inversion is a reflection on Don Lope, but, 
to a far greater extent, it is also a reflection on the human 
law on which liberty may depend.
The implications of that become more serious when 
we consider that Don Lope is the King’s representative, and 
that, indeed, the King would have preferred to uphold Don 
lope’s view of the juridical situation; His failure to 
enforce.it is due, as we have seen, to his own commitments 
and.to Crespo’s being one step-ahead of him. If that is the 
state of the law of the land, then the theoretical arguments
. .proposing .obedience to human law as a guide to natural 
liberty begin to look as if they can become inoperative in 
practice. '
From there, we arrive at the situation of Crespo, 
who wants to live by the precepts of natural law» but who is 
later forced to take account of the vagaries of human law - 
an attitude which is the reverse of Don Lope’s.
At the beginning, Crespo is a man for whom natural
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liberty seems to mean something, as we gather from his first
words:
' ? . queesta tarde • •
sail a mirar la labranza, 
y estan las parvas notables ; 
de manojos y montones, 
que parecen, al. miraree
; 'deede lejos, montes de oro,
y aun orq de.mas quilates,
'■pues de los granos de aqueste 
es todo el cielo el contrasts* (I, ^24-32).
Coming directly after the departure of Don Mendo, the language 
points to the comparison to be made between Mendo*s ’’ejecutoria 
tan grande/ pintada de oro y aaul” (I, 262-3), and Crespo’s 
natural ejecutoria of golden grain set against a blue sky* 
Whereas the former represents a false liberty, Crespo’s words 
manifest the true natural liberty'..known to a man who .’’sees 
that, the bounds of nature are ’set by law and approved by
: reason.” Crespo does not even want an ejecutoria, as the 
scene goes on to show, emphasising the truly free aspect of
• Crespo*s choice, in that.:his predilection for natural goods 
is totally unforced, entirely voluntary*
The same comments may be made about Crespo’s speech
(previouslyreferred to, above) in Isabel’s garden:
• . Un pedazo es de jardin,; •
do mi hija.se divierta.. .
Sentaos; que el viento suave - 
que en las blandas hojas suena 
destas parras y estas copas,
Dunn, ’’Patrimonio del Alma,” p. 82.8
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. mil claueulas lisonjeras .
hace al compas desta fuente,
, . citara de plate y per las,
porque son, en traetea de oro,
. ‘ las guijas templadas cuerdas,
- Perdonadsi.de instruments , .
. solos la musica suena, .
. ' sin’cantor'es que os deleiten, ,
sin voces, que os entretengan;
.. - > ... que como music os son .
. los pajaros. que gorjean, , . . ,
, • no quieren cantar. de noche,
. ; . . ; ni yo puedo hacerles fuerca. (XI, 191*203)
The image is of the wind playing in the leaves of the trees 
and vines, playing melodies to the, rhythm of the stream, a 
either of silver and pearls whose strings are pebbles, tuned 
in frets of gold: the music is instrumental, rather than vocal, 
because the singers, the birds, arb asleep.. The musical 
harmony of nature Ids established, and Crespo’s acceptance of 
its rules (ef. Hni yo puedo hacbrles fiier^a*1), and evident 
delight in its order and tranquility, demonstrate again the 
attitude of a man voluntarily submitting himself to the laws 
of the natural good, that is, the attitude of a man who is . 
naturally free. : .. .
An important pointabout both of the above passages 
of imagery is that they demonstrate the positive possibilities 
of words, just as words can confuse the reason (as in the case 
of Don ilvaro) and help to blind men to the evil aspects of 
their behaviour, so can they suggest to the reason the kind of 
truth to which reason should aspire, and even the kind of truth
which the reason cannot properly grasp, as is evident in the 
work of such poets as San Juan and Fray Luis. . There is a 
striking similarity between the tone of Crespo’s words and 
that of, for instance, Fray Luis’ ”La Vida Ketirada,” a poem 
offering a complete statement of the nature of liberty, in
which ’’each verse within itself reflects the choice and the
consequences of choice which is at the centre of the whole
. 9 ✓ - • ‘ ■poem.” Calderon, by inventing a dramatic situation in which 
language that points to liberty is surrounded, and eventually 
overcome, by language that betrays liberty, is able to suggest 
the rarity of that liberty amongst ordinary men.
The above aspects of the scene in the garden are 
thrown into relief by the contrasting attitude displayed by 
Don Lope, who, although charmed by the milieu (’’Apacible/ 
estancia en extremo es esta.” (llt l89-90j), is incapable of 
accepting Crespo’s invitation to enjoy it (”No podre; que es 
imposible/ que divertimiento tehga.” fll, 211-2JX. The pain 
of his leg, itself caused by the deliberate senselessness of 
human warfare, interferes with his potential for employing his 
natural liberty, just as it does in another way, viz., driving 
him to enforce human law, even if at the expense of natural 
law, because his short temper precludes his contemplation of
?L. J. Woodward, La Vida.Ketirada’ of Fray Luis de Leon,” 
Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, XXXI, 195^, p. 19.
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possible complexities. Human law must, of necessity, restrict 
the import of its words, so that the -"official*1 language of 
Don lope becomes the antithesis of the natural imagery of 
Crespo, who, later, demonstratee the inadequacy of law1© .
language by turning it to hi© own account. The rift between 
the two laws and the two languages is clear ns the garden*scene 
progresses: Crespo, apparently irritated by Don Lope’s rejec* 
tion of the soothing qualities of the garden, begins to mock
■ him. ' • ‘ • ’ ' . '
Hut Crespo’s music is soon drowned by the cacophony; 
of the soldiers; his breeze is lost in the turblon he had 
earlier feared. From that moment, his natural liberty becomes 
obscured by his desire to make human law effective, as the 
imperfections of human law and custom law;render it necessary 
for him to act -in some ways contrary to natural law: even in 
the defence of it. fhus, he defies custom law by not killing 
Isabel, and by preventing Juan from doing so (such an act 
would be a hideous perversion of natural law), but does inflict 
on her, as mentioned above, an action nearly as abhorrent to 
her, the revelation of the crime ("pues no consigues vengarla,/ 
consigue el callhrla ahora" [Ill, 70^*6 J). In the; same scene, 
he protects the life of Juan, but only by having him arrested, 
to Juan 1o utter amazements ' , . • ■ . *
■ - 236 - ' ’ •
. . ' Nadie entender solicits
. tu fin pues, sin honra ya,.
. prendes a quien te la da, . .
•/ . guardando a quien te la quita, (III, 693-8)
At the end, he is without both his children, Isabel having gone 
to a convent and Juan to the army, and we are not given any 
indication of how much they would have divined of Crespo’s 
motives* However, Crespo’s motives are no less difficult for 
the omniscient spectator to see: on the one hand, Crespo wants 
to protect his children, but, on the other, his,handling of 
them is part of his larger scheme of vengeance.
Crespo, then, far from asserting his liberty, actually 
* loses it.by submitting himself to the compromises of human law,
and the first section of this chapter, examining the limitations 
of human justice, suggests why that is inevitable. Not the 
least of the factors involved is the confusing effect of words, 
and the process of Crespo’s turning away from complete submission 
to natural law is reflected in the language of the play, as 
Crespo eschews further reference to the kind of poetic imagery 
mentioned, and indulges in the word-play of human law; there 
is no imagery from Crespo in the whole of Act III, even in his 
offer to the Captain. Language, which for Crespo once led him 
to truth, becomes just a means for him to deceive the King.
Of course, there would be nothing to stop Crespo’s 
regaining his natural liberty after the closing of the case,
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but, at the end, he is made alcalde for life by the King, and 
as long as he has to administer human justice he will find it 
difficult to combine it with the kind of natural liberty he 
enjoyed prior to the coming of the army/ It is, furthermore, 
salutory to note that, while few men wfould prove better 
alcaldes than Crespo, the natural liberty of everyone in 
Zalamea now depends, to an extent, on him? we have seen hie 
manipulation of human law, but he remains the best guardian
1 of the villagers* liberty that human law can offer* We may, 
perhaps, sense a further irony in Crespo’s final words to the 
King, on receiving hie accolade; ”$6lo vos a la justicia/ 
tanto supierais honrarJ* (III, 947-8). .
\ , As regards natural liberty, therefore, the words
”el honor es patrimonio del alma,”'seen in the light of Dunn’s 
explanation of the phrase, contain a commensurately profound ... 
truth; in an imperfect World, liberty must, ultimately, involve 
distinctions between obedience to natural (and divine) law, 
and obedience to human law. For all men, the difficulty io 
that obedience to natural and divine law brings suffering.
Isabel, to whom we can now return, is the obvious 
example of the. association of natural liberty with suffering* 
She is, from all we see of her, as innocent and virtuous as 
we may expect a human to be. Her discretion and obedience \ 
proclaim her natural liberty as clearly as Crespo’s love of
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nature’s harmony proclaims his. The false liberty of Don 
Mendo, the license of the Captain, the indiscipline of the 
soldiers are all anathema to her; as Dunn points out, she is 
as anxious as Crespo to avoid the soldiers:
Se que el estarme
• aquies estar solamente
a escuchar mil necedades. (Ill, 342-4)
In her voluntary choice of that which is discernible as good, 
she approaches the moral liberty implicit in the lines ’’Esta/ 
el merito en la obediencia” (II, 317-8). That obedience, to 
her father and his guest, is constantly in evidence, and, 
presumably, may be seen as a reflection of her father’s educa­
tion and example. Yet, she suffers, just as her father suffers; 
the difference between them is that Isabel is prepared to accept 
it. . ’ • • - . . ’ • - ■
However, if her impeccable comportment is the result 
of Crespo’s training and example, then so, too, must be her 
attitudes and expectations after the rape. When we watch 
Isabel untying Crespo, in the full expectation of being killed
’ by him, we are witnessing the impact that Crespo’s teaching of 
custom law has made on her; the point is reinforced by Juan’s 
adherence to the same custom, which he tries to put into effect 
both in the forest and back in the village, and by Isabel’s . 
anticipation of her brother’s action. Juan, we may remember, ' . 
goes into action repeating Crespo’s words.
. . ' ; ' . • ; • ... -239 - •
Crespo must have taught his children these precepts 
of wiping out stains by bloodshed» but now he is having to 
juggle natural law, human law and custom law, Not surprisingly, 
his defiance of custom law confuses his children completely.
They try to obey the laws he has taught them, which ought to 
mean that they are employing their natural liberty; but the 
result is confusion, not only because their father suddenly 
rejects custom law, but also because the whole idea of killing 
an innocent girl, and the girl’s acceptance of it, must be 
considered a perversion of natural liberty. Here, once again, 
we are watching the practical impossibilities of trying to 
assert liberty through laws made by men.
But the bigger threat to Isabel’s liberty comes, r 
of course, from the Captain and those around him - not because 
liberty implies freedom from such importunities, but because 
their passions cause correspondingly powerful passions of the 
soul in Isabel - fear, shame, sorrow - effecting a distortion . 
of her reason. These passions in Isabel,?mooted in Act I 
when Crespo finds the Captain ’’requebrando una mujer,” ell- . 
citing Isabel’s ’’iYalgame Diosi” (I, 72^-5), and in Isabel’s 
anguish in the garden in Act II (”£$ue culpa tengo yo, cielos,/ 
para estar a esto sujeta?” [XI, 357-3J), finally overwhelm 
her at the beginning of Act III. She wanders bemusedly through
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the forest., symbolic of confusion and indecision, praying 
for the night to never end, for the sun to never rise; she 
expresses^ thus, not the liberty of harmony with nature • 
which she would experience in her garden, but the non-liberty 
of wanting to see nature perverted, its rules reversed. 
Addressing Crespo, she reminds.us, in cuando de la tirania/ 
no son sagrados los montes?” (Ill, 136-7), that, as Dunn
points out, nthe earliest wrong took place sheltered by the
'■ 11 • ■ ' • •'trees of Eden" - as we know, the Fall, among other things, 
involved man’s betrayal of his moral and his natural liberty* 
This; destruction of Isabel’s liberty is one of the facets of 
the essential unity of human society to which Dunn draws ’ 
attention- "what hurts one hurts all."^ . . ..
Eventually, Isabel enters a convent, ostensibly an 
act of natural liberty which offers every possibility of 
attaining moral liberty; but! we may wonder how much such , 
liberty (of either kind) is qualified by the duress under 
which she enters the convent. Juan, meanwhile, who never 
did, apparently, share Crespo’s genuine love of natural goods, 
but tried to follow his precepts nevertheless, goes to join
10. v. Dunn, El Alcalde de Zalamea, ed. cit., pp. 8-9, and 
note to II, 874-93. : ‘
10
11
12
ibid., note to verseo quoted, 
ibid., Introduction, p. 21.
the army. His admiration of Don Lope means that he will no 
doubt obey human law to the very beat of his ability, but .
whether that will assist his natural liberty may be judged 
from what we have seen of Don Lope’s justice,
£1 Alcalde de Zalamea, because it is deeply involved 
with problems of law, shows us some of the problems of liberty. 
We are offered stark contrasts between the quality of the . ' 
liberty of adherence to natural law and that of the liberty 
of obedience to human law, and we can see how conflicts bet­
ween natural law and human law can arise and can jeopardise 
liberty. Because of the imperfections of human law, we can 
see how difficult it is to be free via obedience thereto, even 
though we are told that it is theoretically possible, We can 
also see how the human reason (of which human law is but a 
manifestation), on which natural liberty depends, is suscep­
tible to distortion not only by passions but also by words, 
not least because of the inherent ambiguity and imprecision
, of language itself. These problems are shown more explicitly 
- and more crucially - in La Vida ea Sueno. • \ . *
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Chapt.r IV
Calderon’s LA VIDA £S SUSftO
The problem of liberty and free will in La Vida ee . 
Sueno has been examined before, but not, to my knowledge, in 
a way which takes full account of the premises outlined in . .. 
Part I, above. Perhaps that is because Segismundo has tradi­
tionally been regarded as a developing hero, who, in the words 
• of P._N. Dunn, "attains to prudence and a kind of liberty 
which is more satisfying than that which he yearns for in the 
famous soliloquy.However, as recent work has suggested, 
it is possible to look askance at the quality of Segismundo’s 
/{judgements and actions in the last act, and particularly the, 
last scene, of the play, and it therefore seems legitimate
1 * ' ’ ' • ■’By, for example, Tomas Carreras y Artau, "La filosofla de 
la liber tad en La Vida es Suenot|t in Estudios Eruditos In 
Memoriae! de Adolfo Bonilla y San Martin, Vol. 1, (Madrid, /
1927), pp./151-179, 'An article which is hopelessly confused . '■ 
from basic premises and definitions onwards. .
"The horoscope motif in La Vida es Sueno," Atlanta, I,
1955, PP. 187-201; v.p. 196. . .
5y. e.g., H. B. Hall, "Segismundo and the rebel.soldier," 
Bulletin of Hispanic Studies, XLV, 1968, pp. 189-200, and .
T. E. May, "Segismundo y el soldado rebelde," in Hacia Calderon. 
Coloquio Anglogermano. Exeter 1969, . (Be rlin, 1970), pp. 71-75’ 
It should be said that these two.articles differ considerably 
from each other in both approach and conclusions.
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to examine afresh the problem of liberty as it appears in
the play, having regard to the reservations lately expressed
about Segismundo* That is not to suggest that the Parker-
Wilson-Bunn approach, which has raised discussion of the play
to a sensible level, should be discarded to make way for the
more sceptical view represented by K. B. Kali; to the contrary,
I think that both views can and should be seen in conjunction,
as I hope to be able to demonstrate later in, this chapter#, -
. ; To begin with, I propose to examine precisely the
extent of Segismundo’s possession of, and deprivation of,
liberty, the premises for which are set out in the first 
4monologue, vv. 102-1?2# Concerning the development of
.. Segismundo’s reasoning powers, we may begin to suspect their
■ severe limitations when we hear Segismundo’s opening words, 
which toy with the contention that Segismundo is in j)rison 
because ”el delito mayor/ del hombre es haber nacido” (111-2). 
Segismundo is addressing the cielos, and we know that, in heaven’s 
book, being born can only be a delito in one sense, that is,
• that man is born guilty of original sin# If that is what 
Segismundo means, we should expect, at least from a rational 
or minimally-educated person, some mention of Grace and redemp­
tion; but Segismundo is saying that "haber nacido” is a crime
' La Vida es Sueno, ed. by Albert E. Sloman, (Manchester
University Press* 19&5). All quotations are taken from this
' edition# ‘ - . . ; ' . ,
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for which he is kept in prison, and we know that "vuestra • 
justiciar in this: sense has no basis in divine and natural ; 
law - other men,, equally guilty of being born, do not spend 
their, whole lives in.gaol (save in the Platonic sense of the . 
prison of the body). It does not make much sense as Segis- 
Biundo expresses it, and, although he is clearly not devoid of , • 
the faculty of reason, since he is capable of razon and dis- 
curso and of asking the obvious question, "Pues si los demas 
nacierpn,/ ^que privilegioe tuvieron/ que yo no goce jamas?" 
(120-2), we may nevertheless conclude that his ability to 
apply his reason is, or has been restricted. Later, we find : 
that Segismundo is there by order of Basilic, and.that every­
thing Segismundo knows has been taught him by Basillo's 
hatchet-man, Clotaldo, the only other human being Segismundo 
has ever seen: :• ... -t , •> . . . •
• • _ • , . nunca vi ni' hable
sino a un hombre solamente .
que*aqul mis desdichas siente, -
.. por quien las noticias se .
. de cielo y tierra. (203-7)
So Clotaldo, as Segismundo’s teacher, has obviously been unable 
to give Segismundo any satisfactory answer (not that there
"a note by F. Sanchez y Escribano, "Sobre el origen de ’El 
delito mayor del hombre es haber nacido’", Romance Notes, III, 
1962, pp. 50-51, suggests that this is something of a common­
place, a deliberately paradoxical cry of "desesperacion barroca" 
in the face of humanity’s inadequacy. In the play, that makes 
more sense when we learn about Segismundo’s tutor, a purveyor 
of commonplaces.
could ever bo one) to the only question which can really mean 
anything to him, Segismundo*s knowledge and understanding, 
and hence his capacity to use and develop his reason, have ’ 
apparently been severely crippled, and deliberately soy.by 
the machinations of those responsible for his plight.• It is 
therefore not surprising that,. the rest of his monologue should 
consist of a series of, truths and falsehoods which do not
really help Segismundo.to understand his situation, but rather 
are an Indication of the glaring deficiencies in his education 
The fact,that he does possess the faculty of reason, which 
manifests itself from time to time, becomes important in Acts 
II and III. ,
. . . . The content of the monologue is a- comparison of - ,
Segismundo’s liberty with the liberty he sees in the natural 
phenomena around him; but there is an essential equivocation 
in this comparison, for human liberty is not of the same 
species as the liberty of the natural phenomena, and in that 
sense it is not very useful to ask whether the one has more 
of one thing than the other has of another. Clearly, there 
is a sense in which Segismuno’s liberty is less than that of 
the bird, brute, fish and brook, namely, that they have more 
freedom of movement; but even this freedom of movement is 
severely circumscribed by the fact that, whatever these 
natural phenomena do, they do not do from choice, but from
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an inescapable force of law, the law of their species (i,e.,
' their; instinct). The inherent ambivalence of the comparison 
is -emphasised by Segismundo’s terms of reference: he feels 
deprived because he has the attributes of "mas alma”, ’’major 
distinto [instinto]”, ’’mas albedrio” and ”mas vida”; but those 
attributes bestow on Segismundo more natural liberty than the 
natural phenomena possess: their freedom of movement is only 
a function of their instinct, and, as such, vastly inferior 
to human liberty. Segismundo’s possession of an immortal sdul 
means that he is not chained.to any particular good on earth;
- he has ’’mejor instinto” because, whereas beasts have only 
instinct, Segismundo has, even if‘not given the opportunity 
to develop it, the. faculty of reason and thus the power to 
choose, which comprises his albedrlo; finally, he has ”mas 
vida”, the union of soul and body which combines the previous 
attributes. ■' ’ ‘‘ •
In a simple sense, .the sense implied by ,the progres­
sion of Segismundo ’ s comparisons - from the bird, which can 
move in.air, water and on land, to the beasts which must remain 
on land or in water, to the fish, confined to the water, to
; the brook which may only move in one dimension and in one direc­
tion — that is, the- freedom of movement, Segismundo has leas 
liberty than the phenomena he observes; but, in.a far more sig­
nificant sense, he has a greater liberty than they do, in that
. . . -247- •' ' ■- "
, • '' • .v ' , 6 • • ’''' '■> ' • • * • ■ • ' ■he has freedom of choice. Obviously, that is not to imply 
' that, because Segismundo is wrong, he has nothing to complain
about i we know that the tragedy he endures is of having leas 
liberty than other men. .However, whereas that deprivation is 
one of freedom of action, the onlookers should be-aware, of 
something else, namelythat Segismundo, by virtue of being ■ 
a man, does possess, apparently without realising it, natural 
liberty. We know that this natural liberty is a * freedom which, 
ih practice, has-to be exercised with great caution, in that 
it demands the application'of reason to judgement about what 
is to be done (prudence) and may very easily be abused and 
perverted by a confusion of the reason, leading to misjudgement 
and wrong choicej.'we also know that it can be denied by a sub- 
seryience to the instincts, a point which assumes considerable 
importance in the closing scenes of the play. If the proper
, exercise of natural liberty involves reason refined by knowledge 
and experience, three aspects of the foregoing should be noted: 
one -is that Segismundo is apparently unaware of the liberty he
- / possesses by virtue of being a . man , and is therefore unaware
■ '• 6 ' ‘ ' ■L. E. Palacios makes this point, in "La Vida es Sueno",
.Finisterre, II, 1948, pp. 5*52, but without stating the point 
\ conveyed to the spectators by Segismundo*s ignorance of the
; superior value of natural liberty (p. 15)* Palacios affirms 
that "Segismundo no duda un momento de la existencia de su 
libre alb^drio", but it is significant that Segismundo asks 
"T yo con mas aibedrlo,/ £tengo menos libertad?" (151-2), and 
then passes over the subject. '
of its ramifications; the second is that, even if he were 
aware, he has not had a single opportunity to exercise this 
liberty and thus gain the experience and discrimination neces­
sary to preserve it (a few moments later he is presented with 
his first such opportunity and makes a complete mess of it); 
and the third is that, if the confusion and uncertaintyv of 
this speech is at all representative of Segismundo’s mental 
processes (which, as we are to discover, it is), then his1 ' 
education and the development of his reason leave much to be 
desired - nature is supposed to offer lessons to men, but 
Segismundo does not appear to have been told what they are?
Human liberty, concerned - in practice - with obe­
dience to just lair, or voluntary submission to reason, is a 
kind of liberty which diametrically opposes the involuntary 
submission to instinct of the beasts. Segismundo is subser­
vient to a law, but - and this is where another facet of the 
deprivation of his liberty is shortly to be seen - to a law 
which is not based on right reason', a law which is a perver­
sion perpetrated by Basilic in the name of raison d’etat 
(sic - but more of that in due course). Basilio is respon­
sible for the destruction of natural liberty in himself 
(because he is motivated by fear),1 in Segismundo, and, by 
extension, in all his subjects (because they are all affected 
by the laws he promulgates). To a dispassionate observer,
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Basilio’s decisions regarding Segismundo cannot seem anything 
other than a transgression of divine law, natural law and 
human just law* Segismundo’s loss of liberty is thus com­
pounded by his subjection to this unjust law of Basilic, 
because it means that he has no practical guidance, no criteria 
by which to measure his actions and employ his natural liberty; 
he is obviously not likely, as his contempt for authority and 
convention demonstrates, to be persuaded to respect and acknowr 
ledge law of any kind, since the only law he knows virtually ; 
denied him his humanity. For a knowledgeable and virtuous man, 
the imposition of unjust law might not prove the destruction . 
of liberty, but Basilio has denied Segismundo the opportunity 
to become knowledgeable or virtuous by denying him the oppor­
tunity to develop his reason and experience* Segismundo’s 
predicament, in sum, is not that he has less liberty than the 
beasts, but that he has less than other men, not because he has 
been denied freedom of movement, but because he has been denied 
the reason, guidance and experience via which other men may 
use and develop their natural liberty; inevitably, this law­
less disregard for Segismundo’s natural liberty makes of him 
an animal, that is, a creature governed by his instincts. -
The most significant of the string of questions that 
Segismundo puts despairingly to the universe is thus the last
. ' . ' ' . ■ - 249 - ■■ ' ■
one:
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•: ; . £Que ley, justicia o raxon .
negar a los hombres sabe 
privilegio tan stiave .(167-9)
We are soon to find that no ”ley, justicia o raxon” is respon- 
sibla for Segismundo’s condition, which is the result of the 
above-mentioned denial and transgression of every kind of law, 
justice and reason by one man, Basilio,
For the spectator, such an analysis as this may not 
be possible as he watches - although it must surely have bean 
clear enough to any seventeenth-century Spaniard who knew his 
basic dogma - but we can scarcely fail to notice the way in 
which Calderon proceeds to demonstrate dramatically the practi­
cal consequences of Segismundo’s condition. Immediately 
following the monologue, Segismundo, for the first time in -
his life, encounters.a human being who is not Clotaldo, and 
he has a limited opportunity for action of some kind. This 
action is, as we might expect, quite irrational: for no other .
reason than that
... no sepas que se '
que sabes flaquexas mlas, ;
, solo porque me has oido „ (l8l-5)
he tries to kill Rosaura. This reaction of Segismundo’s is 
an indication of Segismundo’s inability to use his natural 
liberty, which is denied by the breaking of law. That much 
is obvious; more revealing of Segismundo’s limitations is 
what follows. Rosaura kneels before Segismundo and appeals
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to his reason and better instincts: ;
, Si has nacido <
humano, baste el postrarme >
. , a tus pies para librarme. (187-9)
To Segismundo, who thinks that a man’s birth is a crime 
(cf, vv, 111-2), Rosaura’s conditional clause can only mean 
’’because you are a criminal”, and it is not so much reason 
and better instinct that tempers Segismundo*s rage, but a 
confused mixture of emotions which he cannot understand, 
arising from hie being strongly attracted to what seems to 
be a young man, Segismundo’s words to Rosaura are punctuated 
with ’’aunque ♦ but the listener may well feel that these
aunques should be porques, for Segismundo’s recitation is a 
description of the conditions of his life and the sources of 
hie knowledge - evidence, in other words, of the limitations 
which could be inferred from his first monologue: Segismundo 
tells Rosaura (and the spectators) that he knows little of 
the world, that all he has ever seen of it has been the tower 
and ”este rustico desierto" (199)» that in all his life he has 
ever seen only one man, and that this one man is his sole 
source of information (vv. 191-207). The components of the 
sum total of Segismundo’s knowledge and experience may thus 
be enumerated as follows: 1), Clotaldo, 2) Clotaldo’a infor­
mation, 5) nature (interpreted by Clotaldo), and 4) stars; . > 
Segismundo’s confusion, and the silly rhetoric that expresses
it| cannot be wondered at.
Here again, Calderon sums up the situation dramati­
cally, by presenting Clotaldo and,showing us something of the 
quality of his teaching, and how the maestro applies the pre­
cepts of law, justice, pedagogy and so on, that he is supposed 
to be conveying to Segismundo♦ The practical demonstration 
of human justice given to Segismundo consists of hie teacher* 
wearing a mask, shouting to his guards, also wearing masks,
”... acudid, y vigilantes,/ sin que puedan defenderse,/ o 
prendeldes o mataldes.” (284-6), the reason for this display 
being that Rosaura and Clarin have trespassed ’’contra el 
decreto del Key” (299)* For Segismundo, then, that is the 
way royal justice works, and since this is, to his knowledge, 
his first experience of it, we may judge its effect on him to
be considerable. , / ‘
We are then offered an indication of the quality of
Clotaldo’s teaching, in action:
. Si sabes que tus desdichas,
Segismundo, son tan grandee, 
que antes de nacer moriste ; 
por ley del cielo; si sabes 
que aquestas prisiones son 
de tus furias arrogantes
. ; , un freno que las detenga .
y una rienda que las pare,
> &por que blasonas? (319-27)
The pedagogical quality is emphasised by Clotaldo’s repetition 
of ”si eabee”, from which we may infer that Segismundo is
being told continually to accept that he died before he was 
born, ”por ley del cielo”, and that he is spending his life 
in solitary confinement in order to check his "furias arro- 
gantea.” The only sense in which there might be some truth 
in Clotaldo’s statement that ’’antes de nacer, moriste/ por 
ley del cielo” is that natural law decrees that any creature;
. which is born must eventually die in the flesh; but, as I 
pointed out before, a comment on Grace and redemption is 
calledfor if that is what Clotaldo means; within the plot, 
it is not what he means, but rather is he only telling Segis- 
mundo that the stars "foretold” Segismundo’s fate* So that 
is the way Segismundo has learned about the crime of being
, born - no wonder he is confused; in any sense other than the 
religious, Clotaldo’s statement is a contradiction, and doubly 
so as Segismundo is still alive. The contention that this 
condemnation is the law of heaven must, since the foetal 
Segismundo had committed no crime against it, seem to be an
. arbitrary and unjust law, and hence no law at all; worse, 
Clotaldo- tells Segismundo that he is in prison not so much
/ : because he has committed a crime, but because he might,
? thereby^admitting that Segismundo is suffering that hallmark
of tyranny, preventive detention, and has suffered it from 
birth. All that is from the teacher to the pupil 1 We begin 
to see why Segismundo rails at the cielos, why he has such ,
' - 254 - "i • . .' ■■ ■
confused notions of human crime* Meanwhile/ his response to 
the arrival of Clotaldo is to utter irrational and impossible 
threats ("tengo de despedazarme ..." to which Clot-
aldo replies that he cannot kill himself because he is already 
dead! Is that the kind of reasoning Segismundo has been
■ taught to accept?- .• •. • - . -'•••.■ • • ■ ’ .
. . , In terms of liberty, the paragraph immediately above
• suggests two things. One is, that even when Segismundo
attempts some admirable deed (in this case, defending Rosaura 
and Clarin), he still relapses into anarchy; the other, that
^Segismundo thinks that it is only his imprisonment that pre­
vents him from indulging in this license, cfs
\ _ ’• . IAh cielos,
que bien haceis en quitarme
. la libertad! Porque fuera
. contra vosotros gigante,
que, para quebrar al sol 
, esos vidrios y cristales,
sobre cimientos de piedra
. , pusiera montes de j&spe. (329-36)
For Segismundo, liberty means, not obedience to law, but 
uncontrolled assault on, not only human law, but also natural 
law (he thinks he can perform superhuman feats) and even 
divine law (he would attack the sun and the heavens). We 
know that that is impossible, but he does not, because he has 
never had the chance to test his desires against experience, 
and because the truth has been purposely hidden from him all
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his life, as is demonstrated by yet another amassing reply 
from Clotaldo, who, in response to Segismundo’s ’’sobre 
cimientos de piedra/ pusiera montes de jaape”, tells him 
that ’’Quiza porque no los pongas/ hoy padeces tantos males1’ 
(557-8): Clotaldo is here actively encouraging Segismundo’s 
mistaken belief that - among other things - liberty would . 
grant him such powers, without making the slightest attempt 
to warn him that - again among other things * liberty entails , 
not the breaking of law, but submission to it. We are shown 
the paradox of a man who spends his life in chains talking 
in terms of infinite ability, while the man responsible for 
the existence of this paradox makes no attempt whatsoever to
resolve it for him. . . . , : ;
As Segismundo is finally incarcerated once again, 
there can be no doubt in our minds that he has no conception 
of the nature of natural liberty or of any other kind of 
liberty, for he does not understand even the basic character 
of all these kinds of. liberty - inevitably, because we have 
just watched demonstrations of the quality of law, the manner 
of his education, and the extent of his experience, and in 
none of these important components of liberty has he been . 
shown the truth. The denial of liberty leaves only the force . 
of instinct. We are left in no doubt as to where the respon­
sibility for Segismundo’s ignorance lies: it lies with Clotaldo,
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the administrator of the "decreto del Rey", and with the King,. 
who issued the decree. Xn the rest of the play, the conse­
quences of Segismundo’s Condition are shown, to the last 
detail, •' •".’••••• ■ •• . . .■
There is one more aspect of the opening scenes to 
he considered; I have examined the words and the action 
closely, but a play also offere a visual experience, and the 
picture of Segismundo in his.cell, which Calderon is careful 
to describe, directs our attention to the aspects of his con­
dition already discussed. Our attention is drawn specifically> 
to his appearance by Rosaura: ”En el traje de fiera yace un 
hombre/ de prisiones cargado (96~7)» and Calderon offers
one of his few detailed stage directions, ’’Descubrese Segis-. \ 
mundo con una cadena y la lus, vestido de pieles” (1014-), As 
Segismundo speaks, then, the salient features of the dramatic 
picture are not permitted to escape us: he is dressed in skins 
and dragging a chain -two different aspects of his loss of 
liberty, for the chain is man-made, while the skins were ’’made11 
by animals. Dressed as an animal, Segismundo looks as if he 
lacks the natural liberty that separatee men from beasts; but 
he is also held by a chain, a patently man-made object, which 
suggests that the human agency responsible for chaining Segis- 
mundo must also be responsible for his animal appearance: the 
skins, like the chain, have been foisted on Segismundo by a
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man, or men, and are thus an indication that someone wants to 
deny Segismundo his birthright, which includes his natural 
liberty. Underneath the skins, of course, there is a man, 
but he is naked, as are all men beneath their civilised 
trappings, and if divested of these skins he would have to 
learn, via the application of reason and intelligence, to 
manufacture the necessary garments, a task which it would not 
be possible to accomplish overnight. .
The scene before us thus represents visually both
the cause and the effect of Segismundo*s condition; a human 
agency has sought to deny that Segismundo is a rational being, 
and to forbid him the opportunity of knowing and exercising 
the liberty with which he was born; they have succeeded to the 
extent that Segismundo’s reason is retarded, his instincts do 
control him, and his liberty is correspondingly degenerate. . 
To reverse this situation, Segismundo would have to learn 
from first principles, as a child-does - but he isa grown 
man, and cannot be restrained as a child might be.; That is 
the picture we watch, as we hear the words Segismundo utters,
. My treatment of these opening scenes has been con*
fined to a view of Segismundo’s condition as a simple process 
of cause and effect which can neatly be fitted into the appro* 
priate theoretical compartments. However, the spectator may 
well feel that the situation is not quite so simple.
It is clear that a course of action chosen after
due ratiocination is free, while a course of action motivated
by passion is not. The trouble is, that the effects of those
two processes are not always easily divisible into the obviously
good and the obviously evil. Onyone hand, behaviour motivated
by passion can have good results - naturally, for the passions
have their place in man’s psychological hierarchy} on the
other hand - and this constitutes a far greater problem*
unexpected evil can result from behaviour guided, to all intents
and purposes, by the dictates of reason. Thus, as an example
of the first proposition, Segismundo refrains from slaughtering
Rosaura, not because he concludes that it would be morally
wrong, but because ?
Tu vox pudo enternecerme,
tu presencia suspenderme, .
y tu respeto turbarme (190-2)
- his reason is, if anything, further confused, as is suggested 
by the juggling with cliches in the second half of that speech 
(w. 223-^2). That is an instance of evil avoided by the 
impulse of instinct, and there are others in the play. But 
we soon see an example of the converse: the scene changes to 
the palace, where we are told of Basillo’s great plan, osten­
sibly rational, and justified by Basilio on the grounds of 
raison d’etat, with arguments in which Dunn sees ’’dispassionate
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rationality” but which he (Dunn) condemns because Basilio . 
is **too logical and not sufficiently intuitive;** it is that 
plan which brings about the chaos and disorder depicted in 
the play. Calderon seems to be pointing to an ambiguity 
Inherent in both the demands of instinct and the processes of 
reason, and this ambiguity becomes increasingly apparent as 
the play progresses. - ■ \ . . • . .
When Segismundo, with all his handicaps, is placed
in situations which demand recognition of the responsibilities
of liberty, the consequences, for himself and for those around
him, are not surprising. First, he is taken to the palace.
The tone of the second Act is set by the opening conversation
between Clotaldo and Basilio, in which Clotaldo describes, in
some detail, the process of drugging Segismundo by means of
.. .. algunas hierbas, 
cuyo tirano poder •
y cuya secreta fuerza • ; • • - ••
asl al humano discurso
• ’ ... • . 1 priva, roba y enajena, .
que deja vivo cadaver
•. ' ‘ a un hombre, y cuya violencia,
x adormecido, le quita
. los sentidos y potencias ... (993-1001)
Nearly every word there forms part of a metaphor of what 
Basilio and Clotaldo have done to Segismundo: employing < ,
'op. cit., p. 192.
8 ■ ' ■ • ' 5- -
op. cit., p. 195-
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’’tirano poder” and ’’secrets fuerza/1 they have robbed Segis­
mundo of his ability to employ properly both his "diecurso” 
and his "sent Ido's y potencies/' and have turned him into a 
"vivo cadaverClotaldo then goes on to discuss whether or 
not that is feasible, and, following the metaphor, a moral ; : 
judgement is invited: since ”la humane malicia nuestra” can
. lead us to kill a man, it can.obviously lead us to crippling 
a man’s spirit, and the two crimes are, the analogy suggests, 
different only in degree - the latter being a milder poison, 
but still a poison. All that reminds us that Basilio’s actions
. have been prompted by ’’humana malicia" (although presented by 
Basilio a© raison d’etat).
The same speech also offers a reminder of the situa­
tion brought about by the combination 
and Segismundo’s lack of experience.; 
when he took the drug to Segismundo’s
of Clotaldo’© teaching 
Clotaldo tells us that, 
cell, he gave Segismundo
. another little lesson,, . ?. . .
, Para levantarle mas
el.esplritu a la empress
; . . que solicitao, tome \ '
; por asunto la presteza .
de un aguila caudalosa ... (1034 ff)
and the efficacy of Clotaldo’s teaching may be seen in his 
report that Segismundo completely misconstrued the moral of
the lesson (10.48-1063), and was inspired to further delusions 
of grandeur, proclaiming that,
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... si estoy
... ■ \ sujeto, lo estoy por fuersa,
, porque voluntariamente ; ?
a otro hombre no me rindiera. (1060-63)
In fact, this ambition of Segismundo’s is a denial of the 
very liberty he could have, for it is a refusal to admit a 
law to which he should submit; Clotaldo apparently made no 
attempt to explain that, and hastily gave him the potion.
The comic side of the situation is briefly revealed: Clotaldo* 
tutorials never have the desired effect on Segismundo, and, 
on this occasion, hoping to inspire Segismundo with thoughts 
of pomp and grandeur, he merely succeeds in arousing his furyl
Anyway, Segismundo is placed in court for the first 
time, and behaves exactly as one should expect, as he confront 
in rapid succession, the other protagonists. Clotaldo greets 
him first and tries to enlighten Segismundo’a reason and to 
encourage in him a sense of. prudence (1268-9^)? Segismundo’s 
reaction is predictable: he tries to kill Clotaldo. He also
tells Clotaldo the truth: . .
Traidor fuiste con la ley,
. . • lisonjero con el Key, ■ . . • .
y crttel conmigo fuiste;
- treachery, flattery, cruelty, these are accusations which 
are well-founded. Segismundo’s reason is capable of grasping 
the answer to his life-long question, which has at last been 
given him, but he reacts with instinctive savagery.
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Nevertheless, his behaviour at this point is understandable,' 
for two reasons: a) because it is instinctive, and b) because 
his judgement on Clotaldo is reasonable. Once again, ambiguity: 
in his rage, Segismundo wants to kill Clotaldo, but even a. 
disinterested judgement on Clotaldo is unlikely to differ much 
from Segismundo’s. His eagerness to carry out the sentence 
on the spot lacks a certain judicial restraint, perhaps, but 
in this he is only demonstrating how well he has learned from 
his mentors: he saw the way Clotaldo behaved as a guardian of 
the law (when arresting Rosaura and Clarin in the tower) and 
the justice he tries to put into effect is of the same kind, 
the barbaric and merciless justice to which he himself has 
been subjected for twenty years. All.Clotaldo can think of . 
doing is giving Segismundo another of the ’’lessons*’ which 
have helped make him what he is:
lAy de ti,
que soberbia vas mostrando,
sin caber que estas sonandoJ (1316-8)
Segismundo-, it seems, is being both-/passionate and 
rational} within the fiction of the drama, Segismundo is a 
man governed by instinct and entirely devoid of prudence, which 
means that his natural liberty-is ineffective; but the specta­
tor can see in hie words a rational aspect which is entirely 
compatible with natural liberty, and thus is forced to 3'ealise 
that, in certain situations, passion and reason can seem to
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merge. The implications of that ambiguity are made clearer 
in the next scene, where, after Clotaldo has left, the theme 
of justice is continued via the argument between Segismundo 
and the Criado Segundo, concerning the old problem of whether 
or not to obey an unjust law. Two viewpoints are put before 
us: ”En lo que no es justa ley/ no ha de obedecer al Hey;” 
(1321-2), and ”E1 no debio examiner/ si era bien hecho o mal 
hecho” (1324-5). The difficulty is, that both these viewpoints 
may be convincingly argued, and, as Calderon’s audience knew, 
they have been argued ever since Christ’s joke about what to 
render to Caesar and to God respectively. The point that the 
spectator should grasp is that Clotaldo’s treachery, flattery 
and cruelty can be either condemned, on rational grounds, or 
excused, on equally rational grounds! Segismundo merely ,
chooses the tag which best justifies his own passion (at the 
end of Act III, conditioned by fear, he admires Clotaldo’s 
loyalty to Basilio, [yv. 3288-9lJ)t and only a few minutes • 
later he reverses his position: ”Nada me parece justo/ en 
siendo contra mi gusto” (141/-18). How much natural liberty 
do we have in a practical sense, if we can use it to both con­
demn and condone sins such as treachery, flattery and cruelty? 
What does it mean to talk of natural liberty, when reason may 
be made to cloak a particular passion?
The same scene, as well as showing how well
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Segismundo has learned his lessons relating to law and justice^ 
also shows the dire consequences of his lack of experience and 
his need to acquire it. He throws the Criado Segundo to his 
death; why? To see if it could he done I HiPor Dios, que lo 
he.de probarin•(1427)• Por the spectator, the ambiguity is,, 
this time, present in Another way: a brutal act of savagery 
is not. Just susceptible of rational explanation, it is the ; 
logical thing for Segismundo to do. He does not know the : ,
•limit of his own powers, except that Clotaldo had hinted to ' 
him that he might be able to build a tower and attack the ■ : 
heavens; here, he is told by a servant that "Con, los hombres 
.Como yo/ no puede hacerse eso.n (1425-6), and, while murder is 
irrational per se,.for Segismundo it is an experiment, and, as 
such, displays a certain gruesome logic. . ...
This lack of experience, the consequent absence of 
prudence, and what it portends for all concerned, is also appa­
rent in Segismundo^s brief conversation with Clarin. Clarin, 
sycophant extraordinary, aligns himself with Segismundo,.. .
because. Segismundo looks as if he might be the winner (vv.
1328 ff.); his boot-licking is apparent to everyone except . 
Segismundo, but Segismundo is fooled by Clarin because the 
latter is a professional, and Segismundo cannot see through 
the flattery: "Tu solo en tan '.nuevos mundos/ me has agradado." 
(1336-7)* This problem of separating an apparent good from
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a real good is again exemplified when Estrella enters,
(v. 1375)» and Segismundo is immediately entranced by her 
female beauty; instinct smothers reason, and absurd hyper­
boles are insufficient to hide what Segismundo really wants.
The humour of this situation should not be missed: Segismundo, 
having just despised Astolfo*s courtly chatter("Cansome como 
llego/ grave a hablarme” [1368-9])* immediately shows that 
he has learned yet another lesson as he addresses Estrella 
in similarly meaningless and insincere hyperboles.
The underlying irony of all this is that Segismundo 
is behaving like Basilio. Basilio’s Imprisonment of Segis-
■ mundo, and his current test, is, like Segismundo’s murder of 
the Criado Segundo, an experiment, to see if it can be done. 
Both experiments can be seen as logically justifiable, and 
yet, to the spectator, the disastrous consequences of both 
are apparent; if anything, Segismundo is the more rational of . 
the two men, because, unlike Basilio, he cannot be expected 
to know any better. Segismundo’s complete ignorance of the 
extent and limit of his own powers might have impinged upon 
Basilio’s consciousness if the latter had paid more attention 
to Clotaldo’s report of Segismundo’s reaction to the lesson 
on the eagle; as it is, when the two do come face-to-face, it 
is Segismundo, the man raised as a beast, who appears more 
rational than Basilio, the self-styled sabio 1 Segismundo’s
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first words to Basilio manifest, on one level, a delinquent 
unawareness of having done wrong* but* on another level* the 
simple end unanswerable logic already noted. All that Basilio 
can say* however* ie that he is disappointed* because he had 
hoped to find Segismundo *fadvertido j/ de hadoa y estrelies 
triunfando” (1^50-51)» Tor the spectator* who can see that 
the Shades y eetrellas" in Segismundo’s life are Basilio 
himself* that can only mean that Segismundo* if he is to enjoy 
hie natural liberty* must be free of the influence of Basilio* 
at; least as long as Basilio represents unjust law* . , ,
: That ironic flavour of the presentation of these 
two protagonists is sustained throughout the rsst of this 
scene*,in which most of what Basilio says can and should be 
turned against himself; Segismundo* quite rightly and rationally 
does indeed throw it back in his face* and it is Basilio who* 
in his unreason* falls to see the truth* Far from accepting 
his responsibility* Basilio sinks to the depths of irrespon- . 
siblllty; he wnma Segismundo*
. que seas humilde y blando* .
: porque quiaa estas sonando*
: aunque ves que estas desplerto* (1529-51)
Basilio is thereby telling Segismundo that the latter must 
behave properly or there will be trouble* so that the concept 
of virtue which Basilio ie impressing upon Segismundo ie that 
of doing good out of fear; that is. a denial of natural liberty*
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which involves the voluntary choice of the good* and, of course, 
it is also a denial of the proper meaning of virtue - yet that 
is the lesson Basilio wants Segismundo to learn#
Segismundo, not surprisingly, is reduced to a state 
of confusion, of unreason, of helplessness; he was lied to in 
the prison, now he is being lied to outside the prison# The 
silly and irresponsible warning he has just received is repeated 
by Clotaldo when, shortly afterwards, he finds Segismundo 
about to assault Rosaura# As with Estrella, the comedy of 
the scene lies in the fact that Segismundo at first tries to 
conquer Rosaura the ’’proper” way, that is, employing the inflated 
pretentiousness he has learned from his short stay in the 
Court; this time, the comedy is heightened by the presence of 
Clotaldo, hiding in the wings, watching this embarrassing con­
tact between his public and private pasts. Full of pomp and 
bombast, Clotaldo is here because "A Segismundo reducir deseo,/ 
porque en fin le he criado” (1618-9). * a statement which is as 
self-incriminating as Basillo’s "Bien me agradeces ...” (1500)? 
and, as he watches, Segismundo tells Rosaura menacingly that 
”... la reeistencia/ es veneno crtiel de mi paciencia” (16^2-^),
•the word veneno - repeated by Rosaura - reminding us, via the 
drug speech at the beginning of the Act, of the framework of 
the whole situation, with Basilio and Clotaldo poisoning Segis­
mundo mentally and spiritually.
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In the scene witnessed by Clotaldo and the. spectator 
the theme of ambiguity is continued: Segismundo’s behaviour, 
although wholly conditioned by passion, is, at the same time, 
still following a logical pattern# Just as his murder of the 
Criado Segundo is explicable on the grounds that he is trying 
to garner the beginnings of the elementary experience he needs 
to acquire the prudence demanded of him by Basilio and Clotaldo, 
so too is his assault on Rosaura, who, in exactly the same 
way as the Criado Segundo, provokes him into assaulting her: 
’’ROSAURA. ... mi respeto no osara, ni pudiera./ SEGISMUNDO.
Solo por ver si puedo ...” (1637-8). A minute later, when he 
admits, ”Soy tirano” (1666), he is admitting his irrationality, 
since a tyrant is, by definition, a ruler who defies natural 
law; but there, too, Segismundo is following a logical pattern, 
for Basilio and Clotaldo have raised him by methods of tyranny, 
and Rosaura has just called him a tyrant to his face, so what 
has he got to lose by admitting it and acting accordingly?
As Clotaldo watches, he is confronted with the pro­
ducts of bothhis reason (Segismundo, his intellectual progeny) 
and his passion (Rosaura, his physical progeny), conscious 
that both are letting him down in their respective ways. Be 
tries to restrain Segismundo by repeating Basilio’s warning 
(”y no .../ seas crttel, porque quiza es un sueno” /1678-9J), 
but, once again, Segismundo, hie lust turning to anger,
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decorates his passion with unanswerable logic: "Vere, dandote 
rnuerte,/ si es siieno o si es verdad.1* (1682-3).’ Clotaldo, as 
. so often happens, finds himself on his knees before Segismundo;
Astolfo intervenes, Basilio arrives to stop the fight, and
> decides>to deprive Segismundo, of his physical liberty once
more . ,. . ■ . ■ • '
•; . .Segismundo*s brief career in the palace thus tells 
us all we need to know about his liberty* and it tells us a 
little about our own. Segismundo has no liberty: his reason 
malformed, his knowledge perverted, robbed of the guidance of
s just law, denied the experience which fosters prudence, unable 
to choose the good because he cannot distinguish it from evil, 
he is at the mercy of his instincts. His behaviour is just as 
irrational as we might expect - violent, impulsive and destruc­
tive - but the factor which makes us aware of the problems of 
our own liberty is that we tan see :a certain reason behind his 
bestiality, as some of the foregoing examples illustrate. Jn 
other words, the depressing truth about natural liberty that 
we may see in the work is, that while liberty exists by virtue 
of man’s being a rational creature, able to choose his good 
actions instead of being driven to them by instinct, that 
vital distinction can sometimes disappear, when an action may 
result from both an evil instinct and s rational analysis.
Such a situation must obviously reflect the inadequacies of
. . * 270 - . .. . . , . •
human reason (and of human law), which cannot cope with the 
several different facets presented by any one set of circum­
stances. This problem becomes acute in the last scene, which 
I shall examine after looking at the way in which the events 
of Act 1X1 proceed to the conclusion presented on stage.
When Segismundo is put back in prison, the stage 
directions are, once again, precise: "Deecubrese Segismundo 
como al principio, con pieles y cadena, durmiendo en el.sutlo” 
(201? ) * chains and skins again, but, this time, no flickering 
lights. His sleep is the sleep induced by the drugs of Basilio 
and Clotaldo. He has been stripped of his finery: it was not 
his, and he did not choose to wear it, but was decked out in 
it at the whim of Basilio; now Basilio has just as arbitrarily 
re-clothed him in his bestial garb, looking at the scene as 
a picture, the difference between this and the previous picture 
of Segismundo in his cell is that, now, Basilio and Clotaldo 
are also in the cell. The two elders are trapped, forced to 
continue their tyranny, which is disruptive of liberty for 
everyone - Segismundo, themselves, the whole of Poland., They 
listen to Segismundo talking in his sleep, as Segismundo 
dreams of the indulgence in license which is so symptomatic 
of his loss of liberty* The picture also picks out that theme: 
a man dreams of license, but he is lying in a prison. License 
and liberty are incompatible; to suppose that liberty permits
■ - 2?1 - •; '
license is to live in a dream. But we all might dream this 
dream: Segismundo dreams of "el gran teatro del mundo" (2073), 
of which we are all a part, not only in the metaphorical sense 
meant by Segismundo, but also in the literal sense that we 
are in a theatre as we watch all this happening; for us, too, 
the assumption that we may do exactly as we please, and get 
away with it, xs a dream. : ' . - • ■ .
When Segismundo awakes, he is offered another little 
lesson, and at the end of the Act he takes stock of the intel­
lectual, sensual and social experiences he has undergone, and 
deduces therefrom certain principles which he deems worth 
adopting. Since they condition his behaviour in Act III, it 
is worth considering closely his progress to the close of
■ Act II.- ' : ■' . .
First, we find that Segismundo is not convinced that 
his day in the palace was a dream (only Basilio and Clotaldo 
could be surprised at that); nevertheless, Clotaldo*s lies 
about its being a dream serve to confuse him sufficiently for 
him not to feel certain of anything.. Apart from the lies about 
the dream, the only other lesson Clotaldo gives Segismundo is
. the famous lines , .
mas en suenos fuera bien '
entonces honrar a quien
’ te crio en tantos empenoe,’ ;
. Segismundo; que aun en suenos
. no se pierde el hacer bien, (2143-7)
The amazing irony of Clotaldo’s still claiming a kind of 
paternity over Segismundo is one thing, ..but the bargain he •'< 
strikes vfith Segismundo is;something else: ”1 ’ ve been, good 
to you in life (in.the tower), so you*. should be good : to me A 
in. dreams;, (in the palace).” That means absolutely nothing, 
but Segismundo, too confused to be able to spot the absurdity 
ofbit, thinks it does mean something. Even,more damaging to 
Segismundo’s reasoning potential.are. Clotaldo’s parting ; 
words,: ’!aun en suenos/'no se pierde. el hacer bien.” As .. 
Professor>Wilson 'has suggested, .it is a paradoxical state­
ment in that Clotaldo is suggesting that a rational choice - 
can be. made in a .dreamland dreams are irrational and; uncon­
trollable; for the spectator,, though,, the rub is that real AA 
life, too, can sometimes seem irrational and uncontrollable,' . 
making the problem of how to ’’hacer bien” (which entails;.— ? 
acting in.accordance with reason and,prudence) correspondingly 
acute. ; Within the dramatic context, however, uncritical * 
acceptance by Segismundo of Clotaldo’s proposition would?, A < 
imply a failure‘to understand the function- o f. .free choice in 
the pursuit qf the? good, that is^-a failure to understand ,,A. 
what it means toj’hacer bieh”. ; \ s’:, -.--A^A. .
J ^’’La Vida as Sueno,” in Critical Essays on the Theatre 
of'Calderoni ed. by Bruce Wardropper,- New fork, A1965» 
pp.. 69-89, t. P. ?3. ' '■ -■■■ ■■
Ao wesee, Segismundo does accept the premise 
unquestioningly: "Es verdad; pues reprimamos/ esta,fiera 
condicion (2148-9). His view of his "fiera condicion"
as being the main obstacle to "hacer bien” is certainly 
accurate, but the-"fiera condicion" is not something that 
Segismundo, or any other man, can repress overnight, eepe- 
cially as Segismundo thinks that the real world is an irra­
tional world, </ dream-world - el vivir solo es sonar"
(2154). Segismundo goes on to say, . . .
' . : J • y la experiencia me ensena
quo el hombre que vive suena
5 - lo que es hasta despertar. (2155*7)
The important phrase there, "la experiencia me ensena," 
makes it worth our while recapitulating the experiences. on 
which he is building his Weltanschauung, since we have wit­
nessed, in some detail, the sources of what Segismundo has
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learned, -His experience may be summarised roughly as follows:
1) the experiences and life that he had before his first
, release from the prison; 1 .
2) the experience of his day in the palace'* a fake experience 
arranged by another man, which was, for Segismundo, irra-
. tional and involuntary; ;
3) his fairly successful anarchy and rebellion within 2),
■''above'; •• ''
4) Clotaldo*s so-called education and lectures on morality,
27^ - •. v*. '
and the examples he has been set by Clotaldo and others;
5) the powerful memory Of Rosaura, often regarded by critics /
as an important part of. Segismundo’s realisation of the 
. truth. . ' . • - . . . , . - .. ... ' . . ... -
Of those, no. 3), expressed as, .
Solo a una mujer amaba; ‘
que fue verdad, ereo yo,,. / .
■ en que todo se acabo,
. y esto solo no se acaba (2134-7)
is of particular interest. On one hand, it may be seen as an 
expression of a dawning sensibility in Segismundo (cf. the views 
of Wilson, Whitby, Sloman, Sciacca, etc.); on the other hand, 
we may recall that this "love" of Segismundo’s found its physi­
cal expression in an attempt to force himself upon Rosaura, sup­
ported by an attempt to murder Clotaldo when the latter tried to 
intervene, and that Segismundo was captivated by Rosaura even 
when he thought she was a man. We have here the possibility of 
two widely divergent interpretations, but the words we hear from 
Segismundo do not help us to decide which would be the more 
appropriate - just because Segismundo uses the word "amaba" 
does not make him different from the rest of mankind, most of 
whom are susceptible to the Hermosura which, as in Wo Hay Mas 
Fortuna Que Dios, will become only a skeleton. Furthermore, 
the words do not help Segismundo to distinguish between lust 
and sensibility, and yet he clings to those feelings as being
.... 275 --;,.- 7 .
his most convincing connection iwith reality.
Such is.the experience from which Segismundo, as he .
continues to soliloquise, eventually reaches the conclusion 
that ntoda la vida es sueno,/ y los suenos suenos son” (2186-7). 
His ruminations on life’s being a dream (vv. 2158-77) offer 
thoughts that are false in one sense - that men and their 
circumstances are somehow separate from reality, somehow unreal
, and true in another, the sense that Wilson describes, viz*,
of life as a transient phenomenon, etc. This true sense is,
' L ' • ' \ ‘ ‘ \ ' 10however, really rather banal, a commonplace, as Sloman says,
of both Oriental and Christian philosophy, and would not be
helpful to Segismundo even if he could be said to have realised
it, Calderon seems to point to the banality of Segismundo’s
conclusion by putting such statements in the mouths of, first,
Basilio: . 7 - ' . • - 7
porque en el mundo, Clotaldo,
todos los que viven suenan, (1148-9)
cuanto te ha pasado, .
•./. como fue bien del mundo, fue sonado,
. ■ . ' . . (1722-3)
-and th.n Clarin,
, No acabes de despertar,
. Segismundo, para verte
perder, trocada la suerte, 
slendo tu gloria fingida 
una sombra de la vida
y una llama de la muerte, (2022-27)
Introduction to La Vida es Sueno, p. xi.
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.who is mocked, when he says it, by Clotaldo: . •“ .<
- A quien sabe discurrir . .
asi, es bien que se prevenga
: ; una estancia donde; tenga
harto lugar de argtiir. (2028-51)
But can Segismundo be said to understand even that
truism? He goes on to say,
; To sueno que estoy aqui
deetas prisiones cargado,
: y sone que en otro estado
. mas lisonjero me vi. (2178-81)
Having watched the "otro estado", and watching him now, we 
know that, within the fiction of the play, his conclusions 
are quite untrue: Segismundo (even an actor) lying there in 
chains, saying he is not lying there.in chains, offers a pic­
ture which seems to limit the usefulness of discussing the 
play as a paradigm Of a metaphysical or philosophical system#
. Segismundoconclusions are muddled, but the spec­
tator may see a certain truth - apart from the commonplace - 
behind his confusion, which suggests an ambiguity that may be 
seen in his concluding question and in the answers he supplies:
. cQue ee la vida?. Un frenesl.
; £$ue es la vida? Una iluslon,
■ ; ;. una combra, una ficcion,
y el mayor bien es pequeno. (2182-5) 
•These words are false within the context of Christian belief 
(they are made meaningless by their very vagueness), but true 
in’the case of Segismundo. Life can seem to be an illusion,
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a shadow, a fiction, if one has been subjected to the same 
sort of deceit and maltreatment as has Segismundo. The 
truth one may see, then, is partly, that men can make life 
-confused and; dreamlike for others (as Basilio’ has done for. 
Segismundo), and partly, and more important, that sen may 
reduce life to this level for themselves. by their own delu­
sions; the latter theme is clearly depicted by Calderon
through the careers of virtually every other character in the
11 • • ' - • ' ■ ’'play. The.consequences for liberty of Segismundo’s argu­
ments and conclusions may be inferred, when we remember that 
dreams are irrational and involuntary: to say that life is a 
dream is thus to deny the essence of natural liberty,, which 
is,reason and choice. There is no liberty in a dream.
In Act III these themes are followed to their logi­
cal conclusions (which are not necessarily conclusive).
11 ’ zThat is Wilson’s approach, of course (e.g., op. cit., 
p. 87); however, I would extend it even to the characters 
whom Wilson excepts, vis., Clotaldo, Rosaura, and the even­
tual Segismundo. Clotaldo, a victim of, both his personal and 
his political pasts, is thrown into confusion right at the 
start (cf. 396-8J ”Aun no se determinerme/ si tales sucesos 
son/ ilusiones o verdades.”) and spends most of the play in 
panic and turmoil. Rosaura is in a similar daze from her • 
first appearance, "... sin mas camino/ que el que me dan las 
1eyes del destino,/ ciega y desesperada ...” (11-15), through 
the comedy of her succeeding complaints (such as ”&Que hare 
en tantas confusiones, (etc.J fw. 188^ ff.J ), to the final 
joke of herachieving her ambition only to hear Astolfo reveal 
his contempt for her (vv. 3262-6). Segismundo, meanwhile, is 
still under discussion above. '
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Segismundo, on his release from prison, now has to attempt to
.learn what constitutes a good choice, armed with the knowledge 
and experience we have seen him acquire.
The soldiers tell Segismundo, as they release him,
"La libertad/ te espera" (2504-5). In the context, they mean 
freedom from physical captivity, but there are other implica­
tions, for we know that incarceration deprives Segismundo of
other liberties. The soldiers say they are releasing him 
> • ' ' - ’ ; • • • - ■ . «
because they want to be free from foreign rule (which may or 
may not be true; after the tumult and the shouting, their 
leader asks Segismundo for his reward....) and Segismundo 
eventually accepts this task;
en mi lleyais
quien os libre, osado y diestro, 
de extranjera esclavitud. (2574-6)
Poland’s freedom from foreign rule has been jeopardised because 
the ruler, Basilio, corrupted his own natural liberty, defied 
all precepts of moral law, and thus compromised the liberty 
of his subjects, who had to obey his law; for Segismundo to 
guarantee liberty in the realm, he must show himself cognisant 
of the demands of his own natural liberty, by demonstrating 
his reason and prudence. Not surprisingly, though, Segismundo, 
in his reply to the soldiers, does not display any great 
powers of reason and discrimination. His knowledge is limited, 
his experience minute, and he is not convinced that the
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circumstances are real. He clings to the "lessons’* learned
in the palace and in the tower : "se bien. que la vida es
sueno" (2343); he elects to believe that his experience in
the tower was only an "anuncio" (2356), but it was not, and
it is a non-sequitur to say that
pues que la vida es tan corta, 
sonemos, alma, sonemos
otra vaa, (2358-60)
and meaningless to say,
pero ha de ser
con atencion y consejo
. de que hemos, de despertar 
deste gusto al mejor tiempo; 
que llevandolo sabido, 
sera el desengano menos; 
que es hacer burla del dano 
adelantarle el consejo. (2360-6?)
In a dream, we do not think of waking, nor do we behave with 
"atencion y consejo"; in the context, "es hacer burla del 
dano/ adelantarle el consejo" can be taken to mean only that 
Segismundo should avoid spiked drinks, in which case, the 
consequences of his discovery of this would be interesting.
Segismundo, judging him by normal criteria, is not
reasoning very well, which is partly because he really thinks
he is dreaming, as he reveals at the end of all this cogitation:
Mas, si antes desto despierto,
^no sera bien no decirlo,
supuesto que no he de hacerlo? (2383-5)
1 am emphasising that point in order to make it clear that,
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at this stage within the dramatic fictionSegismundo is not 
using the metaphors about the transience of earthly things - 
to which the vidafeaueno equation is usually seen to refer.
Hence, when Clotaldo arrives a moment later, Segismundo . 
repeats his lesson, the last thing he had learned from his
• teachers- ■ ; . ■ - •. *'<••• ■ - • ' •
Que estoy sonando, y que quiero 
; . obrar bien, pues no se pierde
obrar bien, aun entre suenos. (2399*2401) 
That seems genuinely pathetics Segismundo, like a child, is 
trying to show that he has learned his tables, and, like a 
child, he stamps his foot when Clotaldo refuses to indulge him.
What stops him from winning Clarin*s bet for him? As Wilson
' x ’ ' ' 12 'suggests a propoe of Segismundo’s original "reprimamos", the 
wrong motive: not reason, but fear. One instinct is thus held 
in check only by another, and after packing off Clotaldo to 
see Basilio, Segismundo. repeats the lesson which he seems to 
have learned by rote: ’’Mas, sea verdad o sueno,/ obrar bien 
ss lo que imports” (2423-4). Again, an admirable sentiment; 
but the determination to ’’obrar bien”, when not tempered and 
guided by reason and effected with prudence, can be as dangerous 
as the desire to obrar mal; Basilio, after all, thought he was 
doing the right thing. , . . ,
, There are other points to be made here, though. ,
Op. cit., p. 74. ;
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One is, that Segismundo’s analysis of his situation is as 
rational as can ba expected in the circumstances; anot her, 
that even if ha does restrain himself only through fear1 rathar 
than reason, that does not make him markedly different from 
most of the spectators; another, that this passion of the 
soul does at least exert a rational affect on him - ha treats
1 i
Clotaldo with mercy and magnanimity. But there is< a further 
problem for the spectator: Segismundo tells Clotaldo, "Clotaldo, 
vuestro valor/ os envidio y agradesco" (2^14-5), but how far 
is he right to compliment Clotaldo’s courage? One factor to 
be considered is that Clotaldo is certainly brave in submitting 
to probable death at Segismundo’s hands for the sake of hie 
allegiance to Basilio, but other factors are the tyranny that 
that allegiance entails, and Clotaldo’s own avoidance of per­
sonal decision and responsibility (re. Violante, Rosaura and 
Segismundo in particular), both of which result in Clotaldo’s 
slithering from one mass to another, finding himself at the 
mercy of Clarln (of all people), having to look him up quietly 
and illegally, and so on# There is more than one way of esti­
mating Clotaldo’« valor, and the use of the word demands a
critical reaction, not only here, but also in other scenes 
• 13where it is flung about emotively and equivocally. There
13 Calderon puts us on our guard right at the start, when 
the stock expression, "Mi valor lo dice," is parodied by
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is, though, no hint of any reservation by Segismundo in his 
admiration of Clotaldo's valor, and the impression we are 
given, here, is that Segismundo’s reason is bemused by words * 
a familiar problem, which now and throughout the rest of the 
play becomes important, not so much for the fictional Segis- 
mundo, as for the spectator, who also likes to obrar bien,
and who is made to face the fact that his difficulties are the
same as Segismundo’s. . ,
Thus, when we next see Segismundo, we are again con­
fronted with this problem of trying to exercise our reason, 
effectively enough to make judgements, via the distorting 
medium of language, Segismundo is still ’’vestido de pieles” 
(2655^~)> and Calderon’s attention to this detail again invites 
us to consider its implications. He is still talking as 
before, lost in dreams of infinite ability, restraining him­
self only because of his fear (vv, 2656-71), When Rosaura 
arrives on the scene, we have another opportunity to try to 
assess Segismundo’s percipience, his capacity to choose between
Clarin, who, in a moment of tension, says ’’bien mi temor lo 
dice” (77 ♦ and v. Sloman’s note) - a joke which really condi­
tions the wordr throughout the play. Thus we may raise an 
eyebrow at Clotaldo’s description of Rosaura, ”Mi hijo es, mi 
sangre tiene,/ pues tiene valor tan grande” (455*6), and.we 
may even see comic irony in Roaura’e later affirmation of her 
own ’’valor,” e,g,, when having a tantrum in front of her 
father, (v. 2644), having spoken fulsomely of his ’’valor” at 
the beginning of the quarrel (vv. 2492-2500), unaware that he 
is (to quote her) the "traidor” (v, 2737) who betrayed her 
mother and is still reluctant to admit he is her father, etc.
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./. a real and a false good* Previously, Segismundo’s feelings 
‘ for Hosaura have been shaped by his reaction to her appearance;
now he Is to have the opportunity to judge her real self, as'
she delivers her autobiography at great length, following that
by telling him what he must do, and telling him that she has
come to help him (”vengo a ayudarte ...” £2886J)I Her ’’help”,
as it happens, consists of plunging poor Segismundo deeper
into confusion, principally with the words,
*?: La segunda f/vezQ me admiraste
mujer, cuando fue la pompa
. de tu majestad un sueno,
. una fantasma, una sombfa (2720-23)
- she tells him that his day in the palace was a dream, so 
, that, at the end of her speech, Segismundo is frantically 
., trying to work out what on earth he is to infer from that
(vv. 2922 ff.). His reason is thus further bemused before he 
even begins to grapple with this latest test. Can we, as 
spectators, do any better?
. It is not easy to decide how to regard Roaaura.
She has been called a symbol of honour, reason, prudence etc.;
she has also been called "La reina de los hiperboles” and
•' • , *14 0
//’una hiperbole absurda. ” There are several points in favour
of the former view:
14 • * ' ■ /Augusto Cortina, ProIogo to his edition of La Vida es
Sueno and El Alcalde de Zalamea, ’’Clasicos Castellanos,” 
no. 138, Madrid, 1964, p. xlvi.
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1) she has been betrayed, and is determined to obtain repara­
tions from her betrayer, thus upholding a moral principle 
important to society; / • .
2) her affair with Astolfo could be assumed to be a matri- 
monlo clandestine, as Parker suggests, rather than the usual 
silly, sordid,or sentimental liaison;
3) she i6 always telling us that her honour is the most 
important thing in the world; and
• 4) whatever folly she may have committed is not unknown to
the rest of the human race.
The alternative view, that she is a parody of the dishonoured 
heroine, may be sustained by the tedious platitudes with which 
she regales all around her, her constant attempts to persuade 
other people to extricate her from a situation stemming from 
her own irresponsibility, her intellectual confusion (reflec-
, ted in her sartorial confusion), and so on, Calderon seems 
to suggest Rosaura’s comedy in the scene under discussion,
, . where it is revealed that her ’’problem” is merely a repetition 
of the performance of her mother, of which Rosaura is, fittingly
the result I
But if we cannot decide for certain how to regard 
Rosaura, we are no more clever than Segismundo, who sees only 
the surface appearance and hears only what she tells him, 
which is, that her interests and his are of equal importance ,
y::; ■ •’ ’ ; ^85 *= •• • • • ' 7
(▼▼. 2892*2901), of which he allows himself to be convinced. 
This latter belief is/ nevertheless, the main factor dis*
/suading him from trying io take advantage of Rosaura: "mas 
a un prlncipe le toca/ el dar honor que quitarle" (2987*8). 
Even that questionable analysis of the situation might be 
construed as a victory for reason over instinct, and thus 
the beginnings of a proper use of natural liberty; but we 
are not allowed to assume this, because Segismundo’s restraint 
finally depends, not on the reason and the willi but on re* 
treats "Huyamos de la ocasion,/ qua es muy fuerte," (2992*3), 
and, as he leaves, he is still refusing to look at her, for 
the same reason: ’’que no mire tu hermosura/ quien ha de mirar 
tu honra" (3014-5). > " ' .
As before, the spectator must feel some sympathy t 
for Segismundo. Just as when he faced Clotaldo, he is trying 
to "obrar bien," and achieves a certain negative success in 
that he does not indulge his worst instincts; but even that 
limited success is only a product of his misunderstanding of 
his real situation - he still thinks he is dreaming.
It will be apparent that I see some difficulties in the 
way of accepting the view of those critics who suggest that 
this scene makes Segismundo aware of his true situation, and 
shows Rosaura bringing him to his senses at last, to the 
extent that he is able to overcome his passions. He has, 
after all, done nothing that he did not manage to do in Act I, 
when his impulse to kill Rosaura was overcome; if Rosaura
1 makes him see the truth simply because she appears in both
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The problem of reasont and its role in analysing the situation* 
is suggested in an interesting remark Segismundo makes at the 
turning point of his struggle with his sexual urge: "Mas con 
mis razones propias/ vuelvo a convencerme a mi,” (2967-8), 
Referring to his thoughts as expressed in vv, 2950-2966, it is 
certainly true that the words present a convincing case for 
obeying his instincts; on the; other hand, his reasons for not 
grasping this opportunity are also an example of words con­
fusing the issue. His words lesid us into the same problems 
of irony and imprecision as did his compliments to Clotaldo, 
confusing us with a conflict between general and particular < 
truths. The important general truth is, ”mas a un principe 
le toca/ el dar honor que quitarle” (2987-8), but does the 
particular truth that ’’Rosaura esta sin honor’’ (2986) mean 
that he has to be ”de su honra/ ... conquistador/ antes que
, de mi corona” (2989-9l)» if she threw away her honour of her 
own accord, and if there is nothing Segismundo can do to 
restore it, and if there are things to attend to (such as a
tower and palace, and thus shows both to be real, it is odd 
that the appearances of. both Clotaldo andClarln do not pro- 
duoe the same effect; if Rosaura is some kind of allegorical 
representative of reason and enlightenment (cfe.g.,
Cesareo Bandera, wla rason ... estarla representada por 
Rosaura, el jinete del hipogrifo,” on p. 81 of ”E1 itinerario
. de Segismundo en La Vida es Sueno.” Hispanic Review, XXXV,
1967# PP* 69-84), it is odd that Segismundo should deny 
himself Rosaura at the end of the play; and so on.
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civil war) that are more important than her ambivalent honour? 
Segismundo’s conclusion is no less a result of the persuasive 
vagueness of words than was his previous attitude, "sonemoe 
dichas ahora," (2965)* Indeed, the comment, "Mas con mis 
razones propias/ vuelvo a convencerme a ml" could refer either 
to his first attitude ("sonemos dichas ...’*) or to his second 
attitude ("que de su honra/ he de ser conquistador/ antes que 
de mi corona"), or to both ("vuelvo a convencerme a mi ...•*, 
with emphasis on the "vuelvo a Our attention, at any
rate, is drawn to the distorting ambiguity of words, words 
which can condition the reason, and to Segismundo’s, and our 
own, susceptibility to this. All that is in our minds as the 
.play approaches its climax. • . . ..
The tenor of the closing scenes is mooted by
Basilio’s dictum uttered as he flees the field of battle:
En batallas tales .
los que vencen son leales,
los vencidos los traidores Qo65~7)
- Calderon’s equivalent of Sir John Harington’s "Treason doth 
never thrive; for if it prosper, none dare call it.treason."
■ In the bitterness of defeat, Basilio points out a truth which 
the spectator’s knowledge or experience will surely confirm.
, But it is more than just a mere historical or political fact: 
the dictum calls into question once more the usefulness of 
words themselves. Confining ourselves to the political context,
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it indicates that the meanings of words, the value© they 
represent, and the decisions which depend on them, are subser­
vient to the exigencies of political expediency. Basilio’s 
very next words offer an instance of the confusion, which 
arises from such distortion: • . . •
. , . Huyambs, Clotaldo, pues, .
, . • del crUel, del inhumano
■ •. ' rigor de, un hi jo tirano. . (3068-70). .
The audience knows that if Segismundo is cruel, inhuman and - 
tyrannical, it is because his father was cruel, inhuman and 
tyrannical, and that if Basilio is fleeing from Segiemundo, 
he is fleeing from the consequences of his own behaviour,: ’
from his own responsibilities.
The ambiguities suggested by the co-existence of 
both approbatory and censorious views of Segismundo and other 
characters, a difficulty to which I have tried to draw atten­
tion, finally become overwhelming in the last scene of the 
play. It is preceded by Segismundo’s X-could-have-told-you- 
so speech (313S-32A-7) in which he establishes himself as a 
rightful successor to Basilio by displaying the same kind1 of 
language and thought as did Basilio at the beginning: we have
16 ' - ' •T. E. May’s article, ’’Segismundo y el soldado rebelde,” 
analyses important aspects of this difficulty; I concur with 
virtually everything said in that article, and will note 
specific points of agreement where they arise. ,
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the same paradoxes (chatter about horoscopes), the same 
. vocabulary, the same quick and easy aphorisms on life, the
same style, the same basis of amor propio - and even a cer­
tain element of reason. Segismundo keeps telling us that he 
is " un bruto, una fiera humana” (3175), ar*d the human part 
of him seems to be rather as we might have anticipated from 
what we have seen him learn from other human beings. When 
he expresses his good intentions, therefore - Hhoy ha de ser
la mas alta ^Victoria]/ vencerme a mi," (3257~8) 
to be prepared to consider both the decisions he 
their effects, as he sets about re-imposing some 
order on the chaos left behind by Basilio's good
Before considering those decisions, I would like
Segismundo’s closing speech, to try to ascertain
- we have
makes and
kind of
intentions.
to examine
as much as
possible about the state of the mind that is making the 
decisions, and in particular to see how far he has attained 
the liberty which io often ascribed to him,
/ When Segismundo tells us,
... fue mi maestro un sueno,
y estoy temiendo en mis\ansias- 
que he de despertar y hallarme, 
otra vea en mi cerrada
prieion, (3306-10)
he tells us two things; 1) that he has been conditioned by 
that which is irrational and involuntary - "si fue mi maestro 
un suenoh - and, 2) that he is now motivated by an instinct,
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a passion of the soul - Mestoy temiendo ♦ ’ Heasoh, choice,
and the subjugation of the instincts, those vital facets of
natural liberty, are all, by hia own admission, out of Segis-
' ■ 17 . '' . "•
mundo’s reach. Those few words thus constitute a complete
negation of his own liberty, and when he goes on, .
T cuando no sea,
. el sonarlo solo basta;
pues asi llegue a saber 
que toda la dicha human*,
. en fin, pasa como un sueno, (3310-14)
he is telling us that the dream has taught him that all human
happiness is subject to the same choice-denying pressures*
The implications of that are, that all men lack the natural
liberty he denies himself, and that he cannot distinguish a
real dicha from an illusory dicha, the latter being, again,
the only possibility for all men* The final lines,
; I quiero hoy aprovecharla
el tiempo que me durare, 
pidiendo de nuestras faltas 
perdon, pues de pechos nobles 
es tan propio el perdonarlas, (3315-9)
tell us that he is attracted by the illusory dicha, the hap­
piness which passes as a dream, and is going to get as much 
of it as he can; such a clear predilection for earthly goods 
constitutes another denial of liberty, since, through his
^cf. T. E. May, referring to vv. 3305-10; *’No es asi 
que habia el juea seguro y sereno. El temor no tiene pecho
. noble, y es a veces mal consejero," op. cit., p. ?4.
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natural liberty, man is not chained to particular earthly 
goods (because he possesses a soul which aspires to divine 
goods).
All the while, as he is talking, Segismundo is, 
still, dressed in skins, and, just as before, the picture he 
presents depicts the implications of his words and behaviour.
It is difficult to see how Segismundo can be said to have 
acquired the only kinds of liberty which matter, viz., the 
natural liberty which makes possible the hope of moral liberty, 
and which offers the means whereby to attain it# As I remarked 
above, none of this is surprising in view of his education and 
experience, but it does have an effect on the spectator who 
ponders the problems posed by Segismundo’s decisions, at which 
I now propose to look, for the spectator has to judge Segis- 
mundo’s actions, just as Segismundo has to judge others’
actions.
Rosaura is to marry Astolfo, Estrella is to marry 
Segismundo; Basilio having been forgiven already, Clotaldo is 
now forgiven too; the rebel soldier is condemned; Segismundo 
swekrs he has learned his lesson and realised that life’s 
pleasures are transient. As the traditional view of the play 
maintains, those judgements can be regarded as explicable, on 
their respective grounds of honour, the enforcement of pro­
mises, the payment of debts, duty to parents, magnanimity to
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enemies, ejemplariedad, and so on. On the other hand, as
• 7 ’ ’• - . . ‘ 7" ‘18 . 7. ' .
H. B. Ball began to point out, we can regard those same 
judgements with a certain scepticism, and feel that,,even if
Segismundo’s decisions are meant to impose a moral order, they’
’ ' ■ ' ’’ • 19 " • ' • • • ' ' ■, are, as T. E. May indicates, scarcely prudent, , scarcely 
indicative of the kind of practical political sense a ruler 
ought to apply for the greater common good. It would be 
useful to elaborate this alternative view.
. ; Immediately noticeable is that the betrothed parties
have recently been on.opposite sides in the civil war; Rosaura
7 aligned herself with Segismundo, while: Astolfo and Estrella
supported Basilio. Furthermore, the arrangement forces
Astolfo to blurt out, in front of Rosaura, that .
. ella no sabe quien es;
. ; , y es bajesa yes infamia
casarme yo con mujer... (3264-6)
- he had never had, it seems, the slightest intention of marry­
ing her, as she is of inferior status. Rosaura’s reaction to 
this information (she had recently been planning to kill . .
Astolfo) is left to the imagination of producer and actress, 
as are her feelings when Clotaldo admits that he is her. father,
. i.e., the ’’traidor” she referred to just before the battle
; (2737)- It is in these circumstances that Astolfo agrees to
op. cit.
- 7,;- :. 19 7 . - • 7 • 7 • • • • 7- '' * .•
• ’ - op. cit.-. - . ' . 7 • • • . . ' '
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keep his word, (vv. 3277*8)• Segismundo then foists himself 
upon Estrella, his reason being
porque Estrella
; no quede desconsolada, ’
viendo que principe pierde 
de tanto valor y fama (3278-81)
* whether Estrella ever thought of Astolfo in those terms is 
questionable, but anyway, all she now gets is a substitute 
for him. Clotaldo receives an accolade for his loyal service 
to Basilio (vv. 3288-91), the nature of which we have had the 
opportunity of observing all through the play, perhaps with 
the feeling that not only is his service grossly inefficient, 
but that loyalty to tyranny is not the most desirable quality 
in a public servant.
We might reflect on Segismundo’s priorities: since 
his second release from the tower, he has tended to regard 
the conventions of courtly love as being of greater moment 
than affairs of state (cf,, e.g., “que de su honra/ he de ser 
conquistador/ antes que de mi corona.1’), and, accordingly, 
the first acts of his reign are the arranging of marriages. 
Bow, at last, he turns his attention to an affair of state:
' 20 ■ - ■ ■ • ’ " •In an interesting article, “El conflicto de Clotaldo: 
version psicologica,” La Torre, Ano XVII, Bum. 63, July- 
Sep, 1969, pp. 69*83, Eugenio Suares-Qalban has this to say 
about Clotaldo: “Esa lealtad al rey en la que otros han 
visto idealismo y fuerza de caracter resulta ser, pues, el 
escudo de un caracter debil,” p. 82.
29^
the rebel leader who released him asks the obvious question,
Si asi a quien no te ha servido 
honras, ^a ml, que fui causa 
del alboroto del reino, 
y de la torre en que estabas 
te saque,; que: me daras? (3292*96)
Segismundo unhesitatingly condemns him to life imprisonment:
"que el traidor no es menester,/ siendo la traicion pasada.’’ 
(3300*01) * a traitor is a traitor and therefore bad (even if 
he did "betray** tyranny ♦.♦). But Segismundo has just rein­
stated Clotaldo, who, as Segismundo knows, is as much, if not 
more of, a traitor than the soldier, Segismundo himself having 
told Clotaldo as much in Act XI: "Traidor fuiste con la ley ..." 
(13O5)i "... vil, infame* y traidor,/ .../ £como a tu patria 
le has hecho/ tai traicion?" (1295*1301)- .Worse (in Segis­
mundo’s eyes), Clotaldo is. also a traitor in matters which 
Segismundo considers more important than affairs of state, 
viz., courtly romance - Segismundo knows that Clotaldo bet­
rayed Violante; and, if he isgoing to play with the term 
"traicion" in the way that he'does with the soldier, what 
about Basilio’s betrayal of divine and natural law, eventually 
supported by Astolfo, Estrella and Clotaldo? Even more to
the point, if the soldier is a traitor, what does that make 
21Segismundo?
‘ - - ..21 cf. T. E. May; "Si el soldado fue traidor contra un rey 
legitime, tambien lo fue Segismundo; y el mismo reconoce su
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From this alternative angle, then,;Segismundo’s 
reign begins with his forgiving a tyrant (Basilio), pardoning 
a traitor (Clotaldo), pandering to a silly girl (Rosaura), 
overlooking the attempts of foreign pretenders (Astolfo and 
Estrella) to claim the throne, and punishing a soldier, who 
fought for the liberty of his country and for divine and 
natural laws of primogeniture, by locking him in the same 
tower to which he (Segismundo) was condemned for life. We 
have just witnessed the strife which ensued once it was dis­
covered that Segismundo was living in the tower; what will 
happen now that the tower is occupied by one of the winners 
of the war? Or, to take T. E. May’s view of the situation,
"Con tai principe, £qulen puede estar seguro?"
So, there are at least two sides to the final situa­
tion/. Is Segismundo a King or is he a Tyrant? On the one 
hand, he says he ie determined to "obrar bien"; but, as we 
see in the play (if we did not. know it already), that admirable 
objective can have consequences as catastrophic as any refusal 
to do so, whether on the grand scale (represented by Basilio), , 
or on the level of the individual (represented by the Criado 
Segundo)♦ On the other hand, the horoscope cast by Basilio
culpabilidad al final de su famoso discurso critico sobre los \ 
errores de su padre." op. cit., p. 73
22op. cit., p. 7*-
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23has, as Dunn points out, been fulfilled to the letter: 
Segismundo ought therefore to be a tyrant - if we believe 
that the horoscope is to be regarded as an astrological truth
We are offered judgements on Segismundo by other
characters in the play:
BASILIO. Tu ingenio a todos admira.
ASTOLFO. *Que condicion tan mudadal
ROSAURA. »Que discrete y que prudentei (3302-4)
But how much weight can we give to these assessments? We 
have heard the Word ingenio invoked more than once in the 
play: Basilio bragged about his own "ingenio" when he was 
explaining hie scheme in Act X (v. 645)» while Rosaura, too, 
likes to think of herself as. exercising "ingenio" (vv. 1959t 
2863). What about Astolfo’s tribute to Segismundo’s "condi­
cion tan mudada"? Astolfo (the play’s model of vacillation 
and inconstancy) is amazed by Segismundo’s transition from 
savage (dressed as prince) to prince (dressed as savage), 
while Segismundo, thus clad in skins, looks to us exactly as
•he did at the beginning. Rosaura compliments Segismundo’s 
discretion and prudence, but (to quote T. E. Kay again), 
"£tiene Rosaura autoridad para hacernos desatender conclu­
sions s tan evident es? Rosaura es mas apasionada e impulsive
■ ■ . 24
que prudehte; le falta la flexibilidad del politico."
2^op. cit., p. 194. .
2\>p. cit ♦, p. ?4.
< • ' . ,• - 297 - ■ • •" ; ' .
Prudence, anyway, is another of those concepts (like valor) 
of which we hear a lot but see, in, the play, little practical 
evidence: for example, Clotaldo and Astolfo both agreed, when 
the battle was lost a short while earlier, that it was prudent 
for Basilio to continue to flee his responsibilities (vv. 
3116-25), and Basilio himself had demanded prudence of Segis­
mundo (vv* 608-9) when he had made it utterly impossible for 
the latter to have taken even the first step towards the acqui­
sition of it. ‘
. . Far from elucidating the appropriate nature of our
judgement on Segismundo, these comments from Basilio, Astolfo 
and Rosaura do, if anything, confuse the issue still further, 
precisely because there could be some justification for their
views: ingenio, for example, may, after all, be regarded as
• . ' ■ 25 • ‘ . '• '• ■'a part of prudence, although it would be damning with faint 
praise if it were meant as such; Segismundo could be seen to 
have changed in some respects (fear now restrains him, whereas 
in the first day in the palace it did not); and, most interest­
ing of all, he could be said to show a certain degree of ' . '
cf. Juan Luis Vires, who divided prudentia into a com­
bination of ingenium, meaoria, judicium and usus rerum 
(referred to by E. C. Riley, in Cervantes* Theory of the Novel 
^Oxford, 19643, pp. 58-9); hence my suggestion of damning 
with faint praise: Basilio, who.had once hoped for prudentia 
from Segismundo, now sees only ingenium, nothing of memoria, 
iudicium or usus rerum.
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discretion and prudence* If those conditions are acceptable, 
then the range of possible attitudes to his behaviour becomes 
even wider; I want to consider all these alternatives.
It seems,- from what was said earlier,, that Segismundo 
could be regarded either as a King or as a Tyrant, i.e., that 
the final judgements he makes could be seen as either rational 
or irrational. They may be seen as rational on the grounds, 
adduced by those who see in them a restoration of order, that 
moral law demands that promises be fulfilled, that civil dis­
ruption be punished, that enemies be. treated with magnanimity, 
etc. Looking at the events in that way, we may feel that 
Segismundo is indeed setting about the business of restoring 
some semblance of morality to the mess in which he finds the 
social and political affairs of the country, and his decisions 
could certainly be defended on those grounds. They may, 
however, be seen as entirely irrational, for the reasons 
suggested above, viz., that Basilio and Clotaldo were traitors, 
and that, if the soldier was a traitor, so too is Segismundo; 
this irrationality may be implicit in the phrase Segismundo
: uses to justify his imprisonment of the soldier, for while ‘ 
Hel traidor no es menester,/ siendo la traicion pasada" sounds 
like a reasonable principle in the abstract, as a general 
^ruth,in the particular it can be nothing more than a clever 
little aphorism designed to whitewash the expediency of a
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, tyrant. Tyrants are, we must agree, adapt at finding,general 
,, truths to, cloak particular injustices, although, in this case,
that would imply a conscious cunning on Segismundo*s part, ; 
which we might prefer' to discount on the assumption that it
1 is yet another of the cliches Segismundo learned from Clotaldo, 
and by which he himself is convinced;; alternatively, we might 
feel that there is a conscious cunning involved, reflected in 
Segismundo*s conciliatory attitude towards Clotaldo: what more
/sensible for a tyrant to do* than select ministers whom he ; 
knows to be loyal to tyranny? ; ./
: ; Thio last point, about Segismundo’s conscious cunning,
leads us to the extra difficulties I mentioned, which arise 
if there is any truth at all in the three apparently satisfied 
judgements we hear in vv. 3302-4, for there exists the posslbi-
.lity that Segismundo’s actions should be construed as prudent 
in that they avoid a greater evil, by giving clear warning that 
he will not tolerate further social and political disorder; 
however, if that desired effect is not achieved, and further 
unrest follows from his decisions, said decisions will have 
been proved imprudent. The problem is, that although the 
rational course and the prudent course ought to converge, it 
can be seen that they are not necessarily compatible* So 
Segismundo’s arrangements may be seen as either a) rational, 
in that he restores a moral order, or b) irrational, in that
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he ignores the morel ramifications of his decisions and is 
confused by catchphrases, or c) rational but imprudent,.in 
that he tries to restore a moral order but only succeeds in 
causing further chaos, or d) irrational but prudent, in that 
he temporarily sets morality aside in order to bring about a 
more lasting stability (strictly speaking, a false prudence, 
but resorting to fine distinctions does not dispose of the 
problem). Is Segismundo a clever King, a stupid Tyrant, a 
stupid King, or a clever Tyrant, respectively? ’
For the spectator, the difficulty is hot in trying 
to work out what will happen to non-existent dramatic charac­
ters; the spectator’s difficulty consists in the very fact, 
that Segismundo’s decisions can be:interpreted in so many dif­
ferent ways, and that the same words convey all the various 
possibilities. That has important implications:for the liberty 
of the spectator,; An underlying irony, apparent throughout the 
play, is that Calderon’s use of the theme of astrology offers 
the spectator the opportunity of choosing between regarding 
the plot as a lesson in human responsibility, and regarding 
it as illustrative of the power of forces beyond man’s control 
(In this case, the stars). If; he chooses to accept the 
influence of the stars, then of course he necessarily renounces 
his liberty. If he sees the events depicted as consequences 
of human decision and behaviour, then.he will realise that,
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in the last scene especially^ he is being invited to use his 
reason and choice, i.e., to exercise his natural liberty; at 
that point he finds that he cannot do so with any hope of a 
definite conclusion. By virtue of our possession of reason 
and choice, we pride ourselves on being superior to the beasts,
. but we are here forced to admit that, in practise, this 
natural liberty can become obscured; meanwhile, Segismundo, 
the man whose decisions we cannot analyse conclusively, is 
dressed as a beast, and admitting that he is governed by a 
dream and a passion. The joke, it seems, is on us. -
: In sum, discussion of the theme of liberty as ref­
lected in this play must, in my judgement, take account of
• several interrelated’fac tors.; One, that Segismundo ’s reason, 
on which his natural liberty depends, has not been trained or 
enlightened*to the degree necessary to make rational or prudent 
judgements about what is to-be done, but bears all the marks 
of retardation that, from our knowledge:of his background, we 
would expect. Two, that the law, which should offer guidance 
'in matters where his own reasohis inadequate (just as it 
should for other men, few of whom can claim perfectly-developed 
reasoning facilities), is, in Segismundo’s case, an instrument 
of tyranny, a perversion; voluntary submission to Basilio’s 
law would imply no liberty for Segismundo. Three, that he is 
largely dominated by his instincts - for worse in Acts I and
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II, for better in Act III - and for much of the play is 
conditioned by a belief that life is a dream and thus irra­
tional and inconsequential. Four, that as a result of all 
that, his ability to discriminate between a real good and a ; .
false, good is very limited, so that his natural liberty is 
as circumscribed in its application as it is in its develop- ", 
ment. Finally, along with these fictional difficulties, real 
difficulties of judgement are being presented to the spectator, 
via the ironies and ambiguities of Calderon’s mise-en-sc^ne, 
which force him to. .admit, a) that his reason is fallible, and, ’ 
because of the inadequacy of language, potentially misleading, 
even to the point of seeming to justify behaviour that is 
essentially passionate; b) that human law, while not neces­
sarily as tyrannical as Basillo’s, is nonetheless imperfect, 
and is obeyed as much through fear as through love of reason; . 
and c) that he has the same difficulties in controlling his - 
instincts and distinguishing true from false goods as does 
Segismundo* If Segismundo is to be seen, as he sometimes is, 
as a representative of all men, those problems would appear 
to comprise one aspect of the complete picture.
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Chapter V
Cervantes1 IA I LU STRE FREQ ONA
Discussing Cervantes♦ La Ilustre Fregona, Professor
A. A. Parker remarks:. it seems certain that the attrac­
tion of freedom,*, of an unrestrained and anarchical existence,
could in real life outweigh the comforts of a settled domestic 
1existence!’ and then, a little later, ,
None the less, to explain the picaresque novel 
as arising solely from nostalgia for social freedom 
seems to me ultimately misguided because it dis­
regards the context in which the theme of freedom - 
invariably ocours in the literature of the period: 
the context is not that of approval, but of condem­
nation. All the praises of freedom referred to 
above ... are ironical. The Spaniards of 1600 knew 
very clearly how attractive an<Ianarchical freedom 
can appear to be to the young, but they also knew, 
even more clearly, the difference between the res­
ponsible freedom that chooses discipline and the 
license that rejects it* For every instance in 
which the theme of freedom appears in the Spanish 
literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies as praise of the natural life, there are 
ninety-nine in which it appears as a question of 
moral discipline.2
As must be clear from the evidence adduced in this
thesis, Professor Parker’s assessment of the official
Literature and the Delinquent, Edinburgh, 196 7, P* 16.
^op. cit., pp. 18-19*
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e.T«nt..nth-c.ntury Spanish attitude to liberty, and its 
difference from license, is entirely accurate* In this 
chapter I propose to begin by demonstrating the way in which 
this assessment is apparent within the novels ejemplar he 
mentions, La Ilustre Fregona; I will then go on to examine 
the way in which Cervantes sets the logic of the theory 
against the vagaries of practise, and to attempt thereby to 
cast some light on the story, hot just as an exemplification 
of the morality involved, but as an insight into the difficul­
ties and apparent ambiguities of that morality; finally, to 
support Ay view of La Ilustre Fregona, I propose to offer a 
brief study of some associated problems as they appear in 
Rinconete y Cortadillo
1. La Ilustre Fregona*
Cervantes begins the tale of La Ilustre Fregona with 
a brief description of the picaresque life in general, and the 
tunnerles at Zahara in particular. We are told that Carriazo,
**• * 3 -•■Lest my omission of any reference to them should arouse 
comment, there are two books I ought to mention here, viz.
Sentido y Forma de las Wovelas Ejemplares, by Joaquin Casalduero, 
(Buenos Aires, 19^)> and Cervantes y la Libertad, by Luis 
Rosales, (Madrid, 19^0). The former I do not find very useful; 
as for the latter, its content has no discernible bearing on 
the problems under discussion here, but disposes of the premises 
established in this thesis in Its very first chapter by way of 
a distinction between libertad and libre albedrio which is, in 
my judgement, without foundation. ,
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running away from home to become a tramp and a trickster, was
”tan content© de la vida, libre” that he did not mind its
discomforts; we are also told something of the nature of this
”vida libre,” and its moral characteristics are clearly stated;
iAllx, alii, que esta en su centro el trabajo junto 
con la poltronerial Alii esta la suciedad limpia, 
la gordura rolliza, la hambre prompts, la hartura .
. abundante, sin disfraz el vicio, el juego siempre, 
las pendencies, por momentos, las muertes por puntos, 
las pullas a cade paso, Ids bailee como en bodes, , 
las seguidillas,como enestampa, los romances con 
estribos, la poesia sin aciones. Aqul ee canta, alii 
se reniega, aculla se rine, aca se juega, y por todo 
se hurts. . , . (pp. 225-6)
Fun and games go hand in hand with theft and murder. The . 
freedom of the ”vida libre” io, as Parker says, the freedom 
from, or abdication of, social and moral duties, responsibility 
and discipline; it is the freedom to follow desires and 
impulses with no thought of consequences, so that, insofar as 
it is Submission to instinct rather than reason, it is not 
liberty at all (either natural or, still less^ moral), but a 
denial of it. When Cervantes goes on to say ”Alli campea la
libertad y luce el trabajo” (p. 226), he is being pointedly 
ambiguous: trabajo usually means ”work”, but the appropriate
Kovelas Ejemplares, ed> Marin, Madrid 19^2 (Clasieos • 
Castellanos),7Vol. 1, p. 222. All subsequent references in 
this chapter, including both La Ilustre Fregona and Rinconete 
yCortadillo, are to this edition.
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meaning here is the germania, "theft”while libertad, which 
ought to imply responsibility and discipline, here refers - as 
it often does - only to license and anarchy.
The illusory nature of the latter freedom is pointed 
out in.the following paragraph: "... toda esta dulzura que he 
pintado tiene unamargo acibar que la amarga," (p. £27). The 
bitter pill is the prospect of being captured and enslaved by 
Moorish raiders, a prospect which ruins everybody’s sleep.
In the midst of "liberty", then, there is the permanent threat 
of slavery -not just a peripheral menace like fire or pesti­
lence, but a danger which causes everyone to "no poder dormir 
sueno seguro sin el temor de que en un instante los trasladan 
de Zahara a Berberla", and necessitating the posting of guards 
who cannot, however, guarantee the safety of the sleepers.
The word "temor" takes us to the core of the state of natural
liberty: subjection to an instinct such as fear constitutes 
the destruction of human liberty, as I have had occasion to 
point out in previous chapters. Given the nature of the pica­
resque life, one can begin to appreciate the truism that the 
life of a slave could be more free than the life of a plcaro,
5Cf. "trabajarshurtar", in Juan Hidalgo’s Bocabulario 
de Germania, on p. 517 of Origenes de la Lengua Espanola, 
compuestos por varios autores, recogidos por Don Gregorio 
Mayans i Siscar, Tomo 1, Madrid, 1757*
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for a slave may still retain his natural liberty, that is, 
the power to choose the good in obeying the reason rather 
than the instincts, while a plcaro renounces this power.
Carriazo’s avoidance of reason and obedience, and
his subservience to instinct, is apparent all through the
story, and is, visibly, directly connected to the life he
led in the tunnerles, and to his predilection for that life.
He does not have the excuse of not knowing where the rational
choice lies, nor of being unable to exercise it, for he was
well brought up, apparently, and we are told that
... con serie anejo a este genero de vida la miseria 
y estrecheza, mostraba Carriazo ser un principe en 
sus cosas: a tiro de escopeta, en mil senales, 
descubria ser bien nacido, porque era generoso y 
bien partido con sus camaradag. (pp,22j5~4)
Even allowing for the irony underlying this and similar com* 
plimentary descriptions of Carriazo, the point is made that 
Carriazo is aware of proper (rational) standards, but, like 
many of us, succumbs to instinct when to do so appears attrac­
tive, Cervantes, via this comic irony I mentioned, draws 
attention to that in the lines which follow:
Visitaba pocas veces las ermitas de Baco, y aunque 
bebla vino, era tan poco, que nunca pudo entrar en 
el numero de los que Hainan desgraciados, que con 
alguna cosa que beban demasiada, luego se les pone 
el rostro como si se le hubiesen jalbegado con ber- 
mellon y almagre (p. 224)
- he did not drink a lot, at least, not enough to get a
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"boozer's nose"i . This juxtaposition of the demands of the 
reason with those of the instincts, and Carriazo's rejection 
of the former, reappears in various guises throughout the 
story - for example, in the letter sent by Carriazo and 
Avendano to their parents, (pp. 23^-5)s the lies they tell 
suggest what they might reasonably do, fight for God and 
King in Flanders, but, instead, they head for the godless 
anarchy of "gangland".
In the background of the story there is a constant 
illustration of the incompatible juxtaposition of the rational 
and irrational aspects of Carriazo's life. Carriazo is always 
half-way between two worlds: he wants to be a tramp, and so 
he dresses and behaves like one, but cannot slough off certain 
vestiges of his nobility -accent, bearing, lip-service to 
certain principles, and the other things which make him seem 
a "principe en sus cosas” - so that in the end he is recog­
nisable as neither, but is only a rather hapless fake. When
. he and Avendano arrive at the Posada del.Sevillano, where 
they want to see Costanza, "... no se atrevieron a pedirla 
alii, porque su traje no lo pedla".(p, 2^0). The double use 
of pedir draws the reader's attention to the anomaly: although
. they are young nobles, and would have no difficulty in getting 
accommodation if they appeared as such, they do not appear as 
such, and the immediate result is Carriazo's exasperation,
because Avehdano is willing.to hang about hoping to catch 
a glimpse of the girl* When they finally take a room at the 
Posada, they are given one ***.. que .no era de caballeros,ni 
de criados" (p- 243)$ although they claimed to be the latter 
and are in. reality the former, A pointed joke is that it is 
La ArgUello who gives them these rooms, and that she and La 
Gallega, both of them.sluttish maids whom Carriazo understand 
ably finds repulsive, have no faith in the veracity of the 
boys, and warn the innkeeper that the latter will not stay 
a minute longer than they want (pp* 234-3)$‘which, as the 
reader knows, is quite correct, . . <
The essential dishonesty of Carriazo*s situation Is 
that he is playing** He hasvmoney behind him, and one cannot 
be, a* genuine picaro if one has wealth to fall back on; that 
Carriazo does not < use hie own money,/but makes his ^livingr;.; 
in the manner of a picaro, with all its discomforts, cannot
- alter the fact that-his life does not depend on his success 
as a picaro, as it does for any genuine picaro (in the latter* 
eyes,, at least). The silly-point about it ,is that-any real 
picaro (such as the Buscon) would give his eye-teeth to be 
like the real Carriazo. We may say, therefore, that the 
liberty Carriazo seeks and enjoys is doubly false: in the 
first place, it is an illusory liberty, and in the second, 
his relationship with it cannot be genuine*
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;-..?•/' The falsity of Carriazo*s behaviour thus matches 
the falsity of the liberty he seeks, and the latter may be 
seen more clearly when we examine this liberty in the context 
of justice. The kind of justice which apparently prevails in 
Sevilla is discussed by the two taozoa de mulas at the“gate of 
Illeocae (pp. 226~7): it is the?callous and arbitrary justice .. 
of the Killtary Governor,A the Conde de punonrostro, who will 
transgress any civil law which gets in the way of his deter­
mination to hang people, claiming militaryjurisdiction over 
them, without giving*them the right of appeal. If the law . :
is being twisted in this'way - and the similarities with the 
situation in Calderon*s £1 Alcalde de Zalamea should be 
obvious?- it is not very useful to maintain that obedience to 
it comprises the Operation of natural liberty (there are quali­
fications of that which will be mentioned later).? However, if 
the,civil law is a threat to liberty, much more so is the 
"justice" of the: society in which Carriazo moves. When 
Carriazo is beaten up by his fellow water-carriers, it is an 
incident of mob violence which is scarcely justified by 
Carriazo1s assault on the "aguador ahtiguo." There is a cry 
of "iJusticia, justicia I i^ue este aguador ha. muerto a un 
hombret" (p. 2^7)» but the old man is not dead, and mob -
justice - by definition - does not include such elementary 
processes as finding witnesses or hearing the defence of the
accused, who was, to some extent, provoked, <
: later, when- Carriazo again offend© the sensibilities
of the vulgo and the underworld,, in the episode of the ass’s .
tail (pp. 290 ff.), there is a parody of a trial, in which the
jurists analyse the situation:
... hubo letrados que fueron de parecer que ho tenia 
razon en lo que pedia ... (p, 290)
while Carriazo cites precedents for his defence:
... replico Lope que los carneros de Berberla ordi- 
nariamente tienen cinco cuartos, y que el quinto 
es de la cola, y cuando los tales carneros se 
cuartean, tanto vale la cola como cualquier cuarto
.. . . (p. 29D
and rebuts the charges against him with some neat legalistic
phraseology: , . . ■ , ■ .
... y que a lo de ir la cola junto con la res que 
se vende.viva y no se cuartea, que lo concedia; 
pero que la ouya no fue vend!da, sino jugada, y 
que nunca su intenoion fue jugar la cola, y que 
al punto se lo volviesen luego con todo lo a ella 
anejo y concerniente, que era desde la punta del
, cerebro, con toda la osamenta del eapinazo, donde 
ella tomaba principio y descendia, hasta parar en 
los ultimos pelos della. (p, 291)
It is, of course,, ludicrousi and Carriazo has to support his
’’arguments0 with the point of a knife: ... . .
... voleo alii el capelo y empuno un puna 1 que 
debajo del capotillo traia, y pusose en tai poetura, 
que infundio temor y respect© en toda aquella agua~ 7 
dora compania. (p, 292)
Finally, a ’’judge” intervenes and arranges a compromise: 
Finalmente, uno dellos, que parecia de mas razon
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y diecurso, los concerto en que ee echase la cola 
contra uh cuarto del asno a:una qulnola, o a doe 
y paeante. ' , . (pp, 292-5)
The result is that Carriazo regains the advantage financially,
makes/restitution, and - Cervantes’ final detail of the legal
processes he is satirising - pays off the assembled jury and
witnesses: ' •• ■ • • . . • . • ,
le levant6 y le volvio todo el dinero que le 
habia ganado, y los dies y seis ducados del asno, 
y aun de los que el tenia repartio con los circun- 
stanies.... (p* 295)
Afterwards, deed, trial, and outcome are made public, and the 
vulgo forms its opinions*
Such is the nature of picaresque justice, of which 
picaresque liberty is a complement. It depends upon the turn 
of a word or phrase (’’solamente habia jugado los cuatro cuartos 
del asno,” etc.), the point of a knife, or the instincts of 
the mob. Obviously, obedience to that kind of law bears no 
resemblance to the submission to reason which real liberty 
requires. That is easy to say on a theoretical plane, but, 
with the Conde de Punonrostro in mind, the reader may well 
feel that this picaresque justice is not entirely different 
from the kind of justice dispensed in a real court of law; he 
might also notice that amongst the roughnecks there is, at 
least, a desire to punish the guilty, whereas, on the two * 
occasions when Carriazo is in the hands of official civil
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justice, money and influence secure his release.
For the moment, however, I am concerned with the
formal morality of the story, to see what the consequences are
of choosing the illusory liberty of the picaresque life.
Since Carriazo had left home ”... sin forzarle a ello algun
mal tratamiento que sus padres le hiciesen” (p. 221), and
apparently had not sent word home for three years, he has to
make great efforts to present himself to his family as 
• •« •/ ’ . ’ . > . . • *
“honrado y contento” (p. 228), and to tell them “mil magnlfi- 
oas y luengas mentiras”.(p. 229) to account for his lengthy 
absence. Cervantes seams to throw all that into comic relief 
at the end of the story, when Carriazo’s father, finding the 
scruffy and bloodied Carriazo at the Posada, asks in exaspera­
tion, ”^,Aun no se te han olvidado tus picardxas?” (p. 319), 
from which we may perhaps infer that Carriazo’s father had 
always had a shrewd idea of the activities which Carriazo goes . 
to such lengths to conceal; in view of Carriazo Senior’s own 
past, that, would not be hard to believe.
For Carriazo, anyway, those filial lies and deceits* * V ■
are the beginning of the process of his subjection to the 
consequences of his picaresque “liberty”: having succumbed to 
instinct in the first place, in going to the tunneries “solo 
por su gusto y antojo” (p. 222), subsequent choices and actions
are conditioned by that fact in itself, and, more important,
hie
the proper activities of a young nobleman, r,la <jaza” and "los 
muchos, honestoe ygustosos convites" (p. 229), hold no 
Interest for.him because hia judgement and tastes hare been 
warped by the anarchy of the tunneriea, The addiction to 
the tuhneries, the lies which conceal it, and the lies with ’ 
which he depicts it in order to induce Avendano to aid him, 
are to lead, in the end, to the pain and humiliation he 
suffers within the time of the story. The falsity of the 
liberty with which he tempts Avendano may be inferred from 
the way they behave as they begin to put their plan© into 
effect: "Mostraronse los hijos humildes y obedientes;" (p.231) 
- liberty is characterised by voluntary obedience to just law, 
and the two fathers seem to treat the two boys well enough; 
but Carrieso and Avendano only pretend to obey them.
'••• Proceeding to an examination of the?way in which
Carriaso’s false liberty affects his character by reducing 
his capacity to behave according to thedictates of reason, 
and by inducing in him an increasing susceptibility to the 
whims of his instincts, we find thatCarriazo constantly 
meets pain and misfortunenot on the naive level of simple 
retribution, but on the basis of cause and effect. The pro­
cess is exemplified when Carriazo gets into trouble in his 
first day as an aguador (pp. 236-9)* To begin with, the
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events concerned all go back to Carriazo*s relationships with
; the tunneries and with Avendano; were it not for his inclina­
tions toward the vida picaresca, he would not be in Toledo 
now; had he not taken advantage of Avendano‘s friendship to
• , return to the tunnerles, he would not now be hampered by
Avendano; and when he knocks over the old man, it ia because 
hie thoughts are "... puestos . . . en Sus almadrabas y en la 
subita mutacion de euestado" (p. 256), while his immediate 
reaction to the old man's understandable fury ie to knock 
him unconscious. Cervantes* pun on caballero - "que.aun se 
eataba caballero" (p. 257) - draws our attention to what has 
happened to Carriazo; a boy brought up to be a gentleman 
manifests all the savage instincts of a thug-. The eventual
. outcome is logical enough: the alguacil -• the representative
'• / of law - arrests Carriazo, and the latter is physically 
• imprisoned, his release is due, not to the law's finding
him innocent, but to the chain of corruption and bribery 
available to his friend (pp. 259*60), who greases palms with f 
the kind of money that real picaros presumably do not have.
In Carriazo*s next conflict with the society that 
surrounds him, the causal connections between his picaresque
instincts and attitudes, and his previous unsavoury existence, 
are plain. It begins with his quest for another ass - neces- 
sary because his first animal was confiscated after the fight
with the old man - and we^observe the instincts which dominate 
him ashe is tempted into a game of cards, refuses to lose, 
and resorts to trickery and the threat of violence to recover 
hisproperty.: That is the behaviour of a plcaro; worset it is 
the behaviour of a HmugH. Oner cannot imagine a Rinconete 
falling for the trap into which Carriazo falls when he accepts 
the invitation to play, and to which hewas led by the mozo s 
who enticed him to;the Huerta del Rey with his story of a 
♦*euper-aesH? "Creyole el Asturiano >.•n (p, 288) writes 
Cervantes, and it is difficult not to infer that the emphasis; 
on believing the aozo means that Carriazo is being tricked, 
Like the blustering harriero whom Rinconete and Cortadillo 
dupe at the beginning of their story (pp. 1^3*5)» &nd whose 
"inhabilidad y simplezan is remarked by his comrades, Carriazo 
reasoning powers do not even stretch to the elementary caution 
necessary in his own picaresque world. Although he wins back 
his ass, thanks to the chicanery already mentioned, he gains 
another physical reminder’of his condition in the jeering 
horde of urchins who follow him everywhere, yelling nl,Daca la 
colai" * and even when the story ends, twenty years later, he 
is still subject to the fear of hearing that humiliating cry, 
even though his reason ought to persuade him of its unlikeli­
hood. ;\ ... ■_ . ■ /. ■ _ . . "
The immediate result of his behaviour in the cola
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incident is that
No quedo taberna, ni bodegon, ni junta de picaros 
donde no se supiese el juego del asno, el esquite 
por la cola, y el brio y la liberalidad del Asturiano; 
pero como la mala bestia del vulgo, por la mayor 
parte, ee mala, maldita y maldiciente, no tomo de 
memoria la liberalidad, brio y buenas partes del 
gran Lope, sino solamente la cola, (p. 29^)
The vulgo is described as a mala bestia - an animal without
,reason, whose instincts Cervantes describes; but for years 
Carrias&o’s ideal has been to consort with, and behave like,
this mala bestia, and he has learned its instincts well.
Indeed, his current predicament is directly attributable to 
his past vulgarity, so it is he who has let himself in for
this humiliation.
The logic of the causal connections between Carriezo’s
past and present, his psychological and physical states, seems
clear; certainly, he can do nothing about it - hie “mucho
silencioH (p. 29M and ’’paciencia” (p. 295) cannot undo his
actions, and once more there is a logical outcome:
Finalmente, tuvo por bien de retirarse a una posada 
que habia tornado fuera de la de su companero, por 
huir de la ArgUello, y de estarse en ella hasta 
que la-influencia de aquel nial planets pa ease, y 
se borrase de la memoria de los muchachos aquella
/ demanda mala de la cola que le pedian. (p. 295)
As a consequence of hie behaviour (not of any nmal planeta”), 
he now has to shut himself awa,y\ to undergo a self-imposed 
imprisonment - a physical metaphor of his psychological condition
>/-/• ; ? • ’ - • ' \ • * 313 - -• • , . ' " ? .
-and nSeis dias se pasaron sin que saliese de case, si- no 
../’'-era de noche ...*• '.;•*,/•* ' ; / • . ’ • ' . '■
•••.../•-••/When he does finally venture forth again* nothing >• 
has changed* and the inexorable chain of cause and effect
’shackles him once more, as we learn on p. 3^9. The urchins f 
•„ are still yelling *MDaca la colat” Carriazo has lost hie 
/temper and beaten one of them, then resisted arrest and been 
.. . beaten himself♦ Once again, violent instinct has overwhelmed .
'/ whatever reason he may be Said to possess* The law has placed -
himunder arrest, and the result.of everything is utter humi­
liation -..morally, physically, and socially - as he is con­
fronted by his "deceived** father. Again, the physical and -/•
.. social discomfiture proves only temporary as the story closes, 
even though, as long as he remained in Toledo, ”no faltaba •
/quien, en el medio de la pompa, cuando iba por la calle, no 
le.pidiese la cola," (p. 323)* but the constant fear of the 
taunt, as already stated, means that Carriazo’s natural 
liberty is impaired even twenty years later, when the fear 
may be compounded by his having three sons purporting to do 
.exactly what he was purporting to do, "estudiando en Salamanca".
’•'■•(p. 323). ‘ i 1 .
/;//// -/. < The moral thesis 'seems clear. Choosing the. false ’<
liberty of the tunneries* Carriazo began the process of . 
circumscribing his natural liberty. At the tunneries, where
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reason must succumb to instinct if one ie to survive - certainly 
if one is to enjoy it - natural liberty has no place: reason, 
obedience to law, choice of the good, all these things which 
ajre constituent parts of natural liberty are the antithesis 
of the nature of the picaresque existence. Rejecting that 
which separates man from beast, Carriazo becomes bestial, in 
the real sense of the word, that is, as a creature governed 
solely by instinct, with no capacity to choose that which ie 
proper? in the story, we see the inexorable descent into 
savagery and humiliation occasioned by all that. The way ,
Carriazo learned to behave in the tunnerles conditions his
behaviour throughout the story, and the story suggests that 
the conditioning lasts for much of his life; he has exchanged 
his natural liberty for an illusory liberty, and the struggle 
for moral liberty cannot even begin. Indeed, his moral 
condition is reflected in a more physical sense, by the dirty 
and lascivious maids, La ArgUello and La Gallega, who represent 
the abandonment of any moral discipline for the sake of imme­
diate gratification, with all that that involves in the way 
of duplicity and humiliation. Theirs is a complete submission 
to instinct, and, as such, a parallel of Carxiazo’s behaviour; 
but Carriazo regards them as being worse than animals, cf. 
p. 278:
-Mirad, Tomas; ponedme vos a pelear con dos gigantea,
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y en ocaeion que me sea. forzoso deequijarar'por . 
vuestro servicio media docena, o una, de leones; 
que yo lo hare con mas facilidad que beber una 
taza de vino; pero que me pongais en necesidad . 
que me tome a brazo partido con la Argttello, no 
lo consentire si me asaetean.
This morality is all very well when viewed in isola­
tion, detached from both the rest of the story and from 
experience of real life, but there are aspects of the work 
which seem to apprise us of the dangers of seeing it only as 
a moral syllogism* One hint that we should be wary of moral 
didacticism is offered by Cervantes early in the tale* On 
p. 231 we read that .. . .. .
Los padres dieron documentor a sus hijos de lo 
. .,que habxan de hacer, y de comp se habian de gobernar
para salir aprovechados en la virtud y en las 
, ciencias, que es el fruto.que todo estudiante debe
pretender sacar de sus trabajos y vigilias, prin- 
cipalmente los bien nacidos. . •
Whether or not virtue is to be learned from study or reading 
is itself debatable - Avendano has already put in three years 
at the university, but acquiesces in Carriazo’s shady schemes 
without the slightest demur I - but the trap for. the reader 
has already been set: throughout the fxirst three paragraphs 
of the story, Cervantes had pointedly referred to the pica­
resque life in terms of formal education, thus:
Finalmente, el salio tan bien con el aeumpto de <
plcaro, que pudiera leer catedra en la facultad . 
al famoso de Alfarache. (p. 222)
Paso por todos los grados do plcaro, hasta que
se graduo de maestro en las almadrabas de Zahara, 
donde es el finlbusterrae de la picaresca. (pp. 224*5)
Bajad el toldo, amainad el brio, no os llameis 
picaros si no habeis cureado dos cursos en la 
academia de la pesca de los atunes. (p. 225)
The reader thus arrives at the dubious remark about learning 
virtue from university study with the knowledge that he is 
reading about a university of vice I If the reader finishes 
this story of picaresque vicissitudes, it must be because he 
does not want morality so much as he wants fun; the reader is 
thus put quite firmly in his place, a place which is rather 
like that of the readers of those newspapers which concentrate 
on the more salacious items of news while maintaining that 
these are "cautionary tales." Cervantes, laughing up his 
sleeve, acidly inserts the idea that those who ought to derive 
virtue and knowledge from their studies are "principalmente 
los bien nacidos"; so far, all that the reader has learned 
about "los bien nacidos" is that "all! (Zahara) van, o envian, 
muchos padres principales a buscar a sus hijos, y los hallan" 
(pp. 226-7).
This mockery of the reader’s possible moral presump­
tion is apparent in other ways, particularly in the presenta­
tion of the two Carriazos, father and son. Cervantes habitually 
invites the moral approval of the reader for Carriazo's 
character or behaviour, only to confront the reader with the
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realisation that his moral principles are really rather tawdry* 
Consider again the paragraph that begins at the foot of p. 222 
(”En tree anos ♦♦.”), and ends at the top of p« 225* It begin® 
and ends with assertion® that Carriazo, in spite of his pica­
resque existence, cannot help being a jolly good chap:
descubria ser bien nacidOj porque era generoso / 
y bien partido con sus camaradas. . (p- 224)
/.v., En fin, en Carriazo vio el mundo un plcaro virtuoso,
limpio,biencriado, y mas que medianamente discreto. : <
?’•< • - .?•: (p, 224)
Bu t ,: in between the roses, the thorns:
Visitsba pocas•vecee las ermitas de Baco, y aunque <
■ bebia vino, era tan poco, que nunca pudo entrar en
el nuaero de los que llaman desgraciados;... (pi 224)
Every word is loaded, and the paradoxes ought to alert us to 
the dangers (’’plcaro virtuoso11 etc.). •Cervantes is playing fon, 
the likelihood of his reader being like most of us, in that he 
will share the belief that fooling around (i.e., sin). i®harm­
less enough as long as you don’t do it too often; he will 
therefore be pleasantly flattered by the support for this 
attitude implied in Carriazo’s virtue, hygiene, good breeding
and discretion. But the extent of Carriazo’® moderation is .
only that he did not become an alcoholic I Furthermore, if the 
reader accepts uncritically the glossy epithet® regarding; 
Carriazo’® demeanour, he is sharing the opinion of ”el mundo”: 
very reassuring, but what kind of mundo is it that esteem®
Carriazo so highly? Xt can only be the mundo picaresco . * 
naturally, they think a lot of him, after all he is ’’generoso
\ y bien partido con sue camaradas.” So what kind of virtue,
.gentility, etc. is it to which the reader is probably giving 
his assent? And if he does not give his assent, why has he 
allowed himself to be drawn into the mundo picarescp by 
reading the story?
Cervantes1 presentation of Carriazo Senior is equally 
sardonic, as he tempts the reader to-accept Don Diego’s account
, of the rape of Costanza’s mother (ppi 316*7)* That kind of 
story would be-tedious enough in bit~of*a“iad-y*know saloon* 
bar bragging; when it is implied that the deed was hardly even 
the offender’s responsibility, we have to be careful about 
how much we are going to swallow. The whole sorry business 
is made to depend upon the introductory ’’Ordeno la suerte
. alternatively expressed a few moments later as ”el silencio, 
la soledad, la ocasion The reader may not be a rapist,
but, again, if he is like most people, he has at some time or 
another found it convenient to disclaim responsibility for 
his situation or behaviour by attributing it to luck or fate 
or what*have*you, in which case he is quite likely to be
/willing to sympathise with Don Diego*s similar attitude. 
Moreover, reverting to the matter in hand, if grown men do 
talk like this, what on earth is the point of writing morally ..
didactic stories? The story isnot just putting the wayward- ; 
nese of youth before us; this is a middle-aged roan whose 
rhetoric is: held,.up: .to •<-our".gaze. .« ■ "... ' *.
••'X ;' The last point seems important, for it is a corol­
lary of the fact that Cervantes appears.to have a shrewd idea 
that his reader-does hot really, waht.fictional lessons in : .
moral,logic, and that he is unlikely to be much affected’by 
them if he gets them. . . The significance of the corollary is
that the behaviour of Carriazo and company is so utterly
ordinary. -The representative nature.of Carriazo*s behaviour 
may be seen when we consider him in. con junction with.the pre­
ceding genera tion , with his own generation, and with Avendano.
That Carriazo’s behaviour is similar in kind to his father’s
may be inferred.from the paragraph above, and/ it is an infer­
ence which becomes unavoidable at the end of the story, when
/ It seems to me possible to argue that, as a moral lesson, 
the story:is inconsistent; although Carriazo is seen to suffer 
as a consequenceof his behaviour, Avendano is hot, nor is < 
Carriazo*s father; on the other hand, Carriazo’s mother and 
stepmother, both Relatively innocentt art seen to suffer, • 
while Costanza herself, a paragon of virtue, seems to have no 
say at all in the conditions of her life. 6f course, It io 
possible to argue the other way, saying that, since Carriazo 
does suffer, Cervantes has left it to us to assume that the 
other guilty parties do likewise, especially as it is generally 
believed that while sin does not necessarily damage a man in ;; 
worldly terms,: it certainly does spiritually; but if the 
reader sees and understands all that, surely he scarcely needs 
Cervantes to remind him of it in the first place?
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Cervantes brings them face-to-face in a manner that is 
historically surprising, but poetically truthful, for both 
of them arrive at that point in time and space as a direct ; 
consequence of their own previous behaviour* The common
, - ground Carriazo shares with many of his contemporaries may 
be seen in Cervantes1 biting remark that "alii ran, o envian, 
muchos padres principales a buscar a sus hijos, y los kalian” 
(p. 226), which, incidentally, tells us a little about the 
fathers, too. Other pillars of society, such as the Church 
and the judiciary, are, in their own way, no better, as is 
demonstrated by the innkeeper’s scheme to arrange for 
Carriazo1s release from prison (p. 260); while the vulgo are 
neither any better nor any worse.
. Avendano’s position.as an indicator of the way we
should view Carriazo’s behaviour is more prominent, and con- 
slots in his own commonplace experience being bracketed with 
Carriazo’s career. I say commonplace, because, right from the
.first mention,of Costanza, Avendano is shown as another of 
the herd of people who ogle her: like the mozo de mulas at 
lllescas, like the latter’s friends, like the Corregidor’s 
son, like the rest of the crowds that come and go at the 
Posada, Avendano is smitten by Costanza*s looks, and Cervantes 
describes his condition with an accuracy to which anyone who 
has reached the age of twenty will testify. Nothing could be
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more matural, inevitable, and everyday, than Avendano*s ;
immediate passion for;Costanza, his'.' pretence that it is , 
"platonic", his gnawing jealousy, even his physical reactions, 
from blushing face to quaking, knees. The sheer banality of . 
Avendano’s adolescent intensity would be•-worthy"1 of any Teenage 
Love Story, were it not for the comedy with which Cervantes 
surrounds these..sticky little passions: Avendano’s spending 
twenty-four days trying -to get’neai* to Costanza, a feat ■ 
finally accomplished only when she develops toothache; his 
silly (and, in one respect, untruthful) letter, in which he 
claims to be an heir, which is rejected by Costanza,understand-■
1 ably;■ since he also claims to be a picaro; his eventual terror 
at the arrival of his father, aptly ridiculed by the Corregidorj 
Majevuesa merced, senoi' pariente; que aqui no lo aguardan 
oeos ni leones” (p. 320); these , little details all help us to 
keep Avendano in perspective. /
There is little here to arouse moral indignation, 
and Cervantes seems at pains to show both Avendano’s and 
Carriazo’b.behaviour on this same level of normality. Immedi­
ately after the conversation between the two taozos de mu las 
at lllescas, the respective choices of the two boys are encoia- : 
passed within one paragraph (p».239)s Avendano wants to see a 
girl, Carriazo wants to see his tunneries. A few pages later, 
the two mock each other’s desires (p. 243), Avehdano remarking
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that, if a passion for a fregona ill befits a noble, still 
less does it beoome a noble to nurture a passion for the 
almadraba de Zahara. On p. 250, Cervantes says that Costanza 
”... a Carriazo le parecio tan bien oomo a su companero, pero 
enamorole mucho menos”; that both respond differently to the 
same girl may serve to remind us that passion is not, by 
definition, rational or logical, and that, in that sense, 
there is little difference between adolescent passion for a 
girl, and adolescent passion for picaresque excitement.
It could be argued that the reader is meant to con­
trast the two passions, seeing Avendano1s as legitimate and - 
Carriazo’s as illegitimate, especially as Carriazo is shown 
to suffer permanent psychological discomfiture, while Avendano 
lives ’'happily ever after”. But ambiguity surrounds that Rind 
of schematising; on one side, Carriazo’s fear of hearing 
”Daca la cola” seems, by comparison with the risks he ran 
of death, slavery and imprisonment, a small price to pay for 
three years’ fooling around, and thus scarcely convincing as 
a condemnation of an ’’illegitimate” passion; on the other 
side, if the fact that he does pay a price is to be taken to 
prove something, it can, by extension, easily be taken as a 
hint that Avendano*s domesticity is not so blissful as is 
supposed. So, Carriazo’s condition may be seen as either 
(relatively) happy or(relatively) miserable, but neither case
is necessarily a contrast with Avendano’s condition# I think
it is useful,-in this case,;to bear in mind Parker’s remark 
that ’’The Spaniards of 1600 knew very clearly how attractive 
an anarchical freedom can appear to be to the young,” and to 
regard both Carriaao and Avendano as ordinary rather than 
villainous; - however legitimate or illegitimate these youthful 
passions may be, the./truth behind both is seen by Cervantes 1 , 
as comic i just as Avendano’s passion does not work out as he 
might have hoped (until the very end, when his wishes are 
fulfilled, not / via any effort of his, but solely asa result 
of the unhappy events which took, place many years before), so, 
beneath the surface excitement of the ’’vida libre”, we have 
Carriazo eventually driven into hiding by tarts and urchins#
7/ Where does all that leave Us, and what has it to do
with liberty? On the one hand, wehave a demonstration of 
the;moral law in action, on the other, the implication that, 
altho ugh we re cognise this 1aw, w e gladly and unre gret fully 
break<it quite regularly# That we behave in this silly 
fashion is indisputable, and Cervantes is not concerned with 
merely showing us that# As a writer, it is not surprising 
that his interest in the problem concerns the role of words, 
which brings us back * .as'it has before, in preceding chapi­
ters - to the foundation of natural'liberty, human reason#
Part of the problem derives from our tendency to assume that
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there is a real (as distinct from a conveniently artificial) 
connection between a word and its referent, and it is well-
known that in Cervantes’ time the connection was believed to
have a metaphysical basis. That seems to bestow upon words 
a certain power, and we can see in Cervantes’ fiction that 
that power has a lot to do with the problems attendant upon 
seeing what natural liberty means in practice.
The plot of the story culminates in the solution 
of the word-puzzl., "fesTAES 14 SE&AL VERDADEBA" (pp. 315-6), 
and it seems to be a hint that Cervantes has been confronting 
us with the problem of words throughout the tale. On p. 229 
he remarks, "Es de advert±r que en su j>eregrinacion don Diego 
mudo el nombre de Carriazo en el de Urdiales, y con este nombre 
se hizo llamar de los que el suyo no sabian." The reader is 
admonished to notice that Carriazo changed his name. Why this 
stricture? The name Urdiales never occurs again in the story, 
and to that extent is an irrelevance. But it is relevant, in 
another way, to the picture Cervantes is putting before uss 
changing names is not going to change reality, and disguising 
his noble lineage does not make Carriazo any the less a noble
'7rcf. Kray Luis; "Y aesl ... que el nombre es como imagen 
de la cosa de quien se dize, o la misma cosa disfragada en 
otra manera, que sustituye por ella y setoma’por ella ..."
De Los Nombres de Cristo, Ed. Onls, 3 vols,, ’’Clasicos
Gastellanos", (Madrid,,' 19122), tomo 1, pp. 30-21.
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or any the more a picaro - he is.still only a Hborrador de . 
picaro11 (p. 228)hE® de advertir ” is no idle comment 
from Cervantes, for the changing of names becomes a motif 
running through the whole story, .to the extent that, as the 
story progresses, the author insidiously uses the pseudonym . 
HLope Asturiano" as if that Were Carriazo * a. real name. As 
readers, we have to consider the implications of this name- ; ; 
changing, and the important implication is not, that proper 
names can be discarded and rearranged, but that, by accident 
or design, names,themselves * i.e., words - can be used or 
abused in the same way, with the result that the reality, or 
truth, to which they are meant to refer, can be distorted or 
disguised* WMn ^0Tds, the vehicles of reason, do that, 
reason is betrayed and natural liberty jeopardised. .
■To’<refer to the danger ..o f ^distorting, the truth via 
distorted language may be to state the obvious, but Cervantes, 
feels it is worth implying more than once in the story. 
Carriazo’s father is guilty of such distortion when he suggests 
that rape was a consequence of Mla suerte*1; so is the ^hotelier 
when he uses the agreeable metaphor of Hungtlento para untar 
a todos los ministros de la justicia11 (p, 261) as a euphemism 
for what is, inreality, bribery and corruption. So too is . 
Avendanowhen he proclaims his passion for Costanza in terms ; 
such as these; "jque puedoyo hacer,,ei me parece que el
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destino con oculta fuerza me incline, y laeleccion con claro 
discurso me mueve a que la adore?11 (p. 265) - another per* 
suasive cliche, the application of which is questionable: 
Avendano^ destino so far has been Carriazo, and the idea of 
passion being so easily reconciled with ’’eleccion con claro 
discurso” is itself suspect. But those are the kind of gran­
diose expressions we tend to use to dignify our very ordinary 
feelings. Carriazo, rightly, mocks these pretentious common* 
places:
- lOh fe lieisimos tiempos los nuestros, donde
vemos que la belleza enamora sin malicia, la hones* .
, tidad enciende sin que abrase, el donaire da gusto 
sin que incite, y la bajeza del estado humilde 
oblige y fuerza a que le suban aobre la rueda de 
la que Hainan Fortuna! (pp. 265*6)
he, however, has already been hoist by his own petard (cf. 
p. 2*4-5, where Avendano mocks his ”love” for the tunnerles).
The deceptive nature of words is made more explicit 
in the passage on pp. 280*285, involving the huesped and his 
wife. The keynote of the passage is provided in the bickering 
between the huesped and his wife with which their conversation 
opens, she reacting to his gibe (”... como sois poeta, luego 
dareis en su sentericia” jp. 280J) by bragging about her com*
.< iaand of Latin; ”... ya sabeis vos que tengo buen entendimiento 
y que se rezar en latin las cuatro oraciones.” The huesped 
tells her, ”*Mejor hariades de rezallas en romance; que ya os
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dijo vuestro tio elclerigo que declades mil gazafatones 
cuando rezabades en latin, y que no rezabades nada” - her 
Words, he says, are meaningless. But does that make her 
prayers meaningless, if she knows what they are about?
Surely not- after all, Monipodio’s malapropisms are ”mean- 
ingless”, but he knows what he means, and so do his listeners. 
A bigger^danger visible in the huespeda’ s remark is that she 
thinks that her Latin prayers are a sign of her "buen entendi- 
miento” - a silly belief in itself, and one which, from a 
religious point of view, may do more, by its conceit, to 
invalidate her prayers than the meaninglessness of the words
she utters.
The huespeda, meanwhile, attributes the slur on 
her Latin to the envious gossip of the priest’s niece: ”-£sa 
flecha, de la aljaba de su sobrina ha ealidoj que efcta envi­
dio sa.de verme tomar las horas.de latin en la mano, y irme 
por ellas como por vina vendimiada” (p. 281). Maybe, but 
that does not, in itself, invalidate the charge, for gossip 
is not always mendacious: the gossip of the vulgo eventually 
drives Carriazo to desperation, and it has a point, for 
Carriazo - unlike Costanza’s mother, who at the time of par­
turition was on the way to Guadalupe, ”Por huir de los mali-• • - I
cioeos ojos de mi tierra ...” (p. 303) - is not innocent, 
although, on the other hand, the Greek-meets-Greek flavour
of the whole incident means that the vulgo are scarcely 
justified in passing adverse judgement on Carriazo’s behaviour 
(etc.i etc.). The reader, trying to decide where the truth-
lies, is unable to pin it down: the words dissolve into ambi­
guities, and the ambiguities split into further ambiguitiesj 
like a scholastic disputation. Meanwhile, the argument is, < 
in the first place, dependent on a quarrel between husband 
and wife -hardly a situation in which a truthful remark will
be elicited. ..
Duly warned, then, the reader is confronted with 
the discussion between the two concerning Avendano*s poem in
praise of Costanza, which the huesped has discovered in the 
accounts book. After reading the poem, the hueapeda pro­
nounces judgement: , .
-Mirad, marido - dijo la hueapeda: a lo que yo 
veo, puesto qua las copies nombran a Costancica, 
por donde se puede pensar que se hicieron para 
ella, no por eso lo habemos de afirmar nosotroa .
por verdad como si se las vieramos escribirj cuanto 
mas que otras Costanzas que la nuestra hay en el 
mundo; pero ya que sea por esta, ahi no le dice . -
nada que la deshonre, ni la pide cosa que le importe.
(p. 285)
She says that they cannot take it for granted that the poem
refers to their Costanza - the name ia not conclusive - nor
that there is any malicious intent behind the poem. True 
enough, but the huesped is not convinced: "-^No serla mejor 
-dijo el marido- quitarnos dasos cuidados y echarle de casa?"
.For him, what was not said is more important than what was 
said* Cervantes is putting before; us here two different ways
•of looking at the truth: the huespeda will not assume guilt 
because she did not see the deed, and will not assume malice 
because it is not verbally explicit; the huesped will assume 
both guilt and malice notwithstanding* Which attitude will 
the reader choose? The former is probably the intellectual, 
or legalistic, attitude, but stated by someone who claims
//.’’buen entendimiento” because she mumbles pig-latin prayers;
. the latter is the common-sense attitude, which the reader
knows•to be well-founded (Avendano is ’’enamorado de Costancica 
and did write the verses with her in mind), but which also
1 has, in theory, staggering implications for human language, 
//for all that depends thereon (such as law and justice), and,
. .not least, for the; story and; its reader, if the latter agrees 
■ that what is unsaid weighs as much as what is said* ,
•■,/ - Xn the end, Cervantes’ jokes all the arguments are
/put into perspective as reality intervenes. Words or no words
no action is to be taken against Avendano. Why? Because he 
is the best accountant the innkeeper can find! And on that,
z they both agree I They also agree to keep an eye on Avendano, 
but the very next thing we read about is Avendano’s first 
advance to Costansa, which goes unnoticed by the huesped and
••'•/his wife. Even then, Cervantes does not change the subjects
Avendano tells lies in order to confess the truth. He offers
a toothache cure, but makes a- proposal of marriage, and the ; 
proposal itself contains lies (”A la fama devuestra hermosura 
... deje mi patria, aude vestido, etc.” jFp* 285J) which he 
swears are true (”... mirad que pruebas quereis que haga para 
enteraros desta verdad”)« .. •' ' ’ > ' .
k? ; It. seems, therefore, that the story is very much ;
concerned with, among other things, the relationships between .. 
truth and language. The very title of the story suggests the 
ambiguities and contradictions involved: La Ilustre Fregona 
-contradictory as it stands, and later shown to refer to a 
’’fregona que no friega” (her only job is to keep the keys to 
the silver, v. p. 299)* Carriazo’s nafve question, ”^Gomo la 
llaman por toda la-ciudad ...la fregona ilustre, si es que 
no friega?” (p. ,263), deserves a better answer than the one 
he himself supplies (”... debe de ser que como friega plata, 
y no la loza, la dan el nombre de ilustre”); a better answer 
would involve questioning; the perception of reality of those 
who gave her the name* Carriazo ought to know something about 
the power of words to distort reality, for it is he who employs 
such power to win back his ass, via the verbal device of the ■
cola. The word cola later becomes Carriazo’s albatross, and
of itself demonstrates the problem under discussion: a distor­
tion of realityin thefirst place, it brings about r to a ;
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greater orlesser degree - the hobbling of Carriazo*s natural 
liberty through hie fear of hearing it again, and remain® a 
representation of distorted reality in that Carriazo*s hearing 
it again is so unlikely. . •
The most important aspect of the story, though, is 
that it ia not just fictional characters who are confronted 
with, and indulge in, such ambiguities and distortions! the 
reader is put in the same position, and must choose his atti­
tude* Early in the story, Cervantes warns us of that in an 
episode which is, I think, worth examining in some detail.
To an observer, the picaresque life can offer at 
least two very different faces, and, if objectivity is lacking 
in the beholder, the face seen will depend on his eye, as . 
Cervantes reminds us on p* 228: "... todos sue deeeos entrego 
(Carriazo) a aquellas secas arenas, que a el le pareclan mas 
frescas y verdes que los campos Ellseoa.” On p. 230, Carriazo 
lets Avendano in on the secret of his passion for the tunneries, 
and tells him allabout **la vida de la jabega”: ”pintosela de 
modo, que AvendaHo, cuando le acabo de oir, antes alabo que 
vitupero su gusto. En fin, el de la platica fue disponer 
Carriazo la voluntad de Avendano de manera, que determino de 
irse con el a gozar un verano de aqueila felicisima vida que 
le habia descrito ...” The choice of attitude which an obser­
ver can make is implicit in the expression ”antes alabo que
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vitupero su gusto": apparently, there are two mutually opposing 
facets of the picaresque life to be seen. Of the two, Avendano, 
inexperienced in such matters, only sees one. Why? Because 
Carriazo ’’pintoeela de modo que ♦ •.”: Carriazo * s words, arid 
the way they describe life in the tunneries, are enough to con­
vince Ave ndafio that it is worth abandoning home, family and 
studies in order to have fun with Carriazo down in Sahara.
The point about language is plain enough within the fiction, 
but the reader might also consider the fact that, like Avendano, 
he too is on the receiving end of a tale, one created by 
Cervantes. If Carriazo can arrange his information in this ; 
way, to ’’disponer la voluntad” of Avendano, so too can his 
creator, Cervantes, to ’’disponer la voluntad” of the reader, 
and ”lessons” in the story can only be reflections of Cervantes’ 
manipulation of his material; but the reader is unlike Avendano, 
who is merely the author’s puppet, in that he may decide for 
himself how the material offered is to be interpreted and 
judged, and, indeed, on occasions, he is forced to decide. ,
We can see this process at work inthe quoted context: when 
Cervantes says, ”En fin, el de la platica fue disponer Carriazo 
la voluntad de AvehdaBo his pun is drawing attention to
two different meanings of the word fin, which, in the phrase 
”el de la platica,” can mean , either ’’result” or ’’purpose”.
If ” fin” is taken to mean ’’result” , then Carriazo * a story may
7'' '' 7 ' ’ -77 :•* . . 7 ? ;' ' ' . 7
\ be seen as unintentional propaganda} but if ”fin" is taken 
to mean "purpose", Carriazo is guilty of an unpleasant kind 
of incitement • The overtones of that ambiguity are startling;
^/dh^the'-interprWtation of one word may hinge the guilt or inno* 
-";.cence of Carriazo’s motives for telling Avendano about Zahara,
and, whichever way he chooses to interpret the word, the 
reader will be making a judgement on Carriazo, and, ultimately,
; on himself•
, V": ‘-ihe reader must, accordingly, be careful in the
. attitude he takes to Cervantes’ words; if he is not, he reduces
himself to the level of Barabbas, the noisy mozo de mulas at 
. the Posada, who takes umbrage when he misunderstands a single
; / word ("contrapas", fp. 2693), thus changing the whole tone of 
the occasion, and who then hurls abuse at the unknown musician 
because he is unable to understand the banal imagery of the 
serenade. It is therefore incumbent upon the reader to be .
7777:.'7 very circumspect when confronted with Cervantes’ deliberately 
equivocal language, such as,
...7<7* --'';7 En finj en Carriazo vio el mundo un plcaro virtuoso, 
limpio, bien criado y mas que medianamente discreto.77; ‘'777 7 ‘7 ; '7 7‘:---> 77-'—7;'” (p. 224)
/... se preaento a sus padres honrado y contento.
• • - (p* 228)
. Hof.quiso Carriazo tenersela encubierta, por no hacer 
agravio a la grande amistad que profesaban,
7-77?7' ,. ";77 7' ' • * 7< ■ (P. 229) . .
and so on to the penultimate paragraph, ; ,
; Desta manera quedaron todos contentos, alegres y <;■ :
?<•;' satisfechoe .. ’ '• (p. 323)
referring to six people marrying, of whom only one is attaining 
his heart’s desire..;" .. , ’• '
; $ The kind of trap the reader can fall into ia repre-
mented on p.294, where Cervantes invites his middle and upper 
class readers.to share hie contempt for the vulgo and approve 
the noble facets of Carriazo’s character$ ”♦*. pero como la V 
mala beetle del vulgo, por la mayor parte, ea mala, maldita 
y maldiciente, no tomo de memoria la liberalidad, brio y buenaa 
partes del gran Lope, sino solamente la cola”, There, the > 
reader should remember that Carriazo*s "liberalidad, brio y 
buenas partes” was somewhat qualified by his being surrounded 
by thugs who are not likely to let their profits walk away ;; 
from under; their noses, and that Carriazo has not only chosen 
a life amongst the vulgo, but has also acted like a thug 
therein; meanwhile, the reader himself is avidly reading a 
story about life amongst the vulgo. There is a similar;trap 
on the next page, where Carriazo has decided to retire to 
another inn, ”... y de estarse en ella haste que la influencia 
de aquel mal planets paease,-y se borrase de la memoria de los 
muchachos aquella demands mala de la cola que le pedian.”
Again, there is an appeal to the reader’s snobbery, this time
combined with the reassurance that that kind of unpleasantness 
really ie just a run of bad luck; but the original ’‘demands 
male de; la cola1’ was Carriazo’s . .•♦ '• '7*7:
• . Constantly teased in this way by Cervantes, the ;
reader has to be constantly on the watch for what Cervantes 
is making him swallow. He is even able to choose his attitude 
to the liberty which Cervantes describes, and which has such 
an effect onthe plot of the story. The word itself, libertad 
often seems, in prac tlce, hopelessly .ambiguous, serving as it 
so o f t e n d o e s■as:a eup hemiam for.licencia - the ”liee ntia quam 
etulti libertatem vocant” about which Tacitus complained. As 
Professor Parker’s comment, quoted at the beginning of this . ' 
chapter, makes plain, that euphemistic use of the word is fre­
quently applied to the,picaresque life, and we find this at 
the.beginning of La Ilustre Fregona.• As mentioned earlier, 
Cervantes points to5the ambiguity inherent in;the use of the 
word by linking it with trabajo (“Alii campea la libertad y 
luo. el trabajo,*’ [p. 226}) and by remarking how the-"vida 
libre” can result in capture by pirates (p? 227). ■ That the 
rea 1 name of this picaresque liberty is lieencia is clear 
enough, and Cervantes is, presumably, not just pointing out 
that that is the sort of mistake anyone can make -true 
though that be - but that the nature of the mistake has all 
the far-reaching ramifications already .described: the word’s
being made to impart a deceptive gloss to an unedifying ...
business means that reality is being changed, in the eye of 
the beholder, by giving it ah other name • The word, far from 
enhancing reason’s precision, serves only to confuse. The 
theoretically clear distinction between liberty, which is 
worthy and desirable, and license, which is perilous but also 
often desirable, can become unrecognisable in practice: 
instinct can be made to look like reason, and the misapplica­
tion of the words helps us to mistake the one for the other/
The reader can choose his attitude to the libertad Cervantes 
mentions, just Ms he can to the whole of the story;;the way he 
chooses will reveal whether he wants liberty or license -.and 
since he is reading a Story concerned more with the latter 
than the former, his choice seems fairly predictable. •;
' ’-:7 The -point'about the reader’s making a choice is
that to do so is,an exercise of his reason and a practical 
application of his natural liberty: as such, it reflects, as 
a speculum vitae Should, an indication of the way in which he 
applies his natural liberty in real life, ; The reader thus 
cannot detach himself from the problems Cervantes is putting 
before him, in particular, the confusion of the reason brought 
about by the ambiguityof words, and our consequent propensity 
for avoiding contemplation of the moral consequencesof our 
actions, with all the qualificationsof our natural liberty
- 7 that these factors entail* . • . •' • ‘ . .
; , ' c The .conversation, between the two aiozob de mulas at
Illesoas strongly suggests the impossibility of avoiding our 
responsibility as readers:, they tell ua that the law is being 
twisted and. justice perverted in the province of Sevilla, but,
; once again, we are being offered a judgement that is condi­
tioned by a viewpoint, a viewpoint that is hardly objective, ,
but which complains because "barrida esta Sevillay dies
. legu&s a la redonda de jacaros; no para ladron ensue contor-
..v nosj todo's le teraen como al fuegoH (p, 237)* But who are the
, ntodosn? What about the people who are not sorry that Sevilla
has been cleansed, of its thieves and, rogues? Those who fear 
the Gonde de Punonrostro may well be those who fear justice 
itself, while the "senores de la Audlencia’1 who are continually 
tryingto obstruct the Conde may well be, if they are^padree
de los'miserable® y amparo de los deedichadds," highly inef- 
< ficlent and corrupt. If a corregidor can be nmal informado,
? O: bien, apasionado" (p. 238)» then opinions held by ruffians
about officers of the law are at least open to question, and 
' .the quality of the justice administered by the Conde may not 
■ be entirely unambiguous. ■ .
.. . , . Row, the point I wish to emphasise here is that these
references to the Conde, to his methods of enforcing the law,
'. and to the hanging by him of a man named Genie, are all based
on fact. The reader’s judgement, therefore, is not, in this 
case, judgement on an inconsequential fiction, but a judgement 
on history, i.e#, reality: the problems which beset natural 7 
liberty - ambiguity, words and reason, judgement and choice, =; 
and;so on - are thus, briefly, brought into real life. By 
confronting us, all through the story, via the examples 1 have 
been discussing, with these deficiencies and potential defi­
ciencies of our real liberty, the author makes us see the 
illusory nature of picaresque liberty in perspective, and he < 
does so in a manner that is far more effective than mere• 
condemnatory moral!sing’ could be♦/.< ? ?;-:-7--7- V'7'
2. hinconete y Cortadillo. ’ r < , \7 ;7/--’7 7' 7 77'.;
7 I shall now briefly examine Rinconete y Cortadillo, 
to show that some of the problems discussed in connection with 
fa"Ilustre Fregona are not confined to the one story,land that 
the themes involved are not an invention of mine. The main 7 
problems of concern in both stories involve words and language 
and their effeet- on reason (and therefore natural liberty) and 
understanding. •• 7 •. 77.-7--7-^ 7^ ? f . • 7 7 \7.;;'77.• 7-
7; 7/ The thieves’ cofradlaj(which is, in so many ways, a 
parody of human society) ie shown, by Cervantes, to exist 
partly because its members deceive themselves so frequently
:7,v.; footnote to line 8, p. 2^6, where Francisco Rodrlguez 
Marin adduces the evidence for this. :
with their own words and language* which they use, or misuse* 
in such a way as to appear to justify* and invite us to con­
done* their nefarious activities.7 Some obvious examples of ’ 
that.are the easy fallacies adduced by the eozo who first \ 
leads Rincon and Cortado to Konipodio’s house. Be tells the . 
;boys that he is a thief ’’’para servir a Dios y a las buenas/ 7, 
gentes’”* and, when Cortado expresses surprise* explains that
» cada; uno en su oficio puede alabar a Dios’” (pp. ^58“9)*7 
the simple fallacy.of accident * the misapplication of a \
general truth to a particular situation -is enough to ease 7 :
the ciozo’s conscience. 7-' ,7.-< ‘7-. .777 -7 77 ' 7?7,
7/7;77; : A few moments later* the same effect is achieved by 7
the ignoratio elenchi (I use the formal logical terms to 
emphasise that it is reason at stake here) of the moao’s 
question (which he intends rhetorically, although it is not, 
necessarily)*, es peer ser hereje* p renegade* o raatar
a su padre o madre* o ser solomico?’” (p. 161). The other 
members of the cofradxa are full of similar distortions of 
reason* such a© the fallacy of accident invoked by Chiquiznaque, 
to explain his woundingof the servant instead of the masteri 
’’’Quien mal quiere a Beltran* mal quiere a su can’” (p. 206).
• - Less obvious* and correspondingly more prejudicial
to the individual’s reasoning powers, is the confusion inherent 
in remarks such as Cortado’s* ”’Pero pues nuestra suerte ha ;
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querido que entremos en esta cofradia, vueea merced alargue 
si paso,n (p. 16D; Hnueetra suerte” conveniently ignores 
the fact that they are where they are from choice (a point 
1 shall return to at the end)- ; . .
All through the story, Cervantes shows the thieves 
as being trapped by these distortions of language and logic, 
which help to prevent their seeing or admitting the true
nature of their behaviour. But the thieves * condition is
only the background against which the reader must experience 
, the difficulties, arranged by Cervantes, of the relationship 
between language and truth. Throughout the story, Cervantes
is confronting us with the problem of words and meanings, 
and we have to examine the words in the text very closely if 
we are not to be caught out, for Cervantes is suggesting
■! that the meanings aay not always be what they appear. He 
shows us the problem in several different ways.
The first thing Cervantes does is offer us a string 
of puns in his description of the two boys. For example, 
one of them wears shoes that are,HpicadosM (p. 134). As 
Marin’s footnote tells us, nZapatos picados eran ... ’los 
labrados con agujerillos b cortaduras sutiles ...’H, such as 
might be worn by the well-to-do; here, the term means only 
that they are worn and full of holes. On the next page, we
. are told that Hincon (as it transpires) has a collar that is
"deshilado". Again the footnote is useful: "Como renglones 
atrascon lo picado de los zapatos, Cervantes juega ahora de 
las dos acepciones de la vox deshilado, segun sea nombre o ; 
participio. En la primera signifies ’cierta labor que se > 
hace en las telas blancas de Xienzo, eacando de ellasvarios
/.hilos y. formando huecos o calados, que se labran despuis con 
la aguja’" (p. 135); buthennasbefore, the meaning is "worn".
•/.,. In both the above examples, the meaning of "picados" 
and "deshilado" is perfectly obvious from the context: the f 
two boys Cervantes is describing are scruffy urchins, and ; 
the author makes reference to more genteel attire only a© a 
joke. There is no problem for the reader: such ambiguities 
attach to many of the word© we use, and the meaning is almost 
invariably clarified by the context. But when the context '<• 
does not provide such clarification, the problem becomes 
slightly less simple.' For instance, in the next sentence : • /
(after "deshilado"), we are told that Rincon’s playing-cards
, have become "de figura ovada, porque de ejercitarloa se les 
habian gastado las puntas, yporque durasen mas,, se las cer- 
cenaron y los dejaron de aquel tails" (p. 135)* "Ejercitar" 
could mean, here, two slightly different things: it could 
either involve the idea of practice (as of swordsmanship, 
business, etc.), or the idea of training or drilling (as of 
an army - v. Diccidnario de Autoridades). In the context /
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quoted, we cannot be sure which weaning we are to take, but 
whichever meaning we do take will put a different complexion 
on the owner of the cards: it is acceptable to practice (make 
a habit of) card-playing, but what kind of person "trains" or 
’♦drills" a pack of cards, and to what purpose?
Similarly, when we read, in the following sentence, 
that the boys had "unas caireladas, y las manos no muy limpias" 
(p. 135)» we cannot be sure whether the phrase is to be under­
stood solely in its literal sense, or whether we should take 
account df the idiomatic connotation of unas, which suggests 
(according to the Diccionario de Autoridades) an inclination 
to steal; the same connotation, offering us the same choice, 
also attaches to "las manos no muy limpias*" In the case of 
both "ejercitar" and "unas", and of "las manos no muy limpias," 
the context does not enable us to be certain of the meaning 
of the words* Soon, we find that, in both cases, either of 
the possible meanings are justified: the boys are card-sharpers 
and pickpockets, hut the meaning we choose to see before we 
know that throws some light, not only on the fictional charac­
ters, but also on the reader himself.
Having thus reminded us of the inherent ambiguity 
of language, and shown us that it happens all the time, 
Cervantes then goes on to explore its more serious ramifica­
tions, as he begins to present the speech of his characters.
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Cortado tells his life-story twice, The first time, he reveals 
that he is the son of a tailor who learned to be a tailor also,
-and that . corro como una liebre, y salto como un gamo, y 
i corto de tijera muy delicadamente,” (pp. 136-7). The second
time, he admits that hie tailoring activities are mainly con­
; cerned with cutting holes in pockets - he is a cut-purse, and
; on the run from the authorities in Toledo. The first version
of his life-story was, therefore, not the whole truth, yet 
neither was it a lie. The second version is more interesting, 
since, while if does not conceal unpleasant facts, neither
? does, it present them in an unfavourable light: "vine a Toledo 
a ejercitar mi oficio, y on el he hecho maravillasn (p. 142)
- an amusing way of saying that he went to steal where the 
pickings were good, without mentioning words like hurtar or 
robar; the facts are given a similar gloss by phrases such as
; ni hay faldriquera tan escondida, que mis dedos no visi-
ten, ni mis tiserae no corten,n (p. 142). His flight from
... .< justice is flippantly expressed as a lack of desire to ’’tratar 
con personae tan graves’’ (p. 142) as the Corregidor, while 
his poverty is explained by his having to leave Toledo ”con 
tanta priesa, que no tuve lugar de acomodarme de cabalgaduras 
ni blancas, ni de algun coche de retorno, o, por lo menos, de 
un carro” (p. 142). .
The words, it seems, can make the truth more palatable
than it really is, and Rincon indulges in/the same kind of 
rhetoric| as, avoiding all words directly meaning theft or 
punishment or poverty or cheating, he tells a story:of all 
those things, .’’To, senor hidalgo ...” (pp. 138-141) • The
boys talk like gentlemen; pretend to be merchants, and 
finally admit they are, crooks, but the difference between 
each;station appears as only a matter of terminology;, the 
reader is thereby shown how the use (or abuse) of language 
can present several different perspectives of the one situa­
tion. Wer see the boys as they really are, -and hear the© 
pretend to be other things (we 11-born ; down-on-the ir-luck, , 
devil-may-care types)/ but, until they themselves confess 
it, we do no t know where the - truth lies. /This poorer of words 
to distort and confuse, introduced at the beginning of the 
story, becomes;the very stuff of the story, and the reader’s 
difficulties are multiplied by Cervantes’ games with germania
Cervantes sprinkles germania terms throughout the 
story , an d only very occasionally does he itell us that he is 
using germania, or what a particular term means. ‘ The first 
admitted usage of germania comes on pages 155-158, where the 
moso accosts them and offers to lead them to Monipodio’s . .
hideout: ”T asi, les fue diciendo y declarando otros nombres 
de ilos que ellos llaman germanescos o de la germania ...”
(p. 158)., However, the reader must realise that, within the
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fiction, Rincon and Cortado are lying whenthey profess
;incomprehension at the moso * s slang (**•.,, que asl entendemos 
esos norcbrea como volar’ ” Jp, 158jetc. ), for they were already
; empIo ying germania terms in their first conversation at the 
beginning of the story. On p, 142, Cortado telle Rincon how 
nen cuatro meses que estuve en aquella ciudad, nunca fui 
cogido entre puertas, ni soplado de ningun canuto,” and, 
as Marin's footnote explains, ’’Soplar, en lenguaje de germania,
v vale denunciar; y canuto so pion, ” Fair enough - if the boys > 
are thieves, we should expect them to know some thieves’ .
slang; but there are other implications. If all germania 
terms were as easily recognisable, or guessable, as canuto, 
so pion, and the mono's words and phrases (entrevar, murcio,
; finibusterras, etc,, jj?p, the reader would have
little difficulty in sorting out the meanings of Cervantes'
• , words? but many germania terms are perfectly innocuous every­
day words which have a special meaning only to the thieves
; and others who use it, and that adds a further complication 
'•■'?';to the;story. , • ■
: If Cortado is using such germania terms as canuto
and soplon in his first conversation with Rincon, what are we 
to make of the more apparently straightforward parts of his 
life-stories? Since he is a thief right from the beginning
. of the Story, it follows that he might be using germania, if
riot all, at least some of the time* He tells Rincon that 
"mi tierra no es mla, pues no tengo en ella mas de un padre 
que no me tiene por hijo yuna madrastra que me tiene por 
alnado" (p. 136), from which a reader might infer only that 
Cortado has come from,an unhappy home,’ But, in germanla, 
padre can mean "padre de mancebla," and madrastra can mean 
"cadena;, o parcel"? that is to say, Cortado may be telling 
anyone who knows germanla that the only father he ever knew 
was abrothel-keeper * which would probably mean he is the 
eon of a whore, which would explain why his -padre- "no me 
tiene spor hijo" - and that he has already spent some time in 
prison, which would explain his ill-treatment and why he is -■ 
persona non grata in his homeland. On the next page, we 
learn that. Cortado•-,s father is a Vsastre y calcetero"? all
i ; right, he is not a brothel-keeper,but calcetero in germanla 
can mean "el que echa^los grilles’is which is it here? After 
all, Cortado’s references to his own'tailoring skills ("’corto 
de tijera muy delicadamente’" [p. 136.)) may, in turn, convey 
/the germanla meaning of tiseras, "Los dos dados mayores de la
• :< mano,’’ with its implications of picking pockets, so what can 
\ - we believe about hie father? In none of these instances can
duan Hidalgo’ s Bocabulario de Germanla; unless other­
wise stated, all germanla meanings mentioned in this Section 
are, taken from that work, \ ■
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we be certain that we know what is meant» ? .< L
1It seem*, then, that the germania used by Cervantes* . 
thieves may be obvious some;of the time, but not all of the " 
time. Thus, while we can immediately pick out such slang 
terms as Monipodio♦s use of floras to mean "card-tricks" 'V',V' 
(p. 171),; the muchacho *s "gurull&da” (p. 175) , Monipodio*e 
*‘piar el turco puro*’ (p. 17^), and so on, we can never be sure 
how to take some of the more ordinary-looking phrases. hineon, 
about to explain himself to Cortado, says, "pienso que habemos 
de ser, deste hasta el ultimo dia de nuestra vida, verdaderos 
amigos" (p. 158) -a very chummy remark, but, in germania, 
amigos' can mean "dineros"s‘how does t hat cohdition Rincon• s /: 
words, especially as he proceeds to teach Cortado card-sharping 
so; that they can make a quick killing? The moso enquires of 
the two boys, ” ’gcomo ho han ido a la aduana del senor Moni- 
podio?’” (p<156), and Rincon assumes (or pretends to?assume) 
that he is talking about a;tex>office; but/ in germania, aduana 
means ,,mancebian, and the moso admits that it is notSa tax- ; 
officer- "-Si no se page .a io aenos, registranse ante el ; •
senorMonipodio, que es\su padre underlining7!, su maestro 
y suampere** (p.\1£6)? - what exactly could he mean here? ? 
Later, we learn that the whole cofradia;is dependent upon the 
earnings: of prostitutes. .•;/«
consequence of all that is’ that, whenever we
read the direct speech of the thieves, we cannot feel that ;
we know exactly what is being said. Even if we were fully 
conversant with germania (i. e», if we were also thieves i), 
we,could not feel any sense of certainty, because, for one . 
thing, 'the ambiguity remains whether we realise it or not, . . .
andf- for another, Cervantes has set yet more traps for us.
XX J Discuss ing La Ilustre Fregona, I made mention of 
the oft-assumed connection between words and their referents*
In a simple way, that connection is reflected in the names 
of'seme of the members.of the cofradia (Gananciosa, Cariharta, 
Maniferro, etc.). We have seen how the thieves are incapable
of handling ordinary language, but we may feel that they 
ought to be able to handle their own jargon (germania) with­
out too much confusion, and, there fore, that such germania 
terms as we recognise are being usedaccurately by the thieves. 
But let us examine what happens when Monipodio (described by 
the mozo as ”’c&lificado, faabil y suficiente,H jp. 157]) 
bestows a, name on someone s J ’ \ . ;• •
; -Pues de aqui adelante -respondio Monipodio- quiero 
X'-' y «i voluntad quevos, Rincon, os llameis
Rinconete, y vos, Cortado, Cortadillo, que son 
... nombres que asientan como de molde a vuestra edad -
. y a nuestrae ordehansao. , (pp. 167*8)-
The curious aspect of that statement is that, if the given < 
names do fit ’’vuestra edad y a nuestras ordenanzaa," they do . 
not fit , quite so precisely, ..the boys'' professions: in germsni*
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the word cortadillo means "una flor que uean los fulleros en 
el naipe” (a trick used by card-sharpers)* Of the two boys, 
it is kincon who is the expert card-sharper, Cortado being 
the cut-purse. It is true that, in ordinary language, Corta- 
dillo might be an appropriate nickname for Cortado, but, 
since cortadillo is a germanla word, it is surprising that 
Monipodio does not take- its slang meaning into account. Later, 
we find that this muddling of germanla nicknames is reflected 
by Monipodio‘s muddling of Cortado’s ordinary agnomen, ”el 
Bueno” (bestowed upon him by Monipodio, p. 177 ): on p* 212, 
Monipodio suddenly refers to ’’kinconete el Bueno”i
; What Cervantes seems to be doing is making us feel
that, even if we spot the germanla spoken by the thieves, and 
even if we are on the watch for the ambiguity of slang mixed
' with proper usage, we still cannot be certain of any meanings, 
because even the thieves sometimes seem to be uncertain of
the import of their own jargon.
If the germanla in the story were confined to the
conversation of the thieves, then we might at least feel that 
the complications stemming from the germanla could only arise 
when the thieves were speaking. There are however, indications 
that that is not necessarily the case. On p. 189, Cariharta 
has just told everyone about her beating from Kepolido, and 
isscreeching.for justice: ”aqul volvio a pedir justicia, y
aqul se la prometio de nuevo Monipodio, ytodos los bravo® 
que alii estaban,” What does Cervantes mean hereby the word 
’’bravos”? He could be deliberately mixing* the ideas of valour
: and savagery: we know that ’’todos los bravos” in the scene 
described are thugs who profess gallantry. But there is also 
the possibility that the germnxa element is again present: 
the germanla meaning of bravo is ”juez”, .These bravos are 
all promising Cariharta justice, and we have already seen the 
same gang in a parody of a law-court, where the mozo is . 
falsely accused of not declaring the stolen purse, and every­
one gets angry, ’’viendo que se romplatt/sus estatutos y buena®
..ordenanzas” (p,.176), • ' . . :
• .b’Xf Cervantes has slipped in a germanla pun in the
above instance, the implications, are considerable, for the- 
•Word ’’bravos” is not part of a thief’s conversation, but.part 
of the. narrative prose; , what that means, then, is that hidden 
germanla meanings are not confined to the thieves’ dialogue, 
but may occur at any place in the text! And, if we cannot 
be.sure of the meanings of the thieves’ dialogue, because of 
.the possibility of germanla, our situation, now is that we 
cannot be certain that we properly understand any part at all .
of the whole story, What., for instance, is meant by this 
section, of narrative: ’’informaronse de. uno dellos que oficio 
era aquel,, y si era de muoho trabajo, y. de que ganancia” •
^'^(p. 1.4?)$ Cervantes is describing the boys1 enquiries about 
J ; a job, but trafcajar, in germania, means "hurtar”, and the
, . boys* interest in work extends only to how much they can 
\ v ; filch (as is shown in the next paragraph in the story) . Here, >
. the passage quoted is reported speech, which serves to increase .? ?■
;our difficulties, as we oannot be sure whether the choice of
• word should be attributed to the reporter or to the speaker, .
> . ;I began this section of the chapter with the reminder
. that the thieves in the cofradia are trapped by their own con­
fused language, which effectively prevents them from seeing : ?
the truth behind their behaviour and their rhetoric* As he :
? reads the story , ; thoughi the reader may come to realise that 
he is in.the same boat as the criminals, his difficulties of 
understanding having been made, by Cervantes, to reflect theirs. , 
Either we do not notice the tricks the author is playing, in : 
which case we fail to grasp 'the: full meaning of the words and G - < ; 
thus appear to be no more intelligent than the criminals, 
to be as easily convinced; or we do see what is going on, and < ?
=have to admit that the only difference between ourselves and 
'^the fictional criminals is that they do not realise their own \
condition (while we also have to explain how it Is that we ,?
>•?? z know so much 'thie ves* slang t).
>> .• ■?/'._ We may./'accordingly, "begihtto .appreciate.•'.'Cervantes’?
• joke in setting the scene of his tale in Sevilla, for .that '
city was known in germanla as ’’Babilonia”, and Babylon was : ; 
where men built the tower which prompted God to."go down, and 
there confound their language, that they may not understand ; 
one another’s speech” (Gen. tl, v. 7). In Rinconete. y Corta-. 
dillo Cervantes presentsseveraldifferent levels of language 
* ordinary language (presumably 0, obvious Cas tilian puns, 
less obvious Castilian puns, germanla, germanla puns, fal~ 
lacious rhetoric, and so on — through which the reader must . 
try to pick his way, and via which he must eventually conclude 
that language simply does not allow the understanding any7 
certainty, but is, in fact,; a/barrier between men /and reality 
which must inevitably distort truth to a greater or lesser - 
;degree/;\., ;• •• ‘‘ ..</
:"Confirmation of-the reader*'s .situation, relative to 
the story, comes in the final paragraph,- ’’Era Einconete ...” 
(pp, 216*218). 1’he reader, having been shown.the .events of 
the story via the experiences of Rinconete, is told that ; : 
Rinconete had a good laugh thinking back on the inanities hs 
had witnessed:in his first day in the cofradla, and there is ■/ 
a recapitulation of all,the things that amused Rinconete, <
which doubtless caused the reader similar amusement. No /;/
doubt.the reader is flattered and reassured by Rinconete*s 
amusement, because ’’Era Rinconete, aunque muchacho, de muy 
buen entendimiento, y tenia un buen■ natural,” as we are told
at the beginning of the paragraph (p, 216). But we learned 
at the beginning of the story that Rinconete is not really all. 
that bright: his "talents" are taught to Cortado in a few 
minutes (p. 143), he doea not draw the simple lesson he might 
from hia glimpse of the galleys in the harbour (p. 147), *nd 
he shares in the linguistic self-deception of the thieves 
without realising it. / At the endwhen we have finished 
chuckling with Rinconete about the cofradia*a antics,; we find 
that he "propuao en si de aconsejar a su companero no duraaen 
mucho en aquella vida tan perdida y tan mala, tan inquieta, y 
tan libre y diooluta" (p. 218), which would seem eminently 
sensible, except that "Pero, con todo esto, llevado de sus , 
pocoaanoa y au poca experiencia, paso con ella adelante 
algunos meses ..." (p.i 218). Having begun the paragraph by 
telling us that Rinconete was a smart lad in spite of his 
youth, Cervantes ends it by telling us that Rinconete*s con­
sequent folly was attributable to his youth I In the meantime, 
the reader has happily shared JRinconete*s view of past events* 
...< Cervantes then/promises us further stories about Rinconets 
and the cofradia: "... se deja para otra ocasion contarsu - 
vida y milagros,: con los de su maestro Monipodio, y otros 
sucesos de aquellos de la infame academia" (p. 218), thereby 
suggesting that he knows that we, just like Rinconete, want to 
have more fun with the cofradia (as, if we have read this far,
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we must)* . . ■ • , ‘ ; • / \ • *./''
The connection between reader,j Rinconete, and,
hence, the cofradia, having been thus clearly established, 
Cervantes goes on to mention the word ejemplo; ”que todos 
seran de grande consideracion y que podran servir de ejemplo 
y aviso a los que los leyeren” (p. 218). Does that mean 
there has been no ejemplo in the story we hare just read?
The exemplary further instalments promised by Cervantes 
never materialise - why? Because they do. not need to; the 
very fact that we have read Rinconete y Cortadillo means
that we have undergone - whether we were aware of it or not 
-exactly the same experience that we have to undergo in 
real life, of being confronted with the necessity of trying 
to ascertain where the truth lies through the distortions 
and deceptions of language. Therein, X submit, lies the 
ejemplo. - <, . • .
. \There is much more to be said about this novela, 
but my purpose in discussing it was only to show that certain 
aspects of La Ilustre Fregona which I was exploring in the 
first section of this chapter, namely, Cervantes’ demonstra­
tion of some of the relationships between language, reason 
and reality, and his deliberate involvement of the reader, 
are not confined to the one story. Further discussion of 
Rinconete y Cortadillo would be a digression from my theme,
and must therefore be postponed* I shall conclude with one • 
or two observations concerning the problem of liberty in 
Rinconete y Cortadillo, to show how the principles I have 
already outlined may be seen at work. ; ,
• a-Rinconete thinks of the criminal life in terms of
’’aqueila vida;..♦ tan libre” (p. 218). . The word libre is 
here being used pejoratively, and rightly so, for ;the liberty 
of the criminal’s life is as false a liberty as that of 
picaresque life of Avendano and Carriazo. As Cervantes 
clear, the criminal life is a consequence of deliberate 
choice, which is the denial of natural liberty; I refer
to the .incident already mentioned in which Rincon and Cortado, 
on?their arrival in Sevilla, go sightseeing, and are sobered , 
by the presence of six galleys, crewed by condemned criminals ? 
suchas they will one day surely be (p. 14?). It 'is in spite 
of that visual warning, and in; the clear knowledge of where 
their life will lead them (prison, galleys or death)that 
they choose to continue;their criminal life, excusing it by 
.such phrases as "nuestra suerte ha querido que entremos en 
esta cofradla . (p. 161), Simplephraseology and word-
that they cannot
cannot see how ;
effects may,be
.ar turns of
the
makes
wrong
here
choice thus confuse their reason to the extent
sensibly use their natural liberty, i.e., they 
to choose a proper course of action. The same 
seen in their, opening conversationj where j
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phrase conceal the poverty and sordidity which reason would 
suggest they try to avoid. The members of the cofradxa 
destroy their natural liberty in a similar way, seen at its 
most ludicrous in the words of Cariharta: "que -el trabajo y. 
afan con que.yo lbs jpveinticuatro reales] habia ganado, ;; 
ruego yo a los cielos que vayan en descuento de mis pecados" 
(p, 188); as a prostitute, of course,; her trabajo and her 
pecados are one and the-same thing, but the conventional 
form of herwords encourages a blurring of her reason, so 
that she cannot see that her trabajo /- ordinarily a manifests 
tion of liberty * is a denial.of her liberty..'•//]•••; / —
< The members of the cofradia also sacrifice their ' v 
liberty in rendering obedience to Monipodio, himself unable 
to speak or reason properly, and the perversion of liberty 
represented by the cofradia is reflected in their idea of 
justice. The motto of the old lady, Pipota, is "Dios , 
nos libre a todos de poder de, justicia" (p., 181), also . <- : 
expressed as "4l nos libre y conserve en nuestro trato peli- 
groso sin sobresaltos de justicia" (p. 184); that, though, 
is a complete contradiction in terms, for liberty consists 
in obedience to law and justice, not in evasion of it, so
that it would make no sense for God to "free"A them from it• 
The practical application of justice in the cofradia is 
equally meaningless: we are told of a sort of.kangaroo court
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when the mozo is, accused of stealing the purse that Cortado 
stole, and everyone is incensed, ’‘viendo que se romplan sus 
estatutos ybuenas ordenansas” (p, 1?6); unfortunately, their 
statutes and covenants' do not include procedures for estab­
lishing the guilt or innocence of ah accused party! <later, 
there is another example of Monipodio’s justice, the justice 
he ,promises la Gananciosa: ’’aqui estoy yo, que te hare 
justicia”, (p. 186), He tells her that, as. regards Repolido, 
"que no-ha de entrar por estas puertae el cobarde ,envesado . 
si primero no hace una.manifiesta penitencia del cometido 
delito” (p. 190)* A few minutes later, Repolido comes bang­
ing on the door, and, as Cariharta yells ”-No la abra vueea 
merced, senor Monipodio Monipodio immediately opens
■'the 4cor 1 :■
? I »eed hardly add that/ just as the above extracts 
represent;a comic perversion of justice,, so too must,-they ; 
represent the denial and antithesis of liberty. Such dee-. 
criptions might be considered ^gratuitous if Cervantes were 
merely poking fun at a community which he himself had inven­
ted , but we have, to remember, that he has shown us the con- ?
nection between ourselves and the criminals. ; In the same 
way that the law on which society depends is shown in the 
story,.to be fallible (because of corrupt policemen-/ silly 
mule-drivers, shady gallants, ,and so on), the individual’s
; ■- ‘ -.. .■■
dependence on reason and language, and, with it, his natural 
liberty, is shown to be equally fallible. . . .
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Afterword
?. I offer an Afterword rather than Conclusions, ; ,
because, as is indicated in my Foreword, the nature of this 
thesis renders inappropriate the provision of specific con* ... 
elusions; the work itself is, in effect, a series of conclu­
sions, in that it deals with the literary works on an indivi­
dual basis* There are, however,,a few final comments which 
are pertinent in a more general vein* ,
Obviously, I hope I have shown that there is an ; 
approach to the concept of liberty in the Spanish history and 
literature of the Golden Age which is more suitable than that 
hitherto apparent in modern critical studies of the period*
, Forexample, I think that Part I, above, goes, some ' .
small way towards5resolving the punzle reflected in the last
sentence of the following statement: >’< >
The reassertion of royal authority in the spheres 
of administration and justice necessarily involved 
some loss of liberty for the subjects of the Crown* .
// But, after long years of civil strife, this was a 
, price/that the majority of them were willing enough v*
. to pay* According to the -great chronicler Hernando 
< . del Pulgar, their wish?was 1 to escape from lordship ••• , ; .
. into the royal liberty [libertad rea 1J, ’ and they saw
no.incompatibility between,freedom and a greater deg- ; 
ree of subservience to royal power, 1 ?
1J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716, XTelican, 197Q)i
p. 98. : '■ /. ‘
My reading of the theoretical background suggests that there 
ie no reason why the subjects referred to should have seen ; 
any such incompatibility a© that implied in the passage quoted*
; Part II, above, goes on to explain how we might ; '
avoid some of the terminological pitfalls which can beset bur 
interpretation of Golden Age literature, such as those appa-; 
rent in the discussion on liberty in La Vida es Sueno which 
ensued from S/D.-T. Pring-Mill’s lecture at the 1969 Exeter 
conference on Calderon. That, of course, is another way of 
stressing what others have already stressed, namely, the 
necessity to see or read the works through seventeenth-century 
eyes; my particular aim has been to show how. carefully we \ 
should handle the word ’’liberty” < . • « ? , . , • Y z. - , .
A second general point, arising from the analyses . , 
of Part II, concerns the problem.of picking out and encapsula­
ting specific themes, concepts, ideas, beliefs and so on as 
part of Golden Age criticism. Clearly, a danger of distortion 
attaches thereto, in that individual.theories and concepts" : 
are.so often inseparable from other theories and concepts. . 
As we have seen, a discussion of liberty leads us into problems
of law, justice, tyranny, reason, language and so forth, and 
I have been ~ necessarily - a© much concerned with pointing
2v. ”La victoria del hado en La Vida es Sueno”, p. ?0, . 
footnote 45, in Bacia Calderon, pp. 55-7O.
; to' these connections as with illustrating the concept of •'
* liberty itself* That is why .I ha.ve<had, to devote consider- ’
;:W. able -space to outlining the/ associated themes with-which the W-W-C
. \ discussions of libertybecome entwined#; Among other things, ..
•; ?. ,./ we/had, to examine <• in Kuenteovejuna, problems of tyranny5
; SI/ Major Alcalde? el Key and 51 Alcalde de Zalamea, prob- ?.•••:• W. /
. /'.lea’s of justice; in La Vida es Sueno, problems of reason and 
instinct;.in La Ilustre Fregoha,; problems of language; while,
. /;in .all of them, there.are elements of all the problems named./<•;
?Kven. so,/it must be admitted that I. have had to impose arti- ,
.WWW"fioial limits :on the various:lines of enquiry, 
keep within manageable distance of the central 
each work should be analysed Yin its entirety ?’
• /■//"* ” ' /'• ./That leads to-a-/ final, general point,
// . /■ ' - - ac cent ed, which I hope I- have f ur ther illustra t ed, viz •, that ;W/
//’• ?’W the more, we dig into the/works of Lope, Calderon, Cervantes W
W? W W.afcd others of equal/stature,.the more complexities and diffi- /W 
■ cultiea we find?/, Obviously, there is. much more to be done,- 
//.'/•-■/ even concerning the best-known works, as I remarked, in my •' . ' / .
Foreword, and nothing is more certain than that my own findings 
< ; on liberty will have to be modified when further research is ' / W
done into the associated problems?
if only-to , .,/
theme. Ideally,
already widely
- Appendix I,;
A contemporary record of the affair, attributed to 
Luis Cabrera de Cordoba,1 tell© us that when Antonio Perez' 
was arrested by the Inquisition in Zaragoza, in May 1591, his 
friends organised a riot, supported by ”otr& gente popular, 
..•apellidando con grandes voces ’iLibertad IWhen the 
mob increased in size/ nvolvieron con mayor furia a la casa 
del Marques, apellidando * JLibertad y resistenciaV’’* arid, 
after more demonstrations punctuated by cries of niLibertadiH 
the instigators got their way, and Perez was removed from the 
Inquisition prison (subject to Royal justice) to the civil 
prison (subjectrto Aragonese justice, and thus favourable to 
Perez, himself Aragonese), accompanied by Hel vulgo^ con 
muestras de alegriaytalsosiego como sino hubiera pasado
^Historia de Felipe 11°, Key de Esparia, (Madrid, 18??), •
Vo1. Ill,- capitulo adicional. This record of the Perez • 
affair was not published with the original Historia, but 
is; reproduced from a manuscript in the Real Academia de 
Historia, Madrid, attributed to Cabrera, entitled Istoria 
de Cabrera MS parte,2., "r k ''
V . 2Ibid. , p. 551. ••• ■' ■ ■
' • ..?.n>id. ,,p. :551. ?
... • ■) „
el albor^oto, pareciendoles quedaban con aquello salvas sue . 
inertia : ' ?'<<■ •? ''
The liberties being defended by the Aragonese in 
this case concern the privileges of the nobles, the autonomy ' 
of the Aragonese legal and judicial system^ and other checks 
to the power of the Castilian Grown which the latter had 
been trying to’eradicate for at least a century*^ The liberty 
involved,'then, is 03? the legal kind, not-the natural or ■ 
moral liberty which the theorists regard as the most important, 
kind, and when Cabrera describes another riot, saying hestando' 
ya .hecha senora la que su indiscrecion llamaba libertad< ...n, 
he seems to illustrate the kind of phenomenon to which Fajardo 
refers; Certainly Philip IX recognised the problem, .and took 
steps to prevent its re-occurrence in the new charter of 1592, 
one of whose acts, entitled ”De la-pena de los sedicicsos,?’ .5
368 - ;< ;
El apellidar libertad.en este Reynoy incitar a 
aue se hissiesse, sin poder,, ni dever hazerlo, ha
•’ traydo muchos inconvenientes.«.. Deseando su
Shia., p . .554. , . '' .
J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain •1469-I7'i6'« (Pelican. 1970). 
and other-historical accounts of the situation*<
°The Diccionario de Autoridadee notes that the word apellidar 
was, in Aragon, a judicial term, meaning !,invocar ?el favor del 
Juez en un pedimento,” and describes it as a ”Voz curia! anti- 
gua de Aragon.” ; ■
7Ibid., p. 569 -
Majestad evitar esto, •estatuye y ordena, que 
qualquiera persona, de qualquier dignidad, estado,
o condicion que sea, que apellidare libertad, 6 , = .
induziere a otros, que la apelliden, aunque del 
averlo hecho no se siga otro efeeto; puedan.ser 
castiga.dos, condenados hasta en pena de muerte 
natural inclusivamente, a arbitrio del juez/®
, .'- 369 ■
yuerog y Actos de Corto.'del Heyno de Aragon,: Hechos en 
las cortes por la/catholica y r ea1 Majest ad'd el Key Don ' 
Phelipe huestro Senori.celebrsdos en la ciudad de Tarazona 
•1 ano MDXCII/ (Zaragoza, 166?).
Appendix ^1
The moat important of these documents, because they 
were the result of the deliberations of theologians and poli­
ticians trying to set standards, were the Leyes de Burgos 
(1513) and the Leyes Nueves (15^2), although there were hun­
dreds of others J The group convened in December 1512, led 
by some Dominicans under Alonso de Montesinos, devised the 
Leyes de Burgos which were promulgated at Valladolid on
23 rd February, 1513, aa ”Las Ordenanzas parael tratamiento 
de los Indios,” and whose designed effects may be summarised
as follows: / ... ' •/' ..." . • ‘
ley la*): giving the Indians property rights; t
; ley 2a * ) : safeguarding them from injury when being T 
• '■ .• i/'Y'. transported; \ ■' * '"?> ’
leyes 3a.-10a., 12, 16, 17): offering them the theory 
and practice of. Homan Catholicism; :
ley 11a. ): protecting them from being overloaded with 
.■ ; baskets, etc• ; \‘ , '
" v• Coleccion de,Documentos para la Hiatoria de la Formacion
Social de Hispano-America, 1^93-1810, compiled by Richard
Konetake, ^Madrid CCSIC3,>1953)* ‘ >
ley 12, W): allowing them rest after a seasonin '.--the /’.'••
\ —<:/''mines> as weir.as on Sundays and fiestas;. ; ’
ley 1$): ensuring that -they be properly fed;
ley l8j: protecting pregnantwomen andyoung mothers?
’ ley 19, 20): provision of decent bedding and clothing; r 
ley 24): the forbiddingyof corporal punishment,or ;
verbal insult against; the Indians. /
The remaining laws dealt with sundry administrative problems.;
In the second paragraph of the Leyes Musyas, issued a
in Barcelona on 20th November, 1542, there is presented the
following statement which explains the relevance of these laws
X porque nuestro principal intento y voluntad siempre 
, ha sido y es la conservation y aumentd de los indios - 
< ’ y que sean instruidos y ensenados en las; cosas de ' <
huestra santa fe catolica y bien tratadds como per- \.
; . sonas libres y yvasallos nuestros como; lo son» encar-
games y mandamos a los del dicho nuestro Consejo 
tengan siempre muy gran atencion yespecial cuidado?. . 
sobre todo de la conservacion ybuen gobierno delos
•" dichos indios. • _ ■/- . f'5‘;'‘< •- \
The third paragraph reiterates the point: . ...
’ Item, ordenamos y mandamos que de aqui adelante por 
; hinguna causa ... no se pueda hacer esclavo indlo ;
alguno y queremossean tratados como vasallos nuestros 
•• ’ de la corona de Castilla, pues lo son.. y'7
• Among the other Reales;Cedulas sent during the; 16th
century were examples such as these: "Real. Cedula para que los
v. Konetske, op. cit., Vol. .1., Doc.A25* ; .
3Ibid., Doc. 144.
indios no se echen en las mlnas” (Granada^ pec.8, 1526).V 
’’Real provision sobre la libertad de los indios” (Toledo, ? 
Dec. 1,1525).5 . r-t\.
’’Real Cedula quelos indiosnaturales cqeo personas libres 
sirvan y vivan con quien quisieren” (Madrid, Nov; 8, 1539)* 
’’Real Provision para que loa indios vivan donde quisieran, \ 
y se puedan pasar de unos pueblos a otros” (Valladolid,5 Feb* 15 
1544).7 ' ••••• '■ • ... . . /' ■ ■.
’’Real Cedula para que los indios tengan libertad para hacer 
de si lo que quieieren” (Madrid, Nov. 11, 1566).® .
’’Real Cedula para que los indios de la Nueya Espana no reciban 
agravio©” (Tomar, May 1> 15&1)«^ • ,
and' so. on. ' ■'' , -•;> . • ,? • . • ' • ’ •. • *’ 7
• From these laws and letters we may infer the Crown’s
acknowledgement of the necessity, to a free man, of propitious 
external,circumstances, in both the general sense (partially 
alleviating life’s misery), and the particular sense (safe­
guarding specific areas of choice)* '
*Ibid., Doc. 48, .. ?
5Ibid., Doc. 39. ;
-Ibid., Doc. 119.
7Ibid., Doc, 149. . .
' 8Ibid., Doc. 288, . . . .
?Ibid., Doc. 399. .. ‘
z;\Xx <xY/> x \ X X M.XXr' ?>:•.; • < -;x - x;
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It is difficult to arrive at an unequivocal defini 
tion of the Spanish coneeption qf libertad de conciencia; , 
its meaning depends on the userfs meaning of libertad and of 
conciencia, as well as on his impression of it as derived 
from information concerning its practice* For Saavedra \ , X 
Fajardo it means the permitting of differing religions and 
beliefs in the state, giving rise to disunity among the . . •
people, <!de donde naceran las sediciones y conapiraciones, 
y dellas las inudanzas de republicas y dominios,”1 so that \ 
ultimately ”la ruina del Estado ee la libertad.de conciencia 
;♦«luego que entro en loe raises Bajosla diversidadde / 
religiones, faltaron a la obediencia de su Principe natural. 
The nub of the problem in the political context is, that if 
civil law is binding in the conscience for raison d*etat as 
well as for theological reasons, and if the body politic is
MP Principe Politico Christiano, Empresa XXIV, 
para, •I.-/; X "? <■ _-X' " • ' ' • "-X " .
^Ibid., Empress LX, para. .4. X .. . . .
■ 3'X'’-XXx>X ” •' XX:./.. •
cf. Suarez on the matter:>ngubernatlo sine potestate 
cogendi ineffieax est, & facile contemnitur: coactio autem 
sine potestate obligandi in conscientia, vel est moraliter 
impossibilis, quia coactio iusta supposit culpam, quod est
governed according to the principles of law as stated in ; : ;
Church doctrine, then the privilege of the conciencia to 
choose which framework of laws it will accept means that it y \ 
is able to choose which laws it will obey? thelikelyreault- 
is that, if law is no longer able to bind in” conscience, or > • 
to bind everyone in conscience, civil disobedience will ensue.
That much is implicit in the events related in a letter
written in 1623 by Andres de Almansa y Mendoza, a noble at the
Spanish court, who relates: •; a \
Los catolicoe del reino de Irlanda dieron memorial \" 
y a su Majestad, suplicando que,/pues, por ensalzar ;
la fe y bien de los catolicos de loa reinoe de Oran
; Bretana, se tratase el caaamiento de la Sereniaima ';;'y
infanta Maria con el principe de Inglaterra;.V I V . '
una de las principalea mercedes que se lea habian < 
de hacer, era capitular que en el reino de Irlanda j :;
y se dieae libertad de conciencia, y que todos los-que ; ; 
estaban ausentes de aquel reino por su fe y parciali- 
dad espanola, se les volviesen sus haciendas y fueaen^ <
... dado a por buenos y lealea vaaalloa. [My under lining “j • */
The aupplicanta, then, are affirming that libertad de conciencia 
will not bring about any kind of disloyalty on their part.
Another danger of libertad de conciencia concern a ; /.
some of the philoaophical problems already noted in connection
yalde probabile, ut rnagis declarabiturin seq.Jlr-tractando de 
lege poenali, vei certe; eat valde inaufficiena, quia per earn 
non posset in muItis caeihuenecessarija aufficienter reipub- 
licae subvenire.” De Legibue, Liber XII, Caput-XXI,- para. 8.
^Noyedades de estaCortey avisos recibidoa de otraa partes,
1621-1&26, (Madrid, 1&565, letter dated March 12, 1623.
.?'r; ~ 375-;~: , • /X:•' -'• ••/-'• : .'"r-
with natural liberty, and in fact concerns man’s very soul ; 
and chance of salvation< Hivadeneyra makes the point; nla:<■; 
libertad de creer lo que un hombre quiere es muy perjudicial 
y danosa, porque es libertad para errar, y errar en una coea 
peligrosisimaj porque, como la fe verdadera no puede her sino 
una, como dljimos, todo lo que discrepa y deevia della es 
engano, ceguedad y error,” Regardingthat, we are again - 
confronted with the problem of knowledge, knowledge which is 
essential for the proper use of natural liberty, the develop- 
menV of prudence, and the acquisition of the habit of virtue , 
(the approach to moral liberty). Choosing the wrong faith 
means jeopardising the possibility of grasping reason and > 
truth, and hence denying one’s natural liberty and, ultimately 
one’s chance of salvation. Thus Covarrubias’ dictionary (1674 
edition) defines the concept in this way; ’’ta libertad que ?/ 
buscan los Heriges de nuestros tiempos, y llaman libertad de 
conciencia, es servidumbre del alma, y- licencia; ”
Thera were, as I have said, other meanings attached 
to libertad de conciencia - Barrionuevo, for example, uses it 
in reference to the freedom to preach the religion of one’s
; ^Tratado de la Religion, Libro I, Cap. 18, pp» 114-5.
, Ti under heading LIBEHTAD. Thia entry re. libertad d« 
conciencia does not appear in the 1&11 edition.
S . - JJ76. - f
choicer hut the above-mentioned threats to social and
spiritual disorder are,seen to, be the main dangers of the 
principle, dangers whose reality was very strongly reinforced 
by contemporary event® in other European countries, Libertad 
de conciencia serves as a good example of a liberty which is 
false, a denial of liberty, therefore ~ ’’servidumbre del alma.
; HE1 pregon que se ha dado de la libertad de conciencia es 
singular* Dice mucho en x^ocas palabras. Todo Christiano , 
puede libremente.predicar el Evangelio como lo dictare su 
conciencia, sin que por esto caiga en pena alguna, y con todo 
eso se dice que hasta agora nadle se ha declarado, temiendo,7^ 
sea estratagemaJ’ .D. Jeronimo Barrlonuevo de Peralta* Los 
Avisos de Barrionuevo, ;^Escritores Castellanos,nvoIs. XCV, ; 
XCVI, XCVII, Tomo II, (Madrid, 1892), Aviso dated Kay 15, 1655 
referring to: events in Cromwell’s England.
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